FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Skyring, in the matter of Skyring [2013] FCA 997

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The originating application filed 4 September 2013 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1    On 6 July 1999 Sackville J ordered that Mr Skyring could not initiate proceedings in this Court without leave of the Court: Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378; [1999] FCA 907. An appeal against this decision was subsequently dismissed by the Full Court: Skyring v Ramsey [2000] FCA 774.

2    On 4 September 2013 Mr Skyring filed an originating application in which he sought an order of the Court granting him leave to file an application in the form exhibited as AGS-1 to his affidavit filed on the same date.

3    In summary, Mr Skyring wishes to file an application for an order of review of a decision of the Australian Electoral Commissioner because:

    In relation to the recent Federal Election, the Australian Electoral Commissioner accepted “nomination deposits” in relation to Electoral Divisions of the House of Representatives (including in relation to the Electoral Division of Ryan) in the form of “Australian Notes” or “Bank cheques”.

    The tender of money in that form did not comply with the requirements of s 16 and the Schedule thereto of the Currency Act 1965 (Cth) and therefore was not “legal tender of payment of money” throughout the Commonwealth of Australia. Accordingly, nominations were improperly accepted by the Australian Electoral Commissioner.

    There is no nexus between the values of “paper money” and “the legal tender coinage of the Realm” of the same face value.

    Notwithstanding that “bank cheques” are “allowed” under s 170(3) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), recourse to such means to make “nomination deposits” is effectively outlawed on constitutional grounds.

4    Mr Skyring wishes to contend, inter alia, that:

    A breach of natural justice has occurred.

    The decision of the Australian Electoral Commissioner was not authorised by the relevant enactment.

    The decision involved an error of law.

    The decision was induced or affected by fraud.

    The decision was otherwise contrary to law.

5    The matter was listed in Court this morning for directions, however as Mr Skyring indicated that he was in a position to prosecute his application for leave this morning I heard that application.

6    In oral submissions, Mr Skyring submitted (in summary) that the Court ought grant him leave in this case because:

    There had never been a final determination by the High Court of Australia of that which constitutes legal tender in this country. Mr Skyring directed my attention to the decision of Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ in In the matter of an application by Alan George Skyring (unreported, HCA, 9 July 1985) which he submitted was not a determinative decision of the High Court.

    In 1984 Gibbs J refused to allow him to file applications for the issue of writs in the High Court. Mr Skyring submitted that, as a result, he was denied the opportunity to pursue to finality legitimate causes of action.

    A critical point is whether paper money constitutes legal tender in Australia.

    The rejection of his claims by the Federal Court and High Court is symptomatic of corruption in the Commonwealth, including in the judiciary.

7    It is clear that, on many occasions over several decades, Mr Skyring has sought to challenge the validity of paper money as legal tender, in particular in circumstances where money in either note or cheque form is paid in the context of electoral nominations. Relevant cases include Re Skyring’s Application (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 629; Skyring v Ramsey [2003] FCA 745; In the matter of Skyring [2004] FCA 827; Re Skyring [2013] QSC 197. The claim Mr Skyring proposes in this case is of a similar nature. Specifically, in claiming that the Australian Electoral Commissioner improperly accepted nomination deposits in the form of notes or bank cheques, in the context of the recent Federal Election, Mr Skyring claims that:

… it is to be noted that the Perth Mint still issues and puts into circulation coins in its Gold Nugget series, the first of which was put into circulation as ‘legal tender’ coinage following a very public ceremony in Sydney on the 23th April 1987 when the Prime Minister of the day, then one R.J.L Hawke, signed and then presented a personal cheque made out in the amount of $1236.00 in exchange for a ‘souvenir’ set of 4 of these coins having an aggregate face value of only $190.00. Although the ramifications of that action then by a personage having ‘a very high profile, politically’ in this country seemed not to have been generally realised at that time, what that ‘very public action in fact did was to ‘completely and utterly destroy’ from that time, a ‘nexus’ which had been held from well before the time of Federation in this country between the values of ‘paper money and ‘the legal tender’ coinage of the Realm’ OF THE SAME FACE VALUE, whereby each could be ‘exchanged at par’ with the other. The relevance of these matters to the Electoral situation simply is that there is NOW NO ‘CONNECTION’ WHATSOEVER between the ‘monetary values’ values represented by ‘paper money’ and those represented by the ‘coinage of the Realm’ of the same nominal face value, which is regarded ‘in constitutional terms’ as providing the ‘ultimate reference for monetary values’ across this nation.

