FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NAJQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1185


NAJQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 215 OF 2004

 

ALLSOP J

9 SEPTEMBER 2004

SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 215 of 2004

 

BETWEEN:

NAJQ

APPELLANT

 

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

 

JUDGE:

ALLSOP J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 SEPTEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

 

 

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

 

 

1.         The appeal be dismissed.

2.         The appellant pay the respondent's costs.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 215 of 2004

 

BETWEEN:

NAJQ

APPELLANT

 

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

 

 

JUDGE:

ALLSOP J

DATE:

9 SEPTEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY



REASONS FOR JUDGMENT



1                     This is an appeal from orders made by a Federal Magistrate on 4 February 2004 in which the Federal Magistrate dismissed an application made under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 30 December 2002, in which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant a protection visa to the appellant.  The Chief Justice has directed that the matter be heard by a single Judge of this Court.

2                     The notice of appeal from the decision of the Federal Magistrate was as follows:

2.      The Single judge of the Federal Magistrate Court in her Honors Judgment delivered on the 4 February 2004 failed to find error of law, Jurisdictional error Procedural fairness and relief under Section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903.

3.      The grounds and relief is very much similar with a recent High Court Judgment – Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal; Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30 (8 August 2002).  Catchwords:  Immigration – Refugee – Protection visa – Decision by Minister to refuse application for visa – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – Obligation of Secretary of Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to give relevant documents to Register of Tribunal for purpose of review – nature and extent of obligation – Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 148(3), 424(1).

4.      The Honorable trial judge erred in considering the real state of affairs of the applicant, the applicant feared harm.  And also the present ruling government fail to protect civilians life, which is a worldwide concern today.  Honorable Trial judge did not take it into consideration.

5.      S474 of the Migration Act is ineffective as per the recent two decision of the High Court of Australia.  Honorable trail judge did not consider this in favour of me.

6.      The applicant will face persecution if she returns to his country of origin as there are significant level of violation of human rights, this was not considered by honourable judge.

7.      Recent High Court judgement:  Plaintiff S 157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 1 (4 February 2003).

8.      Recent Federal Court of Australia judgement:  SGDB V Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 74 (14 February 2003)

[errors in original]

3                     It is necessary to understand that this is an appeal from the Federal Magistrate not a wholesale re-agitation of the application for judicial review, nevertheless, it is appropriate to understand the claims made for the application which was before the Federal Magistrate.  These were as follows:

1.       The Refugee Review Tribunal has not attended any evidence in relation to the applicant’s claims and thus its decision is influenced by sufficient doubts.  The applicants provided a suitable vehicle and most of the grounds relied upon facts and documents, which the tribunal did not consider.  The RRT heavily depended in their handling of the issues based on the generalized facts and findings of DIMA.

2.       The RRT failed to internalise the circumstantial; grounds of the review application while considering the claims of the review application and did not consider the supporting facts and documents.  Therefore, the applicant seeks a review of the decisions of the Tribunal under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3.       The Tribunal’s ignoring of relevant evidence and its finding in the face of contradicting independent evidence which indicated actual bias constitute jurisdictional error being a breach of procedural fairness which is an essential condition and of the exercise of the decision making power and attracts s 39B Judiciary Act 1903 as per Gaudron J in Abebe v commonwealth (1999)162 ALR 1 at 33 paragraph [113].  Thus, subject to the operation of discretionary factors, breach of those rules is a jurisdictional error which will ground prerogative relief.

4.       The applicant is a genuine refugee under the UN Convention and sub-class 866 of the Migration Act 1958, but the authority has not considered applicants claims and he has been refused to remain in Australia permanently.  The RRT has failed to investigate the applicant’s claims, specifically the grounds of persecution, in Bangladesh.  Therefore, the tribunal’s decision dated on 30 December 2002 was affected by actual bias constituting judicial error.

4                     The generality and lack of specificity of the original application is evident from its terms.  The Federal Magistrate dealt with the matter as follows.  Her Honour first examined the Tribunal decision commencing with an outline of the now appellant's claims for protection.  In [3] of the reasons of the Federal Magistrate the following summary was set out.

