FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thomas v University of Melbourne (No 4) [2019] FCA 1798

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the hearing of 1 February 2019 fixed in the sum of $3,000.

3.    The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the hearing of 1 February 2019 to be taxed or assessed in default of agreement.

4.    On or before 4.00 pm on 18 November 2019 the respondents may file and serve electronically any submissions they wish to make of no more than 5 pages in respect of the costs of the proceeding.

5.    On or before 4.00 pm on 2 December 2019 the applicant may file and serve electronically any submissions he wishes to make in response, of no more than 5 pages.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1.    The first respondent shall not be entitled to recover from the applicant more than the total sum of $3,000 across proceedings numbered VID 738 and VID 1407 of 2018 in respect of their costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The respondent’s costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019 be reserved.

3.    On or before 4.00 pm on 18 November 2019 the respondent may file and serve electronically any submissions it wishes to make of no more than 5 pages in respect of the costs of the proceeding.

4.    On or before 4.00 pm on 2 December 2019 the applicant may file and serve electronically any submissions he wishes to make in response, of no more than 5 pages.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The parties’ costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019 be reserved.

3.    On or before 4.00 pm on 18 November 2019 the respondents and the intervener may file and serve electronically any submissions they wish to make of no more than 5 pages in respect of the costs of the proceeding.

4.    On or before 4.00 pm on 2 December 2019 the applicant may file and serve electronically any submissions he wishes to make in response, of no more than 5 pages.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the hearing of 1 February 2019 fixed in the sum of $3,000.

3.    The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the hearing of 1 February 2019 to be taxed or assessed in default of agreement.

4.    On or before 4.00 pm on 18 November 2019 the respondents may file and serve electronically any submissions they wish to make of no more than 5 pages in respect of the costs of the proceeding.

5.    On or before 4.00 pm on 2 December 2019 the applicant may file and serve electronically any submissions he wishes to make in response, of no more than 5 pages.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1.    The first respondent shall not be entitled to recover from the applicant more than the total sum of $3,000 across proceedings numbered VID 738 and VID 1407 of 2018 in respect of the hearing on 1 February 2019.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHEELAHAN J:

Introduction

1    Mr Darron Thomas, who is self-represented, has commenced four proceedings in this Court. The proceedings concern a range of allegations that Mr Thomas has made in relation to the University of Melbourne, its staff, its agents, the Australian Human Rights Commission, and many other people, that stem from Mr Thomas’s unsuccessful candidature in a PhD program in the University’s Department of Finance within the Faculty of Business and Economics. The Court summarised the subject-matter of each of the proceedings in Thomas v University of Melbourne [2018] FCA 1978 at [6]-[28], and it is unnecessary to repeat that summary.

2    The Court listed interlocutory applications in the four proceedings for 1 February 2019. The hearing on that day was disrupted by the conduct of Mr Thomas, which led the Court to order that he be removed from the Court building. Mr Thomas made a number of statements to the Court, including that he refused to participate in proceedings before the Court, and that the Court did not have jurisdiction. I shall refer to those statements in more detail below. In light of Mr Thomas’s statements, on 8 February 2019 I made the following orders in Chambers in each of the four proceedings –

By 4.00pm on 8 March 2019 the applicant file and serve electronically any submissions he wishes to make addressing –

(a)    why this proceeding should not be dismissed having regard to the applicant’s statements in Court on 1 February 2019 concerning the jurisdiction of the Court, and his participation in the proceeding;

(b)    the further conduct of the proceeding; and

(c)    any application for costs made against him.

3    I also made directions for the respondents and the Commonwealth Attorney-General as intervener in proceeding VID 1222 of 2018 to respond in writing to any submissions of Mr Thomas.

Statements to the Court by Mr Thomas on 1 February 2019

4    Below, I identify the material statements that Mr Thomas made to the Court on 1 February 2019.

5    At the outset, before I took appearances, Mr Thomas stated –

I refuse to participate on the ground that there are menaces with unwarranted demands.

