FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thomas v University of Melbourne [2018] FCA 1978

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application in paragraph 3 of the applicant’s interlocutory application filed 19 November 2018 is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHEELAHAN J:

iNTRODUCTION

1    The applicant in this proceeding filed an interlocutory application on 19 November 2018 seeking the following orders, which I set out verbatim –

(1)    Disqualification of all legal representatives currently acting for all respondents, except Angus Mackenzie, in matters VID738/2018, VID950/2018, VID1222/2018; and VID1407/2018

(a)    This disqualification precludes these legal representatives taking any further steps in all these proceedings due to breaches documented in the attached Affidavit.

(2)    An order for an urgent hearing to determine the orders set out in this interlocutory application.

(3)    An order for Justice Wheelahan to recuse himself from these matters and any matter which may come before the court with Darron Thomas as a party to the proceeding. This is pursuant to Darron Thomas filing a Judicial Complaint against Justice Wheelahan.

2    It is appropriate that I hear and determine the application in paragraph 3 of the interlocutory application that I recuse myself before any other steps are taken in the four proceedings.

background

3    On 26 August 2017, the applicant made a complaint of discrimination to the Australian Human Rights Commission (the Commission). The subject of the complaint was allegations of racial discrimination while the applicant was pursuing PhD studies at the University of Melbourne in the Department of Finance within the faculty of Business and Economics. The complaint was made against the University, and staff of the University.

4    On 6 September 2018, a delegate of the President of the Commission terminated the complaint under s 46PH(1B)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) on the ground that the complaint was lacking in substance.

5    The applicant has commenced four proceedings in the original jurisdiction of this Court. I shall summarise the subject matter of those proceedings.

VID 738 of 2018 – Interim injunction proceeding

6    On 15 June 2018, the applicant filed an interlocutory application in proceeding VID 738 of 2018 (the interim injunction proceeding). The applicant named as respondents to that proceeding the University of Melbourne, the Australian Human Rights Commission, and 15 others. The applicant seeks a range of orders which he claims that the Court should make under s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act, which provides –

46PP    Interim injunction to maintain status quo etc.

(1)    At any time after a complaint is lodged with the Commission, the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court may grant an interim injunction to maintain:

(a)    the status quo, as it existed immediately before the complaint was lodged; or

(b)    the rights of any complainant, respondent or affected person.

(2)    The application for the injunction may be made by the Commission, a complainant, a respondent or an affected person.

(3)    The injunction cannot be granted after the complaint has been withdrawn under section 46PG or terminated under section 46PE, paragraph 46PF(1)(b) or section 46PH.

(4)    The court concerned may discharge or vary an injunction granted under this section.

(5)    The court concerned cannot, as a condition of granting the interim injunction, require a person to give an undertaking as to damages.

7    The grounds for the relief claimed are set out in the originating application. In substance, the applicant claims that he experienced bullying and discrimination at the University of Melbourne which resulted in his work as a PhD candidate being dismissed. The applicant alleges that a number of University staff were involved in the alleged bullying and discrimination. The orders sought by the applicant are extensive, and include orders in the nature of mandatory relief directed to the University.

8    There are currently a number of interlocutory applications that have been filed, or which have been foreshadowed, relating to the interim injunction proceeding. In summary, those applications are as follows.

Interlocutory application by the University for a stay of the proceeding

9    On 16 November 2018 the University filed an interlocutory application seeking a stay of the interim injunction proceeding until another proceeding, VID 1222 of 2018, is determined. I shall refer to proceeding VID 1222 of 2018 again later in these reasons.

Application for leave to appeal interlocutory orders – VID 1475 of 2018

10    On 22 November 2018, in a new proceeding, VID 1475 of 2018, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal interlocutory orders that I made on 30 October 2018 in the interim injunction proceeding. Those orders were as follows –

1.    The case management hearing be adjourned to 3 December 2018 at 9.30 am.

2.    Any application by any respondent for a stay of the proceedings, accompanied by a written outline of submissions, be filed and served by 4.00 pm, Friday 16 November 2018.

3.    The applicant file and serve any affidavit material and any submissions in response to any application for a stay of proceedings by 4.00 pm, Thursday 29 November 2018.

4.    Costs reserved.

11    The grounds for the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal are as follows –

(1)    Apprehended bias by Justice Wheelahan.

(2)    Manifest Bias by Justice Wheelahan.

(3)    Misleading and False statements propagated by legal representatives.

12    The application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal is not before me.

Interlocutory application by the applicant - pleadings

13    On 28 November 2018, the applicant filed an interlocutory application that seeks the following relief –

An order for the Federal Court of Australia to accept this pleading to meet conditions of Federal Court Rule 16.08 as articulated in pleadings.

14    The applicant lodged with the Court a document containing a range of allegations. Those allegations include allegations of “lies”, “fabrications”, and “fraud”.

Other applications by the applicant

15    On 29 November 2018, the applicant filed a notice under s 78B of the Judiciary Act stating that the proceeding involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.

16    The applicant also filed on 29 November 2018 an interlocutory application seeking a number of orders that it is convenient to set out verbatim so as to identify the range of issues that are before the Court –

1.    An order that proceedings VID1474/2018 and VID1475/2018 to be heard and determined before any further steps are taken in any of proceedings VID738/2018; VID950/2018; VID1222/2018 and VID1407/2018.

2.    An order that VID738/2018; VID950/2018; VID1222/2018 and VID1407/2018 be stayed or adjourned pending the hearing and determination of the constitutional matters, with proper notice to the Attorneys-General, or removal of all proceedings to the High Court.

3.    An order that fraud charges to be heard and determined before any further steps in any of the other proceedings;

4.    An order that VID738/2018; VID950/2018; VID1222/2018 and VID1407/2018 to be adjourned or stayed pending a proper notice of constitutional matter to the Attorneys- General in files VID738/2018, VID1222/2018 and VID1407/2018.

5.    An order that VID738/2018; VID950/2018; VID1222/2018 and VID1407/2018 be adjourned or stayed pending removal of these causes to the High Court of Australia, or proper notice of a constitutional matter to the Attorneys-General in files VID738/2018, VID1222/2018 and VID1407/2018 is given.

6.    An order that hearing and determination of proceeding VID1474/2018; VID1475/2018; and the Applicant’s Interlocutory Application filed on 19 November 2018 in VID738/2018 be heard before any further steps are taken in any other proceeding before the Federal Court of Australia where Darron Thomas is the applicant.

7.    An order that costs be awarded against the respondents, especially those appearing on behalf of the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). At least the AHRC legal representative was aware of the constitutional matter, and the need to adjourn proceedings in VID738/2018 or move the cause to the High Court of Australia.

8.    An order for the legal practitioners representing the respondents supply no further false, misleading, negligent or fraudulent statements to the court.

9.    An order for the legal practitioners representing the respondents to no longer put to the court, or rely on, known misrepresentations, lies, false/misleading statements, fabrications, decisions which result from conspiracy to defraud, fraud, and/or General Dishonesty.

10.    An order for the legal practitioners representing the respondents to observe the Legal Profession Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015, or Legal Profession Barristers’ Conduct Rules 2015, as applicable.

VID 950 of 2018 – Fair Work proceeding

17    On 6 August 2018, the applicant filed an application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) naming “The University of Melbourne and Others” as respondent (the Fair Work proceeding). By that proceeding the applicant alleges various breaches of the Fair Work Act and the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), and claims damages for pain and suffering and pecuniary loss from “the University of Melbourne and Others” for psychiatric injury that he alleges he sustained in the course of his employment by the University. The allegations in the application extend over some 49 pages.

18    The applicant has also filed a statement of claim, and then an amended statement of claim in the Fair Work proceeding. The allegations in the amended statement of claim include taking adverse action in contravention of the Fair Work Act, bullying, negligence, unspecified intentional torts, deceit, coercion, and misrepresentation. The applicant claims damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages.

19    There are currently three interlocutory applications that have been filed relating to the Fair Work proceeding. In summary, those applications are as follows.

Application for leave to amend, to add parties, and other orders

20    On 15 November 2018, the applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking orders including that the Court give leave to the applicant to amend the application, and to add parties to the proceeding, which I apprehend to be an additional 41 respondents. There is a broad range of other orders that the applicant seeks, which I shall not set out.

Application for summary dismissal

21    On 20 November 2018, the respondent, the University of Melbourne, filed an interlocutory application seeking summary dismissal of the Fair Work proceeding pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), alternatively, an order pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 that the statement of claim be struck out.

22    By interlocutory orders in the Fair Work proceeding that I made at the case management hearing on 30 October 2018, I made directions for the filing and service of material relating to the applicant’s application for leave to amend the originating application and to add parties, and I made directions for the filing and service of material relating to the respondent’s application for summary dismissal, and I adjourned the case management hearing to 29 March 2019. By paragraph 5 of his application filed 15 November 2018, the applicant seeks an order that I vacate the interlocutory orders that I made at the case management hearing on 30 October 2018.