3.        The applicant claimed to fear persecution by reason of his political opinion in Bangladesh.  He claimed to have been a leading member of the Jatiya Party and to have suffered false charges from members of the rival Bangladesh National Party (the BNP) and the Awami League in 1988 and 1989.  He claimed for the first time at the Tribunal hearing to have been beaten by Awami League members in December 1989.  After the BNP came to power they ordered his arrest.  He feared for his life.  He went to Kuwait in 1993 on an employment visa.  He claimed that after the Awami League if he returned to Bangladesh.  While in Kuwait he had renewed his passport at the Bangladesh Embassy.

5                     The Federal Magistrate then proceeded to explain how the Tribunal had dealt with the matter and this is set out in paragraphs 4, 5 6 and 7 of the Federal Magistrate's reasons, which are in the following terms. 

4.        The Tribunal found that the applicant's pivotal claim to have been beaten in December 1989 was false. It had regard to the fact that the claim was not raised until one day before the Tribunal hearing, that the applicant by then introduced further detail to the story and that his claims in relation to injuries suffered were inconsistent with the description in a hospital document provided by him in support of his claim. The Tribunal rejected the submission by the applicant´s adviser that the claim had been referred to in the applicant's statutory declaration in a claim that he had become `subject to political suppressions by the political opposition alliance´.

5.        As a result the Tribunal found that the authenticity of the documentation provided by the applicant in relation to the hospital admission and the nature of his wounds was false. Having regard to the credibility problems of the applicant in relation to the claimed beating and independent evidence in relation to document fraud, the Tribunal found that other photocopied documents (apart from those downloaded from the web) which had been provided by the applicant on 3 December 2002 were also false.

6.        The Tribunal did, however, find that the applicant was a member of the Jatiya Party and was involved in political activities. However it found that he had a low political profile, that he was able to leave Bangladesh on his own passport and that he had lived overseas for almost a decade. Independent evidence in relation to the situation in Bangladesh did not suggest that the applicant would be targeted if he returned to Bangladesh. The Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance in the future of the applicant being selected or targeted for persecution for reason of his political opinion. Furthermore, although two false cases were lodged against him, for the reasons referred to and because the higher courts in Bangladesh were said to display a significant degree of independence, the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence that there was a real chance in the future of these claims being tried against the applicant for his political opinion.

7.    Considering all his claims, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution should he return to Bangladesh now or in the foreseeable future. Hence it was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention related reason.

 

6                     The Federal Magistrate then, if I may say so respectfully, carefully and thoroughly dealt with the matters identified in the application before her Honour.  In [8] of the Federal Magistrate's reasons, her Honour dealt with the claim that the Tribunal had not attended to the evidence in relation to the claims (being the matter referred to in [1] of the ground of appeal).  The Federal Magistrate noted that no particulars of this claim had been provided and that insofar as it was alleged that the had failed to have regard to relevant considerations this had not been established on the material before the Court.

7                     The Federal Magistrate was of the view that, contrary to the claim in the application, the Tribunal did consider the supporting information and documents submitted by the appellant but did not amongst other things accept the genuineness of the supporting documents.  The Federal Magistrate noted that the appellant was unsuccessful because of the view the Tribunal took of the information and its assessment based on country information and the other factors referred to by the Tribunal that the appellant's claimed fears were not well-founded.

8                     I find no error of approach in [8] of the Federal Magistrate's reasons.  In reaching that conclusion I have had regard to the underlying reasons of the Tribunal.  The considerations referred to in [8] of the Federal Magistrate's reasons also dealt with the assertion in ground 2 of the application of a failure to internalise the circumstances of the appellant's claims.

9                     The Federal Magistrate then turned to the third ground of the appeal, being the allegation of actual bias.  The Federal Magistrate was of the view that no proper grounds for such an allegation were present and this ground was rejected.  There is no error whatsoever in the Federal Magistrate’s approach to this question.

10                  The fourth ground of appeal did not, on its face, require any attention by the Federal Magistrate since it did not identify any conceivable jurisdictional error.  The Federal Magistrate then proceeded to deal with the appellant's written submissions.

11                  I should add that in the introductory section of her Honour's reasons, the following appeared:

As the applicant is self represented, I have considered not only the issues that he raises but also the material before me to determine whether there is any jurisdictional error.

