FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Liang v LV Property Investments Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1057

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appellant’s appeal be dismissed.

2.    The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1    The appellant, Ms Liang, has appealed a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 13 August 2014 wherein his Honour Judge Burchardt dismissed an application for review of a sequestration order made on 9 January 2014 by Registrar Scott in respect of Ms Liang’s estate. The sequestration order was made on the petition of the first respondent (LV Property). The second respondent (Deputy Commissioner) is a supporting creditor.

2    The appeal comes before me in the exercise of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under s 25(1AA)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

3    In my opinion, for the reasons set out below, the appeal should be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

4    It is convenient to begin by summarising the background to the present appeal as disclosed in the material that was before his Honour and that was presented on appeal.

5    Ms Liang filed various affidavits in support of her application for review in the Federal Circuit Court, namely affidavits sworn 30 January 2014, 11 April 2014, 12 May 2014, 14 May 2014 and 6 June 2014 and an unsworn affidavit relating to Supreme Court of South Australia proceedings. Affidavits of debt were filed by the respondents, as described below. An affidavit sworn 5 June 2014 of Mr Christopher Limmer was filed by LV Property but not read, although certain annexures to it were tendered as exhibits. It should be noted that his Honour stated at [31] that the materials filed by Ms Liang were “somewhat densely packed and very hard to follow”. On appeal before me, Ms Liang filed further affidavits sworn 4 November 2014, 26 November 2014, 8 December 2014, 23 January 2015 and 17 April 2015. To the extent that these further affidavits constituted new evidence, I would grant leave under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act for Ms Liang to rely upon the same.

6    Ms Liang represented herself at all times. In her affidavit of 30 January 2014, Ms Liang stated that she had been homeless since 2013. She has not had meaningful employment. It also appeared that what she described as the “Public Trustee and Guardianship Board SA” held funds on behalf of her husband from which she apparently received a weekly allowance. There is little doubt that at the time of the proceedings before his Honour and the time of the appeal before me that Ms Liang was not able to pay her debts as and when they fell due.

7    Ms Liang’s principal argument before his Honour and on appeal was that the sequestration order should not have been made against her as she had a counterclaim against LV Property that exceeded the relevant judgment debt.

8    It appeared from the evidence that Ms Liang and the petitioning creditor, LV Property, have been involved in a number of interrelated proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania concerning certain land dealings in that State. In various proceedings, Ms Liang has claimed $785,000 being repayment of a loan she had made to a third party and interest thereon. Ms Liang claimed that in 2007 she had lent funds, obtained by mortgaging certain of her own properties, to Welcom Pty Ltd, a company owned by a Mr and Mrs Heylen. It was said by Ms Liang that the funds were apparently used by Welcom Pty Ltd to purchase three properties in Tasmania (described as Sawyer Ave, Creek Rd and Lenah Valley Rd) which were to be the subject of a lucrative subdivision development. Ms Liang claimed that she thereby became a first mortgagee in relation to the properties in which Welcom Pty Ltd had invested Ms Liang’s loan. It was unclear into which property or properties Ms Liang’s loan had been invested. Further, it did not appear that any mortgage in her favour was registered over these properties. According to the title search records, it appeared that LV Property subsequently purchased the properties in July 2012. Transfer documents from the Tasmanian Land Titles Office showed a transfer of Sawyer Ave from Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd to LV Property and a transfer of Creek Rd from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia to LV Property. Ms Liang alleged that Mr and Mrs Heylen had become bankrupt “as a fraud” so that the properties could be sold at an undervalue by the mortgagee banks to LV Property. Ms Liang asserted that the properties were falsely valued and that the relevant titles were transferred unlawfully to LV Property. She claimed that she had in fact paid a $128,000 deposit to purchase the Sawyer Ave property. Ms Liang said that she had lodged caveats on the Sawyer Ave and Creek Rd properties in 2011 which she alleged were withdrawn without her consent or any court order. Ms Liang apparently lodged new caveats on these properties in 2012.

9    On 29 October 2012, LV Property and Mr Limmer obtained an order from the Supreme Court of Tasmania (in proceeding number 431 of 2012) dismissing an action that had been brought by Ms Liang with costs. Pursuant to a certificate of taxation dated 5 February 2013 issued in that proceeding, the costs of LV Property and Mr Limmer were taxed in the sum of $6,116.25. It does not appear that any application has been made by Ms Liang to set aside the relevant order of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. This order provided the foundation for the judgment debt which became the subject matter for a bankruptcy notice as described below.

10    In respect of the 2012 caveats lodged by Ms Liang, LV Property applied for orders for their removal in the Supreme Court of Tasmania (in proceeding number 817 of 2012). It obtained an order on 17 December 2012 that caveats D68016 and D71421 and any other caveats lodged by or on behalf of Ms Liang as of the date of the order or in future over the Creek Rd property were to be removed. Another order was made by the Supreme Court on 9 May 2013 that caveats D60742, D68015 and D71422 and any other caveats lodged by or on behalf of Ms Liang as of the date of the order or in future over the Sawyer Ave property were to be removed. Ms Liang was also ordered to pay LV Property’s costs of its application, which were taxed in the sum of $8,173.87 on 28 October 2013.

11    On 10 April 2013, the Supreme Court of Tasmania made an order in proceeding number 877 of 2012 dismissing Ms Liang’s action against LV Property and Mr Limmer with costs. On 18 June 2013 their costs were taxed in the sum of $6,226.70.

12    On 9 May 2013, a bankruptcy notice was served on Ms Liang based on the debt arising from the 29 October 2012 order of the Supreme Court of Tasmania for the taxed costs of $6,116.25. The bankruptcy notice was not complied with.

13    LV Property obtained another order from the Supreme Court of Tasmania on 9 May 2013 (in proceeding number 253 of 2013) which dismissed Ms Liang’s action against LV Property and Mr Limmer with costs. Subsequently, on 28 October 2013 the costs of LV Property and Mr Limmer were taxed in the sum of $2,277.62.

14    On 22 November 2013, LV Property filed a creditor’s petition in the Federal Circuit Court against Ms Liang, claiming that Ms Liang owed it $6,116.25 pursuant to the 29 October 2012 order of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The act of bankruptcy relied upon was non-compliance with the bankruptcy notice.

15    On 9 January 2014, Registrar Scott made a sequestration order against the estate of Ms Liang.

16    A report to creditors dated 12 March 2014 by the trustee of Ms Liang’s bankrupt estate, Mr Alan Scott of BRI Ferrier, in addition to listing the debts of LV Property and the Deputy Commissioner, listed National Australia Bank as a creditor to whom Ms Liang apparently owed $280,761.12. The report referred to two properties of Ms Liang which had recently been sold by mortgagees in possession and a further four properties which Ms Liang had sold to satisfy her creditors.

17    It appears that no Statement of Affairs has been filed by Ms Liang.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDINGS

18    It is necessary to set out the sequence of events before the primary judge.

19    On 30 January 2014, Ms Liang filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court for review of the Registrar’s decision to make a sequestration order. In her application Ms Liang also sought further time to submit affidavits.