(T2/1-2)

6    I interpret the reference to “menaces” as including the Court, because Mr Thomas referred to being threatened by the “presiding judge” (T2/3), and identified the “unwarranted demands” as being –

… for me to prove that things have happened in court, that is, the lawyers acting on behalf of the respondents have failed to carry out their duties under the Australian Barristers and Solicitors Conduct Rules.

(T2/4-6)

7    This was an allusion to unfounded allegations that Mr Thomas had made against the legal practitioners acting for the respondents which had been the subject of an unsuccessful interlocutory application by Mr Thomas that several legal practitioners for the respondents be precluded from acting. On 14 December 2018, I dismissed that application on the grounds that it lacked an evidentiary foundation and there was no basis for the orders that Mr Thomas sought: Thomas v University of Melbourne (No 2) [2018] FCA 2024.

8    Mr Thomas then stated –

This judge has now committed a breach of jurisdiction. That’s a jurisdictional error. As such, any decisions you’ve made are subject to invalidity. This court is not invested with the power to determine its own jurisdiction. By that force, I am now calling for a breach of jurisdiction and for the supervisor court under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 to be called in to determine the jurisdiction of this court, and, again, I say the security guard present here is a menace. I will not participate as long as this menace is ..... over these proceedings.

(T2/18-24)

9    Mr Thomas demanded that the security officer who was in Court be removed. I then said to Mr Thomas that I proposed to proceed with the hearing, to which Mr Thomas responded –

You cannot proceed. You do not have jurisdiction. … You do not have jurisdiction to rule on any decision regarding mandamus, prohibition or an injunction against officers of this Federal Court. As such, you have breached your jurisdiction. I now ask this court to back down because the things it’s doing are invalid and prohibited, and that this court subjects itself to the supervisor court of Australia, being the High Court of Australia. …

(T2/31-38)

10    Mr Thomas continued, stating –

… Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights demands that I stand before an independent, competent and impartial court. From what I have seen to date, there is not such a court, and, as such, I refuse to participate in any proceedings, especially because all one, two, three, except Mr Rogers here so far, have participated in fraud. …

(T3/1-5)

11    I must emphasise that Mr Thomas’s attacks upon the legal practitioners for the respondents were without any foundation.

12    Mr Thomas then directed the following statements to the Court –

Your behaviour is unreasonable to the standard of what is valid. Your behaviour is unreasonable ...... Charge me with contempt of court. Bring the cuffs.

(T3/33-35)

13    I informed Mr Thomas that I would give him one opportunity to calm down, to which he responded –

No. I don’t need to calm down. You do not have jurisdiction. What statute gives you jurisdiction to rule on matters where there is a suit against the Commonwealth of Australia?

(T3/39-41)

14    At that point, I directed that Mr Thomas be removed from the Court building. After I made that direction, Mr Thomas stated to the Court –

… You have no right to proceed. None. Get out. You’re a criminal. I will not stand in front of criminals. [I omit here a very concerning statement] You’re not going to threaten me anymore. You’re not going to breach my rights anymore. You have no authority to make any decision. You’re a criminal. Now make your criminal decisions in my absence.

(T4/23-27)

15    Mr Thomas continued to address the Court as follows –

You do not have authority to proceed. They do not have authority to represent here. You are all criminals. Criminals protecting criminals. My subpoenas for the lawyers to appear, because there is evidence that they committed fraud. It’s on their letterhead with their signature. You barred that evidence at the last proceeding. You’re fragmenting proceedings. You’re doing everything against the rules. You’re a criminal. All criminals. …

(T4/28-34)

16    As I stated in Thomas v University of Melbourne (No 3) [2019] FCA 92 at [21], the Court has retained an audio recording of the hearing on 1 February 2019. The transcript does not convey the full intensity and ferocity of Mr Thomas’s presentation. Mr Thomas used vicious and violent language in a manner that was truly intimidating, and I considered that his behaviour afforded grounds for others present in and around the courtroom to feel unsettled, and to be apprehensive. For these reasons, I decided that, unless and until the Court determined otherwise, interlocutory applications would be conducted on the papers, and I made the orders to which I have referred at [2] and [3] above.

