FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZZRA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 622

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The time for the filing of the appellant’s notice of appeal be extended to 5 March 2015.

2.    The appeal is dismissed.

3.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1    This is an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 21 November 2014. By that judgment, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for constitutional writs directed to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

2    The notice of appeal was not filed within the 21 day time limit imposed by r 36.03(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). An order extending the time within which to file a notice of appeal was made and the hearing of the appeal proceeded.

3    The grounds of appeal are:

1.    His Honour erred in finding that the Second Respondent did not fail to undertake its task of review and/or did not fail to consider an integer of the applicant’s claims by its failure to make findings as to the deaths of the applicant’s friends who were allegedly killed in Karachi because of their involvement in the Lashkar (peace committee).

2.    His Honour erred in finding that the Second Respondent did not fail, in its assessment of relocation, to consider the risk to the applicant of ‘generalized harm’ in Karachi.

3.    His Honour erred in finding that the Second Respondent did not fail, in its assessment of relocation, to consider whether the applicant was at risk of harm for his involvement in the lashkar (peace committee).

The Tribunal’s decision

4    The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. He is of Pashtun ethnicity. His home was in Koza Bandai in Swat in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of northern Pakistan.

5    By 2007, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (“the Taliban”) had seized control of most of the Swat Valley. In late 2007, the Pakistan army launched a military offensive against the Taliban. Some 2 million people were displaced from Swat and the surrounding area during the fighting. The Pakistan army ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley by mid-2009, and some people displaced by the fighting started returning home. However, there were ongoing attacks by the Taliban, including attacks on those seen as aiding the army. There is evidence that the Taliban has conducted targeted killings of its opponents both inside and outside Swat.

6    After the Taliban was ousted, “lashkars” were formed. These are irregular militias which were encouraged by the Pakistan army to fight insurgents or keep a lookout for and inform on Taliban insurgents. The Taliban, in return, has targeted lashkar members and their relatives. The lashkars are described in some of the evidence as “peace committees”, although other evidence suggests that peace committees are not identical to lashkars.

7    A large number of Pashtuns from the Swat Valley, including the appellant, fled to Karachi, in the south of Pakistan, during the military offensive. Karachi is a violent city. One report states:

Karachi has all the ingredients of an explosive cocktail – gang warfare, land grabbings, drugs, Islamist extremism, political rivalries, ethnic tensions, extreme poverty and mushrooming population owing to migration.

8    The appellant arrived in Australia on 30 September 2010 on a tourist visa. He applied for a protection visa. That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 7 November 2011. The appellant then applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision.

9    The Tribunal gave its decision affirming the delegate’s decision on 31 July 2013. The structure of the Tribunal’s reasons was to first summarise the appellant’s claims and evidence and independent country information and then set out its findings and reasons.

10    The Tribunal noted that the appellant’s claims for protection were on the basis that he faced a real chance of persecution at the hands of the Taliban because of his involvement with a political party, the Awami National Party (“ANP”), because of his anti-Taliban political opinion and because of his involvement in a lashkar in Koza Bandai. The Tribunal also noted his claim that it was not reasonable for him to relocate within Pakistan because he would remain at risk of being targeted and killed by the Taliban and because of the hardship that would be caused by relocation.

11    The Tribunal found that some important aspects of the appellant’s claims of involvement with the ANP were not credible [at para 108]. It considered that he was, at most, a supporter of the ANP, but did not accept that he was involved in any organised political activity [at para 113]. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant had greatly exaggerated the nature and extent of his involvement with the ANP [at para 111].

12    The Tribunal found that the appellant had not been as active with the lashkar in Koza Bandai as he had claimed [at para 115], but was prepared to accept that he took part in watches to look out for members of the Taliban and extremist activity after the army had regained control of the Swat Valley [at para 121]. The appellant claimed that in October 2009 he had received two letters from the Taliban accusing him of spying for the army [at para 117]. He claimed that in December 2009, three masked men came to his house looking for him and, when he ran away, they killed his father [at para 119]. The Tribunal rejected this evidence [at para 120]. The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had been identified by the Taliban as a person who had helped the army by providing information [at paras 116, 121 and 138].

13    The Tribunal concluded:

121.    …The Tribunal does not accept that the character of the applicant’s activity and profile was of a kind to spark such interest on the part of the Taliban people or like extremists and the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was in any way targeted in Swat although it accepts that the prevailing security situation there may have led the applicant to be afraid.