20    On 7 March 2014, the Deputy Commissioner filed a notice opposing Ms Liang’s application. He filed an affidavit of Andrew Buckley, an officer employed in the Australian Taxation Office, who deposed that as at the date of the sequestration order, Ms Liang owed $233,891.19 in tax related liabilities to the Commonwealth, which amount remained outstanding as at 7 March 2014. That amount still remains outstanding.

21    LV Property filed an affidavit of continuing debt of Mr Limmer sworn 12 March 2014 in which he deposed that, in addition to the $6,116.25 debt the subject of the bankruptcy notice, Ms Liang also owed LV Property $16,678.19 in respect of other costs orders issued by the Supreme Court of Tasmania.

22    On 13 March 2014, his Honour made orders allowing Ms Liang the further time that she had requested to file affidavits by 11 April 2014 and adjourned the matter for final hearing until 14 May 2014.

23    On 11 April 2014, Ms Liang filed an affidavit seeking an additional 14 days to lodge further material.

24    On 15 April 2014, his Honour extended the time for Ms Liang to file affidavits to 23 April 2014.

25    On 14 May 2014, Ms Liang made an application to adjourn the hearing. The primary judge delivered an ex tempore ruling on Ms Liang’s further adjournment application. His Honour noted that Ms Liang had had two months to file her supporting material. Ms Liang’s asserted position was that if she was granted a four week adjournment she would be able to file the evidence that she said was relevant. His Honour informed Ms Liang that she should understand that the granting of any further delay would be most improbable. Nevertheless, his Honour ordered that the hearing of the application be adjourned to 11 June 2014 and that Ms Liang had until that date to file her material.

26    The application for review was heard by his Honour on 11 June 2014. The hearing was listed in Melbourne rather than Hobart to suit Ms Liang’s convenience.

27    Ms Liang sought to file further material at the hearing but his Honour declined that request. In his reasons delivered on 13 August 2014, his Honour noted that Ms Liang had been given a considerable period of time in which to prepare for the hearing and had received a second adjournment on 14 May 2014.

28    His Honour dismissed the application for review. His Honour was not satisfied that Ms Liang had established that she was able to pay her debts or that she had “other sufficient cause” for the purposes of s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). His Honour ordered that:

(a)    the orders made by Registrar Scott on 9 January 2014 were affirmed;

(b)    the application for review be dismissed;

(c)    the costs of the application, including any reserved costs, were to be paid out of the estate of Ms Liang in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

29    Ms Liang has appealed that decision.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY of the appeal

30    Before dealing with Ms Liang’s grounds of appeal, it is necessary to outline the history of the proceedings before me. At Ms Liang’s request, I have granted numerous extensions of time to enable her to file material for the purposes of the appeal.

31    At a directions hearing on 26 September 2014, I made orders that Ms Liang file and serve by 24 October 2014 an amended notice of appeal setting out precisely the errors alleged to have been made by Judge Burchardt by reference to his reasons for judgment and identifying the basis upon which it was said that such errors had been made, and an index separately listing (with proper descriptions) each document, affidavit or evidence Ms Liang sought to rely upon for the purposes of her appeal.

32    At a further directions hearing on 5 November 2014, I made orders, as requested by Ms Liang, extending the time for her to file and serve the amended notice of appeal and index to 26 November 2014.

33    By an interlocutory application dated 26 November 2014, Ms Liang sought a further extension of time to file the amended notice of appeal and index.

34    At a further directions hearing on 9 December 2014, I again made orders extending the time for Ms Liang to file and serve the amended notice of appeal and index to 9 January 2015. I also ordered that Ms Liang file and serve written submissions limited to ten pages by 9 January 2015. I also set down the appeal for hearing on 13 February 2015.

35    On 12 January 2015, Ms Liang filed an amended notice of appeal of ten pages containing four grounds of appeal and multiple sub-grounds. In her amended notice, Ms Liang stated that evidence would be ready for the appeal hearing to establish alleged fraud on the part of LV Property. For convenience, I have set out in a schedule to these reasons her grounds of appeal as she has expressed them in the amended notice.

36    By email of 17 January 2015 to my chambers, Ms Liang indicated that she had not yet filed the index listing the material which she intended to rely upon but that she would file that index “in the next few days”. She also referred to “several important affidavits and evidences” being ready before the hearing on 13 February 2015. By email of 19 January 2015 from my chambers to the parties, I directed that Ms Liang file the material referred to in my orders of 9 December 2014 by 23 January 2015 and that any other material referred to in Ms Liang’s email was also to be filed by 23 January 2015.

37    At the hearing on 13 February 2015, Ms Liang sought an adjournment of the hearing in order to prepare and file further material. It was unclear precisely what that further material might be, but it appeared to include matters relating to the alleged fraud by LV Property and a range of other matters; that material was likely to have constituted new evidence. It was also unclear when any further material would be prepared and filed. Given that Ms Liang had had more than adequate time to file material, I refused that application for an adjournment. The hearing then proceeded on the material that had been filed by her to that point, including the evidence that had been before the primary judge.

38    But at the conclusion of the hearing I granted Ms Liang leave to file any further material upon which she intended to rely by 10 March 2015. It was made clear to Ms Liang that further delays would not be tolerated. I also indicated to the parties that if further material was filed by Ms Liang, I would consider relisting the matter if necessary for further argument, but otherwise would hand down judgment after considering any further material that she had provided.

39    By email dated 10 March 2015, Ms Liang informed my chambers that she was unable to file the further affidavits that she sought to rely upon by 10 March 2015 due to illness and family issues.

40    By email dated 16 March 2015 from my chambers, I indicated to the parties that Ms Liang would be granted until 30 March 2015 to file the further material sought to be relied upon, but I reiterated that it could not be assumed that any further requests for extensions of time would be granted.

41    By email dated 30 March 2015 to my chambers, Ms Liang sought an extension of two weeks to file further evidence due to illness and financial hardship, stating that this would be “the final extension request at this stage”.

42    By email dated 31 March 2015 from my chambers, I granted one final extension of time for Ms Liang to file any further material by 17 April 2015. I also stated that no further extensions would be granted.

43    By email dated 17 April 2015 to my chambers, Ms Liang filed a further affidavit, the last paragraph of which contained a request for further time to file an additional four affidavits.

44    On 24 April 2015, Ms Liang sent an email to my chambers stating that she was “ill” and would file “the delayed affidavits and evidence next week”. Ms Liang sent another email to my chambers on 29 April 2015 stating that “the affidavits and annexures will be forwarded … soon”.

45    By email dated 29 April 2015 from my chambers, I declined Ms Liang’s request to file further new material given the numerous adjournments already granted. Despite this, Ms Liang sent further emails to my chambers on 1 May 2015, 6 May 2015, 18 May 2015, 17 August 2015 and 28 September 2015 attempting to file further material. I have not taken that material into account; it is too late and in any event would constitute new evidence that I would not grant leave to use and rely upon under s 27.

