FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rana v Deakin University [2013] FCA 59
Citation: | Rana v Deakin University [2013] FCA 59 | |
Parties: | ||
File number: | SAD 169 of 2012 | |
Judge: | MANSFIELD J | |
Date of judgment: | ||
Place: | Adelaide | |
Division: | GENERAL DIVISION | |
Category: | No catchwords | |
Number of paragraphs: | ||
Counsel for the Respondent: | S Cole | |
Solicitor for the Respondent: | Minter Ellison | |
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | |
RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA Applicant | |
AND: | Respondent |
DATE OF ORDER: | |
WHERE MADE: |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY | |
GENERAL DIVISION | SAD 169 of 2012 |
BETWEEN: | RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA Applicant
|
AND: | DEAKIN UNIVERSITY Respondent
|
JUDGE: | MANSFIELD J |
DATE: | 7 FEBRUARY 2013 |
PLACE: | ADELAIDE |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1 Mr Rana has applied for leave to appeal from a decision of Burchardt FM given on 20 July 2012: Rana v Deakin University [2012] FMCA 575. The Federal Magistrate summarily dismissed Mr Rana’s application against the respondent Deakin University pursuant to s 17A of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) (the FM Act) and declared Mr Rana a vexatious litigant pursuant to r 13.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (the FMC Rules), so that Mr Rana may not institute further proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court without leave, and any existing proceedings in that court may not be continued by him without leave.
2 As the appeal is against an interlocutory judgment, Mr Rana requires leave to appeal: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 24(1A), Vatarescu v Commonwealth of Australia for the Agency of Centrelink (No 2) [2012] FCA 165. He has sought leave to appeal from those orders.
3 It is clear that the test to be applied on an application for leave to appeal is whether, in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the appeal court, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2005) 144 FCR 379; Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111. Mr Rana handed up at the hearing a written document called “The Nature of the Appeal”; it did not in any real way seek to dispute those well settled principles.
THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE’S DECISION
4 The Federal Magistrate referred to the extensive and “somewhat scattergun” material presented by Mr Rana.
5 His Honour identified the cause of action as arising initially from a complaint that Mr Rana had been marked down in assessments in a study unit MPE711 (Global Trade and Markets) because of his race or because of a disability. At a later point, Mr Rana extended his complaint to a failure to re-mark his work in the study unit MPK732 (Marketing Management). Mr Rana had undertaken those courses at Deakin University.
6 Mr Rana is of Nepalese origin, and claimed to have a psychiatric disability and diabetes. He alleged to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) that the conduct he complained of contravened unspecified sections of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (the RD Act) and the Disability Discrimination Act 2006 (Cth) (the DD Act).
7 On 7 July 2011, the AHRC by a delegate of the Commissioner terminated the complaint under s 46PH(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) as the delegate was satisfied that the complaint was lacking in substance. There was little information to support the claim, and the information from Deakin University was uncontradicted. It showed Deakin University accommodated his request not to participate in group assignments, had given him extensions of time to complete his assignments, and his assessments were marked and re-marked by two qualified assessors in accordance with the marketing criteria applicable to all students. There was no evidence to indicate his race or disabilities were factors in the assessments. In relation to the MPK732 unit, he had been permitted to sit a special exam to accommodate his disabilities, and the apparent error about when the time for a review of his assessment had expired was not prompted by any factor concerning his race or his disabilities.
8 The Federal Magistrate also noted with some care the several instances where the material he presented to the Federal Magistrates Court extended to matters which had not been the subject of his complaint to AHRC. The principal feature of those extended allegations was that he had been wrongly accused of plagiarism, and marked accordingly, in relation to a separate course by reason of his race; he said the lecturer concerned was of Indian extraction and had picked on him because he was Nepalese. There were several additional matters which the Federal Magistrate noted, but dismissed as the assertions of Mr Rana were not supported by the material he relied upon, and indeed in some respects there was a “disconnect” between his affidavit making the assertions and the materials said to support them.
9 After referring to the allegations, the Federal Magistrate noted the dual application of Deakin University: to have the claim summarily dismissed, and to have Mr Rana declared a vexatious litigant.
