FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mitolo Wines Aust Pty Ltd v Vito Mitolo & Son Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 1140

File number:

SAD 340 of 2016

Judge:

BESANKO J

Date of judgment:

25 July 2019

Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS — where the applicants seek declarations and injunctions with respect to trade mark infringement — whether an injunction granted pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) can and should be expressed in terms of the applicants’ statutory monopoly or in terms of the particular conduct found to be infringing conduct — where the applicants also seek an order with respect to their applications for registration of other marks

CONSUMER LAW — where the applicants seek declarations and injunctions with respect to contraventions of ss 18 and 29(1)(h) of the Australian Consumer Law — whether an injunction granted pursuant to s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law should be expressed in terms of the conduct giving rise to the contravention — where the applicants also seek delivery up pursuant to the Court’s general powers and pursuant to s 238 and s 243(d) of the Australian Consumer Law, or removal of the infringing words — whether the Court should make an order for delivery up when the order will result in the delivery up of valuable commercial property

COSTS where the applicants seek an order with respect to costs — whether the respondents should be ordered to pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the trial

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) ss 18, 29, 232, 238, 243

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 126

Cases cited:

Christian v Société Des Produits Nestlé SA (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 153; (2015) 327 ALR 630

Coflexip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd [2001] RPC 9

Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1970) 122 CLR 25

Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v MWA Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 180 CLR 160

Interflora Inc v Marks and Spencers plc (No 2) [2014] FSR 3

Interlego AG v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461

Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Limited (2001) 205 CLR 1

Mitolo Wines Aust Pty Ltd v Vito Mitolo & Son Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 902

Playgro Pty Ltd v Playgo Art & Craft Manufactory Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 478

Roussel Uclaf v Pan Laboratories Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 316

Solarhart Industries Pty Ltd v Solar Shop Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 780; (2011) 282 ALR 43

Streetworx Pty Ltd v Artcraft Urban Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 140; (2015) 322 ALR 557

Sun Microsystems Inc v Airtech Computer Corp Ltd [2006] FSR 35

Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588

Date of hearing:

18 July 2019

Date of last submissions:

23 July 2019

Registry:

South Australia

Division:

General Division

National Practice Area:

Intellectual Property

Sub-area:

Trade Marks

Number of paragraphs:

30

Counsel for the Applicants:

Mr P Bullock

Solicitor for the Applicants:

Minicozzi Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr M Murphy

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Georgiadis Lawyers

ORDERS

SAD 340 of 2016

BETWEEN:

MITOLO WINES AUST PTY LTD (ACN 089 233 312) AS TRUSTEE OF THE MITOLO WINE TRUST

First Applicant

MITOLO WINES PTY LTD (ACN 112 011 560)

Second Applicant

AND:

VITO MITOLO & SON PTY LTD (ACN 166 447 605)

First Respondent

VITO MITOLO

Second Respondent

ANTHONY MITOLO

Third Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

VITO MITOLO & SON PTY LTD (ACN 166 447 605) (and another named in the Schedule)

First Cross-Claimant

AND:

MITOLO WINES AUST PTY LTD (ACN 089 233 312) AS TRUSTEE OF THE MITOLO WINE TRUST (and another named in the Schedule)

First Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

BESANKO J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2019

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.    By the use of the words:

1.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

1.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

1.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

1.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

and whether or not in conjunction with use of another prominent word, the first respondent has infringed trademark number 801717 of the first applicant registered in Class 33 in respect of the goods “wine”.

2.    By the use of the words:

2.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

2.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

2.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

2.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

and whether or not in conjunction with use of another prominent word, the first respondent has contravened s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.

3.    By the use of the words:

3.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

3.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

3.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

3.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

and whether or not in conjunction with use of another prominent word, the first respondent has contravened s 29(1)(h) of the Australian Consumer Law.

4.    The second and third respondents are persons involved in the first respondent’s contravention of s 18 and s 29(1)(h) of the Australian Consumer Law set out in declarations 2 and 3 above.

5.    By offering for sale red wine:

5.1    bearing the McLaren Vale geographic indication;

5.2    from a location very near to the applicants’ cellar door; and

5.3    utilising the name “V. Mitolo and Son” or “V. Mitolo & Son”

the first respondent has passed off its wine as the applicants’ wine, or otherwise associated with the applicants’ wine.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

6.    Pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents and the second and third respondents and each of them are restrained from infringing the first applicant’s registered trade mark number 801717 for the word “MITOLO”.

