FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2014] FCA 76

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    In respect of the documents lodged by the applicant on 27 December 2013, the Registrar not accept the documents for filing under r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2.    In respect of the documents lodged by the applicant on 13 January 2014, the Registrar not accept the documents for filing under r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

3.    In respect of the documents lodged by the Applicant on 20 January 2014, the Registrar not accept the documents for filing under r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1    I have been asked to consider whether three sets of applications, lodged by Mr Singh on 27 December 2013, 13 January 2014 and 20 January 2014, should be accepted for filing by the Registry.

2    Mr Singh is subject to an order made by Justice Bromberg on 27 July 2011, in the following terms:

The Respondent, Mohinder Singh, may not institute any proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia without leave of the Court.

3    The history of Mr Singh’s litigation is summarised in that decision: Singh v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 833.

4    Since then, Mr Singh has habitually and persistently sought leave to appeal from Bromberg J’s orders, and has sought an extension of time in which to do so.

5    His applications have been rejected approximately 16 times by various judges of this Court. On most occasions those decisions have been made on the papers by the relevant duty judge.

6    The dates of each attempted filing by Mr Singh demonstrate he has attempted to re-agitate these issues through a new proceeding on approximately a monthly basis.

7    The application dated 27 December 2013 is another application for leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Bromberg on 27 July 2011, and an application for an extension of time in which to do so. Mr Singh’s underlying complaint continues to relate to the determination by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and then the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that he and his then wife were living as members of a couple, for the purposes of eligibility for social security entitlements.

8    The second application, dated 13 January 2014, is an application (under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)) to review the decision of a Centrelink delegate dated 4 November 1999 to recover a debt of $88,633.34 from the applicant. This, together with the Centrelink decision about whether Mr Singh and his wife were members of a couple for the purposes of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), have been the two decisions Mr Singh has sought habitually and persistently to have overturned since the time they were made, now approximately 15 years ago.

9    The third application, dated 20 January 2014, is in fact two applications. One is the now familiar attempt by Mr Singh to seek leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Bromberg made on 27 July 2011, and seeking an extension of time in which to do so. The application refers to the SSAT and AAT proceedings again, concentrating on the Tribunal’s dismissal of Mr Singh’s 2006 application for review of the decisions by Centrelink and the SSAT, on the basis that the application was frivolous and vexatious for the purposes of s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). However, the terms of the application for leave to appeal essentially seek to continue Mr Singh’s attack on the Centrelink decision of 4 November 1999 and the review decisions which followed it.

10    Second, there is an application by Mr Singh to lodge an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act against a decision of the AAT made on 19 December 2013. The AAT decided on that date that it had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Tribunal itself made on 3 July 2006 dismissing Mr Singh’s application under s 42B of the AAT Act.

11    The claims in the first application are substantially identical to those Mr Singh has repeatedly sought to make both before Justice Bromberg’s decision and after it. There is no new material and there are no new claims. Time has not improved the existing ones. For the reasons given by Justice Bromberg, as well as by Justice North in his decision Re Singh [2012] FCA 322, those proceedings remain an abuse of the processes of this Court. There is no basis to grant leave to appeal from Justice Bromberg’s decision which was clearly correct.

12    Since Justice North’s decision, Mr Singh has continued to seek to file proceedings which have been held to have no prospects of success, which have been held to be frivolous and vexatious and which are repetitive in both subject matter and the nature of the allegations they make.

13    The “new” application should be treated no differently. The AAT’s decision of 19 December 2013 informed Mr Singh of his entitlement to seek reasons but no reasons have apparently been sought. On its face the Tribunal’s decision is plainly correct: it has no jurisdiction to review its own decisions. Mr Singh’s reliance on the Tribunal’s reinstatement power in s 42A(10) does not advance the matter as he does not identify any arguable error in the Tribunal’s 2006 decision (assuming in his favour but without deciding that s 42B extends to errors such as jurisdictional error: see Brehoi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 58 ALD 385 at 389-390; cf Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 383 at 388-390 per Wilcox and Downes JJ). There is no evidence Mr Singh identified any such error to the Tribunal before it made its decision on 19 December 2013. That this s 44 appeal is vexatious and an abuse of process is illustrated by Mr Singh’s inclusion in his draft notice of appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act proposed orders to set aside Justice Bromberg’s decision in this Court.

14    Accordingly, orders will be made in respect of each of the three applications that the Registry not accept these documents for filing pursuant to s 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

15    The last set of reasons provided to Mr Singh for the Court’s order under s 2.27(e) or a similar power were those of Justice North in March 2012. I considered it appropriate, since there have been 14 applications since then for which leave has been refused, that Mr Singh be provided with reasons for the direction.

Associate:

Dated:    13 February 2014