FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nyoni v Cho [2019] FCA 560

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interlocutory application filed on 24 April 2019 be allowed.

2.    The originating application be dismissed.

3.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interlocutory application filed on 24 April 2019 be allowed.

2.    The originating application be dismissed.

3.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

1    These proceedings were heard together and it is convenient to provide one set of reasons. The proceedings relate to separate decisions by two Registrars of the Court who refused to accept for filing an originating application for judicial review in which a Judge of the Court was named as the sole respondent.

2    I will outline the background to both proceedings, summarise the evidence and the applicant’s submissions and the submissions of amici curiae and then explain why both proceedings should be dismissed.

Summary of background matters

(a) Registrar Cho proceeding

3    By an originating application which explicitly relies on s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision dated 24 December 2018 by Registrar Cho. Registrar Cho refused to accept an originating application for filing in the Court in its New South Wales Registry. The rejected originating application purported to be an application brought solely under s 6 of the ADJR Act. In that rejected originating application, the applicant sought judicial review in respect of the conduct and actions of Colvin J in various proceedings in which the applicant is a party.

4    Registrar Cho’s decision to reject the originating application for filing was made under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (2011 FCRs) on the basis that the subject matter of the originating application did not relate to a decision of an administrative character and it failed to set out a tenable cause of action that engaged the Court’s jurisdiction.

5    The applicant challenges Registrar Cho’s decision on multiple judicial review grounds which reflect virtually all the heads of judicial review set out in s 5 of the ADJR Act. There are 12 grounds in all.

(b) Registrar Tesereiro proceeding

6    In this proceeding, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision dated 25 January 2019 by Registrar Tesereiro, who refused to accept for filing in the Court in its New South Wales Registry an originating application which was substantially similar to the one which had been rejected earlier by Registrar Cho. Registrar Tesereiro also refused to accept the document for filing under r 2.26 of the 2011 FCRs. Registrar Tesereiro explained that he had rejected the originating document for filing on the basis that the judicial review which it sought was bound to fail, that the cause of action relied on was misconceived and that the document was frivolous or vexatious. The Registrar also noted that, as a proceeding had already been commenced for judicial review in relation to the originating application the subject of Registrar Cho’s decision, attempting to file the same document again was likely to be an abuse of the Court’s process.

7    The originating application filed on 6 February 2019 in respect of Registrar Tesereiro’s decision raises most of the grounds relied upon in the originating application concerning Registrar Cho’s decision. There are 11 grounds in all, many of which are unparticularised.

(c) Involvement of amici curiae

8    Both Registrar Cho and Registrar Tesereiro filed submitting appearances, which meant that there was no contradictor. The Court expresses its gratitude to the Bar Association of New South Wales for arranging to provide amici curiae to assist the Court in both proceedings.

(d) Summary of further relevant information concerning the decisions of Registrar Cho and Registrar Tesereiro

9    Before summarising the background to these decisions, it is appropriate to note that the applicant has been involved in numerous proceedings in this Court, most of which relate to or stem from a pharmacy which the applicant operated in the Shire of Kellerberrin in Western Australia. The applicant contended that, following several complaints from the general public about the pharmacy, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Shire wrote to two regulatory authorities and notified them that the electricity supply to the pharmacy had been disconnected, with the intention that they would take steps to close the applicant’s business down. The applicant claimed that the CEO’s conduct was unlawful because it involved inter alia conduct which amounted to misfeasance in public office and was also misleading or deceptive. These proceedings were the subject of five separate interlocutory judgments by Siopis J in the period 14 November 2011 to 6 March 2014 (Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin [2011] FCA 1299; Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 2) [2012] FCA 1477; Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 3) [2013] FCA 1090; Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 4) [2014] FCA 22 and the Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 5) [2014] FCA 204).

10    On 23 November 2015, Siopis J published his reasons for dismissing the applicant’s substantive claims, except for a trespass claim which involved an electrical contractor who had entered the applicant’s pharmacy to disconnect the electricity (see Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 6) [2015] FCA 1294).

