FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mathews v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 191

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for orders under Part VAAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) filed by the first respondent be listed for hearing before a judge other than Rangiah J.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1    The applicant, Russell Mathews, commenced proceedings in this Court under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (“the AHRC Act”) alleging that the respondents had unlawfully discriminated against him. His complaint was that on 5 March 2013 he was forced off a bus operated by the second respondent because he was accompanied by his assistance dogs. He alleged that the discrimination was on the basis of his disability.

2    Mr Mathews’ proceeding was transferred to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“the Circuit Court”) and eventually dismissed. He did not appeal against the dismissal, but now seeks the grant of certiorari to quash the orders made by the Circuit Court.

3    The first respondent, the State of Queensland (“the State”), has filed an application seeking orders against Mr Mathews under the vexatious proceedings provisions of Part VAAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”). In particular, the State seeks orders under s 37AO(2) that the application brought by Mr Mathews be stayed and that he be prohibited from instituting any further proceedings in this Court without leave.

4    The hearing of the State’s application was set down for 2 February 2015. Mr Mathews did not appear. The hearing proceeded in his absence.

5    Mr Mathews had filed an application seeking that I disqualify myself from hearing the State’s application on the basis of apprehended bias. As he did not appear, there was no occasion to deal with that application. However, in the course of the State’s submissions, another potential difficulty emerged with my deciding the application. That difficulty is that the State submits that I should make a finding that accusations of corruption and bias that Mr Mathews made against me in another proceeding are scandalous and without substance. I will set out the accusations made by Mr Mathews after first describing something of the history of the litigation.

6    I had some early involvement with Mr Mathews’ application under the AHRC Act. On 24 April 2014, I dismissed a number of applications made by Mr Mathews for non-party discovery, and I ordered that the proceeding be transferred to the Circuit Court: Mathews v State of Queensland [2014] FCA 424. Mr Mathews applied for leave to appeal to the Full Court against my orders. On 12 May 2014, Mr Mathews’ application for leave was dismissed by Dowsett J: Mathews v State of Queensland [2014] FCA 574. The matter then proceeded in the Circuit Court.

7    Mr Mathews filed a number of interlocutory applications in the Circuit Court but failed to appear at the hearing of any of them. On 23 June 2014, His Honour Judge Jarrett dismissed “all outstanding applications”: Mathews v State of Queensland & Anor (No. 2) [2014] FCCA 1658. It appears that by that order His Honour dismissed the substantive proceedings, as well as the interlocutory applications.

8    Mr Mathews applied to the Circuit Court at least twice for the order dismissing his proceedings to be set aside, but those applications were dismissed when Mr Mathews failed to appear: Mathews v State of Queensland & Anor (No. 4) [2014] FCCA 1978.

9    Mr Mathews then commenced his application in this Court for certiorari in respect of the orders made by the Circuit Court. I understand that is the proceeding that the State wishes to have stayed.

10    At the hearing of the State’s application under the vexatious proceedings provisions, it emerged that among the State’s grounds is that Mr Mathews’ application for leave to appeal against my orders of 24 April 2014 was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of s 37AM of the Act because the application was made for a wrongful purpose. The wrongful purpose is said to be “to make scandalous accusations without foundation against Rangiah J and others.”

11    The accusations that Mr Mathews made against me in the course of his application for leave to appeal were as follows:

1.    The refusal to give the discovery and extended non-standard discovery is aimed at artificially restraining my claim of this assault and false imprisonment and permanent injury being a continuation of the catholic inspired program or regime aimed at my destruction by the State of Qld, and Commonwealth of Australia since both have been under the corrupt executive control of catholics, resulting from systemic political branch stacking by catholics.

2.    Rangiah J. is a catholic, was biased as a catholic, and close associate of catholic ex-Justice Spender who has corruptly, repeatedly acted against my interests repeatedly since circa March, 1974, when as a barrister, Spender, instructed by Terence Joseph Mellifont defrauded me coram the Railway Appeals Tribunal, to please the catholics being Frank Heffernan and CJ (Joe) Kelso who had set me up on trumped up charges to sack me.

3.    Rangiah J. and ex Justice Spender both gained their promotion to the Federal Court as a result of systemic catholic political branch stacking.

4.    It is the same corruption catholic juggernaut that has long targeted myself, that was expressed by Rangiah J and Spender J, which is also the cause of this Translink assault upon me, and which will be disclosed by the documents sought by me by way of discovery.

5.    Any judge that is catholic and has been appointed by an executive dominated by catholics in those positions as a result of systemic catholic political branch stacking, has not been promoted on merit and will exhibit the same apprehended bias.

6.    Systemic catholic political branch stacking is proven by statistical analysis.

7.    Rangiah J. knew he was biased so transferred the proceeding to the Federal Circuit Court to save his having to disqualify himself.

12    During the hearing, the State indicated that it wished to continue to rely on its submission that the accusations were scandalous and without foundation. The State submitted that I should proceed to determine that issue in the course of deciding its application. I indicated that I would reserve my judgment, but would consider whether it was appropriate for me to decide the application.

13    This case is not quite the same as one where unfounded allegations are made against a Judge with the aim of achieving the disqualification of the Judge – in such a case a Judge ought not too readily withdraw: c.f. Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352, per Mason J. The allegations were made against me by Mr Mathews in a different proceeding, namely the application for leave to appeal. It is the State which relies upon the making of those allegations to support its case that Mr Mathews is a vexatious litigant; they are not raised by Mr Mathews in this proceeding.

14    The difficulty does not lie in determining that the accusations are scandalous, in the sense of being abusive and offensive – they undoubtedly are. The difficulty lies in the same Judge against whom the accusations are made making a finding that they are unfounded.

15    It is true that, on one view, the State’s submission could be dealt with on the basis that Mr Mathews has offered no evidence, whether before Dowsett J or in this application, to support the serious accusations he makes; and in the absence of evidence, the accusations are unfounded.

16    However, I consider that it is in the interests of justice that I should refrain from deciding the State’s application.

17    I will order that the State’s application be listed for hearing before another Judge. The registry will notify the parties as to the date of the hearing in due course.

Associate:

Dated:    11 March 2015