FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

E I Du Pont De Nemours and Company v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC [2006] FCA 874


Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY v IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC AND COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

NSD 19 OF 2006

 

GYLES J

23 JUNE 2006

SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 19 OF 2006

 

BETWEEN:

E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY

APPLICANT

 

AND:

IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JUNE 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

 

1.      The applicant have leave to amend the application forthwith.

2.      Costs be reserved.



Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 19 OF 2006

 

BETWEEN:

E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY

APPLICANT

 

AND:

IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

 

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE:

23 JUNE 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1                     Counsel for the applicant has sought leave to amend the application to seek injunctive relief against the Commissioner. Prior to that only declaratory relief was sought. The significance of the amendment is that it would bring the case squarely within s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and therefore clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel for the first respondent objects to the amendment. It is said firstly that the amendment is futile because no matter how the proceeding is constituted there is no ‘matter’ to be determined. It is also said that this is a colourable amendment in that it is designed to create what counsel called a federal ‘hook’ in the absence of any ‘matter’.

2                     In my opinion, the amendment should be allowed. It follows naturally from the relief which has already been sought. It relates directly to the right alleged to be capable of being vindicated. If the relief which is presently sought were obtained, then injunctions of this kind would be appropriate in any event. Counsel for the first respondent sought leave to adjourn so that he could consult the authorities as to colourable proceedings. I have taken the responsibility of making a decision on the footing that the cases that I have mentioned to him in the course of argument (Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1987) 18 FCR 212; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564) are those which would govern the matter in any event.

3                     Counsel for the second respondent does not put any objection to the amendment but reserves all grounds of opposition to the amended application.

4                     I will reserve costs. I indicate that I will make an order in due course that costs thrown away should be paid. I am not prepared to pre-judge any further than that, because Mr Gleeson presses his argument that there always was jurisdiction pursuant to s 39B(1A)(c).

 

I certify that the preceding four (4) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.



Associate:


Dated: 6 July 2006



Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr JT Gleeson SC, Mr PW Flynn



Solicitor for the Applicant:

Addisons



Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr DK Catterns QC, Mr C Dimitriadis



Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Phillips Ormonde & Fitzpatrick Lawyers



Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Ms K Howard



Solicitor for the Second Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor



Date of Hearing:

23 June 2006



Date of Judgment:

23 June 2006