11    On 1 March 2016, Mortimer J dismissed the applicant’s applications to stay an order for costs and to add a new cause of action (see Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 7) [2016] FCA 135). On 10 March 2016, her Honour granted the applicant’s application for leave to amend his notice of appeal (Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 8) [2016] FCA 245. On 5 May 2016, her Honour dismissed the respondents’ application for security of costs (Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 9) [2016] FCA 472).

12    On 13 April 2017, the Full Court, by majority, allowed the applicant’s appeal from Siopis J’s judgment and orders dated 23 November 2015 and held that both the CEO and the Shire had committed the tort of misfeasance in public office (Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin [2017] FCAFC 59; 248 FCR 311). The High Court refused an application for special leave to appeal (see Shire of Kellerberrin v Nyoni [2018] HCA Trans 27).

13    Following the remittal to the Court for a determination of damages in respect of the applicant’s successful appeal concerning the tort of misfeasance in public office (and in circumstances where Siopis J was no longer a Judge of the Court), on 19 October 2018 Barker J published his reasons for judgment for awarding the applicant $30,000 in damages (see Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 10) [2018] FCA 1576).

14    On 9 November 2018, the applicant filed a notice of appeal against Barker J’s orders (see WAD 498 of 2018). On 22 January 2019, Colvin J made directions in this appeal, including that an objection as to the competency of the appeal be heard on 5 April 2019 which date was adjourned to 15 April 2019 in the afternoon following the hearing in the present proceeding.

15    The applicant has also been involved in multiple proceedings in this Court in which the Pharmacy Board of Australia (Pharmacy Board) has been a respondent. The first such proceeding is Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia (WAD 357 of 2014 and WAD 191 of 2018) which arose out of the imposition of conditions by the Pharmacy Board on the applicant’s licence to practise as a pharmacist, and publication of those conditions on the website of the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHRPA), which has also been a respondent in some of the proceedings. The applicant alleged that the publication of the conditions gave rise to claims for defamation, misleading or deceptive conduct and malicious falsehood. Those claims were ultimately dismissed by Siopis J in Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia (No 6) [2018] FCA 526. On 18 February 2019, White J dismissed an appeal from Siopis J’s orders – see Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 225.

16    The applicant has also been involved in proceedings in both the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) and this Court concerning his bankruptcy. On 17 February 2017, the FCCA issued a sequestration order against the applicant’s estate (see Murphy v Nyoni [2017] FCCA 143). On 16 August 2017, Barker J dismissed an application for an extension of time to appeal from the FCCA’s orders (see Nyoni v Murphy [2017] FCA 941).

17    On 24 August 2017, the applicant sought to file in the Court an interlocutory application and supporting affidavit in which he sought to have Barker J’s judgment and orders set aside relying on r 39.05 of the 2011 Rules. He also sought an order that Barker J be recused from the proceedings. By letter dated 24 August 2017, the Registrar wrote to the applicant and informed him that she was rejecting his documents for filing under r 2.26 of the 2011 Rules. The applicant then sought to have the Registrar’s decision reviewed, relying upon s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

18    On 8 December 2017, Siopis J determined and dismissed the application for review (see Nyoni v Murphy (No 2) [2017] FCA 1479). The applicant appealed Siopis J’s orders to the Full Court. On 25 May 2018, the Full Court (constituted by Barker, Banks-Smith and Colvin JJ) dismissed the appeal (Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75 (Murphy FCAFC).

19    In a separate proceeding, on 22 January 2019, Colvin J dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of Registrar Benter. Registrar Benter had determined on 4 December 2018 to refuse to accept for filing documents dated 3 December 2018 relating to the applicant’s attempt to commence proceedings against a Judge of the Court. Registrar Benter refused to accept the documents for filing under r 2.26 of the 2011 FCRs on the basis that the documents disclosed no cause of action and were an abuse of process as well as frivolous or vexatious. His Honour gave brief reasons for dismissing the judicial review application in circumstances where the applicant failed to attend the hearing on 22 January 2019.

20    The applicant has also brought various proceedings in this Court relating to the sale of his pharmacy, which proceedings have at various times involved Gilmour J, Siopis J and McKerracher J. There have been six such proceedings.

21    In addition to all these proceedings in this Court, the applicant has been involved in numerous proceedings in the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal, the Supreme Court of Western Australia and the Court of Appeal in that State.

22    In brief, Colvin J has been involved in the following proceedings in which the applicant has been a party:

(a)    his Honour is case managing the applicant’s appeal from Barker J’s damages judgment;

(b)    his Honour was a member of the Full Court which dismissed the appeal from Siopis J’s judgment which dismissed the applicant’s application for a review of the Registrar’s decision in the Nyoni v Murphy litigation;

(c)    his Honour dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of Registrar Benter’s decision in Nyoni v Registrar Benter on 22 January 2019; and

(d)    although his Honour has not been directly involved in any of the proceedings between the applicant and the Pharmacy Board, the applicant has claimed that the respondents in those proceedings influenced Colvin J in his Honour’s decision to dismiss the application for judicial review of Registrar Benter’s decision as referred to above.

The Registrars’ reasons

23    Both Registrars gave brief reasons for their respective decisions. The relevant passage in Registrar Cho’s reasons is as follows (without alteration):

The Document purports that it is an application made under section 6 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the Act). However, on the face of the Document, it is not possible to ascertain what conduct(s) (whether engaged, is engaging or otherwise proposes to engage) for the purpose of making a “decision to which this Act applies” (as defined under s 3 of the Act) is or are being sought for review under that provision of the Act. In my view, the matters subject of your complaint(s) do not relate to decision(s) of any "administrative character". To that end, it fails to set out a tenable cause of action to engage this Court's jurisdiction, and I am of the view that should this application be filed, it is foredoomed to fail. The Document is therefore an abuse of the process of the Court and is otherwise frivolous and vexatious.

24    The relevant passage in Registrar Tesereiro’s reasons is as follows:

It appears that on 24 December 2018, Judicial Registrar Cho rejected a filing of a similar application to that set out in the Document, which you are now seeking judicial review to this Court in NSD 35/2019. I understand that that matter is now docketed and listed before a Judge of this Court. Having considered the Document separately, I am of the view that the judicial review you seek is bound to fail for it misconceives the cause of action arising under the relevant Act you rely upon, and as such, is frivolous and vexatious. I also note that, given you are seeking judicial review of Judicial Registrar Cho's decision set out in NSD 35/ 2019 (sic), this attempt at filing the Document is likely an abuse of the process of the Court.

The applicant’s evidence and submissions summarised

25    The applicant relied upon two affidavits sworn by him, both dated 25 February 2019. In one of those affidavits, the applicant described at some length many of the proceedings brought by him in the Court involving the Shire of Kellerberrin, commencing with his application in WAD357/2014 which was filed on 26 November 2014. In the other affidavit, the applicant described many of the proceedings relating to the Pharmacy Board and AHRPA.

26    The applicant relied upon the same outline of submissions in both proceedings. As amici curiae pointed out, those submissions addressed the proposed originating applications which Registrars Cho and Tesereiro respectively refused to accept for filing, as opposed to the originating applications filed by the applicant in respect of the Registrars’ decisions.

27    The originating applications which were not accepted for filing made the following allegations:

(a)    there was a relationship between Colvin J and counsel for the Pharmacy Board and AHPRA because they had both been members of the same set of barristers’ chambers in Perth;

(b)    Colvin J was involved in many of the applicant’s proceedings in the Court;

(c)    Colvin J did not recuse himself (presumably, from the judicial review proceedings in relation to Registrar Benter’s decision and case management of the applicant’s appeal against Barker J’s award of damages); and

(d)    the respondents in the Pharmacy Board proceedings influenced Colvin J in the Benter proceeding.

28    The applicant represented himself. In the course of the hearing, the Court invited the applicant to make oral submissions in support of his two judicial review applications. He was asked to explain how the ADJR Act applied to the actions or conduct of a Judge of the Federal Court performing judicial functions as part of the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. In particular, he was asked to address how any such conduct related to a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment so as to attract the jurisdiction of the Court under s 6 of the ADJR Act.

29    The applicant submitted that the matters relating to Colvin J about which he complained were matters of an “administrative character”. He contended that the making of orders or directions as part of case management merely involved administrative steps engaged in for the purpose of preparing cases for judicial determination. He did not explain how conduct arising from Colvin J’s membership of a Full Court in hearing and determining an appeal was a matter of an “administrative character”.

The submissions of amici curiae summarised

30    Amici curiae provided a helpful outline of submissions in both proceedings.

31    It is unnecessary to summarise those submissions because they are substantially reflected in the reasons below for dismissing both originating applications.

Consideration and determination of the applications

32    I will now address the two judicial review applications in relation to the Registrar’s decisions.

33    The Court has jurisdiction under the ADJR Act to review decisions by a Registrar under r 2.26 because such a decision is a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment and is not a decision of a judicial character (see Satchithanantham v National Australia Bank Limited [2010] FCAFC 47; 268 ALR 222 (Satchithanantham) at [49]-[50]; Murphy FCAFC at [32] and [38] and Bird v Registrar, Federal Court of Australia [2016] FCA 21 at [25] per Collier J).

34    Rule 2.26 of 2011 FCRs provides as follows:

A Registrar may refuse to accept a document (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious:

  (a)    on the face of the document; or

(b)    by reference to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document.

35    The power of a Registrar to refuse to accept a document for filing turns on the Registrar’s satisfaction that the document is an abuse of process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious. That satisfaction must be honestly and actually formed but it is amenable to judicial review, including in an appropriate case under the relevant provisions of the ADJR Act. It is incontestable that judicial review does not extend to a review of the merits of the Registrar’s decision apart from a case where the ground of unreasonableness involves an examination of the outcome of the decision for the limited purpose of that particular judicial review ground.

36    In Rahman v Hedge [2012] FCA 68 at [5]-[6] (Rahman) Perram J held that the Registrar’s “satisfaction” of the particular state of affairs referred to in the predecessor to r 2.26 (i.e. Order 46 r 7A) was amenable to judicial review, including by reference to Gibbs J’s well-known statements in Buck v Bavone 135 CLR 110 at 118-119. I respectfully agree.

37    It is well established that a document is:

(a)    an abuse of process if “it can clearly be seen to be doomed to fail” (SZQYP v Hannigan [2012] FCA 723 (SZQYP) at [30]; and

(b)    frivolous or vexatious, if it is “obviously untenable or utterly hopeless” (SZQYP at [30]).

38    The purpose of a Registrar’s power not to accept a document for filing is “to assist the Registrar to maintain efficient operation of the registry and, thereby, the Court” (see Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; 128 FCR 353 (Bizuneh) at [15], with reference to an earlier similar provision).

39    Referring to the previous r 7A (which not only conferred a power on the Registrar expressed in similar terms to those in r 2.26 but also empowered a Registrar in his or her discretion to “seek a direction of a Judge who may direct him” on the question whether a document should be accepted for filing), the Full Court in Bizuneh said at [17]:

17.    Rule 7A provides for a Judge to act in aid of administration of the Court. There is no application to the Court by motion or otherwise and no requirement for a party to be heard. It involves determination of administrative obligations with respect to documents presented to a Registrar having regard to the character of the documents on their face. No order or decree intended to bind a party and no determination of right is made by a Judge where assistance is provided to a Registrar under r 7A.

40    It is significant that the applicant has chosen to seek judicial review of the Registrars’ decisions pursuant to the ADJR Act and has not relied on any other appeal or review jurisdiction of the Court.

41    The ADJR Act applies in respect of “a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made… under an enactment (see ss 3(1) and 5). The ADJR Act also applies where a person “has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in conduct for the purpose of making a decision to which this Act applies…” (s 6).

42    The originating application filed by the applicant in both proceedings for review of the Registrars’ decisions relies expressly on s 5 of the ADJR Act. That is to be contrasted with the proposed originating application which was not accepted for filing by both Registrars. That originating application is expressly stated to be in relation to judicial review of conduct of a Judge of this Court and is brought pursuant to s 6 of the ADJR Act.