10 His Honour referred at some length to the affidavits relied upon by Deakin University, including from three academics who had been directly involved in the dealings with Mr Rana about which he complained. Then his Honour referred at length to the extensive material Mr Rana relied upon in response, in particular in two affidavits of 4 November 2011 and 6 March 2012, as well as to his “Rebuttal Submission” of 7 May 2012 and a further affidavit of 15 May 2012, and the oral submissions.
11 Earlier in his reasons, the Federal Magistrate had rejected Mr Rana’s application to summarily dismiss (or refuse) the applications of Deakin University on the grounds first that there was no “genuine steps statement” as required by Rule 4.10 of the FMC Rules, and second that its outline of submissions was filed a little over two weeks later than had been specified in the directions given on 27 March 2012.
12 In fact, it appeared that Mr Rana had not filed a “genuine steps statement” before filing his application (and only did so belatedly on 14 May 2012). No doubt that was because the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) only came into operation on the day of, or shortly before, Mr Rana commenced his application. Hence, the Federal Magistrate did not criticise Deakin University for failing to file a “genuine steps statement” in response because, before the proceedings were commenced, there was nothing to respond to. His Honour ruled, clearly correctly, that the purpose of that legislation was to have parties where appropriate explore the prospects of resolution of the dispute before proceedings are commenced: see s 3. In any event, his Honour under ss 11 and 12 has a discretion about how to address any non-compliance. As the hearing was fixed for 28 May 2012, he would – assuming there was any obligation on Deakin University to file a responsive statement between 14 and 28 May 2012 – have excused any such default. In the circumstances that would have been an entirely sensible exercise of the discretion.
13 As Mr Rana had obviously not been prejudiced by the somewhat late filing of the submissions of Deakin University, again in his discretion his Honour declined to impose on Deakin University the sanction of dismissing its application. That, too, was an available exercise of the Federal Magistrate’s discretion.
14 As to the orders sought by Deakin University, the Federal Magistrate also allowed it to amend its application to invoke the power of the Federal Magistrates Court under s 17A of the FM Act. There was, he found, no possible prejudice to Mr Rana in allowing that amendment. The material relied on was unchanged, and invoking s 17A went little further except as an alternative source of the relief sought under Rule 13.10 of the FMC Rules.
15 The Federal Magistrate, having considered the terms of s 17A of the FM Act and Rules 13.10 and 13.11 of the FMC Rules, discussed in a little detail some decisions in which their application was considered. His Honour also discussed the authorities, including the then recent decision of Stone J in Soden v Kowalski [2011] FCA 318 especially at [35]-[36], concerning the circumstances in which a litigant may be considered vexatious. That decision was subsequently affirmed on appeal: Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153.
16 As to the summary judgment application, the Federal Magistrate at [115] said he had no hesitation on the material in concluding that Mr Rana had no reasonable prospects of succeeding in his claim. None of his primary factual allegations were made out on that material. Nor, even assuming to the contrary, was there any reasonable basis for any conclusion that the relevant staff of Deakin University engaged in the (alleged, but not established) conduct by reason of Mr Rana’s race or his disabilities. The contemporary documentary material pointed to the contrary. I note that one document which might have been taken to support Mr Rana’s claim labelled a “draft” (and containing changes imposed on the original in the custody of Deakin University), was found at [130] to have been altered by Mr Rana for his own purposes. On the Federal Magistrate’s analysis, that finding on a summary judgment application was, in the particular circumstances, available to him.
17 As to the application to have Mr Rana declared a vexatious litigant, the Federal Magistrate:
(1) found the particular proceeding of Mr Rana was vexatious;
(2) found that, upon analysis of the many decisions to which he was referred, Mr Rana habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court and in other Australian Courts;
(3) concluded that Mr Rana should be declared a vexatious litigant, and be subject to an order under Rule 13.11(1) of the FMC Rules.
18 Consequently, both the orders sought by Deakin University in response to Mr Rana’s application were granted, and he was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding.
THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
19 The grounds of appeal presented by Mr Rana can be divided into three groups of issues: namely, the Federal Magistrate’s directions on pleadings and procedure; the Federal Magistrate’s findings on whether the conduct complained of amounted to discrimination; and the Federal Magistrate’s finding that Mr Rana is a vexatious litigant. In respect of each of those groups of issues, Mr Rana urged that he had shown that the Federal Magistrate had plainly erred or clearly erred – those terms being his expression of what he sought to show on the present leave application.
Pleadings and Procedure
20 Mr Rana submitted that the Federal Magistrate erred in his finding that Deakin University was not required to respond to Mr Rana’s genuine steps statement, and the Federal Magistrate’s alternative finding that even if such a document should have been filed, Deakin University should not face any penalty for the late filing of that document.
21 As noted above, the Federal Magistrate noted that Mr Rana had filed no genuine steps statement prior to his application and that the relevant provision had as its object dispute resolution prior to the instigation of civil proceedings. His Honour also held alternatively that any infraction of the genuine steps obligations gives a discretion to the Court to exercise the powers in Part 3 of the Act: [11]-[14], and in his discretion he would not penalise Deakin University for any such failure.
22 I have addressed those issues in the course of referring in detail to the reasons for decision of the Federal Magistrate. It is sufficient to say, therefore, that for those reasons there is no arguable merit in this ground of attack on the orders challenged.
23 Mr Rana further submitted that the Federal Magistrate erred in accepting the late submissions of Deakin University. Mr Rana also submitted that Deakin University’s subsequent amendment to its application in a case was unfair in the light of Mr Rana’s advanced submissions. The Federal Magistrate noted that Mr Rana did not make any interlocutory application as a result of that delay, and (as noted) that Mr Rana was able to file a substantial amount of material in response to Deakin University’s written submissions. The finding that Mr Rana was not prejudiced by the late filing of Deakin University’s written submissions in the Federal Magistrate’s reasons is not shown to have been in error, or more accurately is not shown even arguably to have been in error: [18]-[20].
24 Accordingly, I do not consider that in respect of the pleadings and procedural issues Mr Rana has shown that the rulings of the Federal Magistrate are attended with any doubt. The consequence is that it would be inappropriate to grant leave to appeal from any of those issues, as simply they do not warrant reconsideration by a Full Court. There being no arguable merit demonstrated on those issues; there can be no injustice if Mr Rana is not entitled to take them further.
Discrimination
25 Mr Rana submitted in various ways that the summary dismissal of his claims for discrimination on the part of the staff of Deakin University was incorrect.
26 The Federal Magistrate summarised the three complaints of Mr Rana as follows:
(1) that Mr Rana was required to take group work because an Indian lecturer disliked him;
(2) that Mr Rana’s papers were wrongly marked and should be re-marked; and
(3) that the complaint made that Mr Rana was a plagiarist was motivated by the racial prejudice of another lecturer.
27 I respectfully agree that, in the material before the Federal Magistrate, there was nothing to support any of the three claims. The Federal Magistrate referred to the email exchanges attached to the affidavit of one of the lecturers and remarked that it was clear that Mr Rana himself created friction in the groups in which he was working and was accommodated to the extent that he requested to work alone: [117]. Mr Rana failed his initial exam but his paper was re-marked and passed: [118]. There was nothing to suggest that a different marking scale was applied, or that his race or his asserted disabilities played any part in the marking process: [120]. The communications between the lecturer and Mr Rana disclose a fair and tolerant response from the lecturer to Mr Rana: [127].
28 In reaching that view, it has been appropriate to revisit Mr Rana’s affidavits and submissions and also the materials available to the Federal Magistrate. I concur with the conclusions reached by the Federal Magistrate. There is no basis for a finding of discrimination motivating at all how Mr Rana was treated by Deakin University or its staff. It is desirable to mention the few particular matters Mr Rana focused on in his oral submissions.
29 First, with respect to the marking criteria applied, Mr Rana provided a document which he says represents the marking criteria used, but asserts that the lecturer stated different criteria would apply. The lecturer has denied that. The objective evidence simply does not support it. Mr Rana has not provided any coherent basis for his claim that a different representation as to marking was made. I see no reason to conclude that the Federal Magistrate’s assessment that the evidence firmly pointed against any different marking basis was incorrect, or that there was no cogent evidence that race or disability discrimination informed the marking process or outcome.