12                  The first matter considered by the learned Federal Magistrate was the submission that the Tribunal erred in failing to investigate the appellant's claims.  The learned Federal Magistrate correctly said that the Tribunal was under no obligation to make inquiries though her Honour restricted the comments she made to the circumstances of this case.  Her Honour was plainly correct in this regard.

13                  The learned Federal Magistrate then dealt with the submission that the Tribunal did not complete the exercise of its jurisdiction as it made no findings as to what socio-political changes might occur in Bangladesh in the reasonably foreseeable future and failed to assess whether the appellant's fears of being persecuted for being a popular politician of Bangladesh were well-founded in the reasonably foreseeable future.

14                  The learned Federal Magistrate correctly concluded that, contrary to this submission, the Tribunal did in fact consider the reasonably foreseeable future and that it concluded on the basis of a number of factors which were open to it that the appellant did not face a real chance of persecution should he return to Bangladesh now or in the foreseeable future.

15                  The Tribunal then dealt with the appellant's complaints that the Tribunal did not provide him with particulars of information which formed part of the reason for the Tribunal decision.  Particular emphasis was apparently placed before the magistrate on information that political persecution in Bangladesh had subsided.

16                  The learned Federal Magistrate noted that this claim, which appeared to raise a complaint under s 424A of the Migration Act, or an assertion of lack of procedural fairness, foundered on the difficulty that the reasons of the Tribunal reflect that the Tribunal did provide the appellant with particulars of information about the present situation in Bangladesh.  This was discussed with the appellant at the hearing.  No transcript of the hearing was tendered before the Federal Magistrate.

17                  The Federal Magistrate concluded, correctly in my view, that there had been no breach of s 424A or a lack of procedural fairness established in this regard. 

18                  From [12] onwards, the learned Federal Magistrate proceeded to deal with matters not specifically raised by the applicant, the appellant before this Court, which could possibly raise an argument as to the existence of jurisdictional error.  The learned Federal Magistrate noted that the Tribunal rejected the appellant's claims referring to a number of factors, including the question of the prevalence of document fraud in Bangladesh.  

19                  The learned Federal Magistrate noted the existence of Full Court authority in the Federal Court that in some circumstances a Tribunal is under an obligation to put such information of document fraud to an applicant for comment consistently with its obligations to afford procedural fairness.  The learned Federal Magistrate, however, noted that the reasons of the Tribunal indicated that the Tribunal put its concerns in this respect to the appellant, whose response, which is recorded in the reasons of the Tribunal, was that that was impossible and can not happen.   On this basis the learned Federal Magistrate was of the view that there had been no denial of procedural fairness. 

20                  The learned Federal Magistrate then in [13] proceeded to consider the information which the Tribunal put to the appellant about the present situation in Bangladesh including the independence of the higher levels of the judiciary.

21                  Thereafter the learned Federal Magistrate rejected any contention that the decision was illogical or that this was a ground of jurisdictional error.  It is unnecessary to examine the correctness of this last proposition, because there is no apparent illogicality in the Tribunal’s decision. 

22                  The learned Federal Magistrate concluded in relation to procedural fairness as follows in [14] of her Honour’s reasons. 

This is not a case where claims were rejected on the basis of material which should have been put to the applicant (cf WAGU v MIMIA [2003] FCA 912). Critical issues were raised with the applicant.

23                  Subject to the comment made as to the question of illogicality above, I find no error in the approach thus far of the learned Federal Magistrate. 

24                  The final paragraph of the reasons of the Federal Magistrate are as follows: 

15.  None of the applicant's other generally worded, but unparticularised, written arguments, or the material before me raise any jurisdictional error. In particular, the applicant's written arguments refer to Muin (Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601) as `very relevant´ without further explanation. There is nothing in the material before me to suggest that that case has any relevance to the circumstances of this case. As no jurisdictional error has been established the application must be dismissed.

25                  This paragraph raises an assertion that the cases of Muin and Lie, decided in the High Court, provides a ground of jurisdictional error to this appellant.  No evidentiary assertion was laid before the Federal Magistrate for any conclusion or even any argument that the appellant was in any way misled by any procedure adopted.  Muin and Lie were cases on agreed facts.  It is necessary to make out some factual foundation in any particular case upon which to found a conclusion that there has been some procedural unfairness in a particular person's case.