The parties’ submissions

The submissions of Mr Thomas

17    Mr Thomas lodged an eight page, single-spaced, typed submission dated 22 February 2019. The submission was accepted for filing on 26 March 2019. Mr Thomas’s submission does not speak to the issues that he was given the opportunity to address. The submission makes a number of wide-ranging complaints about the Court, including that the Court “ignored the Rule of Law and/or their initial jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and/or s.144 of the Evidence Act 1995 …”. The submission addresses authorities concerning the Court’s obligation to afford parties, including self-represented litigants, procedural fairness. The submission then accuses the Court of racial discrimination, perversion of the course of justice, contraventions of s 42 and s 43 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), contraventions of s 139.2 and s 142.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) in the context of (inter alia) the Court’s refusal to accept a number of Mr Thomas’s documents for filing, and alleges contraventions by the Court of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Mr Thomas concludes his submission as follows –

The current state of disregard for the FCR, the rule of law in general, and various specific laws, including, but not limited to, s.36A, s.37, s.42 and s.43 of the Crimes Act 1914; s.139.2, s.142.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, suggest that we are operating in “the Wild Wild West.” Of course, in 2018 in an OECD country there is no room for the Wild Wild West, especially if the Court is the hub of the Wild Wild West.

I call on senior officers of the Court to take the Court out of the disrepute into which it has been brought in dealing with files VID738/2018, VID950/2018 and VID1222/2018.

The submissions of the University

18    The University filed submissions in the proceedings to which it is a party, namely VID 738, VID 950, and VID 1407 of 2018. In relation to the costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019, the University seeks its costs, to be fixed in a lump sum of $3,000.

19    As to the future conduct of the proceedings, the University submits that Mr Thomas’s submissions do not address the matters set out in the orders made 8 February 2019, and that accordingly the Court was left with the understanding that Mr Thomas did not wish to move on any of his interlocutory applications that he has filed with the Court, and that he otherwise does not wish to pursue the proceedings. The University submits that Mr Thomas has not resiled from his statements made in Court, and that despite the opportunity to withdraw or qualify the statements, he has not done so. The University submits that the applicant’s submissions instead criticise the Court and its officers and raise various grievances in relation to the Court’s processes and procedures, and that this was consistent with Mr Thomas’s approach to the proceedings to date which has been to attempt to agitate matters that are irrelevant or collateral to the proceedings. The University submits that the history of Mr Thomas’s conduct of the proceedings supports the drawing of an inference that Mr Thomas has brought and continued the proceedings for the purpose of harassing or annoying, or causing delay or detriment to the respondents or for another wrongful purpose. The University submits that Mr Thomas’s maintenance of the proceedings in the Court in circumstances where he asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine his claims, and where he refuses to participate in the proceedings and does not wish to pursue the proceedings, is vexatious, and an abuse of process. The University submits that accordingly, the maintenance of the proceedings is untenable, and that they have no reasonable prospect of success. The University submits that the proceedings should therefore be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

The submissions of the Australian Human Rights Commission

20    The Australian Human Rights Commission is a respondent to VID 738, VID 1222, and VID 1407 of 2018. The Commission seeks its costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019 in VID 738 of 2018 and VID 1407 of 2018. A number of interlocutory applications filed in those proceedings had been listed and the Commission submits that costs incurred in connection with preparing for and appearing on those applications were thrown away. The Commission and the other respondents in proceeding VID 1222 of 2018 submitted that the costs in that proceeding should be reserved, because the Court was able to deal with the only interlocutory application listed in that proceeding by ordering that the Commonwealth Attorney-General be given leave to intervene.