7.    Pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, is restrained from advertising, marketing, promoting, exhibiting in public, offering for sale and selling wine in Australia using the words:

7.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

7.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

7.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

7.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

8.    Pursuant to s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law, the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, and the second and third respondents and each of them, are restrained from advertising, marketing, promoting, exhibiting in public, offering for sale and selling wine or wine related merchandise in Australia using the words:

8.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

8.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

8.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

8.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

9.    The first respondent is restrained from offering for sale red wines:

 9.1    bearing the McLaren Vale geographic indication;

  9.2    from a location very near to the applicants’ cellar door; and

 9.3    using the name “V. Mitolo and Son” or “V. Mitolo & Son”

other than to the minimum extent necessary in order to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

10.    With respect to the following items:

10.1    all wine products (including bottles) in the first respondent’s possession, custody or power; and

10.2    all packaging, promotional material, advertisements, signage and other materials in any form, cartons, advertisements, whether electronic or in hardcopy;

and which use the words:

10.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

10.4.    V. Mitolo & Son;

10.5    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

10.6    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

other than:

10.7    “WAVEFORM” branded wine held by the first respondent in the United States of America at the date of this order for the purpose of sale in the United States; or

10.8    items meeting the description of sub-paragraph 10.1 above where the words referred to in sub-paragraphs 10.3 and 10.4 above are used to comply to the minimum extent necessary with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument

the first respondent is within 28 days to do either of the following:

10.9    deliver up the said items and verify on oath such delivery up within 35 days; or

10.10    remove the said words by obliterating them in such a manner as is irreversible and so that the removal of the said words is not apparent and to verify such action on oath within 35 days.

11.    The first applicant has liberty to apply for additional or amended orders in respect of its pending applications for the registration of the word MITOLO in relation to Classes 35, 41 and 43 and the words MITOLO WINES in relation to Classes 35 and 43 in the event that those applications result in the registration of those marks.

12.    The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the trial pursuant to order 4 made 16 May 2017 as varied by order 1 made 7 August 2018, to be taxed if not agreed.

13.    The respondents’ cross-claim be dismissed.

14.    On or before 9 August 2019 the applicants write to the respondents setting out the categories of discovery they propose as being relevant to the determination of any account of profits by the respondents.

15.    On or before 16 August 2019, the respondents write to the applicants identifying:

15.1    which, if any, of the applicants’ proposed categories of discovery are agreed and to make discovery of those categories within a further 21 days;

15.2    which, if any, of the applicants’ proposed categories of discovery are disputed and, in that case, why they are disputed.

16.    If some or all categories are not agreed, then on or before 30 August 2019 the applicants make such application for discovery as they may be advised.

17.    Any interlocutory application for discovery be listed for argument on a date to be fixed.

18.    On or before 11 October 2019 the applicants file and serve affidavits comprising any further evidence-in-chief upon which they seek to rely in relation to the question of an account of profits.

19.    On or before 25 October 2019 the respondents file and serve affidavits comprising any further evidence-in-chief upon which they seek to rely in relation to the question of an account of profits.

20.    On or before 15 November 2019, the applicants serve on the respondent any expert reports upon which they seek to rely on the question of an account of profits.

21.    On or before 29 November 2019 the respondents serve on the applicants any expert reports upon which they seek to rely on the question of an account of profits.

22.    The matter be listed for a case management hearing on 16 December 2019 at 9:15 am.

23.    Liberty to apply.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BESANKO J:

INTRODUCTION

1    These reasons deal with the final orders which are to be made in this proceeding. I delivered reasons determining the issues between the parties on 13 June 2019 (Mitolo Wines Aust Pty Ltd v Vito Mitolo & Son Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 902) (the Substantive Reasons) and I made orders for the respective parties, if they could not agree the final orders to be made, to file and serve draft minutes of order reflecting the conclusions in the Substantive Reasons. The parties have not agreed the final orders to be made.

2    The applicants seek declarations, injunctions, orders for delivery up, an order with respect to their applications for registration of other marks and an order with respect to costs. The applicants have elected to pursue an account of profits. The parties have agreed the procedural orders appropriate to the hearing and determination of this claim and, subject to not fixing a hearing date at this stage, I will make those orders.

Declarations

3    I will begin by identifying the declarations which I consider should be made and then address the parties’ submissions to the extent that they oppose these declarations.

1.    By the use of the words:

1.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

1.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

1.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

1.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

and whether or not in conjunction with use of another prominent word, the first respondent has infringed trademark number 801717 of the first applicant registered in Class 33 in respect of the goods “wine”.

2.    By the use of the words:

2.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

2.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

2.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

2.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

and whether or not in conjunction with use of another prominent word, the first respondent has contravened s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.