26                  I turn to the grounds of appeal in the notice of appeal.  I will use the paragraph numbers adjacent to the paragraphs set out earlier, being [2] through to [8]. 

27                  Paragraph 2 is a generalised assertion without any particulars of error of the magistrate and my earlier discussion of the magistrate's reasons is sufficient to deal with [2].

28                  Paragraph 3 is an assertion that Muin and Lie somehow gives a legal conclusion to the effect that jurisdictional error was present in this case.  For the reasons earlier expressed that is not the case.

29                  Paragraph 4 of the notice of appeal is not in terms an identification of any species of jurisdictional error.  It directs itself to the fact finding process involved and is not a ground of jurisdictional error.

30                  Paragraph 5 deals with s 474 of the Migration Act.  The whole approach of the learned Federal Magistrate was conformable with the decisions of the High Court such that if jurisdictional error is shown s 474 is of no effect to prevent judicial review.

31                  Apart from the fact that the wrong gender is used, paragraph 6 does not identify any jurisdictional error of the Tribunal or any error in the learned Federal Magistrate.  As I have sought to identify, the learned Federal Magistrate dealt with the grounds of application, the written submissions and her Honour's own reading of the decision.  The assertions in [6] assume an answer contrary to that given by the Tribunal as to a real chance of persecution.

32                  Paragraph 7 refers to Plaintiff  S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, the learned Federal Magistrate was well aware of that decision and her reasons illustrate as much.  That is not a legitimate ground of appeal.

33                  Paragraph 8 deals with the decision of Mansfield J in SGDB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCA 74.  No particulars are given as to why this decision of his Honour in relation to another person's application has any bearing on this appeal.  This was a case decided shortly after Plaintiff S157 was handed down.  His Honour found jurisdictional error in the particular decision.  It is of no relevance in relation to this appeal.

34                  The appellant has filed two sets of written submissions in this Court on the appeal, the first was filed on 13 July 2004 and the second was filed in Court today.  The first submissions deal at length with the Tribunal's decision.  The first body of submissions, which were otherwise dealt with by the learned Federal Magistrate, complain about the failure of the Tribunal to internalise the circumstantial grounds of the review application and otherwise failing to give appropriate weight to material which was said to be favourable to the appellant.  An instance of this can be seen in [4] of the appellant's written submissions filed on 13 July in which the following appears:


The review applicant supplied additional evidences to the tribunal, but unfortunately the tribunal did not pay attention on those additional evidences and used the previous controversial DFAT report and other traditional and structured sources in arriving its decision.  Further and in the alternative, if the above documents were referred to by the Tribunal, there is not mention of these documents in the Tribunal’s reasons.  This constitutes a breach of section 430 (1) (c) (d) of the Act.  The above grounds are judicially-reviewable under section 476 (1) (a) (e) (f) (g) of the Migration Act.

35                  A breach of s 430 of the Migration Act is there identified.  Repealed provisions of the Migration Act are also identified.  There was no error in the Tribunal not making all the findings of fact that the appellant would have it make.

36                  The written submissions rely on Muin and Lie.  I have dealt with that. 

37                  The written submissions deal with the asserted failure of the Tribunal to deal with material placed before the Tribunal.  The learned Federal Magistrate dealt with that matter and I have dealt with her Honour's treatment of it. 

38                  The written submissions then proceed to describe the appellant's factual circumstances leading up to an assertion that there were sufficient grounds for the Tribunal to conclude with certainty that his claims and fears were genuine.  This is not any body of material which founds any argument for jurisdictional error.

39                  The written submissions then return to Muin and Lie.  I do not repeat what I have said about that case.  I should add, however, that in [15] the appellant in dealing with Muin and Lie states the following: 

At a factual level, my case differs substantially from Muin but the nature of denial of procedural fairness is very much similar.  It is understandable that the letter misled me, or that I would have taken any particular steps had I been told, if it was the case, that the Tribunal had not been provided with them.  It was submitted that the Part B documents could be seen to relate to my case and the findings of fact in Muin made out.  I was affected by the Tribunal’s adverse material, which information was contained in the Part B documents and the issues in my case.  It was assumed that I would have taken any particular course had I known that the Tribunal had not been provided with the documents, or did not intend to refer to them.  It was not explained by the Tribunal how that might be concluded by reference to the contents of the Part B documents.