21    In relation to proceedings VID 738 and VID 1407 of 2018 generally, the Commission submits that Mr Thomas has not withdrawn or otherwise resiled from the objections that he made to the Court’s jurisdiction during the hearing on 1 February 2019. The Commission submits that Mr Thomas has failed to engage with the matters which he was given leave to address, and that he has provided no reasons why proceedings VID 738 and VID 1407 of 2018 should not be dismissed.

The submissions of the Commonwealth Attorney-General

22    In relation to VID 1222 of 2018, the respondents to that proceeding were given leave on 12 February 2019 to file submitting appearances, and they have done so. The Commonwealth Attorney-General, who has intervened, has submitted that nothing in Mr Thomas’s submissions ought to persuade the Court that the proceeding should not be dismissed. The Attorney-General submits that, amongst other things, the applicant’s submissions allege that the Court is acting in breach of the rule of law, and in collusion with the respondents. The Attorney-General submits that in short, Mr Thomas’s submissions do little more than repeat his attack on the authority and reputation of the Court, and do not advance any reason as to why the proceeding should not be dismissed having regard to the applicant’s statements to the Court on 1 February 2019 and his participation in the proceeding. Accordingly, the Attorney-General submits that the application in proceeding VID 1222 of 2018 should be dismissed.

Consideration

Costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019

23    The hearing on 1 February 2019 was rendered largely futile as a result of Mr Thomas’s extreme conduct. In his written submissions Mr Thomas advanced no reason why he should not pay the University’s and the Commission’s costs of the hearing.

24    The University assessed its costs as $3,727.80 comprising counsel’s fees for half a day, three and a half hours of a solicitor’s time for attendance and instructing at the hearing, and for the cost of transcript. Paragraph 4.1 of the Court’s Practice Note GPN-Costs provides that it is the Court’s preference to make a lump sum order for costs when it is practicable and appropriate to do so. The University sought a lump sum order in the amount of $3,000. Mr Thomas advanced no challenge to this amount, and I consider the claim to be reasonable.

25    Proceeding VID 950 of 2018 has been brought against the University under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Sub-section s 570(1) of the Fair Work Act applies so as to restrict the circumstances in which an order for costs can be made in a proceeding relating to a matter arising under the Act. One of those circumstances, which is relied on by the University, is the subject of s 570(2)(b) –

the court is satisfied that the party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other party to incur the costs;

26    While the University’s costs of the hearing were wasted, I entertain some doubt as to whether any act or omission of Mr Thomas caused the University to incur the costs which the University claims in respect of the hearing on 1 February 2019. Arguably, the costs were incurred by the University whether or not the conduct of Mr Thomas rendered the hearing futile. I have not heard argument from the parties on this point, and I refrain from expressing any concluded view. I will therefore reserve the University’s costs in proceeding VID 950 of 2018 for later consideration. However, I will make an order that Mr Thomas pay the University’s costs of the hearing on 1 February 2019 in proceedings VID 738 of 2018 and VID 1407 of 2018, which I will fix in the sum of $3,000. I will note in the orders that in relation to those costs, the University shall not be entitled to recover from Mr Thomas more than the total sum of $3,000 so as to make explicit that there should not be double-recovery.

27    The Commission did not seek a lump sum for its costs of the interlocutory hearing on 1 February 2019 in VID 738 and VID 1407 of 2018, so I will order that Mr Thomas pay the Commission’s costs in an amount to be assessed.

Should the proceedings be dismissed?

28    Mr Thomas’s conduct on 1 February 2019 is capable of being characterised as a contempt in the face of the Court. Mr Thomas has done nothing to retract or qualify the vicious, violently expressive, and intimidating statements that he made to the Court. By those statements Mr Thomas attacked the integrity and authority of the Court, and made baseless and unwarranted attacks on the legal practitioners for the respondents. If anything, Mr Thomas’s written submissions dated 22 February 2019 perpetuate and enlarge his attacks upon the Court.