3.    By the use of the words:

3.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

3.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

3.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

3.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

and whether or not in conjunction with use of another prominent word, the first respondent has contravened s 29(1)(h) of the Australian Consumer Law.

4.    The second and third respondents are persons involved in the first respondent’s contravention of s 18 and s 29(1)(h) of the Australian Consumer Law set out in declarations 2 and 3 above.

5.    By offering for sale red wine:

5.1    bearing the McLaren Vale geographic indication;

5.2    from a location very near to the applicants’ cellar door; and

5.3    utilising the name “V. Mitolo and Son” or “V. Mitolo & Son”

the first respondent has passed off its wine as the applicants’ wine, or otherwise associated with the applicants’ wine.

4    The respondents submitted that the declarations should not include paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 because, by reference to [292] and [369] of the Substantive Reasons, the finding of infringing conduct was limited to the use of V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son or V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo. That submission is not correct. It overlooks the words, “for example” in [369]. More importantly, it overlooks the reasons as a whole which make it clear that the infringing conduct was the use of V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son and V. Mitolo & Son whether within the two-heads logo or not (see, for example, [303] of the Substantive Reasons). Paragraph 292 of the Substantive Reasons is descriptive of some of the bottles which were in evidence and the point of the distinction in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) in [292] is whether or not “V. Mitolo and Son” and “V. Mitolo & Son” was used with another prominent word.

5    The respondents submitted that I should add to, for example, paragraph 1, “on labels affixed to bottles of wine whether or not ...”. I do not think that this is necessary. The declaration as framed reflects the findings and, having regard to the phrase “in respect of the goods wine’” and the terms of the infringement section in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

6    The applicants sought a slightly different declaration to that contained in paragraph 5 above, but the declaration I will make reflects the case they advanced at trial and the case I found was made out (see [363] of the Substantive Reasons).

Injunctions

7    Again, I will set out the injunctions which I consider should be made and then address the parties’ submissions to the extent that they oppose these injunctions.

6.    Pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents and the second and third respondents and each of them are restrained from infringing the first applicant’s registered trade mark number 801717 for the word “MITOLO”.

7.    Pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, and the second and third respondents and each of them, are restrained from advertising, marketing, promoting, exhibiting in public, offering for sale and selling wine in Australia using the words:

7.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

7.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

7.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

7.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

9.    Pursuant to s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law, the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, is restrained from advertising, marketing, promoting, exhibiting in public, offering for sale and selling wine or wine related merchandise in Australia using the words:

   9.1    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

   9.2    V. Mitolo & Son;

9.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

   9.4    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

12.    The first respondent is restrained from offering for sale red wines:

12.1    bearing a McLaren Vale geographic indication;

12.2    from a location very near to the applicants’ cellar door; and

12.3    using the name “V. Mitolo and Son” or “V. Mitolo & Son”

other than to the minimum extent necessary in order to comply with an applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

8    The applicants submitted that I should also make an injunction in the following terms:

8.    Pursuant to s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law, the first respondent, whether itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents and the second and third respondents and each of them are restrained from engaging in conduct by which it represents that:

8.1    the first respondent and the applicants or either of them are the same person;

8.2    wines produced by the first respondent were produced by or at the direction of the applicants or either of them; or

8.3    wines produced by the first respondent have a sponsorship, approval or affiliation with the applicants or the applicants’ products.

9    The respondents submitted that the injunctions in paragraphs 6 and 8 should not be made because they did not identify the particular conduct found to be infringing conduct and that injunctions in intellectual property cases should be made by reference to particular conduct.

10    There is a good deal of debate in the authorities about the appropriateness of an injunction in terms of an applicant’s statutory monopoly. The English position that such an injunction is not inappropriate seems reasonably clear (Coflexip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd [2001] RPC 9; Sun Microsystems Inc v Airtech Computer Corp Ltd [2006] FSR 35; and Interflora Inc v Marks and Spencers plc (No 2) [2014] FSR 3).

11    In Australia, the High Court has upheld injunctions expressed in terms of an applicant’s statutory monopoly in intellectual property cases (Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588 at 611 and 622; Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1970) 122 CLR 25 (Colbeam Palmer v Stock Affiliates) at 48; Interlego AG v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461 at 489; Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v MWA Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 180 CLR 160 at 171). There is authority of this Court to the effect that such an order is generally not appropriate (Christian v Société Des Produits Nestlé SA (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 153; (2015) 327 ALR 630 at [181]), although I do not understand the Full Court to be saying that such an order can never be made. I did not understand the respondents to submit that that was the effect of the authorities (i.e., that such an order could never be made).