40                  As can be seen from this paragraph an unparticularised assertion is made that steps would have been taken by this appellant.  No such evidence was led before the Federal Magistrate.  This is not a matter which should properly be allowed on appeal.  It would need an evidential foundation and a trial about factual matters.  The appellant has had his opportunity to have a trial in relation to Muin and Lie.  The exercise of appellate jurisdiction in this Court is not the place for a factual trial.

41                  The submissions then go on to make generalised and irrelevant legal assertions concerning  s 39B of the Judiciary Act and s 75(v) of the Constitution.  The submissions then go on to on to deal with issues about privative clause decisions, which are irrelevant because of the way the learned Federal Magistrate approached the matter.

42                  Submissions then attacked once again the Tribunal's fact finding as somehow revealing jurisdictional error, but as the learned Federal Magistrate found, correctly in my view, the Tribunal’s approach to the application did not display any jurisdictional error in its fact finding.

43                  The submissions then in [20] proceeds to deal with natural justice.  Once again, Muin and Lie is raised. I have dealt with that.

44                  Further bases for the assertion of a failure to accord procedural fairness were as follows. First, it was said that the evidence and documents before the Tribunal were not properly assessed.  The learned Federal Magistrate rejected this and I have dealt with this.

45                  Secondly, there was an assertion that there were further documents that were in the appellant's possession and/or could have been obtained from Bangladesh and that he could have placed before the Tribunal.  The submission asserted that he wished to have further documents before the Tribunal, but felt that the Tribunal had made up its mind; and the appellant asserted that he also felt that the Tribunal did not consider the fact of a Jatiya Party member being persecuted both by the Awami League and the BNP.

46                  What this aspect of the submission of the appellant ignores is that it is for the appellant to bring forward such material as he wishes to satisfy the Tribunal of his claims.  This submission, akin to that dealt with by the learned Federal Magistrate, was that it was somehow the obligation of the Tribunal to undertake its own investigations.  It is also related  to the submission made to the magistrate that the Tribunal was biased. If there were documents in Bangladesh that could have helped the appellant's case, it was his responsibility to bring them forward before the Tribunal.

47                  In [20c] of his submissions of 13 July the appellant stated the following in relation to this question of documents:

20c.   There was confusion in my case on the question of documents before the tribunal.  I asserted that I wanted to produce more documents.  The question arose whether this referred to documents that I had produced to the tribunal, documents that I tried to produce to the Tribunal, documents that I now wished to produce to the tribunal, documents I wished to this court or documents that I wished to produce at further I desired before the tribunal (differently constituted) or a Federal Magistrate.

48                  There is no material before me which indicates that there was any real debate before the learned Federal Magistrate about whether some adjournment should have been given which was or may have been requested and which was refused.  It is not clear from this submission whether the appellant's complaint now is that the Tribunal failed to give him natural justice because it failed to adjourn the hearing.  That matter does not appear to have been agitated before the Federal Magistrate.  It would require evidence.  It is not a matter to be agitated on appeal without an evidentiary foundation laid before the Federal Magistrate.

49                  The submissions then continued with complaints as to the fact finding of the Tribunal and once again raised the question as to the Tribunal's failure to investigate his claim.  The submissions of the appellant were summarised in the final paragraph of his first written submissions [20f] as follows. 

My Submissions can, it seems to me, be broadly stated:

1.             The tribunal failed to assess whether my fears of being persecuted were well founded and thereby failed to accord him procedural fairness.

2.             The tribunal’s finding that I had no well founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh for a political related reason.

3.             The Tribunal did not invite me any comment regarding the Country Information of Bangladesh.

4.             The tribunal did not put to me in its doubts about the documents.

5.             I also in the same position as in Muin.

6.             The tribunal’s finding that I did not have well founded fear of persecution.

7.             There was procedural inefficiency; in that I did not refer to sufficient documents supplied by me and ignored and relevant evidence.

8.             The Tribunal’s actual findings indicate actual bias.

9.             The Tribunal did not believe me without any reasons.

10.         The Tribunal failed to investigate my claim.

50                  The only matter that I have not dealt with already in this list is the assertion in [3] that the Tribunal did not invite the appellant to comment regarding the country information of Bangladesh.  To the extent that the issue related to document fraud the Tribunal raised that issue with the appellant.  This appeal is not an opportunity to begin again complaints about the Tribunal's decision.  It is a place to determine whether the Federal Magistrate committed any error which should be rectified on appeal.