New evidence

46    At the hearing on 13 February 2015, Ms Liang sought leave to rely upon evidence in the form of an affidavit sworn 23 January 2015 with 125 pages of attachments that had not been before Judge Burchardt. I indicated to the parties that I would allow Ms Liang to make submissions on the affidavit and attached material but that I would consider later whether I would formally grant leave to Ms Liang to rely upon it. I would grant that leave, but the material does not assist Ms Liang to establish any error on the part of the primary judge.

47    I would also grant leave to Ms Liang to rely upon the material in her further affidavit of 17 April 2015, even though again much of that material also constitutes new evidence.

DEfects in amended notice of appeal

48    LV Property contended that the amended notice of appeal should be dismissed on the ground that it was incomprehensible and contravened r 36.01(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in that it did not state “briefly but specifically, the grounds relied on in support of the appeal”. I have not acceded to that submission, but I do agree that much of what has been put forward by Ms Liang is incoherent; alternatively, to the extent that it is coherent it does not establish the conclusions or legal consequences contended for.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

49    The amended notice of appeal contains four disjointed grounds of appeal and multiple sub-grounds. As the grounds of appeal overlap to an extent, it is convenient to consider them under separate headings corresponding, for the most part, to the conditions contained in s 52(2)(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), namely, whether within the terms of s 52(2)(a) Ms Liang is able to pay her debts (ground 3) and whether within the terms of s 52(2)(b) “other sufficient cause” has been shown such that a sequestration order ought not to have been made (grounds 1, 2 and 4). But first it is appropriate to set out some principles.

Relevant Legal Principles

50    A petitioning creditor has a prima facie right to a sequestration order once proof of the matters required by s 52(1) has been satisfied (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Cumins (2008) 101 ALD 78 (Cumins) at [14] per Gilmour J; Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639 (Cain v Whyte) at 646 and 648, the Court agreeing with Henchman J; Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 11 (Russell v Polites) at [23] and [24] per Flick J; Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407 at 414 per Dixon CJ and Webb and Fullagar JJ). There is no doubt that in the present case, LV Property put forward sufficient proofs to establish s 52(1). Nevertheless, there is a discretion to refuse such an order if the debtor is able to pay her debts (s 52(2)(a)) or for “other sufficient cause” (s 52(2)(b)). But the onus is on the debtor to establish either or both of the preconditions in s 52(2).

51    I do not need to elaborate on the principles concerning s 52(2)(a). But elaboration is necessary in relation to the concept of “other sufficient cause” under s 52(2)(b).

52    First, the circumstances which may constitute “other sufficient cause” are extremely variable, and it is inappropriate to catalogue or circumscribe them (Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1985) 5 FCR 1 at 5 per Fisher, Morling and Wilcox JJ; Cain v Whyte at 645).

53    Second, even if “other sufficient cause” has been shown, that merely enlivens the Court’s discretion to refuse to make a sequestration order. The power in s 52(2) is permissive, not mandatory. Even if a debtor can bring herself within s 52(2)(b), that does not entitle her to have a sequestration order refused (Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2015) 228 FCR 334 at [37] per Edmonds, Gordon and Beach JJ; Russell v Polites at [24] per Flick J).

54    Third, a court has a discretion to go behind a judgment. This may be exercised where the judgment was:

(a)    obtained by default or compromise;

(b)    procured by or tainted with fraud or collusion; or

(c)    obtained following an adjudication on the merits where both parties appeared, but where there are substantial reasons for questioning whether there is in substance a debt.

55    In each case a court may go behind the judgment to ascertain whether the judgment is founded on a real debt (Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 347 per Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ; Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137 (Ahern) at 147 and 148 per Davies, Lockhart and Neaves JJ). Primarily, this is a s 52(1)(c) question (Ali v Retail Decisions Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1130 at [17] to [20] per Bromberg J), although some authorities have also brought this within s 52(2)(b). In the present case, no reason has been shown by Ms Liang to go behind the judgment debt(s) of LV Property.

56    Fourth, a court should not proceed to sequestrate the estate of a debtor where an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on as the foundation for the bankruptcy proceedings, provided that the appeal is based on genuine and arguable grounds (Ahern at 148 per Davies, Lockhart and Neaves JJ; Rigg v Baker (2006) 155 FCR 531 (Rigg v Baker) at [67] per French J; Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1990) 95 ALR 525 at 532 per Burchett and Gummow JJ; Council of the City of Sydney v Obeid [2013] FCA 149 at [37] to [39] per Robertson J). This is also a s 52(2)(b) question. At the least, the existence of an appeal or leave to appeal application based upon genuine and arguable grounds may provide a basis for adjourning the hearing of the creditor’s petition, even if it does not provide a basis for ultimately refusing a sequestration order. But none of this is the present case. There is no such outstanding appeal or application in relation to the judgment debt. There is no extant proceeding or application seeking to set aside the same; and even if there were, such an application would have little if any prospects of success.

57    It should also be said that the mere fact that an appeal has been lodged does not without more avail a debtor in any event (Cumins at [17] per Gilmour J). The judgment debtor has to point to grounds having “a real chance of success on appeal” (Re Lewin; Ex parte Milner (1986) 11 FCR 312 at 318 per Pincus J). Mere assertion is not sufficient. The onus is on the judgment debtor to establish the substantial nature of the grounds of challenge (Re Verma; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 4 FCR 181 at 187 and 188 per Beaumont J; Cumins at [18] per Gilmour J).

58    Fifth, the existence of a cross-claim may be a “sufficient cause” if the claim, if successful, well exceeds the judgment debt.

59    An important distinction is to be made between a cross-claim which is likely to succeed and a cross-claim which is a bona fide and reasonably arguable claim, but where it is not established by the judgment debtor that it is likely to succeed. In the former case, where it is established that the claim is likely to succeed, such a claim may warrant the refusal of a sequestration order (Rigg v Baker at [66] per French J; Singh v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 889 (Singh) at [14] per Collier J). In the latter case, only a basis for adjourning the creditor’s petition may be established, but the ultimate refusal of a sequestration order may not be justified (Rigg v Baker at [66] per French J).

60    There is a theoretical question. If you have the latter case, do you establish a “sufficient cause” at all? Some authorities suggest that you do not and that only cases in the former category fit within s 52(2)(b) (St George Bank Ltd v Helfenbaum [1999] FCA 1337 at [13] per Sundberg J; ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Young (2009) 260 ALR 515; [2009] FCA 1169 at [85] per Lindgren J; Hilellis v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1139 at [8] per Hely J; Singh at [14] per Collier J; Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193 at [85] to [87] per Cowdroy J). In my view, these authorities support what was said in Rigg v Baker that cases in the former category support a refusal of a sequestration order, whereas cases in the latter category support only an adjournment of the petition. In such a case, a “sufficient cause” has not been shown. The discretion to adjourn does not then arise under s 52(2), but rather arises more generally (s 33) as to when the petition should be decided. In any event, there is little doubt that the discretion to adjourn arises in the latter case (Re Schmidt; Ex parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111 at 116 per Gibbs J).