14    The Tribunal continued:

122.    …The Tribunal has accepted that the applicant has an anti-Taliban political opinion and helped the lashkar with watches in his area and it is these factors which, in the Tribunal’s assessment, are relevant to the chance that he could face persecution in his own home area in and around Koza Bandai in Swat.

…

125.    …Having regard to his particular profile the risk may not be great but the Tribunal considers that there is nevertheless a real chance that the applicant would face harm amounting to persecution in the event that he were to return to Swat.

15    Having reached this conclusion, the Tribunal said that it would proceed to consider whether the appellant could relocate to another area of Pakistan where there would not be a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason and, if so, whether it was reasonable for him to do so [at para 127]. The Tribunal proceeded to consider these issues by reference to possible relocation to Karachi [at para 129]. The appeal centres upon the Tribunal’s consideration of the appellant’s claims as to why he would be at risk of persecution despite relocation and why relocation is not reasonable.

16    In the Tribunal’s summary of the appellant’s evidence, it had noted that the appellant stated that his friend Shujat Ali had been killed by the Taliban in Karachi [at para 54]. The appellant said that Shujat was in the peace committee (or lashkar), but had no involvement in the ANP and had a low profile. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant claimed that his friends Rustam Khan, Illyas Khan and Sher Ali had also been killed in Karachi by the Taliban [at paras 31, 47 and 54]. Rustam Khan was also a member of the ANP but did not hold any senior position within the ANP. Illyas Khan had been helping the Pakistan army and the lashkar. The appellant said that if others with a low profile could be tracked down and killed in Karachi, there was nowhere in Pakistan where he would be safe [at paras 47, 53 and 56].

17    As to whether the appellant would face a real chance of persecution by the Taliban if he were to relocate to Karachi, the Tribunal said:

132.    The applicant has drawn attention to the presence in Karachi of Taliban and like extremists. He refers to a number of these people having been arrested, he says ‘every day’, and he refers to the killing of political leaders by the Taliban and of ANP people. He claims to fear that the Taliban have moved to different places in Pakistan. The applicant has named people he knows in Karachi who he claims have been killed. The applicant claims to fear that Taliban an such extremists who had run to Karachi from his home area might see him and they would know him. The applicant said he was ‘getting more threats in Karachi and had to leave…’. Despite this claim appearing to indicate that he had been threatened personally when he was in Karachi, the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was that he had not been but he said he had been afraid. Nothing happened to him in Karachi and he was there for some two months a year in the few years before he came to Australia. This does not necessarily mean that nothing will happen in the foreseeable future but it is nevertheless a relevant factor to weigh.

133.    The Tribunal accepts that there has been a growing presence of Taliban and like religious extremists in Karachi. It does not however accept the applicant is a person who has been of any interest at all to the Taliban and like extremists (the Tribunal has rejected the claim that the Taliban threatened and came looking for him in Swat) and does not accept that he would be identified as a person of interest, or sought out, by extremists in Karachi. The Tribunal notes that its assessment is that the chance that he could come to the adverse attention of Taliban people if he were to return to Swat is not great but could not be said to be remote having regard to the unsettled security environment there. But the character of the applicant’s activity and profile in Swat is not of a kind which would see these people looking out for him or tracking him down elsewhere.

…

139.    In summary and having considered the applicant’s claims and circumstances individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal considers that there is not more than a remote chance that the applicant would face persecution on account of his support for the ANP; his anti-Taliban political opinion; or having originated from Swat, if he were to return to live elsewhere in Pakistan, away from Swat and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There would be in the Tribunal’s view no appreciable risk of the feared persecution occurring outside these areas.

(Underlining added.)

18    The Tribunal then proceeded to consider whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate and live in Karachi. The Tribunal considered the security situation in Karachi, difficulties in finding employment, problems for his family with resettling in Karachi and problems with obtaining treatment for depression. As to the security situation, the Tribunal concluded:

142.    The Tribunal understands that there are terror and other attacks in many parts of the country. As is plain in the independent information about the security situation in Karachi set out earlier in this decision record, Karachi has long been a city where there are ethno-political and sectarian attacks. It has been described as an ‘explosive cocktail’. There are, however, reportedly some 18 million residents of the city (‘Karachi’s population explosion far greater than experts’ calculations’ Pakistan Today 6 December 2011) and the numbers of people killed or injured needs to be considered in this context and in light of information about the kinds of people most at risk of coming to harm – ANP and MQM people, gang members, political and religious leaders, and certain people who are members of minority religious groups.