30 Second, Mr Rana expressed vehemently his concern as to the incorrect tallying of his results by another lecturer. He repeatedly set out the error made in calculating and recording his grade for Marketing Management in his affidavits, written submissions and again in oral submissions. Mr Rana’s submissions are not to the point. The Federal Magistrate accepted that an error was made, but concluded that that error, though unfortunate, did not disturb the proposition that the marking of Mr Rana’s work was routinely done and uncontroversially so. That was an appropriate focus for the Federal Magistrate. Despite that error, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the only cogent evidence was that the process of marking was routine, and in particular that the only cogent evidence was that race or disability did not influence that process. On the material, despite Mr Rana’s suspicion, I think the Federal Magistrate is not shown to have erred.
31 Mr Rana reiterated during oral submissions, as in written submissions and his affidavits, that as a result of the failure to correct this grade, he has not been eligible to commence a Doctorate of Philosophy in Marketing at Flinders University. This claim is not made out. At first blush, it is not clear how that claim can be sustained as the academic transcript he annexed to an affidavit shows a grade point average well below the distinction average apparently required to enter the doctorate program. I do not need to make a finding on that. The Federal Magistrate correctly found that Mr Rana has not established that the marking error was even possibly a result of, or evidenced, any form of racial or disability discrimination.
32 Underlying that submission is Mr Rana’s assertion that the reason for the error (and presumably the subsequent handling of that error) was the marker’s dislike of Mr Rana, the marker having worked at another university, and which influenced him in his employment at Deakin University. That marker deposed to have never having met Mr Rana, nor taught Mr Rana, or otherwise have known Mr Rana from the time that he worked at the earlier university. The Federal Magistrate considered it, prima facie, unbelievable that the marker had formed a dislike of Mr Rana at that university (which he left in 1994) and which he brought to bear in his employment at Deakin University in about 2009 and 2010, some 15 years or more later. Having considered the communications between that marker and Mr Rana (and other students) by email and Deakin University’s online forum, the Federal Magistrate concluded that it showed an even-handedness in responding to Mr Rana even in response to vehement and sometimes offensive messages. The long time lag, the contemporary documentation, and the direct evidence of the marker, and the absence of any cogent evidence to the contrary was adequate to enable the Federal Magistrate to reach the level of satisfaction required by s 17A of the FM Act.
33 I see no reason to overturn the Federal Magistrate’s finding.
34 Third, more generally, Mr Rana questioned the evaluation of his claim by the Federal Magistrate at [124]-[127]. The Federal Magistrate considered that there was no evidence supporting Mr Rana’s claim that he had suffered discrimination on the basis of race or disability and that the emails exhibited disclose a fair and tolerant response from the lecturer to Mr Rana’s “sometimes rude and almost invariably combative approach.” Mr Rana’s submissions and affidavits on this application and the affidavits filed in the original proceedings do not demonstrate error in the Federal Magistrate’s reasoning or conclusion. There is no reason to conclude that the Federal Magistrate erred in deciding that Mr Rana’s claim to race or disability discrimination has no reasonable prospect of success.
35 It is necessary to address one further matter. Mr Rana further submitted that the Federal Magistrate failed to afford Mr Rana procedural fairness in making a finding that Mr Rana altered the document exhibit “K” for his own purposes. That is the document marked “Draft Only” referred to above. The authenticity of the document was not directly confronted by Deakin University in evidence. The Federal Magistrate, it is said, did not specifically indicate in the course of the hearing that he might conclude that it was in effect forged by Mr Rana.
36 The Federal Magistrate made findings about the status of that document. Clearly, it was desirable for there to have been some assessment made by the Federal Magistrate about the weight to be attributed to that document, as part of the evidence relied upon by Mr Rana. It is not therefore correct to say that Mr Rana was entitled to proceed on the basis that its apparent significance – as he asserted in his submissions – could not be the subject of such an assessment. The decision in Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 concerning s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) explains that, on such an application as was before the Federal Magistrate, the Court is not blindly to accept every piece of evidence on its face value. For the reasons which the Federal Magistrate gave, based on the appearance of the “Draft Only” document itself, no weight was given to it. The Federal Magistrate was entitled to reach that view, so no reviewable error is shown.