61    It is important to emphasise that a judgment debtor does not establish a bona fide and reasonably arguable claim by merely producing a statement of claim in a separate proceeding or by pointing to such litigation or indeed by bare assertion; Ms Liang’s position falls into that last category. There must be sufficient evidence or other material to show that it is reasonably arguable or of substance. This may require prima facie verification of the key factual elements as well as demonstrating legal tenability.

62    Finally and separately, a decision to adjourn a hearing constitutes an exercise of a court’s discretion. An appellant bears a heavy onus in establishing that the exercise of such a discretion has miscarried. A court will be reluctant to interfere with the exercise of such a discretion.

Ground 3 — section 52(2)(a)

63    There is little doubt that before the primary judge, indeed before me, Ms Liang did not establish s 52(2)(a). She is and was at the relevant time insolvent.

64    Ground 3 of the amended notice of appeal included a number of rolled up propositions. Ground 3 asserts that his Honour erred in taking into account the tax liability in assessing Ms Liang’s financial situation. But Ms Liang admitted that she had not paid the tax debt of $233,891.19 that was owed to the Deputy Commissioner. She attributed this failure to the alleged fraud of LV Property and the consequent sale of all her properties. She also asserted that her “past financial asset” would have been enough to pay the tax owing. Further, Ms Liang submitted that the taxation amount was somehow “evidence” that she had assets. Moreover, she further claimed that she did not regard tax as a “debt” and that it was a “contradiction” that she was living in destitute circumstances despite the amount of the tax owing. Ms Liang also listed six properties in South Australia and Tasmania in respect of which she said that she was either the owner or a lender but that such properties had been transferred either fraudulently or by invalid title documents thereby causing her significant financial loss of more than $2 million.

65    What all these rolled up propositions demonstrated was in fact the reverse of what Ms Liang was contending. They demonstrated that she was insolvent.

66    LV Property submitted that its debts had not been paid by Ms Liang and there was no reliable evidence of Ms Liang’s financial position. I agree. The Deputy Commissioner submitted that Ms Liang had not successfully contested the amount of the debt owing to it and that there was no reason to exclude such a debt from the consideration of her solvency. I also agree.

67    In terms of the evidence of solvency, his Honour referred to the following:

36.    Ms Liang said her properties in China and South Australia were all now gone, and if I understood her correctly, she may have asserted that there were 10 such properties, of which six were lost because of conduct of Mr Limmer. Ms Liang also dealt with renovation work which, as I understand it, may have taken place in relation to the South Australian property, but the submissions were so scattergun they were hard to follow.

37.    She said that her own mother could send her $70,000, and that her husband and she had separated because of a health issue in 2006. This would appear to be the person referred to in the Public Trustee correspondence.

38.    Ms Liang also asserted she had $97,000 from the sale of her home, held in the South Australian Supreme Court, and this, it would seem to me, was a reference to what I have described as the interpleader proceeding.

…

40.    Ms Liang said that on the previous day in the Supreme Court of South Australia, her counter-claim for $680,000 or more had been “cancelled” by the Supreme Court. She did not understand what was meant by cancelled.

41.    Ms Liang said that she had paid a deposit for the land in Tasmania and that it should therefore be hers, and she asked how the land, now worth $2 million, could be sold for $600,000. She said she could prove she was the first mortgagee. She referred to the values of property in Tasmania as possibly being $1.5 million, and if this was so, she would be able to reclaim the money and pay her tax and other liabilities.

…

66.    It is quite clear on the materials as they stand that Ms Liang is not able to pay her debts, even within the more extended meaning given to that terminology by the cases that have flown from Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666. Her own materials have suggested that from time to time, she has been all but destitute, living in a car, it would appear, over the Christmas period last year. Nothing suggests that any significant influx of funds has flown to her since then, save for the reference to the $1000 per week paid from the South Australian Guardianship Authority. This sum, however, is clearly payable to Ms Liang referable, inter alia, to the care of her son.

67.    In any event, a figure of $1,000 per week would not suggest that Ms Liang is able to pay the enormous amount clearly owing to the supporting creditor.

68.    Ms Liang has made glancing reference to the possibility of the receipt of $70,000 from her mother in China, but no evidence has been filed to support that hearsay assertion.

69.    I further note that Ms Liang might assert some, or even the whole, ownership of the $97,000, the subject of the inter-pleaded proceedings in South Australia but, once again, there is no definite proof that that money is partly or wholly owned by her.

70.    Even if I was to assume that all these figures were, as it were, to be assessed favourably to Ms Liang, it would go nowhere near to discharging the capital sums that she owes.

68    His Honour concluded at [71] that Ms Liang had not discharged the relevant onus. In my view, no error has been shown in his Honour’s findings or approach.

69    Ms Liang submitted no reliable evidence as to her financial position other than unsubstantiated statements in her affidavits and oral submissions. Moreover, the respondents’ debts have not been paid.

70    Further, the trustee in bankruptcy’s report discloses significant debts owed by Ms Liang. Further, no statement of affairs has been filed by Ms Liang.

71    Further, Ms Liang has asserted that she has approximately $97,000 which is the subject of interpleader proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia involving another creditor. Such assertions do not establish solvency. Indeed, once again they point to the opposite conclusion. Further, as to her asserted claims against other parties, that does not demonstrate present solvency.

72    Finally, part of ground 4, which I address later, is also relevant to s 52(2)(a). I have also rejected it for reasons that I later explain.

73    In my opinion, the only conclusion reasonably open to Judge Burchardt was to find that Ms Liang had not discharged the onus of establishing the condition set out in s 52(2)(a). That position has not changed in terms of the evidence filed before me.

grounds 1, 2 and 4 — section 52(2)(b)

74    Grounds of appeal 1, 2 and 4 concerning s 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) assert in summary that his Honour erred in determining that there was not other sufficient cause why a sequestration order ought not to be made because his Honour:

(a)    did not have all relevant evidence before him;

(b)    failed to allow Ms Liang to file further materials;

(c)    did not find that LV Property or Mr Limmer had committed fraud in relation to the Tasmanian property transactions which gave Ms Liang a claim exceeding the debt owing to the respondents; and

(d)    failed to take into account that the order underlying the bankruptcy notice was not a final order.

75    Sub-elements (a), (b) and (d) also have broader significance than the s 52(2)(b) lens.

(a)    Primary judge’s reasons — fraud

76    Under the heading “[i]s there other sufficient cause why a Sequestration Order should not be made?”, his Honour stated:

72.    As Ms Liang herself has said, this is, perhaps, the central part of the issue. She believes passionately that she has been defrauded from the benefits of a major land development in Tasmania. Whether this is put at the amount she herself loaned to the Heylens, which is in excess of $600,000, or the resultant profits that might be generated by the land development, which are clearly over a million dollars, if these matters were made out, they would certainly suggest that there might be a sufficient cause why an order ought not be made.