143.    It has been submitted that the applicant would always be anxious if he were to return to Pakistan wherever he lived in the country. He would always be afraid that he could be attacked or killed. The Tribunal understands the applicant’s concern about the security situation in his country, including Karachi, but its assessment is that there is no appreciable risk that the applicant would come to harm as a result of such violence there. This is not to say that he would never be harmed: such a guarantee can never be made in respect of any location, including here in Australia, but the Tribunal does not consider that the poor security situation prevailing in Pakistan makes it unreasonable for an individual such as the applicant to return and live in a place other than his home area, such as Karachi, a city he knows his way around.

…

147.    Even taken all together, the factors raised about why it would not be reasonable for the applicant to live outside Swat do not indicate to the Tribunal that such relocation would be unreasonable.

19    The Tribunal then considered the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and held that this criterion was not satisfied.

The judgment of the Federal Circuit Court

20    The appellant’s grounds of appeal in this Court essentially replicate his grounds before the Federal Circuit Court.

21    As to the first ground, the primary judge found that it was not an integer of the appellant’s claim that his friends were killed in Karachi. The primary judge also held that the Tribunal had not failed to make findings in respect of the evidence concerning the killings of the appellant’s friends, his Honour apparently reaching that conclusion by reasoning that it would have been reasonably open to the Tribunal to find that the appellant did not share the profiles of his friends, and for that reason, the killing of these men in Karachi was not probative of whether the appellant would face a risk of harm in Karachi.

22    As to the second ground, the primary judge found that the Tribunal did consider the appellant’s claim to be at risk as a result of general violence in Karachi. His Honour rejected the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal had restricted its consideration of the reasonableness of relocation to the risk of serious harm for a Convention reason.

23    As to the third ground, the primary judge found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant’s claims, including his involvement in the lashkar when it considered whether the appellant would be exposed to harm in Karachi “on the basis of the appellant’s profile as found”.

Consideration

24    The appellant relies on the three grounds of appeal set out earlier. As there is substantial overlap between the first and third grounds, I will deal with them together.

Grounds 1 and 3

25    The Tribunal accepted that the appellant would face a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason at the hands of the Taliban if he were to return to his home in the Swat region. The Tribunal then considered the appellant’s claim that it is not reasonable for him to relocate to another part of Pakistan because he would remain at risk of persecution by the Taliban. In support of this claim, the appellant pointed to the killing of several of his friends in Karachi because of their involvement in the ANP and the same lashkar. His argument was that if those friends had been targeted and killed in circumstances where they had a similar level of involvement as his in the ANP and the lashkar, there was a risk that he would also be targeted and killed even if he were to relocate to Karachi.

26    The appellant submits that the risk posed as a result of his involvement with the lashkar and the killing of his friends in Karachi were both “integers” of his claim which the Tribunal was required to, but failed to, consider. He argues that the Tribunal thereby failed to exercise its jurisdiction. The Minister argues that neither of these matters were “integers” of his claim, but were merely pieces of evidence which were not required to be considered by the Tribunal. The Minister argues that, in any event, the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrate that it did consider those matters.

27    Before considering the competing arguments, it is necessary to say something about the Tribunal’s function and the relevance of possible relocation within Pakistan to the decision. The Tribunal’s function under s 414(1) of the Act is to review certain decisions of the Minister if a valid application for review is made. The Tribunal must consider whether it is satisfied of the matters required under s 65(1) of the Act. In the context of an application for a protection visa, it is required to consider whether it is satisfied that the criteria set out in s 36 of the Act are met.

28    Section 36(2)(a) of the Act provides, relevantly, that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention defines a refugee as any person who:

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country…

29    In Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437, Black CJ (with whom Whitlam J agreed) held at 440-441 that there is no warrant for construing the definition of “refugee” so that it would give refugee status to those who, although having a well-founded fear of persecution in their home region, could nevertheless avail themselves of the real protection of their country of nationality elsewhere within that country. Black CJ also held that it is necessary to ask whether the visa applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate to another area of his or her country of nationality. His Honour said at 443:

If it is not reasonable in the circumstances to expect a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution in relation to the part of a country from which he or she has fled to relocate to another part of the country of nationality it may be said that, in the relevant sense, the person’s fear of persecution in relation to that country as a whole is well-founded.

