Federal Court of Australia

AJP18 v Minister For Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1793

Appeal from:

AJP18 & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 2424

File number:

VID 1022 of 2019

Judgment of:

ANASTASSIOU J

Date of judgment:

16 December 2020

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Courtwhether Circuit Court erred whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred – unspecified and unparticularised grounds of appeal – no error – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYYL and Another [2012] FCAFC 147

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Prathapan [1998] FCA 955; 86 FCR 95

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 [2004] HCA 18; 222 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yasouie [2001] FCA 1133; 116 FCR 7

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

25

Date of hearing:

27 February 2020

Counsel for the Appellants:

The Appellants appeared in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr C. Hibbard

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Sparke Helmore Lawyers

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice and did not appear

ORDERS

VID 1022 of 2019

BETWEEN:

AJP18

First Appellant

AJQ18

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

ANASTASSIOU J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 December 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal is dismissed.

2.    The Appellants pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $3,000.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANASTASSIOU J:

1    The Appellants are citizens of Malaysia who applied for protection visas. Their applications were refused by the First Respondent’s delegate (the Minister) on 21 September 2016 on the grounds that the Appellants are not persons to whom Australia owes protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 2 January 2018, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed that decision, and on 30 August 2019, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for judicial review of that decision: AJP18 & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 2424. The Appellants appeal the decision of the Circuit Court.

2    On 19 September 2019, the Appellants filed an Application for Leave to Appeal and an accompanying affidavit in this Court. The Application contained two grounds:

1.     I think the reasons were unfair.

2.    The judge said that I did not need full protection from my own country but when it’s come to my life, I required a guaranty of protection from my home country. Otherwise I refuse to go back to my country.

[errors in original]

3    It is unnecessary to say anything further concerning the Application for leave, as the Notice of Appeal was lodged within time and accordingly the Appellants do not require leave to appeal.

4    On 19 September 2019, the Appellants also filed a draft Notice of Appeal containing two grounds:

1.    The decision has a judicial error.

2.    The decision was incorrect because the Administrative Appeals Tribunal member uses incorrect information in the judgment and was bias against me.

[errors in original]

5    I will treat grounds 1 and 2 of the Application for Leave to Appeal as grounds in the appeal, together with the two grounds (3 and 4) contained in the Notice of Appeal.

6    The Appellants were required to file submissions by 13 February 2020 but failed to do so. They appeared unrepresented at the hearing of the appeal on 27 February 2020, though assisted by an interpreter.

7    At the hearing, the Appellants made oral submissions which went to the merits of the decision of the Tribunal and Circuit Court. They went on to make a plea to stay in the country for a longer period of time, “maybe for three years”. I attempted to explain to the Appellants that the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to judicial review, and that the Court is not able to undertake a review of the merits of decisions made below, nor grant them an extension to their visas.

8    For the reasons below, the appeal is dismissed.

background

9    The Appellants claim to fear harm from loan sharks in Malaysia. They claim to have borrowed money from a loan shark to start an online business in Malaysia, but the business failed and they could not make repayments to the loan shark. They claim that the loan shark then began to harass them and so they fled to Australia. They say they cannot return to Malaysia because of corruption in the Malaysian police force. They claim there would be no safe place to relocate to within Malaysia as the loan shark has networks everywhere in Malaysia. They claim to fear that if they returned to Malaysia they would be harmed by the loan shark or his associates.

10    The Tribunal accepted that the Appellants were threatened by associates of a loan shark, and that they had a credible fear of harm if returned to Malaysia. The Tribunal considered the Appellants’ evidence, along with country information, but concluded that the Appellants could obtain effective protection from police and the judiciary if they returned to Malaysia.

11    The primary judge held there was no jurisdictional error and that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that effective protective measures were available to the Appellants throughout Malaysia. The primary judge also found that the Tribunal had not failed to consider the Appellants’ particular and personal circumstances relating to threats by loan sharks.

Ground 1 of the Application: The Reasons were unfair

12    Ground 1 of the Application is an unparticularised allegation of unfairness.

13    In the Circuit Court, the Appellants filed written submissions and were represented at the hearing by counsel.

14    The grounds of appeal before the Circuit Court were as follows:

1. The Tribunal failed to consider the Applicant’s claims in accordance with law in that it failed to consider an element of the test in s 5LA(1)(b) in determining whether the Applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the convention and thereby failed to exercise jurisdiction.