51                  Paragraph 3 of [20f] of the submissions amounts to the proposition that the Tribunal was obliged to provide to the appellant every piece of country information upon which it was to rely in some fashion in reaching its conclusion. Thus stated, in my view, it is far too broad. I refer to what I said in the Full Court in VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 82.

52                  The gist of what I said there is relevant here.  It is for applicant seeking the protection visa to bring forward all that he or she wishes in support of his or her application before the Tribunal.  The Tribunal is a specialist administrative body set up to deal with these applications.  Its members have expertise ranging over a number of countries.  They have access to a wide range of information about many countries.  Part of their obligation and responsibility in dealing with applications of this kind is to inform themselves of the countries in question.  This is not adversarial litigation.  It is for the applicant to bring forward all the material he or she wishes be considered.  Very often reference to country information is made in an attempt to assess the reliability of information put forward by applicants.  It does not follow, merely because the result of the Tribunal's decision is unfavourable, that all such information necessarily becomes "adverse" so as to enliven the principles of natural justice.

53                  Natural justice is not a linear logical progression.  It is a question of fairness.  The learned Federal Magistrate took the view after careful reading of all the material before her that here there had not been a denial of procedural fairness.  No appealable error is revealed in that conclusion.

54                  I now deal with the appellant's outline of submission filed in Court today.  Once again this submission deals afresh with the Tribunal's reasons.  In paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, there is some background given and unparticularised assertions of jurisdictional error, are made.

55                  Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 once again raise Muin and Lie; I have dealt with that earlier.

56                  Paragraph 7 deals with the assertion that the Tribunal failed to investigate the appellant's claims.  The learned Federal Magistrate dealt with this without error.

57                  Paragraph 8 once again returns to the failure of the Tribunal to internalise the circumstantial grounds of his review application; I have dealt with that. 

58                  Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 raise issues concerning s 39B of the Judiciary Act, s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 474 of the Migration Act which are now uncontroversial and which were the framework in which the learned Federal Magistrate approached the application before her.

59                  Paragraph 13 deals with the Tribunal's alleged ignoring of relevant evidence and findings in the face of contradicting independent evidence.  It is asserted that this discloses jurisdictional error and a failure to accord procedural fairness.  The failure of the Tribunal to refer to or rely upon particular evidence that the appellant considers favourable is not a jurisdictional error.  It is for the Tribunal properly attending to its task to make the relevant factual findings by reference to such material as it rationally thinks appropriate.  There is no basis to think that the Tribunal did not do this or that the learned Federal Magistrate failed to appreciate this in her consideration of the matter.

60                  Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the submissions once again claim a failure of the Tribunal to investigate the claims and thus it is said that there was actual bias. The learned Federal Magistrate dealt with this without error. 

61                  Paragraph 16 of the submissions claims that the Tribunal did not complete the exercise of its jurisdiction, because it made no findings as to sociopolitical changes that might occur in Bangladesh in the reasonably foreseeable future. The learned Federal Magistrate dealt with this without error.

62                  Finally, paragraph 17 asserted that the Tribunal did not provide the appellant with particulars of information which form part of the reason of the Tribunal's decision, in particular, the persecution against the Jatiya Party of Bangladesh had subsided.  The learned Federal Magistrate dealt with this without error in the way that I have identified above.

63                  The appellant made some oral submissions before me today.  They were brief and to the effect that he had left his country 12 years ago and that it was not safe for him to return and that people are being killed every day.  He said his parents were old, between 80 and 85 and he cannot go back to them in the foreseeable future because of the difficulties he will face by way of persecution.  None of those matters are matters which grounds any argument for appealable error by the learned Federal Magistrate.

64                  For the above reasons the appeal should be dismissed.

65                  The orders of the Court are:

1.    The appeal be dismissed.

2.    The appellant pay the respondent's costs.



I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Allsop.


Associate:


Dated:              16 September 2004


The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of a Bengali interpreter.



Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr T Reilly



Solicitor for the Respondent:

Sparke Helmore



Date of Hearing:

9 September 2004



Date of Judgment:

9 September 2004