30    In SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ adopted Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s exposition of the role of relocation given in Januzi v Secretary of State for Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426 at 440:

The [Convention] does not expressly address the situation at issue in these appeals where, within the country of his nationality, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution at place A, where he lived, but not at place B, where (it is said) he could reasonably be expected to relocate. But the situation may fairly be said to be covered by the causative condition to which reference has been made: for if a person is outside the country of his nationality because he has chosen to leave that country and seek asylum in a foreign country, rather than move to a place of relocation within his own country where he could have no well-founded fear of persecution, where the protection of his country would be available to him and where he could reasonably be expected to relocate, it can properly be said that he is not outside the country of his nationality owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason.

31    Lord Bingham continued at 440:

[A] person will be excluded from refugee status if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect him to seek refuge in another part of the same country.

32    It was in this context that the Tribunal was required to consider whether the appellant would have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason if he were to relocate to another part of Pakistan, and whether it is reasonable for him to relocate. The Tribunal considered these questions by reference to Karachi. That was because the focus of the appellant’s argument was that he was at risk of being targeted by the Taliban if he relocated to Karachi. It would have also been open to the Tribunal to consider possible relocation to any other part of Pakistan, but the Tribunal did not find it necessary to do so.

33    The appellant submits that the Tribunal made no specific findings concerning his clearly articulated and specific claim that he would be at risk of harm in Karachi because of his involvement in the lashkar and his claim that his friends who were in a similar position to him had been targeted and killed. The Tribunal expressly referred to these matters in its description of the appellant’s evidence and claims, but the appellant argues that the Tribunal omitted to make findings as to these matters, indicating that the Tribunal fell into error by failing to complete its statutory function of reviewing the decision.

34    In Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244, Allsop J (with whom Spender J agreed) said at 259:

[42]    The tribunal failed to address and deal with how the claim was put to it, at least in part. The requirement to review the decision under s 414 of the Act requires the tribunal to consider the claims of the applicant. To make a decision without having considered all the claims is to fail to complete the exercise of jurisdiction embarked on. The claim or claims and its or their component integers are considerations made mandatorily relevant by the Act for consideration in the sense discussed in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; 66 ALR 299 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 180 ALR 1; 62 ALD 225. See also Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287; 58 ALD 30 at [18], [19], [21] and [50]. It is to be distinguished from errant fact finding.

35    In Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630, French, Sackville and Hely JJ said at 641:

[46]    It is plainly not necessary for the tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 62 ALD 225; 180 ALR 1 at [87]–[97]) and a failure by the tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Each of the applications it decides is, of course, of great importance. Some of its decisions may literally be life and death decisions for the applicant. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body and not a court and its reasons are not to be scrutinised “with an eye keenly attuned to error”. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.

[47]    The inference that the tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where, however, there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.

(Underlining added.)

36    It may be seen that there is a distinction between an “integer” of a claim and “evidence”. If resolution of an issue in a particular way would be dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the decision, it may be regarded as an integer which must be dealt with by the Tribunal.

37    In the present case, it was a central part of the appellant’s claim that he was unable to relocate elsewhere in Pakistan because he was at risk of being targeted by the Taliban and killed because of his involvement with the lashkar in Koza Bandai. That was an issue which, if resolved in favour of the appellant, would have been dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision. The issue was an integer of the appellant’s claim and the Tribunal was required to consider and deal with it. I will examine whether the Tribunal did deal with this integer.

38    After accepting that the appellant would face a real chance of persecution because of his involvement with the lashkar if he returned to Swat, the Tribunal expressly considered whether he would be at risk of being targeted and killed by the Taliban if he relocated to Karachi. The Tribunal’s findings on this question were informed and influenced by its findings on the role that the appellant had in the lashkar. The Tribunal concluded that he had exaggerated his role in the lashkar and found that he had not been targeted by the Taliban in Swat. The Tribunal found that the character of the appellant’s activity and his profile in Swat was not of a kind that would see the Taliban looking out for him or tracking him down elsewhere.

39    The Tribunal expressly referred [at para 139] to the chance that the appellant would face persecution outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on account of his support for the ANP, his anti-Taliban political opinion, and his having originated from Swat. The appellant submits that the absence of specific reference to his involvement with the lashkar indicates that the Tribunal failed to deal with that integer of his claim.