29    The attacks on the Court appear in part to be Mr Thomas’s response to the Court’s dismissal of two interlocutory applications: Thomas v University of Melbourne [2018] FCA 1978; Thomas v University of Melbourne (No 2) [2018] FCA 2024. The attacks are also to be considered in the context of the Court’s rejection of a number of documents that Mr Thomas has sought to file with the Registry. Most of the documents that Mr Thomas has sought to file are prolix. Many of them contain unsupported allegations of a scandalous nature against the parties, their legal practitioners, a number of non-parties, the Court, and its officers. Some of the documents contain allegations of conspiracy, fraud, dishonesty, breaches of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), and the Criminal Code (Cth). Allegations of this type are not confined to documents that have been rejected. Some of the documents that Mr Thomas has succeeded in filing are littered with words that are calculated to impute fraud, conspiracy, wilful misconduct, and criminal conduct. These words exist amongst a maze of logorrheic allegations and claims by Mr Thomas in various documents across the four proceedings that are on a scale which no court should have to attempt to untangle and decipher.

30    By way of illustration, the documents that have been rejected include an interlocutory application dated 24 January 2019 in VID 950 of 2018 which names 49 respondents, most of whom are not respondents to the four proceedings that Mr Thomas has commenced. The respondents to the rejected interlocutory application include the Fair Work Ombudsman, Mr Thomas’s former lawyers, the Victorian Legal Services Board, and legal practitioners acting for the respondents. Most of the 49 named respondents are individuals. The orders that were sought in the rejected interlocutory application were expansive –

Leave to Issue Subpoenas to witnesses or persons complicit in fraud:

1.    An order for leave to issue subpoenas.

2.    Interlocutory order for mandamus, prohibition or an injunction against the Federal Court of Australia under s 46PO or s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act; s 38 of the Judiciary Act 1903; or s 75 of the Commonwealth Constitution; and/or s 21 through 24 of the Federal Court Act 1976 to recuse the Federal Court of Australia and/or Judges of the Federal Court of Australia, and any other related parties employed/affiliated with University of Melbourne (or any other Respondents), from taking on administrative decisions/judicial roles in these or any related proceedings, where those acts/omissions, past, present or future were/are the use of the rules as an instrument of tyranny, unreasonable, illogical, oppressive, in breach of procedural fairness, or otherwise in excess of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia.

31    Other rejected documents include separate interlocutory applications dated 9, 17, and 22 January 2019 that subpoenas issue to at least 39 persons to give evidence and produce documents at the interlocutory hearings that were fixed for 1 February 2019. Those hearings were described in one of the rejected applications as “fraud hearings”. The named persons included: solicitors and counsel for the respondents; Mr Thomas’s former lawyers; the Law Institute of Victoria; the Victorian Legal Services Board; and the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner.

32    On 29 October 2018, Mr Thomas was unsuccessful in judicial review proceedings that he commenced in the Supreme Court of Victoria in relation to a decision by the Legal Services Commissioner to close a complaint that Mr Thomas had made about his former lawyers: Thomas v Victorian Legal Services Board and Commissioner [2018] VSC 645. The complaint was closed under s 277(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (Victoria), which authorises a complaint to be closed after a preliminary assessment if it is vexatious, misconceived, frivolous, or lacking in substance. I infer that, amongst other collateral purposes, Mr Thomas intends in these proceedings to attempt to agitate further his grievances against the Legal Services Commissioner, the Legal Services Board, and his former lawyers.

33    It is important to emphasise that the documents to which I have referred are only examples of various prolix documents of Mr Thomas that the Court has rejected.

34    In Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29 at [10] the Full Court (Gyles, Stone and Buchanan JJ) said the following, which is apposite to these proceedings –

The liberty which the Court frequently extends to unrepresented litigants was systematically abused by Ms Bahonko in the present case. She seems unwilling to respect reasonable standards of conduct in the material which she appears to feel she may place before the Court as a matter of right. The processes of the Court and the Court itself are brought into disrespect if unreasonable relaxation of ordinary standards is extended to litigants in person simply for the reason that they are without legal assistance. There is no basis to think that the rights of any litigant in person are infringed or diminished by the steady insistence that proceedings in this Court are not be used as a means of sullying the reputation of other parties to the proceedings or third parties who are not directly involved in the proceedings at all. Ms Bahonko, by her conduct, breached the necessary standards in a systematic and apparently intentional way.