Application for leave to appeal interlocutory orders – VID 1474 of 2018

23    On 22 November 2018, in a further new proceeding, VID 1474 of 2018, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders that I made on 30 October 2018 in the Fair Work proceeding. The grounds of the application are the same as those referred to at [11] above. That application is not before me.

VID 1222 of 2018 – AHRC bias proceeding

24    On 25 September 2018, the applicant filed an originating application for judicial review naming the Australian Human Rights Commission and two officers of the Commission as respondents (AHRC bias proceeding). The applicant seeks a range of orders, including an order under s 16 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) that the decision made by the Commission to terminate the applicant’s complaint be quashed.

25    The applicant has filed one interlocutory application in the AHRC bias proceeding seeking orders including “removal” of registrars of this Court from the applicant’s matters, and reversal of decisions that are alleged to have been made by registrars of the Court, including relating to “oral appeals” alleged to have been made by the applicant. At the case management hearing on 30 October 2018 I adjourned this interlocutory application to today, 3 December 2018, and I have yet to rule on it.

VID 1407 of 2018 – discrimination proceeding

26    On 5 November 2018, the applicant filed an originating application under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act in proceeding VID 1407 of 2018 (the discrimination proceeding). The applicant named as respondents to that proceeding the University of Melbourne, the Australian Human Rights Commission, and 16 others.

27    The applicant seeks leave to make the originating application, because leave would appear to be required under s 46PO(3A)(a) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act. By the application the applicant alleges that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination at the University of Melbourne, and seeks interlocutory and final injunctive relief and other orders, including orders of a mandatory nature. The applicant makes a number of allegations, including that the termination of his complaint by the delegate of the President of the Commission was “generally dishonest and fraudulent”.

28    On 19 November 2018, the applicant filed in the discrimination proceeding the interlocutory application referred to at paragraph [1] above

The application for recusal

29    On 12 November 2018 the applicant sent an email to my chambers demanding that I vacate all orders made on 30 October 2018, and that I immediately recuse myself from the four proceedings involving the applicant. The basis for the demand was expressed as follows –

Justice Wheelahan has served, and continues to serve, the objectives of the University of Melbourne. This service is by way of financial and other support over a protracted period of time, spanning at least 2012 through 2017, and beyond. His Honor is a member of the Chancellor’s circle at the University of Melbourne, and a listed “supporter” of the University of Melbourne’s Law School Honor Roll. Members of the Chancellors-circle explicitly make financial contributions in support of, and service to, the objectives of the University of Melbourne. The evidence of Justice Wheelahan’s, and his wife’s, commitment and service to the University of Melbourne can be found in Appendix 1, and at the following links:

30    The applicant then listed four links to web pages of the University which record that, together with other alumni, my wife and I gave financial support to the Melbourne University Law School over the period 1 April 2011 to September 2017.

31    A fifth link records that in 2016 my wife and I, together with many other people, made a gift to the University of between $1,000 and $2,499, thereby making us “Chancellor’s Supporters”. The web page for the “Chancellor’s Circle” states that –

The Chancellor’s Circle is a community of generous benefactors who demonstrate leadership and commitment to the University of Melbourne through annual gifts of $1,000 or greater.

With more than 1,400 affiliates, the Chancellor’s Circle plays an important role in supporting the University’s pursuit of innovative research, high-quality teaching and learning, and support for students

32    In response to the applicant’s email of 12 November 2018 my chambers advised the parties that I would hear any application for recusal at the case management hearing, which had been fixed for 3 December 2018.

33    On 19 November 2018, the applicant filed the interlocutory application that is referred to at [1] above. The application seeking an order that I recuse myself is supported by an affidavit of the applicant affirmed 19 November 2018. In his affidavit which is titled “Affidavit: Justice Wheelahan’s Apprehended and Manifest Bias”, the applicant refers to the filing of a “Judicial Complaint”. The applicant states that his complaint rests on –

(b)    Perceived/theoretical bias - Documented long-standing contribution and support to the Respondents by the Presiding Judge

(c)    Manifest/expressed bias; and

(d)    Conduct contrary to the Federal Court Act 1976; Federal Court Rules 2011 and Federal Court Practice Notes, among other laws.