37 Whether the positive finding that Mr Rana deliberately and dishonestly altered the document was necessary may be debated. However, the assessment that the document carried no weight did not involve error. Moreover, the Federal Magistrate described its assessment at [131] as “only adding to the overall picture”. That picture, namely that Mr Rana’s claims could not succeed, had been reached in any event.
38 Consequently, irrespective of whether it was appropriate to have made the firm adverse finding about the status or provenance of that document, the conclusion as to the prospects of Mr Rana’s claims succeeding was not made in error.
39 There is no need to decide whether Deakin University should be permitted to adduce fresh evidence on these applications for leave to appeal. Its application to rely on the affidavit of Christopher Kelly of 6 September 2011, annexing the original document of which the “Draft Only” document was said to be a predecessor is therefore refused.
40 In my view, Mr Rana has not shown that the decision of the Federal Magistrate that his claims should be summarily dismissed is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court. In that circumstance, refusing Mr Rana leave to appeal from the dismissal of his claims does not result in any injustice to him
41 To that extent, therefore, leave to appeal is refused.
Vexatious litigant
42 Mr Rana also seeks leave to appeal against the order declaring him a vexatious litigant.
43 The first step in Mr Rana’s submissions is that the Federal Magistrate erred in his treatment of the deeds of release that were produced by Mr Rana. Mr Rana produced the deeds of release as evidence that many of the cases referred to by Deakin University were settled by deeds of release, and therefore the decisions related to those deeds of release should not be relied upon for the purposes of declaring Mr Rana a vexatious litigant.
44 The Federal Magistrate rejected this, stating at [207]:
In my view, these deeds of release show in many ways striking similarities. They show the enormous range of complaints and litigation brought by Mr Rana against each of the respondents. They involve settlements involving relatively small amounts of money (I think the largest cash sum paid to Mr Rana was $27,000) which were clearly paid by those institutions and parties to avoid the obvious further expenses that further litigation would involve. Some of the recitals expressly refer, accurately enough, to the long history of litigation that has been undertaken by Mr Rana against the party or parties with whom he is settling.
45 The Federal Magistrate concluded that “far from proving his point, [the deeds of release] only go to show the scope of and unending nature of Mr Rana’s litigation activities”: at [208].
46 Mr Rana now submits that those deeds of release should not have been used as the basis for an adverse finding against Mr Rana. Mr Rana submits this on the basis of public policy and/or ss 53A and 53B of the Federal Court of Australia Act and or ss 131 and 135(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
47 In my view, Mr Rana’s submission in that respect is misguided. The Federal Magistrate’s finding that Mr Rana habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in this Court or other Australian Courts was based on the 77 decisions of Courts in matters which Mr Rana has litigated. Barring “some wholly immaterial minor interlocutory exceptions”, the analysis of those cases shows that Mr Rana was unsuccessful in each case. That is the basis of the Federal Magistrate’s decision.
48 Mr Rana has not shown how the Federal Magistrate was incorrect in his statement of the law or the application to the facts. The deeds of release came into existence in order to deal with Mr Rana’s case as pleaded. The Federal Magistrate did not accept the characterisation of the deeds as asserted by Mr Rana, and in fact considered that they supported the Federal Magistrate’s findings. That analysis of the material was available to him.
49 Second, Mr Rana separately submitted that the Federal Magistrate’s findings were incorrect in that the Federal Magistrate did not have proper regard to precedents, namely the decision of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of South Australia regarding Mr Rana’s claim against Skycity Casino, and separately the decision of Rana v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1667.
50 The Federal Magistrate made no error in his discussion of the law regarding vexatious litigants, nor his treatment of the cited authorities. With respect to the latter case, this was dealt with by the Federal Magistrate at [183]-[185]. In that case Spender J dismissed the application made against Mr Rana for security of costs of an appeal he had brought “principally because of the significant delay between the filing of the appeal and the application for security of costs”: at [18]. The Federal Magistrate noted “that although Mr Rana was successful, his Honour described Mr Rana’s prospects of success in the appeal as ‘quite poor’.” In respect of the findings of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of South Australia, the Federal Magistrate considered that “Mr Rana was largely unsuccessful. His claim against three respondents was effectively dismissed and he was granted leave to re-plead as against a fourth”: at [107].