35    So too are the observations of Ipp JA and Brownie A-JA in Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741 at [24] in relation to the conduct of hearings –

The proper conduct of hearings in the courtroom depends largely on all participants in the proceedings observing certain conventions. These conventions are substantially based on reasonable control over feelings, and respect for others and the judicial institution itself. The courtroom is a place where, not infrequently, the atmosphere becomes intense, emotions become inflamed, and patience wears thin. Sometimes things are said which may be regretted later. Nowadays, virtually all judges adopt a robust attitude to behaviour of this kind. There is a strong reluctance to resort to the remedy of contempt of court to restrain those who in the heat of litigation say things that are rude or insulting or disparaging to the presiding judicial officer. But there comes a time when it is no longer appropriate for judges to be impervious to improper behaviour by litigants, particularly those who make false allegations, are consistently rude, provocative, aggressive and obstructive, and who refuse to accept the decisions of the court. Care must be taken to preserve a proper degree of restraint, decorum and respect in the courtroom, otherwise the quality of justice will degenerate and administration of justice will be harmed. Eventually, steps must be taken to ensure that the time of the court and other parties is not wasted, and unnecessary costs are not incurred in futile litigation launched by obsessive and obdurate litigants.

36    The Court has implied power to protect its own processes: Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612. The implied power is confirmed by the Court’s power under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act to make orders of such kinds as it considers appropriate. In Cocker v Tempest (1841) 7 M & W 502 at 503-4; 151 ER 864 at 865 Alderson B described the power as follows –

The power of each Court over its own process is unlimited; it is a power incident to all Courts, inferior as well as superior; were it not so, the Court would be obliged to sit still and see its own process abused for the purpose of injustice. The exercise of the power is certainly a matter for the most careful discretion; and where there are conflicting statements of facts, I agree that it is in general much better not to try the question between the parties on affidavit. The power must be used equitably; but if it be made out that the process of the Court is used against good faith, the Court ought to interfere to prevent it, for the purpose of administering justice.

37    The observations of Alderson B have been cited many times: see, for example, Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 at p 638 (Gaudron J); von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd [2005] QCA 109; 1 Qd R 681 at [14] (Keane JA); Manolakis v Director of Public Prosecutions (2009) 108 SASR 451 at [15] (Gray J); Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 299; 306 ALR 256 at [116] (Whelan JA).

38    Mr Thomas’s statements in Court on 1 February 2019 together with his written submissions dated 22 February 2019 are extremely serious and concerning. They are manifestations of an entrenched pattern of querulous behaviour. I have a high degree of confidence that while these proceedings remain on foot, Mr Thomas will continue systematically to attempt to abuse the processes of the Court, to reject the authority of the Court, to attempt to file prolix documents, to make scurrilous allegations, and to attempt to use the proceedings to vex the respondents, and other persons such as their legal representatives, his former lawyers, and the Legal Services Commissioner, who are not parties to the proceedings. In these circumstances, the Court has a responsibility to protect its processes, and to address the improper hindrance of its ability to make its resources available to other litigants. In relation to this latter consideration, see Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88 at [15] (Lord Phillips MR) and Attorney-General v Ebert [2002] 2 All ER 789 at [35]-[36] (Brooke LJ).

39    The power to dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process should not be exercised lightly. However, in the extraordinary circumstances of these proceedings, the considered response of the Court is that it should protect its integrity, its authority, its processes, and its resources, by making orders that the four proceedings be dismissed.

40    I shall make directions for written submissions on the question of the costs of the proceedings.

Associate:

Dated:    4 November 2019

SCHEDULES OF PARTIES