40    However, it is necessary to read the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole. The Tribunal’s reasons for its finding that the appellant would not face a real chance of persecution if he relocated to Karachi must be read in the context that it had already made a finding that there was a real chance of persecution if he were to return to Swat by reason of his involvement in the lashkar. It would be artificial to read the Tribunal’s reasons concerning the absence of a real risk of persecution in Karachi divorced from its earlier findings. In any event, the Tribunal said [at para 133] that “the Tribunal has rejected the claim that the Taliban threatened and came looking for him in Swat”. That statement referred to the Tribunal’s earlier rejection of the appellant’s claim that he had been an informer for the army through his involvement with the lashkar which had led to the Taliban targeting him in Swat. It follows that when considering and dealing with the appellant’s claim that he would be targeted and killed in Karachi, the Tribunal did so by reference to his involvement with the lashkar. The failure of the Tribunal to expressly refer to the appellant’s involvement with the lashkar in its summary of its findings [at para 139] does not mean that the Tribunal did not in fact deal with that integer of the claim.

41    The appellant’s evidence that several of his friends who had a similar role in the lashkar had been targeted and killed in Karachi was not an integer of his claim. That was a piece of evidence which the appellant relied on to establish that he was at risk of being targeted and killed in Karachi. That evidence, if accepted by the Tribunal, was capable of influencing the Tribunal’s decision, but would not have been dispositive. Any failure on the part of the Tribunal to consider and deal with this evidence would not, of itself, amount to a failure of the Tribunal to conduct a review of the decision. I will consider whether, in any event, the Tribunal did deal with this evidence.

42    The appellant submits that the Tribunal did not deal with his allegation that his friends who had a similar level of involvement to him in the lashkar were targeted and killed in Karachi. The Tribunal said at [at para 132] that “The applicant has named people he knows in Karachi who he claims have been killed.” The Tribunal did not go on to make any findings as to whether it accepted or rejected that aspect of the appellant’s evidence.

43    The Tribunal’s reasoning for its finding that the appellant was not at risk of being targeted in Karachi would not, however, have been affected by any finding as to whether his friends had been targeted and killed in Karachi. The appellant alleged that he and his friends all had a similar level of involvement in the lashkar. The Tribunal appears to have proceeded by assuming in favour of the appellant that his friends had been targeted and killed. However, the Tribunal found that the appellant’s own level of involvement was at a lower level than he had claimed and considered that, unlike his friends, the appellant was not likely to be targeted by the Taliban. I accept my understanding of the Tribunal’s reasoning involves some inference as to its process of reasoning. However, it seems tolerably clear that this is the way the Tribunal proceeded. Even if I am wrong in my understanding of the Tribunal’s reasons, as I have indicated, any failure by the Tribunal to deal with the appellant’s evidence concerning his friends did not amount to a failure of the Tribunal to review the delegate’s decision.

44    In these circumstances, the appellant has not established the first and third grounds of his notice of appeal.

Ground 2

45    The appellant submits the Tribunal’s consideration of the risk of harm to the appellant in Karachi was confined to the risk of harm for a Convention reason and that the Tribunal failed to consider the risk of harm by reason of general lawlessness.

46    The appellant did advance a claim that he would be at risk of harm, not merely by reason of persecution for a Convention reason, but also by reason of general lawlessness in Karachi. In NAIZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37, Branson J (with whom North J agreed) held at [22] that the Tribunal was required to “give consideration to the practical realities” facing the visa applicant when relocating: see also SYLB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 87 ALD 498 at 499 [28] per Branson J; SZIED v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1347 at [42] per Moore J. I accept that the Tribunal was required to consider whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Karachi having regard to the risk of harm to him as a result of general lawlessness in Karachi.

47    The Tribunal indicated [at para 141] that the factors going to the matter of reasonableness of relocation included “the security situation elsewhere in Pakistan, including Karachi.” It then set out its findings concerning that security situation [at paras 142 and 143].

48    The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s reasons should be construed as indicating that it only examined the risk of harm to the appellant for Convention reasons in Karachi, and not the risk of harm by reason of general lawlessness. He submits that the Tribunal’s reference to “its assessment” that there was no appreciable risk that the appellant would come to harm as a result of violence in Karachi [at para 143] was a reference to its earlier assessment that there was no risk of harm for a Convention reason.

49    It is plain that the Tribunal when considering “the security situation” [at paras 141 to 143] was considering the risk of harm to the appellant by reason of general violence. It found that the appellant was not in any of the categories of people who were likely to be killed or injured – people involved in political activity, gang members, political and religious leaders and people who are members of some minority religious groups. In my opinion, the Tribunal did consider and deal with the appellant’s claim that it was unreasonable for him to relocate because he was at risk of harm because of the high level of general violence in Karachi.

50    The appellant has not made out his second ground of appeal.

51    In summary, the appellant has not demonstrated any error in the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. The appellant will be ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.

Associate:

Dated:    26 June 2015