73.    The difficulty is, however, that Ms Liang has not persuaded the Court that the fraud she asserts is indeed established. Indeed, to the extent that the objective documentation shows anything, it would tend strongly in the opposite direction. The evidence so far as one could approach it with any measure of confidence suggests that LV Property and Mr Limmer have engaged in no fraudulent activity at all. To the extent that there appears to have been any kind of curial disposition of any of the matters in conflict, LV Property and Mr Limmer appear to have succeeded on each occasion.

74.    As already mentioned more than once in this judgment, fraud is a very serious matter requiring cogent proof. Such proof is simply not available. In my view, there is not sufficient cause within the meaning of s.52(2) that a Sequestration Order ought not be made.

…

77.    It is clear that the mere fact that the applicant has ongoing claims in the South Australian Supreme Court and, it would appear also, in the Supreme Court of Tasmania is not of itself enough to establish the applicant’s case.

77    Further, his Honour stated at [56]:

I should say that counsel’s account of the events in Tasmania, taken together with the exhibits filed at the hearing, suggests, as counsel submitted, that whatever complaints the applicant may have really should more properly be pursued against entities other than LV Property or Mr Limmer.

78    In my view, no error has been demonstrated in relation to the primary judge’s treatment of these questions.

(b)    Alleged fraud

79    Ground 1 asserts that Ms Liang had won an appeal against LV Property and had a judgment set aside in proceeding number 1088 of 2012 in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. It is said that this allowed her to file a defence in that proceeding and accordingly her counterclaim against LV Property was still on foot for the money that she had allegedly lent for the Tasmanian land development.

80    The reality is that in that proceeding, LV Property had sought declaratory orders against Ms Liang that she had no interest in the Sawyer Ave or Creek Rd properties. Orders were entered in favour of LV Property by the Supreme Court following Ms Liang’s default in filing a defence. By consent, those orders were set aside as irregular and defective. No orders as to costs were made and no further steps taken in that proceeding. These circumstances do not establish that Ms Liang has any reasonably arguable or likely claim against LV Property.

81    Ground 2 of the amended notice of appeal asserts that Ms Liang has an entitlement to claim money owing to her based on alleged fraudulent activities of LV Property and Mr Limmer in relation to the Tasmanian land dealings which claim was in excess of the debts owing to the respondents. In particular, Ms Liang has claimed that LV Property had engaged in fraud in the valuations of the land and in obtaining title to the Sawyer Ave and Creek Rd properties. She has also made an allegation that LV Property committed fraud together with Mr and Mrs Heylen. Ms Liang has also alleged that there had been an unlawful sale of the land by the mortgagees and that fraud was alleged against both the mortgagee and LV Property.

82    Generally, Ms Liang has asserted that LV Property was engaged in fraudulent activities which gave rise to an offset claim against LV Property which exceeded the debt the subject of the bankruptcy notice.

83    But Ms Liang’s allegations of fraud are unsubstantiated assertions. LV Property purchased Sawyer Ave and Creek Rd from the mortgagees of those properties pursuant to the mortgagees’ powers of sale and it has relied on the indefeasibility of its title.

84    In my view, general assertions are insufficient to establish fraud or to provide a reasonably arguable foundation for that assertion. Moreover, it is not sufficient to state facts and circumstances which merely imply that a fraud of some kind was committed. Ms Liang, in substance, has not provided anything more than unsubstantiated if not misconceived assertion.

85    This is to be contrasted with part of the documentary evidence tendered by LV Property before his Honour which included:

(a)    An historical title search showing the transfer of 9 Sawyer Avenue, West Moonah, Tasmania more particularly contained in Certificate of Title Volume 127497 Folio 1 (“Sawyer Avenue”) to LV Property following the discharge of a mortgage from Welcom Pty Ltd in favour of Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd.

(b)    An historical title search showing the transfer of 48 Creek Road, Lenah Valley, Tasmania more particularly contained in Certificate of Title Volume 127497 Folio 2 (“Creek Road”) to LV Property following the discharge of a mortgage from Welcom Pty Ltd in favour of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the CBA).

(c)    A contract and a transfer of Sawyer Avenue to LV Property by Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd under a power of sale.

(d)    A contract and a transfer of Creek Road to LV Property by the CBA under a power of sale.

86    Moreover, s 40(2) of the Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) has the effect that LV Property’s title to Creek Road and Sawyer Avenue are indefeasible subject to various exceptions including fraud (s 40(3)(a)). Section 41(1) of the Land Titles Act has the effect that a purchaser of land need not make enquiries into the circumstances underlying a transfer of land except in the case of fraud. Section 81(2)(c) of the Land Titles Act applies s 41 to mortgagee sales.

87    Ms Liang submits that Judge Burchardt erred in not finding that LV Property engaged in fraud in relation to obtaining title to Sawyer Avenue and Creek Road. But there is no evidence of fraud, only assertions of fraud in Ms Liang’s affidavits and by her in oral submissions. Moreover, such material did not even establish a reasonably arguable case to that effect.

88    Ms Liang asserts that she is the rightful first mortgagee of Sawyer Avenue and Creek Road. But the evidence does not show that a mortgage was ever registered to her against either property prior to their transfer to LV Property through the exercise of other mortgagees’ powers of sale.

89    Perhaps Ms Liang may have had or has a claim against other third parties rather than LV Property. But this is not relevant to these proceedings. Ms Liang has not provided evidence of fraud which reaches anywhere near the threshold to set up an arguable claim against LV Property let alone to impeach the otherwise indefeasibility of LV Property’s title.

90    Ground 4 of the amended notice of appeal reiterates that Ms Liang has a legal claim to certain money or real property. Accordingly, she says that she would need to lodge caveats on and re-mortgage certain properties of which she was not registered proprietor in order to obtain the funds required to satisfy her debts. Such assertions do not satisfy the elements of s 52(2)(a). Moreover, the mere assertion of a claim does not satisfy the elements of s 52(2)(b) either.

91    In my opinion, Judge Burchardt made no error in dealing with these matters.

(c)    Admission of further evidence

92    Ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal in substance asserts that his Honour erred in not accepting Ms Liang’s request to file further documents at the hearing on 11 June 2014. Ground 1 also states that Ms Liang was not able to file her evidence on time even though several extensions of time had been granted. She referred to “unexpected extraordinary circumstances” including illness, financial difficulties and the “Public Trustee” ceasing “rental payments and maintenance”. In my view, no error was made by his Honour, whether one treats this complaint as part of the s 52(2)(b) question or more generally in terms of an asserted lack of procedural fairness.

93    Ms Liang asserts that his Honour erred at [32] and [55] where his Honour stated:

32.    Ms Liang commenced the proceeding by seeking to file further materials. In view of the time already granted to her at her request, I declined her permission to file further material in Court.

55.    In reply (although, being unrepresented, Ms Liang was not restrained to matters arising from counsel’s submissions), Ms Liang repeated her criticisms of the course of dealings with the properties in Tasmania. She intimated from time to time that she was offering to provide to the Court numerous documents that were plainly on the bar table before her, but I did not accept them. No formal application to tender any documentation was made. Her submissions were, I regret to say, somewhat chaotic in their character but appeared to arise from Ms Liang’s perception that she had a valid prior mortgage to the Tasmanian properties, which had been defeated by the conduct of Mr Limmer.

94    In my view, as is apparent from the chronology that I have set out earlier, his Honour had already granted significant indulgences to Ms Liang to prepare and file her material. Further, there was no proper description given by Ms Liang as to what further evidence was available to be put before his Honour that might have otherwise persuaded him to accede to her application to set aside the sequestration order.

95    Ms Liang did not make any specific submissions as to the detail of what other evidence might be available. There remains no comprehensible evidence from Ms Liang as to what other detailed and probative evidence was available that Judge Burchardt should have considered and that was reasonably capable of potentially changing the result.

96    Judge Burchardt had already granted significant indulgences to Ms Liang with respect to permitting her to file her materials. Moreover, a further adjournment would have unfairly prejudiced the respondents and further delayed the matter.

97    In my view his Honour made no error in not permitting Ms Liang to file further materials from the bar table or in not further adjourning the matter. This was a matter well within his Honour’s exercise of discretion on a matter of practice and procedure. No error is demonstrated.

(d)    Finality of costs order

98    Ground 2 of the amended notice of appeal alleges that the order of the Supreme Court of Tasmania that formed the basis of the bankruptcy notice did not constitute a final judgment or order for the purposes of s 40(1)(g). Ms Liang suggested that the bankruptcy notice and the creditor’s petition were based on an interim costs order of the Supreme Court of Tasmania and that the Supreme Court matters were ongoing. Ms Liang’s assertion can be assessed either in terms of whether the elements of s 52(1) were satisfied or under s 52(2)(b). But whichever context is used, the point fails.

99    A final judgment or order is one that finally determines the matter in dispute. The matter in dispute can be an order as to costs. Further and in any event, the costs order with the completion and certification of taxation is sufficient to found a bankruptcy notice by virtue of the deeming provision of s 40(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

100    In the present case, the bankruptcy notice annexes an order of the Honourable Associate Justice Holt of the Supreme Court of Tasmania made on 29 October 2012 together with a certificate of taxation dated 5 February 2013. There is no substance to the suggestion that the bankruptcy notice is invalid due to the lack of a final judgment or order.

Conclusion

101    I have considered all material filed by Ms Liang up to and including 17 April 2015 and the detailed assertions set out in her amended notice of appeal.

102    In my opinion, neither her grounds of appeal nor more generally her assertions have been substantiated.

103    Her appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    29 September 2015

SCHEDULE

Grounds of Appeal

1.    That his honorable Judge Burchardts has made the error on, that in his view, that there is not sufficient cause, within the meaning of s 52 (2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, that a sequestration order, ought not be made. By reference to Judge Burchardts' reasons for judgment: Paragraph 73, 74, 77. Judge Burchardt's opinion, based on that he has not yet seen the full evidence.

1)    The appellant Yan Liang hereby states, that evidences and proofs, are available. And will be ready for Federal Court of Australia's Appeal. Which will establish that L V Property Investment Pty Ltd and associates, were doing Fraud. Judge Burchardts said “L V Property and Mr Limmer appear to have succeeded on each occasion” was also an error. the past record was, that in No. 1088 of 2012 of the Supreme Court of Tasmania matter, that Ms Yan Liang and her lawyers, Leonard Ferandez Barristers and Solicitors, have won an appeal, and did set the wrong judgment aside. which allowing Yan Liang's party, as the Hobart 3 properties and 114 lots development land areas' in fact first mortgage lender, and its 5 years proceedings' financial lender, continuing to counterclaim her home loan and interests amount, that lent into, and carried the Hobart subdivision land project, since 6/11/2007. In July/2012, L V Property Investment Pty Ltd and associates, have defaulted Yan Liang's party mortgage loan and interest repayment of $785,000 due on 6/11/2010. Thereafter, incurred further damages, to Yan Liang's family.

2)    His honorable judge Burchardts said "fraud is a very serious matter requiring cogent proof." That Yan Liang's party totally agrees. Then Judge Burchardts said "such proof is simply not available" was an error. Conspiracies to take large financial advantage of others, planning to default, doing fraud with dishonesty, were normally very hard to find evidence. especially if the fraud which planned to take large financial advantage, were premeditated in-between professional parties, as so called "white-collar crime Australia", it was almost impossible, to find enough evidence for a long time. But however, these evidences somehow, suddenly came out from several third parties' words and emails, from those illogical and strange things were kept happening in the past, from many contradictions of statements, from abnormal behaviors, and from leaked out hidden agreement and document. after putting all these jigsaw puzzles together with other facts, then realize Ian Heylen of Welcom Pty Ltd and Christopher Allan Limmer and its new company L V Property Investment Pty Ltd were doing fraud.

3)    His honorable Judge Burchardts actually realized Christopher Allan Limmer of LV Property Investment Pty Ltd was dishonest, reference to his reasons for judgment paragraphs 11 and 12, paragraphs 36, paragraphs 41, which he has mentioned part of my affidavits and oral submissions at court hearing, and he realized how hard the damages has impacted on me and on my family. It was another error made by Judge Burchardts that led to his judgment, reference paragraph 32 and paragraph 55 of reasons for judgment, on 11 June 2014, said by Judge Burchardts "Ms Liang commenced the proceeding by seeking to file further materials." "I declined her permission to file further material in Court." "from time to time that she was offering to provide to the Court numerous documents that were plainly on the bar table before her, but I did not accept them. no formal application to tender any document was made. Her submission were, I regret to say, somewhat chaotic in their character". Which this meant, the evidences were existing, but was not organized in the right manner, therefore, these evidences have not yet been reviewed by Court.

4)    The evidences were not able to lodge at the Federal Circuit Court on time, before Judge Burchardt, although several extension times, were kindly given. But due to unexpected extraordinary circumstances, the appellant Yan Liang, during May/2014 to July/2014, who was a victim as defaulted mortgage lender creditor, and a victim as defaulted owner creditors, was totally relay onto Public Trustee, on behalf of her husband James Longmuir, who lives at nursing home since year 2006, to pay rent for their teenage son Alastair Longmuir and herself. Which during these several weeks, in May to July/2014, Public Trustee has changed an officer, who has stopped the rental payments and maintenance, and kept asking Yan Liang to re write new applications and arranged appointments and meetings for about 7 times. without rental payment, lacking of food for the child, Alastair Longmuir left school and home, went to live in at his classmates' houses, my mother was in hospital in China, I therefore was wondering why I could not contact her at home by phone calls and by email at the time. not enough money for going to internet to do any paper work, could not print out and organize evidences for each party and Federal Circuit Court to review before the hearing. At the time, the appellant was in depression and lacking of many days' sleep therefore was exhausted. But has managed borrowed some money drove from Adelaide to Melbourne, with chaotic materials were on the bar table, for his honorable Judge Burchardts to have a look, but they appeared in a mess form, and have been rejected. The appellant will write affidavits, and put all important evidences together, for Federal Court of Australia, to review these past years' facts with available evidences.