12    This proceeding involves an acrimonious and costly dispute between, in effect, private individuals. The applicants have been successful and I consider that they are entitled to all such relief as is permitted by precedent and principle. I consider it appropriate to make the orders in paragraphs 6 and 7.

13    I consider that the injunction in proposed order 8 raises different considerations because it is not in the field of intellectual property, albeit in the related field of misleading and deceptive conduct and the High Court authority to the effect that the conduct giving rise to the breach or contravention should be specified (Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Limited (2001) 205 CLR 1 at 60 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). I will not make the injunction proposed in paragraph 8.

14    The respondents submitted that the qualification in the injunctions in paragraphs 7, 9 and 12 should be (instead of “save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument”):

Save that it, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, may advertise, market, promote, exhibit in public, offer for sale and sell wine in Australia that identifies the first respondent by its full name as the producer of that wine without further use of the word “MITOLO”.

15    I consider that the applicants’ qualification is appropriate. It is true that the applicants did not pursue the respondents in relation to the OZTALIA range where “V. Mitolo and Son” is only used to identify the producer of the wine product and the Oakley Road address is given (see [292]–[294] of the Substantive Reasons) and that there was a suggestion during submissions that a wine seller was required by legislation to identify the producer of the wine on the bottle. However, I was never taken to the legislation for the purposes of considering its precise terms. In my opinion, the applicants’ qualification achieves the desired end, whereas the respondents’ qualification is open-ended and may authorise conduct which may otherwise be an infringement of the applicants’ trade mark.

Orders for delivery up

16    The applicants seek the following orders:

10.    The first respondent, at its expense, deliver-up, and verify on oath the delivery up of:

10.1    all wine labels (and where affixed to bottles, all bottles) in the first respondent’s possession, custody or power; and

10.2    all packaging, promotional material, advertisements, signage and other materials in any form cartons, advertisements, whether electronic or in hardcopy;

and which use the words:

   10.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

   10.4.    V. Mitolo & Son;

10.5    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

10.6    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

other than:

10.7    “Waveform” branded wine held by the respondent in the United States of America at the date of this order for the purpose of sale in the United States; or

10.8    items meeting the description of sub-paragraph 10.1 where words referred to in sub-paragraphs 10.3 and 10.4 above are used to comply to the minimum extent necessary with an applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

11.    Pursuant to s 238 and s 243(d) of the Australian Consumer Law the first respondent, at its expense, deliver-up, and verify on oath the delivery-up of:

11.1    all wine products (including bottles) in the first respondent’s possession, custody or power; and

11.2    all packaging, promotional material, advertisements, signage and other materials in any form cartons, advertisements, whether electronic or in hardcopy;

and which use the words:

   11.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

   11.4.    V. Mitolo & Son;

11.5    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

   11.6    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

other than:

11.7    “Waveform” branded wine held by the respondent in the United States of America at the date of this order for the purpose of sale in the United States; or

11.8    items meeting the description of sub-paragraph 11.1 where words referred to in sub-paragraphs 11.3 and 11.4 above are used to comply to the minimum extent necessary with an applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.

17    The respondents opposed the making of these orders. They submitted that it would not be appropriate for the Court to make an order which required the respondents to deliver up valuable personal property to the applicants. The parties were not in a position to refer me to authority on the point raised by the respondents and I gave them the opportunity to provide the Court with further submissions in writing. In their written submissions, the respondents submitted that although the Court had the power to make an order for delivery up or destruction of infringing articles, that arose under its general jurisdiction and not by reason of ss 238 and 243(d) of the Australian Consumer Law. The respondents also submitted that there should be one order and not two. The respondents referred me to authorities dealing with whether the Court should make an order for delivery up when the order will result in the delivery up of valuable commercial property. These authorities include Colbeam Palmer v Stock Affiliates at 39 per Windeyer J; Roussel Uclaf v Pan Laboratories Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 316 at [12]; Streetworx Pty Ltd v Artcraft Urban Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 140; (2015) 322 ALR 557 at [111]–[112], [116], [128]–[130] per Beach J; and Playgro Pty Ltd v Playgo Art & Craft Manufactory Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 478 at [28] per Moshinsky J.

18    I do not need to analyse these authorities because, having regard to the written submissions of the respective parties, there was a measure of agreement between them.

19    In my opinion, it is appropriate to make one order. There is no doubt that the Court has the power to make the order (see the discussion of Perram J in Solarhart Industries Pty Ltd v Solar Shop Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 780; (2011) 282 ALR 43 at [13]) and I do not propose to consider the submission that there is no power to make an order for delivery up under ss 238 and 243(d) of the Australian Consumer Law.