51 In relation to the Federal Magistrate’s reasoning on this aspect, the Federal Magistrate correctly identified the correct rule of the FMC Rules (Rule 13.11) and correctly identified the relevant principles as discussed in Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153 at [141] and earlier by Stone J in Soden v Kowalski [2011] FCA 318 at [35]-[36].
52 His Honour then took the steps required by those authorities of:
(a) asking whether the claims of Mr Rana in the subject proceeding had been instituted vexatiously, in the sense that term is used, and he decided that the proceeding had been instituted vexatiously; and
(b) asking whether Mr Rana habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court and other Australian Courts, and he decided that he had.
53 In my view, the Federal Magistrate is not shown to have erred in understanding how to go about addressing those issues, or to have erred in reaching the factual findings which he made in relation to those two issues. Nor do I think that Mr Rana has shown that he has any real arguable case that the Federal Magistrate erred in either his understanding of the questions he had to address, of the material upon which those questions should be addressed, or in the answers he gave to those questions.
54 Consequently, in relation to the orders declaring Mr Rana to be a vexatious litigant, and that any existing proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court may not be continued without leave of that Court, and that Mr Rana may not institute a proceeding in that Court without its leave, I am not persuaded that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its consideration by the Full Court. It again follows that there is no real injustice to Mr Rana by the making of those orders. If he has a claim which is properly expressed, and which has apparent merit in law and on the facts as expressed, he may seek leave to bring that claim.
55 Finally I note the two separate interlocutory applications filed in this matter.
56 By the first, dated 20 August 2012, Mr Rana sought to tender fresh evidence regarding the deeds of release, including, in support that “Thomas Martin had given legal advice to the applicant as an inducement to sign the deed that he and his employers Minter Ellison will never use materials involving my past litigation in other cases”. I have concluded that the Federal Magistrate’s decision was based on the analysis of the 77 decisions to which his Honour referred; the deeds of release were of incidental significance only. Accordingly, the further evidence sought to be tendered would not assist me in determining the current application. Moreover, on these leave applications, it is not appropriate to address fresh evidence of an argumentative character. I accordingly do not accede to that application.
57 By the second application, filed on 13 September 2012, Mr Rana sought to tender exhibits A, B, C, CA, F, I, J, M of his affidavit of 20 August 2012, as well as the remaining exhibits as were before the Federal Magistrate.
58 Exhibits A, B, C and CA do not go to any of the pleaded matters. Exhibit F is a letter from Dr Albert Chan to Mr Thomas Martin dated 20 July 2012. The terms of the letter are unclear and in any event do not go towards establishing any of the proposed grounds of appeal. Exhibit I is incomprehensible; it does not assist with the interpretation of Mr Rana’s transcript, which is Exhibit IA. Exhibit J appears to set out the admission requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy at Flinders University.
59 Exhibit J states that a requirement of admission is that students who have completed a Masters by coursework require an average grade of a Distinction or better. That might demonstrate injustice to Mr Rana by showing that any erroneous marking may have precluded him from undertaking Doctoral studies, so that that evidence is admitted. However, in the particular circumstances, it does not show injustice firstly because, even assuming he had passed that subject, it is not shown that would have made any real difference to him being admitted to Doctoral studies, and secondly because (as noted above) he had no arguable case to make so not being allowed to take his arguments to the Full Court cannot cause injustice.
60 Exhibit M is a letter from the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board to Mr Rana of 26 July 2012, enclosing a copy of Mr Rana’s initial complaint. The letter from the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board does not add anything to Mr Rana’s claim, and the attached letter from Mr Rana merely repeats matters claimed by Mr Rana in the current application.
61 The proposed appeals have no prospect of success. The applications for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrate made on 20 July 2012 are refused. Mr Rana must pay the costs of Deakin University of the applications.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Mansfield. |
Associate: