FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Croker v Segal [2014] FCA 1044

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

1    Mr Croker is an undischarged bankrupt. On 25 November 2013 the Full Court of this Court dismissed an appeal by Mr Croker to it describing it as lacking coherence (at [12]) and as being an abuse of process (at [14]): Croker v Minister for Finance [2013] FCAFC 154. At trial the case had concerned an application for orders in the nature of mandamus. Mr Croker then sought to apply for special leave to appeal to the High Court but an official of that Court suggested that any rights of appeal were vested in Mr Croker’s trustee in bankruptcy since the application for special leave was not a proceeding to recover damages for personal injury or wrong done to him. It is not necessary for me to decide whether it is correct that rights to claim prerogative relief vest in a trustee in bankruptcy on the making of a sequestration order: cf. Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1988) 12 NSWLR 45; Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2008) 171 FCR 380 at 435 [225].

2    In any event, the trustee refused to continue the proceeding himself whereupon Mr Croker attempted to appeal that decision to this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under s 178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). I say ‘attempted’ because after some false starts, Mr Croker’s efforts to file the appeal papers were rejected, on 11 April 2014, by Deputy District Registrar Segal of this Court on the basis that the proposed proceedings were frivolous and vexatious. Mr Croker then sought judicial review of that decision. Rares J summarily dismissed that application under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) on 13 August 2014 holding that it was an abuse of process: Croker v Segal [2014] FCA 944. That order was interlocutory by force of statute: s 24(1D)(b). Accordingly, Mr Croker requires leave to appeal. It is for such leave that he now applies. As the reasons above will amply demonstrate, the application for leave to appeal is itself a gross abuse of process. It will be dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    29 September 2014