(Format and errors in original).

Consideration

8    In Re Attorney-General  (Cth) ex parte Skyring (1996) 135 ALR 29 at 31-32 Kirby J, in considering the issue of the grant of leave to commence proceedings to a person who has been declared a vexatious litigant, observed as follows:

First, it is always important for every judge to keep an open mind in case a person who has been rejected by courts in the past may have, hidden amongst the verbiage of his or her arguments, a point which has not been previously seen and which may have merit. Vigilance, and not impatience, are specially required where that person is not legally represented.

Secondly, it is regarded as a serious thing in this country to keep a person out of the courts. The rule of law requires that, ordinarily, a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. It is a rare thing to declare a person a vexatious litigant. It is extremely rare in this court to use the power, whether under the inherent power or under O 63, to require leave before a person may commence proceedings invoking the court's jurisdiction.

Thirdly, the court must never shy away from the determination of a point sought to be argued simply because it may have major ramifications. Mr Skyring urged that I should not be reluctant to provide relief on the legal grounds argued by him simply because to provide relief would be to attack both the banking and taxation and other economic systems of this country. The history of this court since its establishment in 1903, including recently, has shown that the court does not refrain from offering relief where the law requires it simply because its decisions may have large consequences for the nation or particular interests in it.

Fourthly, I do not pause to consider the appropriateness of the particular process that Mr Skyring has commenced, seeking relief by way of the writs of certiorari and mandamus. It is not necessary for me, in the decision which I have arrived at, to determine whether they are in each case, or in any of the cases, the appropriate process of the court to invoke its jurisdiction. Mr Skyring appears before me today unrepresented. If he had commenced proceedings by an irregular process which had any separate or different merit from the matters which have already been determined by the court, I would endeavour to assist him to get such proceedings into proper form or require him to commence again in proper form. I would not dispose of his application upon such a formal basis.

Fifthly, no question arises as to the validity of the rule under which Mr Skyring approaches the court for leave to proceed.

9    I note that, in that case, his Honour was similarly considering an application by Mr Skyring which concerned the question of the constitutional power of the Federal Parliament to legislate to make paper money, as distinct from gold, legal tender in Australia.

10    Taking into account the considerations listed by Kirby J, nonetheless on the material before the Court it is clear that Mr Skyring is seeking to re-litigate claims which have previously been before the Court, and which he has been ordered not to re-litigate because there is absolutely no merit to those claims.

11    Further, contrary to Mr Skyring’s submissions, it is clear that there have been numerous final determinations – following litigation initiated by him – of the question of what constitutes legal tender in Australia. One example of a final determination is the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court in In the matter of an application by Alan George Skyring (unreported, HCA, 9 July 1985). This morning Mr Skyring submitted that the findings of their Honours were not “final” because they stated that they were “not persuaded that the judgment of Deane J contain(ed) any error”.  In my view, the submission of Mr Skyring that this judgment did not constitute a final opinion is as misguided as it is wrong.

12    I note the observation by Kirby J, made almost 20 years ago, that Mr Skyring’s agitation of opinions in the Courts is motivated by sincerity. This also appeared to be the case today. However this sincerity does not warrant a grant of leave to Mr Skyring to commence an application which would waste the time of the Court. In my view there is no basis upon which the leave sought by Mr Skyring should be granted.

13    The originating application filed 4 September 2013 is dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    2 October 2013