20    In my opinion, it is appropriate to make the following order.

10.    With respect to the following items:

10.1    all wine products (including bottles) in the first respondent’s possession, custody or power; and

10.2    all packaging, promotional material, advertisements, signage and other materials in any form, cartons, advertisements, whether electronic or in hardcopy;

and which use the words:

   10.3    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;

   10.4.    V. Mitolo & Son;

10.5    V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or

10.6    V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo

other than:

10.7    “Waveform” branded wine held by the respondent in the United States of America at the date of this order for the purpose of sale in the United States; or

10.8    items meeting the description of sub-paragraph 10.1 above where the words referred to in sub-paragraphs 10.3 and 10.4 above are used to comply to the minimum extent necessary with an applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument

the first respondent is within 28 days to do either of the following:

10.9    deliver up the said items and verify on oath such delivery up within 35 days; or

10.10    remove the said words by obliterating them in such a manner as is irreversible and so that the removal of the said words is not apparent and to verify such action on oath within 35 days.

21    This order gives the respondents the option of delivery up or of removing the said words in the case of all items which contain the infringing words. The applicants submitted that there were certain items where removal was not practical and that, in those cases, the only option which the order should give to the respondents is delivery up. The applicants’ contention may well be correct as a practical matter, but I do not propose to make that judgment now and include it in the order.

22    The respondents submitted that the alternative to delivery up should be expressed in terms of obscuration. I do not agree. In my opinion, the wording advanced by the applicants and incorporated in sub-paragraph 10.10 above is appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of this case.

23    The respondents submitted that the Court should not require the removal of the words referred to in sub-paragraphs 10.310.6 above, but rather, only the removal of the word “MITOLO” which is the registered trade mark. I do not agree. The order is in aid of the injunction. The injunction refers to the words which have been found to be the infringing words and that is appropriate. It is not for the Court to be making a judgment at this stage as to what variations might or might not infringe in the future.

Account of Profits

24    As I have said, the applicants have made it clear that they seek an account of profits rather than damages.

Other Applications for Trade Mark Registration

25    The applicants seek the following order:

14.    The first applicant has liberty to apply for additional or amended orders in respect of its pending applications for the registration of the word MITOLO in relation to Classes 35, 41 and 43 and the words MITOLO WINES in relation to Classes 35 and 43 in the event that those applications result in the registration of those marks.

26    In the Substantive Reasons, I said the following:

13    The two applications for registration are the subject of opposition proceedings by Vito Mitolo & Son. Vito Mitolo & Son made a request for an extension of time to file evidence in the opposition proceedings which was refused by a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. Vito Mitolo & Son brought proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) in relation to the delegate’s decision. Reasons in that proceeding will be published on the same day as these reasons.

14    The other matter to note is that the applicants are not precluded from bringing proceedings on the two applications for registration, but they are not able to obtain relief until registration has taken place (Hunter Douglas Australia Pty Ltd v Perma Blinds (1969) 122 CLR 49 at 59 per Barwick CJ; Global Brand Marketing Inc v Cube Footwear Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 852; (2005) 66 IPR 19 at [6] per Goldberg J).

27    I consider this to be no more than a note that an application may be made. If and when such an application is made, it will be considered on its merits.

Costs

28    The applicants seek the following order:

15.    The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the trial pursuant to order 4 made 16 May 2017 as varied by order 1 made 7 August 2018, to be taxed if not agreed.

29    The respondents oppose the making of this order. The only argument which they advanced in opposition to this order was that the applicants had at the commencement of their closing submissions abandoned any claim for past infringement in the United States in relation to the modified WAVEFORM range of wine (see [293] and [368] of the Substantive Reasons) and, somewhat faintly, that the applicants did not pursue a claim in relation to the OZTALIA range. In those circumstances, the respondents asked me to reserve the question of costs.

30    I see no reason to reserve the question of costs. If there is anything in the respondents’ points, it might lead to a reduction in the costs otherwise awarded to the applicants. However, I accept the submission made by the applicants that the time spent on the modified WAVEFORM range of wine sold in the United States was relatively insignificant and, in any event, it was part of the respondents’ good faith and estoppel pleas in respect of which they were unsuccessful. The evidence with respect to the OZTALIA range did not add to the length of the trial in any sense. In the circumstances, I think it is appropriate to make the order set out in paragraph 15 above.

I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Besanko.

Associate:

Dated:    25 July 2019

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

SAD 340 of 2016

Cross-Claimants

Second Cross-Claimant:

VITO MITOLO

Third Cross-Claimant:

ANTHONY MITOLO

Cross-Respondents

Second Cross-Respondent

MITOLO WINES PTY LTD (ACN 112 011 560)