2.    There was evidence before his honorable Judge Burchardts, that the amount of the primary debt, set out in this Bankruptcy notice, requested by L V Property Investment Pty Ltd and forced onto the appellant Yan Liang, was a little in excess of $6,000.

1)    That the said amount was for legal fees ordered in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, between the same parties, the Appellant Yan Liang and L V Property Investment Pty Ltd.

2)    It is a possibility that finial orders between the parties in these actions as to the issues and as to costs could be materially different in relation to who pays and in what amount or amounts.

3)    Although the appellant is now self representing, but since her loan and interest has been defaulted, thereafter incurred many related events of damages, the appellant has already paid her lawyers for more than $50,000. each of these lawyers, can forward a statement. and for Supreme Court of Tasmania Court matters, several hearings were actually in relation to Mr Nathan Munting's applications, Yan Liang has flown from Adelaide to Melbourne to Hobart, or flew from Adelaide to Sydney to Hobart for around 10 times, plus accommodation needs, at least $20,000 air plane tickets fees and accommodation costs, has been paid.

4)    That there are serious issues, of equity amount on properties, and disposition first mortgage loan and false valuations of lands and unlawful title transfers that are litigated in that Supreme Court of Tasmania, that the appellant's defaulted home loan and interest amount which used by development lands and project, were far greater than the amount of costs, as set out in the bankruptcy notice of $6,116.25. Reference to reasons for judgment, paragraph 5, the procedural history of the matter.

5)    the appellant hereby, again, especially points out to Ferderal Court of Australia, that Christopher Allan Limmer and associates, has advised his conspiracy partner, Ian David Heylen of Welcom Pty Ltd, claimed a fraud bankruptcy, when all development lands' valuations were increased, with planning permits were in places, and were still under the Heylens' and Welcom Pty Ltd's names, have not yet been sold. Ian Heylen through his emails, that has informed many people, these development lands, were expecting revenues of several million dollars profits. and wrote, these lands' values were largely increased. reference to paragraphs 35 reasons for judgment. However, associated with Limmer, has made Heylens claimed themselves bankrupt, then could hand over these lands to banks and pretending these development lands and properties were brick homes. Thereafter, instructed bank staff, to value it at below cost price, with Ian Heylen's wrong hidden instruction. which enabled Christopher Allan Limmer to deal with banks later on, with intentions to take large financial advantages and default lands' creditors as they have already planned. Hidden agreements were in between Heylen-Limmer. As his honourable Judge Burchardts understood appellant at the hearing and wrote "it is asserted that the bankruptcy of Heylens was a fraud advised by Mr Limmer." In Supreme Court of Tasmania, Christopher Allan Limmer gave his associate Judge Holt pressure, by inside his affidavit, wrote about himself might claim bankrupt. Therefore Judge Holt had no choice, but had to in favor of Limmer's party at the time, orders were set out by Mr Munting. But it was such a contradiction, for in other parts of the Limmer's affidavit, he admitted it was a $12 million dollar project, people could easily realize, these development lands, had much higher values than brick homes.

6)    In all the circumstances and in particular the ongoing litigations in between the parties, at Supreme Court of Tasmania matters, the appellant Yan Liang, besides according to law, claiming her $785,000 defaulted repayment, she has also aimed to help some other innocent people to get their financial equities back. As the appellant believed the development lands' true worth, can easily recovering at least part of these people's credits, Courts can realize these development lands have attracted huge amount of the interested parties, after the appellant shows the past evidences. The several court matters, were also involved the parties, such as Ian David Heylen and Welcom Pty Ltd, and La Trobe Financial, which I may make petition that signed up by other people, to against Heylens and Welcom P/L who was doing fraud, and to against Christopher Allan Limmer and L V Property Investment Property Pty Ltd if necessary. As to allow the Supreme Court proceedings, to go ahead properly, enable it to reach final judgment, the appellant's party needs Federal Court of Australia to set this bankruptcy order aside. In fact, that the first respondent L V Property Investment Pty Ltd as creditor, as for the reason of his solicitor Mr Munting's fee of $6000, could not reasonably claim, that in the middle of the ongoing Supreme Courts proceedings, in between the same parties, to have suffered or be at risk of suffering prejudice, by the setting aside of the sequestration order.

3.    The second respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, filed an affidavit on 7 March 2014, states that appellant Yan Liang needs to pay her wholly due tax amount $233,891.19. reference to paragraphs 15 reasons for judgment.

1)    Paying tax is everybody's obligation, if he or she was working or doing business. As the appellant, I am more than happy to pay my tax.

2)    The Deputy Commissioner of Australian Taxation by far should realize, that the first respondent L V Property Investment Pty Ltd, and its director Christopher Allan Limmer's misconducts with others, was actually the cause of, defaulted Yan Liang's home loan and interest repayment. Thereafter the default, all her properties have been one by one sold, therefore, the appellant Yan Liang hasn't yet paid the tax amount of $233,891.

3)    The appellant did not regard any person's tax amount as "debt", or regard Australian Taxation as the "creditor". for none of us has borrowed money from the Taxation Department. People were according to their incomes and business activities, do their best, to contribute his country, by carrying on all sorts of jobs and business. But in fact, the issued Tax due amount, was only a much smaller amount, comparing with the rest of the incomes and business profits, that were entitled as the tax payer's personal assets. It appeared as such a contradiction, that the appellant's tax duty is more than $230,000, but the appellant was living inside her car and then sleeps on the floor until today. which parties, have taken financial advantages of the appellant's past 23 years' assets? that were all consisting inside her several real estate properties, and also lent inside the related Hobart development lands.

4)    His honorable Judge Burchardts has made error on his conclusion on is Ms Liang able to pay her debts? reference to paragraphs 66, Judge Burchardts said " it is quite clear on the materials as they stand that Ms Liang is not able to pay her debts," " Her own materials have suggested that from time to time, she has been all but destitute, living in a car, it would appear, over the Christmas period last year." reference to paragraphs 67, said "a figure of $1,000 per week would not suggest that Ms Liang is able to pay the enormous amount clearly owning to the supporting creditor." The appellant hereby must point out, that Judge Burchardts has indeed made an error, on that he has misled parties to believe, that appellant's current or future income sources, is or will be responsible to pay the due amount Tax to commissioner of Taxation. But the genuine fact is, every person's due amount of tax, was actually a part of the past years' incomes or business profits, which the appellant's past financial asset, would be far more than enough, to pay the issued tax amount owed. Current income has current tax assessment; future income will incur future tax.

5)    As Judge Burchardts read that Public Trustee was paying the Appellant $1,000 per week on behalf of her husband James Longmuir. Which James indeed since year 2006 has been admitted to a nursing home due to Health condition by Royal Adelaide Hospital and by his other family members. Obviously, that my husband has not been working since year 2006. But for the past 8 years until today, he has never been on any center link payment and he is not on government pension. This because of although he is not working, but there was past years' incomes and financial asset, which he has worked 30 years for Australian government, also worked with me in properties renovations and shop business. Therefore, in this men-made crisis of L V Property Investment P/L and other parties, together were taking financial advantages of me, he can still support his child Alastair Longmuir and me through the Public Trustee. The question is, if a person without working for past 8 years still has large amount of finance, then where are my past 23 years' financial assets? that I have always been worked in business and employed people working together. The homeless photos of I was trying to survive in hot weather of Adelaide when living inside my car, were with registrar of Tasmania. As I have mixed up these photos that were taken on many different dates, but printed on papers without separate them according to the individual date, the registrar have not yet given them to his honorable Judge Burchardts. Reference to reasons for judgment paragraph 12 and 13. If anyone thought or said, that the appellant Yan Liang has lost money through bad investment, that I hereby state, that I have never involved into any sort of "investment" things, I was either as the property's owner, or as the properties' true mortgage lender, that these properties and lands, were agreed as my loan and interests' repayment's securities. by doing renovation works, improvement works, by gaining planning permits and changing the lands' uses, highly increased the properties' and lands' revenues of rental incomes and future profits, all related properties' and lands' valuations in relation to the appellant were actually increased. but by far all have been financially defaulted by the parties, who were bullying and taken advantages of the appellant. This unjustified situation, was an alarm and warning for societies, that to prevent this kind of horrible events, do not happen again, to innocent Australian families and especially to their children. that the Federal Court of Australia, should set the 9 January 2014 Sequestration Order aside, to let the Supreme Court matters take its course, to improve relevant real estate and property laws, improve judicial system, by combining the property and land titles legislations, valuations law, associated criminal laws together, and make a principal guidance, towards power of sales, to prevent large financial fraud, on properties and lands sales and on tittles transfers. The report will be given to Parliament and to Australian securities and investment commissions.

6)    Here are the figure of more than $2 million dollar financial asset, that were inside several real estate properties, by far all have been taken large financial advantages, by several parties, which including Christopher Allan Limmer and his new company L V Property Investment Pty Ltd. And his honorable Judge Burchardts has actually realized this situation. reference to his reasons for judgment paragraphs 36 " Ms Liang said her properties in China and South Australia were all now gone, and if understood her correctly, she may have asserted that there were 10 such properties, of which six were lost because of conduct of Mr Limmer. Ms Liang also dealt with renovation work which, as I understand it, may have taken place in relation to the South Australian property, but the submissions were so scattergun they were hard to follow." and then in paragraphs 41: "Ms Liang said that she had paid a deposit for the land in Tasmania and that it should therefore be hers, and she asked how the land, now worth $2 million, could be sold for $600,000. She said she could prove she was the first mortgagee. She referred to the values of property in Tasmania as possibly being $1.5 million, and if this was so, she would be able to reclaim the money and pay her tax and other liabilities."

7)    Here is the list of properties, which have been sold in year 2012 and 2013. that all have financially defaulted the appellant, either as properties' lender creditor, or as the owner creditors. Which according to property and land title legislations, and according to relevant criminal law sections, these land titles gained by fraud sales process, or gained by sales of property, based on land titles documents were in error, then these land titles by law were not valid and were instantly void. These properties are:

1.    22 Northcote TCE Gilberton South Australia SA 5081. Land title document were in error. Renovations have been done. Forgot to do report and reject the council rate's value. Transferred at less than the certified land value which valued by bank SA in year 2011 at $650,000 for its land only, at $1000 per square meter, regardless the house value is on top of the land, needs $250,000 to $300,000 if do replacement. Without auction. Reansfered at $550,000. Below the land value. Defaulted owner creditors and lender creditor, which were appellant and family member $200,000 to $300,000.

2.    221a Lenah Valley Road, Lenah Valley, Tasmania 7008. Defaulted appellant planning permits process incurred 5 years costs, advertisements fee. The 114 lots planning permits, included 66 lots subdivision planning permit which was for this property and land area.

3.    9 Sawyer Avenues West Moonah Tasmania 7009. Defaulted appellant's home loan and thereafter 5 years bank interests lent to carry on the year 2008's settlement and the development project process, achieved 114 lots subdivision planning permits for the area, 44 allotments for this property and its land area.

4.    48 Creek Road Lenah Valley, Tasmania 7008. Defaulted appellant's home loan and further lending of 5 years bank interests to carry on the December year 2007’s settlement and thereafter planning process 114 lots subdivision permits, 4 lots for this property and its land area.

Above no 2, 3, 4 properties and land areas, sold by fraud sales process, and transferred at fraudulent brick home prices base on hidden false valuations. Documents were all in errors. Mr Nathan Munting did not mention appellant's caveats D 5872 D 5873 caveats, which have not yet been canceled by court and were forbidden the land titles transfers. Defaulted the appellant $785,000 due on year 6/11/2010.

5.    20 Northcote TCE Gilberton South Australia 5081. Land title document was in error. Done property extensions in year 1996/1997. the appellant have not yet and forgot to report to land title department and reject its council rate value which misled the sale. Extension building records was with local Walkerville Council. Transferred at much less than the area's land value's only price, which would be $970,000 at $1000 per square. the house on top of land needs $450,000 for replacement. Transferred at $750,000, without auction. defaulted the appellant and her family $400,000-$600,000.

6.    173-175 Port Rd Hindmarsh South Aistralia 5007. land title document was in significant error, also sold by fraudulent sales process, with hidden false valuation. The singing school and hostel's renovations through year 2008 to year 2013, the last part of finance that enabled to finalize the works, was came from the appellant's 2 apartments sold in Beijing China in year end of year 2012, put into the properties' improvements. Without auction. Defaulted appellant $700,000 plus.

Above mentioned 6 properties plus 2 apartment in china has consisted more than $2 million dollar financial asset, which appellant have earned incomes and profits during the past 23 years' works and business. $85,000 or more of family member's past asset as further financial damage also needs to claim and pay back to innocent parties. Further caveats will be lodged on these defaulted properties, with Public Trustee's assistance.

4.    His honorable judge Burchardts was asking in his reasons for judgment Is Ms Liang able to pay her debts? (question on page 14) Is there other sufficient cause why a Sequestration Order should not be made?

1)    The appellant hereby states, the appellant is according to law claiming the defaulted financial equities or claiming the properties back, and able to pay the tax amount $233,891.91.

2)    The Sequestration Order should not be made, as the Appellant will need to put caveats then remortgage some of these above mentioned titles, then redeem the current parties on land titles out, so they can have their money back, or use it to buy other property instead. Which borrow bank's loan to remortgage, cannot have a Sequestration Order that against the appellant Yan Liang. When bank according to property's and land's true justified valuations to remortgage, at the same time, the appellant will borrow out the suitable equity amount to pay deputy commissioner of taxation wholly and pay Mr Munting's fee.