2. The Tribunal wrongly construed s 36(2B)(b) of the Act as being satisfied if the states police force and other state authorities offer effective protection without an inquiry into the particular circumstances that appertain to the non-citizen whose application for a visa is under consideration for the purpose of ascertaining whether the effect of the identified effective protection would be such that there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen (the Applicant) will suffer significant harm.

15    The primary judge considered the grounds of appeal and the Appellant’s submissions and set out the relevant law and legal principles in detail. As summarised in the Minister’s written submissions filed in this appeal, the primary judge:

(b) considered the appellants’ first ground, and:

(i) noted the Tribunal erred by implying that a denial of effective protection needed to be for a Convention reason, as opposed to any reason, but considered that that error did not affect the Tribunal’s reasoning about effective protection: [10]-[12];

(ii) noted the Minister’s concession that the Tribunal erred by considering “victims of loan sharks” as a particular social group, but found (as urged by the applicant) that such people could form a particular social group given they had in common owing money to loan sharks: [13]-[15];

(iii) noted a further error by the Tribunal by its finding that the Appellants could obtain effective protection from consumer associations, which appeared not to comply with the source of effective protection required under s 5LA of the Act, but found that error was not material: [16]-[17];

(iv) concluded in respect of effective protection that the Tribunal did not commit any error in considering effective protection, as it considered whether the Malaysian authorities were able and willing to provide effective protection as required under s 5LA of the Act: [18]-[24]; and

(c) considered the Appellants’ second ground, and concluded that the Tribunal did not commit any error in its application of s 36(2B)(b) of the Act: [25]-[33].

16    Although the primary judge identified errors in the Tribunal’s reasons referred to above, he determined that those errors were not material. In my opinion, the reasons of the primary judge do not disclose any jurisdictional error. There is no basis in the reasons of the primary judge to conclude that the Appellants have been subjected to any unfairness.

17    Accordingly, I reject ground of appeal 1.

Ground 2 of the Application: Guarantee of Protection

18    By ground 2 of the Application, the Appellants seek a guarantee they will be protected if they return to Malaysia. In effect the Appellants are asking this Court to engage in merits review of the Tribunal’s finding that effective protection is available to the Appellants. At [23] of the Circuit Court reasons, the primary judge states that “effective protection does not require a guarantee of protection”. Although the Appellants may disagree with this statement, it is a well-established principle of law: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 [2004] HCA 18; 222 CLR 1 at [28]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yasouie [2001] FCA 1133; 116 FCR 7 at [30]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Prathapan [1998] FCA 955; 86 FCR 95 at 104-105. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYYL [2012] FCAFC 147; 207 FCR 211, the Full Court (Lander, Jessup and Gordon JJ) held at [35]:

s 36(2B)(b) does not, in its terms or in its operation, require either the conclusion that it is inevitable that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm or the conclusion that it is certain that he or she will not. The express terms of the section require the Minister to be satisfied that, given the protection available to MZYYL in the receiving country, there would not be a real risk that he will suffer significant harm. There is nothing to suggest or warrant the imposition of some kind of guarantee of one or other outcome. And, indeed, such a guarantee is practically impossible.

(emphasis added)

19    For the above reasons, I reject ground of appeal 2.

Ground 1 (cumulatively Ground 3) of the Notice of Appeal: judicial error

20    Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal (cumulatively ground 3) is also an unspecified and unparticularised allegation of judicial error. The Appellants have not provided any particulars of the judicial error, rendering this ground incomprehensible. I reject ground of appeal 3.

Ground 2 (cumulatively Ground 4) of the Notice of Appeal

21    Ground two of the Notice of Appeal has two components. First, that the Tribunal Member used incorrect information and, second, that the Tribunal Member was biased.

22    In the absence of particulars of the alleged incorrect information, this ground is also incapable of being meaningfully understood. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal used incorrect information.

23    Further, in the absence of any particulars in relation to the allegation of bias on the part of the Tribunal Member, I consider this contention to be without any proper basis. In this regard I note the Appellants did not make any submissions at the hearing of this appeal concerning bias on the part of the Tribunal Member.

24    Accordingly, I reject ground of appeal 4.

disposition

25    The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding twenty-five (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anastassiou.

Associate:

Dated:    16 December 2020