34    The applicant refers in his affidavit to the links to the five web pages to which I have referred above. The applicant characterises the financial support of the University as “a commitment to achieving and serving the objectives of the University of Melbourne”, which “necessarily implies that, at least in principle/theory, Justice Wheelahan must also be committed to defeating each of the cases brought in the referenced files”. The applicant also claims that “[d]uring court proceedings on 30 October 2018, Justice Wheelahan’s bias manifested itself in a pattern of perverse, patent, prolific, potent and perfidious prejudice.” The applicant then sets out over eight pages of his affidavit in paragraphs numbered from [14] to [49] a series of complaints about the conduct of the case management hearing on 30 October 2018, and the procedural orders that were made at that hearing.

35    The principles concerning apprehended bias are well-established. Apprehended bias may be demonstrated by showing that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: Ebner v Official Trustee (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 344 [6]; Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 at 437 [31]. The assessment is objective: Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 493 [12]; Grassby v R (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 20.

36    Grounds giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias may take many forms. Any consideration of the appearance or presence of bias requires identification of the grounds which are alleged. In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 345 [8], Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that two steps are required –

First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an ‘interest’ in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.

37    In Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls at 445 [64] Gummow A-CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ emphasised the need to articulate the connection between the events giving rise to the apprehension of bias, and the possibility of departure from impartial decision-making.

38    In Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 74 Deane J in a passage in a dissenting judgment, which is often cited, identified four main categories of apprehended bias –

(a)    disqualification by interest, that is to say, cases where some direct or indirect interest in the proceedings, whether pecuniary or otherwise, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of prejudice, partiality or pre-judgment;

(b)    disqualification by conduct, including published statements, which category consists of cases in which conduct, either in the course of, or outside, the proceedings, gives rise to such an apprehension of bias;

(c)    disqualification by association, which will often overlap the first and consists of cases where the apprehension of pre-judgment or other bias results from some direct or indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons interested in, or otherwise involved in, the proceedings; and

(d)    disqualification by extraneous information, which will commonly overlap the third and consists of cases where knowledge of some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance gives rise to the apprehension of bias.

39    In this case, the applicant’s claim of apprehended bias rests upon an alleged association or relationship with the University of Melbourne arising from past financial donations. To sustain the claim of apprehended bias, the applicant must establish that, evaluated objectively, the fact of charitable donations to the University might lead a fair-minded lay observer reasonably to apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the applicant’s claims.

40    Judges are selected for judicial office because of their learning and training in the law, integrity, and capacity for impartiality: R v His Honour Judge Leckie; Ex parte Felman (1977) 18 ALR 93 at 101. Appellate courts have cautioned against judges too readily acceding to applications alleging apprehended bias: Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) CLR 288 at 294. In Ebner v Official Trustee (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 348 [19]-[20], Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated –

19    Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their Judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular Judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the Judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.

20    This is not to say that it is improper for a judge to decline to sit unless the judge has affirmatively concluded that he or she is disqualified. In a case of real doubt, it will often be prudent for a judge to decide not to sit in order to avoid the inconvenience that could result if an appellate court were to take a different view on the matter of disqualification. However, if the mere making of an insubstantial objection were sufficient to lead a judge to decline to hear or decide a case, the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable.

41    Although it is important that justice be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone more likely to decide the case in their favour: Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352. There is an element of that concern in this case because the applicant in his affidavit has associated his claim of apprehended bias with a series of complaints about the case management hearing on 30 October 2018, which he claims resulted in procedural orders that were adverse to him. These complaints essentially amount to a lengthy collateral challenge to those procedural orders.

42    Other than the fact of the charitable donations, there is no other connection with the University of Melbourne alleged by the applicant. In particular, this is not a case where it is alleged that the judge has any personal connection with the administration or governance of a party before the Court: cf, R v Bow Street Magistrate; ex parte Pinochet (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 119; Trustees of the Christian Brothers v Cardone (1995) 57 FCR 327. In my view the fact that a judge has in the past made charitable donations to further the interests of education at the University of Melbourne would not lead a reasonably-minded lay observer to think that the judge might not bring a fair and impartial mind to deciding the issues that arise in this case. Assessed objectively and in accordance with the principles stated in Ebner v Official Trustee, there is no logical or reasonable connection between the fact of the charitable donations, and any reasonable prospect that the judge might not decide the case in an unprejudiced manner. I therefore reject the applicant’s application to the extent that it rests upon an allegation of apprehended bias arising from the fact of the charitable donations to the University.

43    During the course of the hearing today, I asked the applicant whether his reference to “manifest/ expressed bias” in his affidavit of 19 November 2018 was an allegation of actual bias, or an allegation of apprehended bias. I did not receive a clear answer to that question so I shall therefore consider the allegations on both bases.