43    It is unnecessary to specify the particular grounds set out in the underlying proposed originating applications in which Colvin J is named as the sole respondent. This is simply because although conduct is reviewable under the ADJR Act it must relate to a decision to which the Act applies, being a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment. The conduct which is the subject of the proposed originating applications is the conduct of a Judge of this Court. That conduct is judicial in nature and not administrative. That is because, as amici curiae pointed out, it is axiomatic that where “a power is exercised by this Court the exercise of the power must be judicial in nature” because that is a Constitutional requirement of its conferral (see McDonald v Federal Court of Australia [2017] FCA 1216 at [60] per Kerr J). Neither Registrar erred in rejecting the proposed originating application for filing because, as Registrar Cho pointed out, the application did not relate to a decision of an “administrative character”. That is also what Registrar Tesereiro had in mind when he said that the originating application was bound to fail “for it misconceives the cause of action arising under the relevant Act you rely upon”.

44    Taking in turn each of the four aspects of the conduct raised by the applicant, it is plain that none of that conduct relates to an administrative decision made under an enactment. The impugned conduct arising from case management of the appeal was judicial in character. A Judge’s case management functions are part of the judicial process and the ultimate exercise of judicial power which conclusively and authoritatively determines the controversy between the parties (Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330). His Honour’s membership of a Full Court which hears and determines an appeal is a quintessential exercise of judicial power, as is the case with his Honour’s decision to dismiss the applicant’s judicial review application against the decision of Registrar Benter. Finally, his Honour’s past professional relationship with another barrister is far removed from conduct which is reviewable under the ADJR Act.

45    This is a sufficient basis for dismissing the originating applications because it provides an insurmountable obstacle for the applicant. For completeness, however, I should add that I am not satisfied that the applicant has established any of the individual grounds of judicial review relied upon by him in respect of the Registrars’ decisions, for reasons which I will now explain.

46    With specific reference to Registrar Cho’s decision, the applicant has failed to establish any reviewable error. In particular:

(a)    In respect of grounds 1, 4 and 5 (breach of natural justice, unauthorised decision and improper exercise of power) the applicant claims that Registrar Cho misconstrued s 6 of the ADJR Act. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Registrar’s decision involved a misconstruction of the meaning of “conduct”. As to the claim of a denial of natural justice, the particulars indicate that the applicant’s complaint is not one of procedural unfairness as such, but rather relates to the alleged misconstruction of s 6 and the distinction drawn between “conduct” and a substantive decision.

(b)    As to grounds 2, 3 and 9 (failure to observe procedures, lack of jurisdiction and otherwise contrary to law), the applicant claims that, given the substance of his claims of defamation, misleading or deceptive conduct, malicious falsehood and the invalidity of the conditions imposed by the Pharmacy Board and AHPRA, such matters ought to have been determined by a properly constituted Full Court and not a Registrar. But a Registrar is plainly empowered by r 2.26 to refuse to accept a document if the Registrar has the requisite satisfaction in respect of one of the matters as set out in that provision. The applicant does not claim that Registrar Cho did not actually or honestly have the state of satisfaction which enlivens the exercise of the power not to accept a document for filing.

(c)    In grounds 1 and 6, the applicant contends that Registrar Cho misapprehended or misconstrued the facts but no particulars are provided of those claims. Moreover, a mere error of fact cannot be equated with the concept of error of law, at least not without further elaboration which is not provided in the originating application.

(d)    As to ground 7, the applicant claims that Registrar Cho’s decision was “induced or affected by bias” because the Registrar gave “a disproportionate weight in favour of the respondent or against the applicant”. The applicant points to no material in support of this serious allegation. There is simply no basis to conclude that an appropriately informed lay observer might apprehend that Registrar Cho might have exercised his power under r 2.26 by disproportionally weighing matters in favour of the respondent and against the applicant so as to give rise to apprehended bias.

(e)    As to ground 8, which claims that there was no evidence or other material which justified the making of Registrar Cho’s decision, which is particularised as being based “on conjecture without referring to the substantive evidence outlined by applicant (sic)”, the Registrar was entitled to determine the matter on the face of the proposed originating application itself.

47    For similar reasons, I reject each of the judicial review grounds raised by the applicant in respect of Registrar Tesereiro decision. As noted above, the underlying originating application the subject of Registrar Tesereiro’s decision was in substantially similar terms to the underlying originating application which had not been accepted for filing by Registrar Cho. Necessarily, therefore, it suffered from the same fatal misconception in that it purported to seek judicial review of conduct which was not in relation to a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment. Otherwise, each of the individual grounds of judicial review is rejected for similar reasons given above in respect of the comparable grounds relied upon in respect of Registrar Cho’s decision.

48    During the course of the hearing, the applicant raised the possibility of him amending his underlying originating application relating to Colvin J. As was pointed out by the Court, this was not open against the background of the events that have occurred. This was because the proceedings before this Court were solely concerned with whether the Registrar erred in rejecting the applicant’s proposed originating processes. Regardless of whether those proposed originating processes may have been amended to cure the defect identified above, it remains the case that the proposed originating processes rejected by the Registrars were defective at the time they were rejected. It is not for this Court on a judicial review of the Registrar’s decisions to effectively permit the applicant to change the subject matter of those decisions. It is a matter for the applicant to determine what future course of action he might wish to take.

Application to reopen

49    After judgment was reserved, the applicant sought to file an interlocutory application seeking leave to reopen in relation to what he described as “evidence” which was attached to an affidavit sworn by him and dated 22 April 2019. He also sought to file an outline of submissions in support of the interlocutory application.

50    The “evidence” is a copy of Hill J’s judgment in New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (1995) 59 FCR 369 (ATSIC case). The applicant explained that he wished to rely upon Hill J’s finding that, even if a particular decision or conduct is not reviewable under the ADJR Act, if the case was one brought under that ADJR Act the Court could decide in its accrued jurisdiction to grant appropriate relief if relevant error is established.

51    There is a fundamental difficulty with the interlocutory application. Justice Hill’s reasons for judgment are not “evidence” in any relevant sense. In truth, the applicant (who represents himself) wished to draw the Court’s attention to the decision notwithstanding that judgment had been reserved. He requires leave to do so and I will treat his interlocutory application in that way.

52    As previously noted, the respondent in both proceedings filed submitting appearances. There is no issue of any prejudice to them if leave was granted to enable the applicant to cite the relevant authority. On the basis that the essential principle is that the Court should do justice between the parties, I grant the applicant leave to make submissions in relation to the relevance of the ATSIC case.

53    The applicant submitted that the decision was relevant because it identifies “the possibility that a common law claim in reliance upon the principles of administrative law may attract the Federal Court’s accrued jurisdiction, even though the ADJR Act claim fails”.

54    This submission must be rejected for similar reasons to those set out in [48] above regarding the applicant’s suggestion that he should be permitted in this proceeding to amend his underlying originating applications. The applicant placed no reliance upon the Court’s accrued jurisdiction when he sought to file the underlying originating applications which were rejected for filing. As has been emphasised, his application was explicitly and solely based on the Court’s jurisdiction under s 6 of the ADJR Act. The Registrars’ decisions to reject the proposed originating application were made on that basis. It is those decisions which are the subject of the current judicial review applications. The applicant is effectively asking the Court to grant him leave retrospectively to amend the proposed originating applications which were rejected by the Registrar. In other words, the Court is being asked to now rewrite the history of the conduct of the proceedings. It is inappropriate that the Court do so in the context of the present judicial review proceeding.

55    The position was quite different in the ATSIC case. There, from the outset, the judicial review applicant relied not only on the Court’s ADJR Act jurisdiction but also on its accrued jurisdiction. The applicant there was not seeking retrospectively to have the Court on a judicial review change the elements of ATSIC’s policy decision which was the subject of its judicial review challenge. The ATSIC case provides no support for the applicant’s case in circumstances where the applicant placed no reliance upon the Court’s accrued jurisdiction and no reviewable error has been demonstrated in respect of the Registrars’ reasons for decision for rejecting from filing applications for review which relied solely on s 6 of the ADJR Act.

Conclusion

56    For these reasons, both originating applications will be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs because both Registrars filed submitting appearances.

57    The Court expresses it profound gratitude to Ms Kaur-Bains and Ms Trahanas for agreeing to assist the Court as amici curiae and on a pro bono basis.

Associate:

Dated:    24 April 2019