44    Whereas an allegation of apprehended bias is to be assessed objectively by reference to the standard of the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer, an allegation of actual bias is directed to the actual state of mind of the judge in question. A claim of actual bias therefore requires evidence from which inferences concerning the judge’s actual state of mind might be drawn. In evaluating that evidence, actual bias on the part of a judge is to be regarded as a serious allegation, that must not be made lightly, and which must be the subject of clear and cogent proof: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140(2). In this case, the allegation of “manifest/expressed bias” is tantamount to an allegation that the judge will not in fact bring an unprejudiced and impartial mind to the determination of the issues in dispute, and it is that fact that must be proven.

45    To the extent that the applicant alleged actual bias, there is no evidence that supports the applicant’s claim. The applicant’s evident dissatisfaction with the procedural orders made on 30 October 2018, which finds expression at paragraphs [14] to [49] of his affidavit affirmed 19 November 2018 is not a proper basis on which to make an allegation of actual bias.

46    To the extent that the applicant’s reliance on the procedural orders made 30 October 2018 and the conduct of that hearing are alleged to form the basis for an allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias, I reject that claim also.

47    The applicant relied upon what he perceived to be differential treatment of him and the respondents. In oral submissions, the applicant claimed that I had cited a case for the benefit of the respondents but had not assisted him. The example which the applicant gave was the decision of the High Court in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13, which formed the basis of a question which I put to the legal representative of the Australian Human Rights Commission at transcript page 25, line 21, where I asked the following question –

Mr Edgerton, do your clients take the position that they will actively defend this proceeding or do they take the position consistent with the principles discussed in Hardiman?

48    I then explained the purpose of this question to the applicant at transcript page 26, line 42 to transcript page 27, line 5 –

Let me just explain to you what my concern is about the case as constituted in that way. It’s conventional that where decision-making bodies are joined as parties to proceedings, where the decisions of those bodies are challenged, it’s conventional for the bodies, normally, not to play any active part in the proceeding. That is, it’s not their role to defend the correctness or otherwise of the decision. Normally, the court is assisted by a contradicting party; that is, to put the opposing case. And what Mr Edgerton has proposed is that the Attorney-General might indicate whether or not the Attorney-General will take up the position of the contradicting party.

49    The applicant complained that I had not considered his application for relief against the Fair Work Ombudsman. The applicant relied in this respect on s 682 of the Fair Work Act, which is a provision which states the functions of the Fair Work Ombudsman. The applicant claimed that the Fair Work Ombudsman should be representing him in these matters and should launch an investigation into the suggested breaches of the Fair Work Act. The applicant made these claims at the hearing on 30 October 2018 at transcript page 21, lines 30 to 35 –

But, your Honour, before we proceed any further discussing orders, could we turn our attention to the orders sought in the originating application filed about 1 August 2018 in respect of file VID950/2018. In particular, there is a contemplated breach of the Fair Work Act under s 682 of the Fair Work Act. The Fair Work Ombudsman should be representing me in these matters, should also launch an investigation into the suggested breaches of the Fair Work Act to date.

50    I then stated to the applicant at transcript page 24, lines 6 to 8 –

Mr Thomas, I will not be entertaining any applications or make any orders against any persons or bodies or offices who are not parties to a proceeding before the court.

51    I also stated at transcript page 23, lines 21 to 28 –

Mr Thomas, it’s a matter for you as to what s 682(1) means but one thing you might consider is whether that is merely the conferral of a function, rather than the prescription of an obligation on the Fair Work Ombudsman to represent everyone.

52    The applicant also claimed today that the decision of the Australian Human Rights Commission to reject his claim was “invalid under the Constitution”. The applicant also made references to the prospect that his student visa may shortly expire.

53    The applicant also complained that orders proposed by him were not made, yet orders proposed by the respondents were made. I shall not undertake an analysis of the extent to which the orders made on 30 October 2018 reflected orders proposed by the respondents. The orders made were, however, no more than the outcome of the consideration of the procedural issues that arose at the case management hearing.

54    The applicant’s perception that applications he made to the court on 30 October 2018, or otherwise, were not determined favourably to him does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not determine the matters raised by the applicant fairly and impartially.

55    I conclude that the conduct of the hearing on 30 October 2018 and the procedural orders that were made that day do not give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. The applicant’s application in paragraph 3 of the interlocutory application filed 19 November 2018, that I recuse myself, is therefore dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    3 December 2018

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES