FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd

[2004] FCA 1135

MICROSOFT CORPORATION & ORS v EZY LOANS PTY LIMITED & ORS

N 1129 OF 2001

STONE J

2 SEPTEMBER 2004

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.                  In these orders, terms defined in the annexure to these orders shall have the meanings set out in that annexure;

2.                  Judgment be entered for the applicants against the first and second respondents jointly in the sum of $70,000 being:

(a)    $20,000 for damages for infringement of copyright pursuant to s 115(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

(b)   $50,000 for additional damages for infringement of copyright pursuant to s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).

3.                  In addition judgement be entered for the applicants against the second respondent in the sum of $520,625 being:

(a)    $220,625 for damages for infringement of copyright pursuant to s 115(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

(b)   $300,000 for additional damages for infringement of copyright pursuant to s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).

4.                  The respondents and each of them, whether by their servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from:

(a)    Reproducing or authorising the reproduction of the whole or a substantial part of any of the Microsoft Programs without the licence of the first applicant;

(b)   Selling, offering for sale, supplying, offering to supply or distributing any Infringing Microsoft Program;

(c)    Selling, offering for sale, supplying, offering to supply or distributing any Incomplete Microsoft Program; and

(d)   Authorising, directing or procuring any other company or person to engage in any of the conduct sought to be restrained by the orders in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this order.

5.                  The respondents deliver up on oath within 7 days, each infringing Microsoft Program and any equipment used to make any such infringing copy in the possession, power, custody or control of the respondents or any of them.

6.                  The respondents and each of them, whether by their servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from infringing the Microsoft Trade Marks by:

(a)    manufacturing, procuring the manufacture of, importing, purchasing, selling, offering to sell, supplying, offering to supply or distributing any Infringing Microsoft Product; and

(b)   authorising, directing or procuring any other company or person to engage in any of the conduct sought to be restrained by sub-paragraph (a) above.

7.                  The respondents deliver up to the solicitors of the applicants on oath all Infringing Microsoft Products and any equipment used or intended to be used for making Infringing Microsoft Products in the possession, custody or control of the respondent or any of them.

8.                  The first respondent, whether by its servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from representing in trade or commerce to persons to whom the first respondent supplies or offers to supply any Infringing Microsoft Programs, Incomplete Microsoft Programs, or Infringing Microsoft Products:

(a)    that the first respondent is lawfully entitled to supply any such product; or

(b)   in the case of Infringing Microsoft Programs and Infringing Microsoft Products, that any such product has been made with the licence of the first applicant.

9.                  The second respondent be restrained from aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or being in any way directly or indirectly a party to or concerned in the conduct sought to be restrained by order 7.

10.              The first respondent, whether by its servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from representing in trade or commerce to persons to whom the first respondent supplies or offers to supply any Infringing Microsoft Programs, Incomplete Microsoft Programs, or Infringing Microsoft Products:

(a)    that the first respondent is lawfully entitled to supply any such product; or

(b)   in the case of Infringing Microsoft Program and Infringing Microsoft Products, that any such product has been made with the licence of the first applicant.

11.              The second respondent be restrained from aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or being in any way directly or indirectly a party to or concerned in the conduct sought to be restrained by order 9.

12.              The second respondent, whether by his servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from representing in trade or commerce to persons to whom the second respondent supplies or offers to supply any Infringing Microsoft Programs, Incomplete Microsoft Programs or Infringing Microsoft Products:

(a)    that the second respondent is lawfully entitled to supply any such product; or

(b)   in the case of Infringing Microsoft Programs and Infringing Microsoft Products, that any such product has been made with the licence of the first applicant.

13.              The respondent to pay the applicants’ taxed costs including all reserved costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

ANNEXURE to the orders of Stone J - 

2 September 2004

‘Incomplete Microsoft Program’ means a copy of the whole or a substantial part of any of the Microsoft Programs which is not accompanied by the associated media, product manual, certificate of authenticity and end-user licence agreement for the relevant Microsoft Program.

‘Infringing Microsoft Products’ means any Microsoft Class 9 Products or Microsoft Class 16 Products to which the mark ‘MICROSOFT’ or the mark ‘WINDOWS’ or a mark substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the mark ‘MICROSOFT’ or the mark ‘WINDOWS’ has been applied without the consent of the first applicant.

‘Infringing Microsoft Program’ means a copy of the whole or a substantial part of any of the Microsoft Programs which has not been made by or with the licence of the First Applicant or which has been imported into Australia without the licence of the first applicant;

‘Microsoft Class 9 Products’ means computer programs, magnetic disks and tapes containing computer programs, computer software, computer hardware, memory boards for use with computers, programmed chips, cartridges embodying computer programs and computer software and firmware embodied in computers or designed to be used therewith;

‘Microsoft Class 16 Products’ means printed instructional and teaching material related to computers and computer software, books, paper and printed matter for use with computer equipment, computer hardware and software manuals, newsletters featuring information about computer hardware and software, paper, paper tape and cards for the recordal of computer programs;

‘Microsoft Programs’ means the computer programs, associated documentation and works identified in the Schedule hereto; and

‘Microsoft Trade Marks’ means any or all of the first applicant’s registered trade marks comprising the mark ‘MICROSOFT’ and numbered 371528(9) and 377674(16) or comprising the mark ‘WINDOWS’ and numbered 576996(9) and 576997(16).]

SCHEDULE to the orders of Stone J 

2 September 2004

MICROSOFT PROGRAMS

All versions of the following computer programs and associated manuals and documentation (including versions created or released subsequent to the date hereof):

Microsoft Access

Microsoft Access Developers Toolkit for Windows

Microsoft Access Distribution Kit

Microsoft Access Solution Pack for Windows

Microsoft Access Upsizing Tools for Windows

Microsoft Age of Empires

Microsoft Age of Empires Expansion: The Rise of Rome

Microsoft Age of Empires II: The Age of Kings

Microsoft Allegiance

Microsoft Ancient Lands

Microsoft Arcade for Windows

Microsoft Asheron’s Call

Microsoft BackOffice

Microsoft Beethoven for Windows: The Ninth Symphony

Microsoft Best of Entertainment Pack

Microsoft Biz Talk Server

Microsoft Biz Talk Server Enterprise

Microsoft Bookshelf

Microsoft Caribbean Scenery

Microsoft Casino

CD-ROM Fun and Fact Pack for Windows

Microsoft Cinemania

Microsoft Close Combat

Microsoft Close Combat Russian Front

Microsoft Combat Flight Simulator

Microsoft Commerce

Microsoft Complete Baseball 1995 for Windows

Microsoft Complete NBA Basketball 1995 for Windows

Microsoft Cordless Wheel Mouse

Microsoft Crimson Skies

Microsoft Creative Writer

Microsoft Dangerous Creatures

Microsoft Dinosaurs

Microsoft Dogs

Microsoft Encarta

Microsoft Entertainment Pak

Microsoft Entertainment Pak: The Puzzle Collection

Microsoft Excel

Microsoft Exchange

Microsoft Explorapedia: World of Nature

Microsoft Explorapedia: World of People

Microsoft Fine Artist

Microsoft Flight Simulator

Microsoft FORTRAN Compiler

Microsoft FORTRAN PowerStation

Microsoft FoxPro

Microsoft FrontPage 2000

Microsoft FrontPage 1.0 Macintosh Edition

Microsoft Golf 2001 Edition

Microsoft Greetings 2001

Microsoft Host Integration Server

Microsoft Intellimouse Explorer

Microsoft Intellimouse Optical

Microsoft Intellimouse Trackball

Microsoft Interix

Microsoft International Soccer 2000

Microsoft Internet Explorer

Microsoft Internet Keyboard

Microsoft Internet Keyboard Pro

Microsoft ISA Server

Microsoft ISA Server Enterprise Edition

Microsoft Japan Scenery

Microsoft LAN Manager

Microsoft LAN Manager Resource Kit

Microsoft Links 2000 LS

Microsoft Links 2001

Microsoft Links Courses

Microsoft Macro Assembler

Microsoft Mastering Enterprise

Microsoft Mastering MFC

Microsoft Mastering Visual Basic

Microsoft Mastering Visual Studio Ent

Microsoft Mastering Web Development

Microsoft Mail

Microsoft Mechwarrier

Microsoft Metal Gear Solid

Microsoft Midtown Madness

Microsoft Money 2001

Microsoft Money for Windows

Microsoft Monster Truck Madness

Microsoft Motocross Madness 3D Version 2

Microsoft Mozart for Windows – The Dissonant Quartet

Microsoft MSDN Library

Microsoft MSDN Professional

Microsoft MSDN Universal

Microsoft MS-DOS

Microsoft Multimedia Composer Collection

Microsoft Musical Instruments

Microsoft My Personal Tutor Pre-K

Microsoft Natural Keyboard Pro

Microsoft New York Scenery

Microsoft NT Server Enterprise

Microsoft Office

Microsoft Outlook

Microsoft Pandoras Box

Microsoft Paris Scenery

Microsoft PhotoDraw 2000

Microsoft Picture It! Premium

Microsoft Picture It! Publishing Gold Edition

Microsoft Picture It! Publishing Silver

Microsoft Pinball Arcade

Microsoft PowerPoint

Microsoft PowerPoint 2000

Microsoft Plus Entertainment Pack

Microsoft Project

Microsoft Proofing Tools

Microsoft Proxy Server

Microsoft Publisher

Microsoft Rabbit Ears for Windows: How The Leopard Got His Spots

Microsoft Racing Madness

Microsoft Return of Arcade

Microsoft Scenes – Brain Twister Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Flight Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Hollywood Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Impressionists

Microsoft Scenes – Sierra

Microsoft Scenes – Sierra Club Nature Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Sierra Club Wildlife Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Sports Extremes Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Stereogram Collection

Microsoft Scenes – Undersea Collection

Microsoft Scholastics’ Magic School Bus

Microsoft Schubert for Windows: The ‘Trout’ Quintet

Microsoft Services for Netware

Microsoft Services for Unix

Microsoft SGML Author for Word

Microsoft Sidewinder Dual Strike

Microsoft Sidewinder Force Feedback Pro

Microsoft Sidewinder Force Feedback Steering Wheel

Microsoft Sidewinder Freestyle Pro

Microsoft Sidewinder Gamepad Pro

Microsoft Sidewinder Game Voice

Microsoft Sidewinder Joystick

Microsoft Sidewinder Plug & Play Game Pad

Microsoft Sidewinder Precision Pro 2

Microsoft Sidewinder Precision Racing Wheel

Microsoft Sidewinder Strategic Commander

Microsoft Sidewinder Site Server

Microsoft Sidewinder Site Server Internet Connector

Microsoft Small Business Server

Microsoft Small Business Server Client Add On

Microsoft Smart Cards

Microsoft SNA

Microsoft SoundBits – Classic Cartoons from Hanna Barbera

Microsoft SoundBits – Classic Hollywood Movies

Microsoft SoundBits – Musical Sounds from Around the World

Microsoft SourceSafe

Microsoft Space Simulator

Microsoft SQL Server

Microsoft Starlancer

Microsoft Strauss for Windows

Microsoft Stravinsky for Windows: The Rite of Spring

Microsoft Systems Management Server

Microsoft Systems Management CAL

Microsoft Systems Management Server

Microsoft Test for Windows

Microsoft TrueType Font Pack

Microsoft Visio

Microsoft Visual Basic

Microsoft Visual Basic Enterprise

Microsoft Visual Basic Pro

Microsoft Visual Basic Standard

Microsoft Visual C++

Microsoft Visual C++ Enterprise

Microsoft Visual C++ Professional

Microsoft Visual C++ Standard

Microsoft Visual FoxPro

Microsoft Visual FoxPro Professional

Microsoft Visual InterDev

Microsoft Visual J++ Pro

Microsoft Visual J++ Standard

Microsoft Visual SourceSafe

Microsoft Visual Studio Enterprise Edtn

Microsoft Visual Studio Professional

Microsoft Wheel Mouse

Microsoft Wheel Optical

Microsoft WinCE Took Kit for VB

Microsoft WinCE Took Kit for VC++

Microsoft Windows

Microsoft Windows 95

Microsoft Windows 98

Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server

Microsoft Windows CAL

Microsoft Windows 2000 Internet Connector

Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional

Microsoft Windows 2000 Server

Microsoft Windows Trmnl Services CAL

Microsoft Windows for Workgroups

Microsoft Windows CAL

Microsoft Windows Millennium Edition

Microsoft Windows NT

Microsoft Windows NT CAL

Microsoft Windows NT Server

Microsoft Windows NT Workstation

Microsoft Wine Guide

Microsoft Word

Microsoft Works

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1                     This proceeding concerns alleged breaches of copyright in computer programs contrary to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (‘Copyright Act’), infringement of registered trade marks contrary to the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Trade Marks Act’)and breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘Trade Practices Act’) and the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) (‘Fair Trading Act’).  It is important to note at the outset that the dispute between the parties in this proceeding was concerned only with the facts and the applicants’ success entirely depends on whether they could make good their allegations of fact. 

2                     It was not in dispute that the first applicant, (‘Microsoft’), owns the copyright in the computer programs, which were particularised in a schedule to the applicants’ further amended statement of claim.  It was also not in dispute that Microsoft is the registered owner of trade marks, ‘MICROSOFT’ and ‘WINDOWS’ in classes 9 (trade marks 371528 and 576996) (computer programs etc) and 16 (trade marks 377674 and 576997) (printed material etc), together the ‘Microsoft trade marks’.  The respondents did not challenge the applicants’ legal analysis although they made brief submissions in respect of the quantification of damages. 

The applicants

3                     An understanding of the relationships between the three applicants is helpful.  The following account is drawn largely from the uncontested evidence of Ms Vanessa Hutley.  An outline of Ms Hutley’s connection with the applicants and of her other evidence is set out below at [31]–[42]. 

4                     Microsoft is incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington in the United States of America.  It carries on the business of manufacturing, marketing and distributing computer programs (‘Microsoft Programs’) and is well known throughout the world as one of the largest publishers of software for personal computers.  The second applicant (‘MPL’) is an Australian company that is a subsidiary of Microsoft.  On behalf of Microsoft, MPL provides marketing and technical support in Australia for the Microsoft Programs.  The third applicant (‘Microsoft Licensing’) is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Nevada in the United States of America.  It is also a subsidiary of Microsoft.  Since 31 December 1997 the third applicant has been Microsoft’s exclusive worldwide licensee with respect to ‘OEM distribution’ of certain Microsoft Programs.  ‘OEM distribution’ means distribution of copies of Microsoft Programs to and by original equipment manufacturers or assemblers of computer systems as integral elements of the computer systems manufactured or assembled by them.  Microsoft Programs sold by way of OEM distribution are intended and marketed for distribution with new computers. 

The respondents

5                     The first respondent, Ezy Loans Pty Limited, (‘Ezy Loans’) carried on the business of selling computer products under the name, ‘Harmony Telecommunications and Business Equipment’ (‘Harmony’) from about 30 April 2001.  Prior to that Mr Earl Davis, the second respondent was the proprietor of the Harmony name and carried on business as a sole trader under that name from 1997.  At all material times the second respondent, Mr Davis, was a director of the first respondent.  When this proceeding was commenced there were two additional respondents, Katrina Ann Ellis-Davis, Mr Davis’ wife, and Robert Schocroft but the applicants filed notices of discontinuance against those respondents on 8 April and 20 September 2002 respectively.  Mr Schocroft subsequently gave evidence in the proceeding for the applicants.  Unless otherwise indicated, I shall use the term ‘Harmony business’ to refer without distinction to the business carried on by Mr Davis as a sole trader and by Ezy Loans. 

The applicants’ claims

6                     The case put forward by the applicants is that Mr Davis, first as a sole trader under the Harmony name and later trading though Ezy Loans of which he has control, engaged in the business of selling and renting second-hand computers to the public.  In order to prepare those computers for sale or rental it was necessary to wipe the hard disk and install additional memory and some software.  The applicants allege that the respondents duplicated Microsoft’s copyright programs onto the hard drives of the computers without licence from the applicants.  The process, referred to as ‘hard loading’ to distinguish it from selling pirated copies of the software, was carried out by technicians employed by one or other of the respondents and was done knowingly and flagrantly and under their auspices. 

7                     As summarised in written submissions made on behalf of the applicants, the applicants allege that the first respondent, without the licence of Microsoft,

‘(a)      reproduced in a material form the whole or a substantial part of Microsoft programs (namely Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office);

(b)               reproduced in a material form the whole or a substantial part of Microsoft programs (namely Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office) on the hard disk of various computer systems supplied by them; and

(c)               with the requisite knowledge or constructive knowledge, sold, offered for sale, supplied, offered to supply or distributed infringing Microsoft Programs.’

8                     As indicated above, it is contended that the actions of the respondents amounted to breach of copyright and infringement of registered trade marks.  It is also contended that they involve misleading representations as to the authenticity of the products supplied by the respondents in breach of the Trade Practices Act.

Self represented litigants

9                     Mr Davis appeared for himself and, with leave of the Court, for the first respondent.  The proceedings were attended by many of the difficulties that commonly arise with litigants in person.  Where one party is represented by highly experienced solicitors and counsel and the other is self represented, the Court needs to be especially diligent to ensure that hearing is fair and reasonable and that the issues raised by the unrepresented party, despite lacking legal sophistication, are given due consideration.  In this regard I am conscious of the High Court’s comment in Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 at 150:

‘A frequent consequence of self-representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy.’

10                  In discharging this burden, however, the Court must maintain the balance between the interests of the parties and not give an advantage to the unrepresented party; Platcher v Joseph [2004] FCAFC 68 at [105] per Tamberlin and Emmett JJ; see also Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 at [27]-[29] and [33].  What is necessary to maintain the balance varies from case to case and requires some assessment of the difficulties confronting the individual litigant, the litigant’s intelligence and his or her understanding of the case; Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] ATPR 41-507 (‘Abram’). 

11                  It seems to me that the difficulties confronting Mr Davis were less formidable than is often the case for unrepresented litigants.  As noted above, the dispute was basically factual and concerned facts that Mr Davis was well placed to know; he did not have to grapple with questions of law or fine legal distinctions.  The applicants said that the respondents used their software without a licence.  A defence to such a claim had to be either (a) the respondents were licensed, or (b) that the respondents did not use the software, or a combination of those two responses.  At various points in the hearing Mr Davis appeared to assert both of these defences.  In addition, in their further amended defence (filed on 10 April 2002), the respondents claimed that the applicants had impliedly waived their copyright on some or all of the relevant software. 

12                  Although Mr Davis cross-examined all but two of the applicants’ witnesses, he seemed to have very little idea of what he was trying to achieve.  In particular, as was put to Mr Davis when he was himself being cross-examined, he did not take issue with many unequivocal statements that were adverse to the respondents’ defence.  I did not, however, get the impression that this was because Mr Davis did not understand the issues and, in the circumstances, I do not think that intervention by the Court would have been appropriate; see generally the comments in Abram on the dangers of judicial intervention in cross-examination.

13                  The respondents’ defence arguably suffered more from their failure to give the proceeding the attention it warranted in pre-trial stages and from taking a cavalier attitude to the respondents’ obligations in relation to pre-trial directions made by the Court.  As is usual, in the months prior to the hearing of the applicants’ claims various pre-trial directions were made.  It would appear that, almost without exception, the respondents failed to comply with these orders, including orders for discovery, despite protests by the applicants’ solicitors which went unanswered.  The paucity of evidence submitted by the respondents was such that, for reasons explained in detail below, it did little to advance their defence. 

Applicants’ evidence

14                  The applicants have the burden of proving that the conduct of which they complain actually occurred as well as the burden of proving that the respondents were not licensed; Avel Proprietary Limited v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88.  In the circumstances, the inherent reliability of the applicants’ claims and, in particular, the extent and frequency of the alleged breaches of the applicants’ rights require careful scrutiny.  For this reason I have summarised separately, and in some detail, the evidence given by each witness for the applicants.

15                  The applicants relied on the evidence of nine witnesses, among whom was Ms Gemma Dalgleish, a solicitor employed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques, the solicitors for the applicants, and Mr Kenneth Taylor, a private enquiry agent and owner of Trade Mark Investigation Services.  The only purpose of Ms Dalgleish’s affidavit was to put into evidence letters to Mr Davis from Mallesons complaining of his failure to comply with orders for discovery.  In so far as Mr Davis sought to cross-examine Ms Dalgleish his questions were directed to matters concerning without prejudice negotiations between the parties and were not permitted.  The evidence of Mr Taylor related to the service of documents in the proceeding, including a notice to admit facts.  The respondents did not dispute any of the facts set out in the notice and Mr Taylor was not required for cross-examination.  I shall summarise the evidence of the other seven witnesses in some detail. 

Mr Nathan Clamp

16                  Mr Davis engaged Mr Clamp as a contractor to work in the business of Harmony from July 1999 to March 2001.  According to Mr Clamp, a typical transaction was for a customer to rent a computer over a period of two years after which the customer became the owner of the computer.  Mr Davis generally purchased computers at auction.  In the main they were ex-government computers that had been superseded by newer models or were otherwise surplus to requirements.  In most cases all the data and software had been deleted from the hard drives of these computers.  Mr Clamp’s job was ‘to rebuild the hard drive’ by installing Microsoft software onto the hard disk.  He said he received his instructions from Mr Davis who would instruct him to load the computer with ‘Windows and Office’.  He stated that he often heard Mr Davis talking on the phone to customers and promising to load Windows 98 and Office 97 on the computers they were to acquire. 

17                  The software, which was kept in the storeroom at the rear of Harmony premises, included the following:

·                    Microsoft Windows 95;

·                    Microsoft Windows 95 B release;

·                    Microsoft Windows 98

·                    Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition;

·                    Microsoft Windows 2000;

·                    Microsoft Office 95 Professional;

·                    Microsoft Office 97 Professional;

·                    Microsoft Office 2000 Professional; and

·                    Microsoft Works.

Mr Clamp also described CDs kept in the same storeroom as being either:

‘(a)      gold writable CD-ROMs which are commercially available blank CD-ROMs on to which software and other data may be copied …;

(b)               Microsoft OEM CD-ROMs …; or

(c)               Genuine Microsoft software that is sold by retailers to retail customers.’

18                  Mr Clamp said he was aware that the gold CD-ROMs contained unlicensed copies of Microsoft software and that the software being loaded on to the hard drives from those CD-ROMs was also unlicensed.  He recalled a conversation in which Mr Davis had told him that the original copy of Windows 98 had been stolen by one of the other technicians when Mr Clamp was not there.  Mr Clamp also said that some of the software being loaded onto the computers being sold by Harmony was installed using genuine OEM CD-ROMs and explained how he was able to recognise those CDs as genuine.  He said that he was aware that OEM software was licensed by Microsoft to be supplied only with personal computers.  Mr Clamp explained his understanding of Microsoft’s licensing procedures as follows:

‘The purchaser is required to receive a copy of the original disk, a Certificate of Authenticity and a End-User Licence Agreement.  If it is installed on a computer and the purchaser does not receive the original disk, a Certificate of Authenticity and a End-User Licence Agreement, the person who purchases it will not have a licence to use it.  A Certificate of Authenticity is a security certificate or label that accompanies all Microsoft software products.  The End-User Licence Agreement is a written agreement that comes with all genuine Microsoft software products.’

Mr Clamp added that as far as he was aware Harmony customers who purchased computers loaded with the Microsoft software did not receive a copy of the original disk, a Certificate of Authenticity or an End-User Licence Agreement.

19                  Mr Clamp said that from September 1999 to March 2001, under Mr Davis’ instructions, he loaded about 210 computers with unlicensed copies of Windows 98 and either Office 95 Professional or Office 97 Professional.  Each of these computers was provided to a Harmony customer on a hire-sell basis.  He added that he had also loaded approximately 560 computers with unlicensed copies of Microsoft Works.  Mr Clamp’s affidavit included a table showing the numbers of copies of each Microsoft program that had been installed on computers hired or sold with Microsoft programs installed. That table showed, in addition to the numbers already mentioned, the number of computers on which, according to Mr Clamp, the following programs were installed:

·                    Microsoft Windows 95 or Microsoft Windows 95 ‘B’ Release – 56 computers; 

·                    Microsoft Office 95 Professional – 56 computers;

·                    Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition – 48 computers; and

·                    Microsoft Office 2000 Professional – 24 computers. 

20                  Mr Clamp testified that customers would often ask why they did not receive a CD-ROM for the software they purchased with their computers.  On two or three occasions Mr Davis gave the customer a gold CD with a copy of the software program on it.  Once he instructed Mr Clamp to do so.  Mr Clamp said that when, in September 1999, he queried Mr Davis’ use of unlicensed software, Mr Davis told him that he had a ‘multi-user licence with Microsoft’ and was allowed to use the software.  Mr Clamp also raised the matter with Mr Robert Schrocroft (see [21]–[24] below) who, he said, was initially concerned but later told Mr Clamp that Mr Davis had a multi-user licence.  Mr Clamp says that he did not ever see such a licence.  Finally Mr Clamp testified that in March 2000 he saw a letter from Microsoft to Mr Davis on Mr Davis’ desk.  He said:

‘I had a quick read of the letter and understood that it was warning [Mr Davis] about hardloading and the unauthorised copying of Microsoft software.  From my experience in the computer industry it is my understanding that hardloading is where computer users load unauthorised copies of software on to the hard disk of a personal computer as an incentive for their customers to purchase a computer ….  The dealer does not supply the original disks, manuals, Certificates of Authenticity or End-User Licence Agreement which always comes with legitimate copies of software products.’

This letter was the subject of evidence given by Ms Vanessa Hutley and is described below at [38]–[39]. 

Mr Robert Schocroft

21                  Mr Schocroft said he worked as a ‘contractor’ for Mr Davis in the Harmony business from June to September 2000.  According to Mr Schocroft, Mr Davis was responsible for the day-to-day running of the Harmony business.  On cross-examination by Mr Davis, Mr Schocroft denied that he had ever acted as manager and Mr Davis did not pursue the point.  Mr Schocroft’s description of the business was generally consistent with the account given by Mr Clamp.  He said that there were two technicians in addition to Mr Clamp who worked on reconfiguring the computers bought at auction and loading them with software.  He said that Mr Davis had instructed the technicians that all computers sold by Harmony must have Microsoft Windows and Office installed on them.  His evidence generally confirmed what Mr Clamp had said about the use of OEM disks and copies of other Microsoft programs.  In particular, he described how Mr Davis had advised one of the technicians of the licence key numbers that he should use in installing the Windows and Office 97 programs.  As Mr Schocroft explained, a ‘Licence key’, also known as a product key, is a number that is printed on the Certificate of Authenticity supplied with genuine Microsoft software.  The numbers provided by Mr Davis were used each time a copy of Windows 98 or Office 97 was installed on the hard drive of a computer.  Mr Schocroft said that during the initial period of his employment with Harmony (June to September 2000) the three technicians then employed by Harmony installed Windows 98 and Office 97 on at least 40 computers each.  He commented: 

‘Based on my understanding of Microsoft’s licensing procedures, I was aware that the copies of Microsoft Windows 98 and Microsoft Office 97 reproduced and loaded on to the hard drives of computer systems supplied to Harmony’s customers … were not licensed because the customers were not supplied with genuine Microsoft CD-ROMs, a manual, a [Certificate of Authenticity] or an End-User Licence Agreement.’

22                  Mr Schocroft referred to a letter from Microsoft concerning the unauthorised use of the Microsoft software, apparently the same letter referred to by Mr Clamp; see [20] above.  He said that Mr Davis told him not to worry about the letter as he had a multi-user licence and was entitled to use the software.

23                  Mr Schocroft ceased working in the Harmony business on 18 September 2000.  He was then employed from June 2001 to 13 May 2002 by Ezy Loans, which acquired the Harmony business at the end of April 2001.  The directors of Ezy-Loans were Mr Davis and Ms Ellis-Davis.  By this time Mr Clamp and one of the other technicians had left and the third technician left in July 2001.  Mr Schocroft then took over some of the work of preparing computers for sale that had previously been done by the technicians.  The process continued as before except that Office 97 was no longer included as a standard item. 

24                  Mr Schocroft described how in the last week of July 2001, Ms Ellis-Davis was served with the application and statement of claim in this proceeding.  He claimed that following this he was present when Ms Ellis-Davis discussed the matter with Mr Davis.  Mr Schocroft said that for three weeks following this discussion, licensed software was installed in the computers but in the last week of August 2001 Mr Davis again directed him to use the unlicensed software because the costs of buying licensed software were ‘horrendous’.  Mr Schocroft left Harmony on 13 May 2002 but said that during visits to the Harmony premises between that date and the end of June 2002 he observed Mr Davis loading the unlicensed software onto computers for customers. 

Mr Philip Quinn

25                  Mr Quinn was a customer of Harmony.  In June 2001 Mr Quinn visited the Harmony premises in order to purchase a computer.  He specified that the computed had to have internet capability and be able to support AutoCad and Microsoft Office.  He said that a man who introduced himself as ‘Robert’ told him that the computer would have a new hard drive, a second hand monitor and that Windows 98 and Office 97 would be installed.  Mr Quinn purchased the computer and four days later Mr Davis delivered the computer to his home.  Mr Quinn did not at any time receive any disks, licence agreements or manuals for the Microsoft Windows 98 and Microsoft Office 97 programs. 

26                  Subsequently Mr Quinn had trouble installing a printer; he was not able to do it without the CD-ROMs for the operating system.  When he called Harmony he was told that their agreement with Microsoft would not allow them to provide the disks but that they would come around and install it for him.  Mr Quinn then telephoned the Microsoft anti-piracy infringement hotline.  He told the operator that he did not get any disks for the software he purchased or any licences.  The operator asked Mr Quinn to check his computer to see whether it had a certificate of authenticity and Mr Quinn confirmed that there was no such certificate.  The operator informed Mr Quinn that ‘the fact that there is no certificate of authenticity makes the sale of Microsoft software to you illegal.’  Mr Quinn did not contact Harmony again. 

Mr Neville Hollingsworth

27                  In July 2000 Mr Hollingsworth bought a computer from Harmony for his partner, Chris Burfoot.  He was not supplied with any CD-ROMs for the Microsoft software.  Soon after delivery of his computer he noticed that the registration screen of the operating system noted that the program was registered to Harmony.  Mr Hollingsworth had difficulty loading computer games and returned the computer to Harmony for repair.  After about nine days he collected the computer.  At this time he noticed that the name of Harmony in the registration screen had been changed to ‘Chris Burfoot’ however the computer was not fixed and he again returned it to Harmony.  In the meantime Mr Hollingsworth telephoned the Microsoft hotline and on their advice he asked Harmony to supply him with the manual, licence agreement, authenticity certificate and original CD-ROM.  He was told that Harmony had an arrangement with Microsoft which meant that they did not have to supply those items.  The items were never supplied. 

Ms Anna Tran-Nguyen

28                  Ms Tran-Nguyen works as a research assistant for Trade Mark Investigation Services.  On instructions from her employer she went to the Harmony premises in June 2001.  She told the attendant, who identified himself as ‘Robert’, that she wanted a computer with certain specifications.  A few days later she collected the computer.  She was told that it was loaded with Windows 98 and Office 97.  She did not receive any disks, manuals, end-user licence agreements or a Certificate of Authenticity for any of the software.  Later that day she marked the computer for identification and couriered it to Microsoft. 

Mr Matthew Laye

29                  Mr Laye is a Technical Support Analyst employed by Datacom Customer Contact Pty Ltd.  He provides technical analysis services to Microsoft in connection with Microsoft’s anti-piracy program in Australia.  He holds qualifications relevant to the information technology industry and is accredited as a Microsoft Certified Professional.  Mr Laye conducted a technical analysis of the hard disk drive of the computer that was bought by Ms Tran-Nguyen.  Annexed to his affidavit were copies of documents he generated in the course of his analysis and a copy of the report that he prepared for Microsoft.  This report gave the following description of the software on the hard disk drive:

‘Operating system –

Microsoft® Windows 98 Second Edition, Version 4.10.2222 A with Product ID: 23400-OEM-0077725-61192 and registered to “Joe Dis Silvio”, with no company name.

Installed applications –

Microsoft® Office 97 Professional, product ID “53488-111-1111111-92819” and registered user of “Joe Dis Silvio”.’

30                  Mr Laye also carried out a similar analysis of the hard disk drive of the computer that was bought by Mr Hollingsworth.  His report included the following:

‘Operating system –

Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition, Version 4.10.2222 A with Product ID: 22200-OEM-0077725-61192 and registered to “Burfoot”, with company name of “Burfoot”.’

Ms Vanessa Hutley

31                  From July 2001 to July 2003 Ms Hutley was in-house counsel for the first respondent.  Since July 2003 she has been in-house counsel for the second respondent.  She had access to the books and records of all three applicants and testified that she is able to ascertain if a person or company has a Microsoft licence or is an authorised sub-contractor of a licensee.  Ms Hutley has been trained to identify authorised and unauthorised copies of the Microsoft Programs and receives regular updates and analyses of infringing copies throughout the world.

Licences for Microsoft software

32                  Microsoft Licensing is the worldwide exclusive licensee of the copyright in various Microsoft OEM Programs and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Microsoft.  Every copy of a Microsoft Program published by Microsoft bears a copyright notice on each component item of the packaging, such as the CD-ROM on which it is distributed as well as the accompanying documentation and instruction manuals.  Ms Hutley stated that in the period July 1999 to May 2002 Microsoft and Microsoft Licensing had only issued licences in the following categories:

(a) Authorised Replicators licence;

(b) Royalty OEM Agreement licence;

(c) Microsoft System Builder’s licence;

(d) Rental Agreement licence;

(e) Microsoft Service Provider licence; and

(f) End-user licence.

Together these licences cover both retail and OEM distribution.  According to Ms Hutley, authorised copies of Microsoft software are packaged for retail or OEM distribution in distinctly different packaging.  The retail packages are for distribution on a ‘stand-alone’ basis whereas OEM packages are intended and marked for distribution with new personal computers or ‘other computer hardware made or assembled by or on behalf of OEMs’. 

33                  Microsoft has appointed three companies to distribute OEM Programs and Microsoft Retail Programs.  They are Ingram Micro Australia Pty Limited (‘Ingram’), Synnex Australia Pty Limited and Tech Pacific Australia Pty Limited (‘Tech’).  Together with Express Data Pty Ltd, Igram and Tech are also licensed to distribute Microsoft Retail Programs to dealers in computer products.  Ms Hutley stated that she caused a search for the names of Ezy Loans, Harmony and Mr Davis to be conducted of the licence records of the applicants but that there was no record of any licence having issued to any of the three named entities.  According to Ms Hutley, this search result left only the possibility of a Microsoft System Builder’s licence or an end user licence. 

Licensing of System Builders

34                  Microsoft Licensing maintains a database that includes listings of all Microsoft System Builders (as well as OEMs and computer resellers) that are registered with Microsoft Licensing to receive OEM product information.  Ms Hutley said that a review of that database on 25 April 2000 revealed that Harmony was registered with Microsoft as a Microsoft System Builder.  The contact for Harmony was listed as Mr Davis. 

35                  Microsoft System Builders acquire Microsoft OEM Programs from Microsoft OEM distributors who obtain them directly from Microsoft’s Authorised Replicators.  The System Builders then assemble and market computers that are typically sold as a ‘package’ including software operating systems and hardware accessory components.  In accordance with the terms of the agreements issued to Microsoft System Builders from 1 July 1999, they are licensed to install one copy of a Microsoft OEM Program on a computer system supplied by them on the condition that they supply that computer system to their customer with all associated components of the Microsoft Program, including CD-ROMs, manuals, certificates of authenticity and end user licence agreements. 

36                  Ms Hutley stated that, in the relevant period, all licensed Microsoft OEM Programs were distributed as a package that included, inter alia, a certificate of authenticity (‘COA’) bearing a unique code.  Since February 2000, all packages of OEM versions of Microsoft Programs have included the COA on an adhesive label that the Microsoft System Builder was required to remove and affix to the computer being distributed with the Microsoft OEM programs on its hard drive.  According to Ms Hutley, the respondents were not at any time licensed to reproduce any of the Microsoft OEM Programs for resupply to their customers except in accordance with the terms of the Microsoft OEM System Builder User Agreement. 

End User Licence Agreements

37                  Ms Hutley described end user licence agreements in the following terms:

‘A user who purchases a Microsoft OEM Program or a Microsoft Retail Program obtains a licence to reproduce or use that program on the terms of the accompanying End User Licence Agreement (“EULA”).  Until recently, a hard copy of the EULA was packaged with the CD-ROMs (on which a single copy of the relevant Microsoft program is stored), user manual and integrated COA for the relevant program.

The EULA for recently released versions of Microsoft Programs, including Microsoft Windows XP, is not packaged in hard copy form with the other media for the relevant program, but is stored on the CD-ROM on which the program is also stored.  In this case, the terms of the EULA appear on the screen when the CD-ROM is first inserted into a compact disk drive by the user.  The user must acknowledge that he or she has read and accepted the terms of the EULA by clicking on a button with the words “I AGREE” before the program can be used on the user’s computer system.

…

In accordance with the terms of the EULAs … the rights under the EULA can be transferred only on the condition that the transferor retain no copies of the relevant Microsoft Program and deliver to the transferee all component parts of that Microsoft Program, including all CD-ROMs, user manuals and COAs.  In addition, the EULA for Microsoft OEM Programs further provides that the rights under the EULA can be transferred only as part of the sale or transfer of the computer on which the Microsoft OEM Program was originally installed.’ 

MPL and the respondents

38                  MPL operates an ‘anti-piracy hotline’ (‘hotline’) and website to which members of the public may report suspected instances of piracy of Microsoft Programs.  Ms Hutley stated that on 30 March 2000, following a report to the hotline, MPL wrote to Mr Davis in terms that included the following:

‘It has been brought to our attention that a number of your customers are being offered and/or provided with Microsoft software without also receiving the original diskettes or CD ROM, Licence Agreement, Certificate of Authenticity and operating manual for each of the Microsoft software products provided.

This practice is known as “hard loading” and it is illegal.  We have also received information that suggests that you have been dealing in counterfeit copies of certain “Microsoft” products.

Trade mark and copyright infringement

Microsoft is the owner in Australia of the registered trade mark “Microsoft” and Microsoft Pty Limited is a registered user of that mark.  It is an infringement of our trade mark rights for you to sell, offer to sell, supply, or offer to supply, any computer disk, diskette, CD-ROM, computer program, computer software, computer hardware, manual or documentation under or by reference to the mark “Microsoft”, if those goods have not been manufactured and the mark applied by or with the licence of Microsoft.

Microsoft is also the owner of the copyright subsisting in all computer programs distributed by reference to the “Microsoft” mark (“Microsoft Programs”).  It is an infringement of copyright for you to sell, offer for sale, supply, or offer to supply or distribute, any copy of the whole or a substantial part of the Microsoft Programs, or to reproduce or authorise the reproduction of the whole or substantial part of any of the Microsoft Programs, without the licence of Microsoft.’ 

39                  The letter (‘Microsoft letter’) went on to describe, in explicit detail, the distribution restrictions affecting Microsoft OEM and retail products and to name the authorised distributors.  A copy of the Microsoft letter was annexed to Ms Hutley’s affidavit.  MPL also enclosed a deed of undertaking that was executed on behalf of Harmony and himself by Mr Davis on 7 April 2000 and returned to MPL.  By that undertaking the respondents undertook not to infringe the rights asserted by Microsoft. 

Microsoft Rental and Leasing Agreements for Microsoft Products preinstalled on Rental computers

40                  Ms Hutley gave evidence that since 1999 Microsoft, MPL, Microsoft Licensing and Microsoft Operations Pty Limited, a Microsoft subsidiary responsible for Microsoft’s Asia business for network service providers, (‘together the Microsoft Companies’) have issued Microsoft Rental Agreements for Microsoft Programs preinstalled on rental computers.  When completed, the Rental Agreement allows a computer rental company (‘rental company’) to rent Microsoft software products to a customer, along with a rented personal computer.  The Microsoft Companies maintain a searchable system of records that includes the details of people or companies that are, or have ever been, a party to a Rental Agreement for Microsoft software products stored on a rental computer.  Ms Hutley gave evidence that she caused a search to be done of the Microsoft Companies’ books and records and that the search did not reveal any of the respondents, or Harmony, as ever having entered into a Rental Agreement. 

41                  The terms of the Rental Agreement require the rental company to do certain things in order to ensure that the products they sell are properly licensed.  The requirements include submission of certain records to Microsoft Operations.  Ms Hutley gave evidence that she has no record of the respondents, or Harmony, submitting any the required records to Microsoft Operations, or any of the other Microsoft Companies. 

42                  Further, Ms Hutley’s evidence states that, even if the Rental Agreement had been entered into by the respondents it would not authorise the reproduction of the Microsoft Programs from a single disk onto numerous personal computers that are rented to customers or provided to customers on a rent/buy basis, as the respondents are alleged to have done.  There must be a licence purchased for ‘each and every’ computer system on which a Microsoft Program is installed, and the rental company is obliged to retain a copy of each licence. 

respondents’ evidence

43                  The evidence for the respondents was minimal; of the three affidavits that Mr Davis proposed to read, he was permitted to read only one, which was the affidavit of Mr Davis himself, affirmed on 22 March 2002.  For reasons given in the following paragraphs, Mr Davis was not permitted to read an affidavit of Ms Ellis-Davis, or his own affidavit of 11 April 2003.

Affidavit of Katrina Ellis-Davis

44                  The question of Ms Davis’ affidavit was raised when the matter was before me for directions some days before the hearing.  The applicants had clearly indicated that it would require Ms Davis for cross-examination if her affidavit were to be read however Ms Davis resides in Perth and, according to Mr Davis, it was not possible for her to attend the Court in Brisbane.  At that time I advised Mr Davis that it might be possible to arrange a video link with Perth however, if he wished to use this facility, he should advise the Court as soon as possible so that arrangements could be made.  Mr Davis did not attempt to make those arrangements prior to the hearing but raised the matter on the first morning of the hearing. 

45                  Enquiries established that a video link could be set up at a convenient time on the second day of the hearing however, according to Mr Davis, the respondents were not able to bear the cost of the link and he requested that the Court do so.  There are situations in which the Court itself bears the cost of a video link, usually where the necessity for it has arisen because of circumstances internal to the Court such as judges being in different locations to the parties.  It may do so in other situations but, in my view, only where considerations of justice require this.  When I invited Mr Davis to give me some indication of the importance of Ms Ellis-Davis’ evidence for the respondents’ defence, he was unable to point to anything other than that she had been involved in applications to Microsoft for a licence and would be able to testify that such applications were made.  He did not contend, however, that her evidence would extend to a claim that any licence had been granted.  Another difficulty was that the affidavit of Ms Ellis-Davis that had been filed by the respondents was largely inadmissible and, in part, scandalous.  In the circumstances I was not satisfied that the Court itself should bear the cost of the video link.  Mr Davis declined to pay for the link himself and because of Ms Ellis-Davis’ consequent unavailability for cross-examination, Mr Davis was not permitted to read her affidavit.

Mr Earl Davis’ affidavit of 11 April 2003

46                  This affidavit, consisting of nine short paragraphs, was challenged by the respondents on various grounds, the most fundamental of which was that it contained certain scandalous and unsupported allegations about persons who were not parties to the proceeding.  On the application of counsel for the respondents I ordered that the affidavit be removed from the file. 

47                  Annexed to the affidavit was a document headed ‘Microsoft Rental & Leasing Agreement for Microsoft Software Products Preinstalled on Rental PCs’, (‘Rental Agreement’).  I permitted Mr Davis to tender this document.  The Rental Agreement is an agreement of the type described at [40]-[42] above.  It is signed by Mr Davis and dated 1 November 2000.  According to Mr Davis after the document was signed by him it was returned to Microsoft for execution.  Although there is provision on the document for execution by Microsoft Operations Pte Ltd it has not been executed. 

Evidence of Mr Earl Davis

48                  Mr Davis was permitted to read his affidavit of 22 March 2002 although not without challenge.  Although Mr Cobden, counsel for the applicants, had provided Mr Davis with a list of his objections Mr Davis, understandably given his lack of legal training, was unable to make any cogent response.  In the circumstances it was necessary for the Court to rule on the objections without assistance from the respondents with the result that Mr Davis was not permitted to read some parts of his affidavit. 

49                  In addition to specific objections to earlier parts of the affidavit, the respondents objected to paragraphs 22-40 on the ground of relevance.  Those paragraphs related to financial difficulties allegedly experienced by Nathan Clamp and may have been intended to raise issues of credit.  On cross-examination of Mr Clamp however no such issue was raised.  In the absence of any submissions responsive to the applicants’ objection I reserved my ruling on relevance.  Having now had the opportunity to consider the matter I am satisfied that the respondents’ objection should be upheld and paragraphs 22-41 of Mr Davis’ affidavit should not be admitted.

50                  Mr Davis’ affidavit generally focused on the role played by Nathan Clamp in the Harmony business.  He said that Mr Clamp’s duties included the installation of hardware and software on the computers that had been acquired second-hand, removal of any confidential and private information of the previous owner and provision of technical assistance to clients.  According to Mr Davis removing private information sometimes affected files on the computer and that if these files ‘had not been reinstalled from Microsoft Operating System discs then the computers would have either ceased to function or would have functioned incorrectly’.  He said it was a condition of Mr Clamp’s contract with Harmony that he provide the tools (including software) necessary to carry out the task of hard loading the computers in preparation for sale and that, at the time, ‘Harmony had no software or drivers library of its own’.  He said that ‘at no time during his time with Harmony’ was Mr Clamp ‘told, requested or implied’ to reinstall any Microsoft product in its entirety.

51                  On cross-examination by Mr Cobden, Mr Davis admitted that he was responsible for the day to day control of the Harmony business including acquiring stock, employing staff and engaging contractors although he said that, for a brief (unspecified) time, Mr Schocroft was acting, under contract, as manager.  Despite this assertion Mr Davis admitted that he had overall control whether Mr Schocroft was there or not. 

52                  Contrary to his assertions in his affidavit, Mr Davis also admitted that he gave Mr Clamp instructions to load Microsoft Office and Microsoft Windows onto the computers, that there was a library of software in the storeroom of Harmony’s premises and that the library included copies of Microsoft Windows 95, Microsoft Windows 95 B Release, Microsoft Windows 98, Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition, Microsoft Windows 2000, Microsoft Office 95 Professional, Microsoft Office 97 Professional, Microsoft Office 2000 Professional and Microsoft Works. All of these except Microsoft Windows 95 B Release and Microsoft Office 95 Professional Works were copies that were on burnt or gold CD-ROMs. 

53                  Mr Davis asserted that all of this was licensed software being permitted backup copies of an authorised copy.  He said that he had three authorised copies that were kept at his home to guard against the possibility of theft.  Subsequently he admitted that as long as there were enough disks to load Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office as required he was quite indifferent to the number of burnt disks. 

54                  When Mr Davis was asked to explain the process followed in the Harmony business when preparing a computer for a customer his evidence was confusing.  At one point he maintained that new software packages were used and when the system was delivered to a customer a bundle of disks, manuals and software was delivered with it.  At other times he maintained that he obtained licence keys from customers who had their own software. He also sought to rely on the Rental Agreement referred to in [47] above. Although the proceeding against him was commenced by the applicants in 2001, Mr Davis admitted that it was not until early 2003 that he sought to rely on this agreement. Mr Davis also admitted that he had not acted in accordance with the terms of the Rental Agreement, in particular by having rental customers execute a written contract containing certain acknowledgements or by sending reports to Microsoft as required by the Rental Agreement.  

55                  One of the most damning concession that Mr Davis made on cross-examination was to agree that the respondents could not have supplied computers at prices of $499 (see the evidence of Ms Tran-Nguyen at [28] above) or $1,000 (see the evidence of Mr Hollingsworth at [27] above) if licensed software had been included.  

Findings and Consideration

Copyright infringement

56                  Computer programs and compilations of computer programs are literary works within the definition of that term in s 10 of the Copyright Act.  It is an infringement of the copyright in a literary work for a person to reproduce or authorise the reproduction of a literary work in a material form without the licence of the copyright owner; Copyright Act ss 13, 14, 31 and 36.  Section 38 of the Copyright Act provides that it is also an infringement of copyright if a person, without licence from the owner of the copyright:

‘(a)      sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire, an article; or

(b)       by way of trade exhibits an article in public;

if the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the making of the article constituted an infringement of the copyright …’

57                  Although less than precise in some aspects, the applicants’ evidence created a reasonably coherent picture of the Harmony business.  On cross-examination none of the applicants’ witnesses resiled from the evidence given nor was any significant inconsistency revealed.  The witnesses generally gave straightforward answers to Mr Davis’ questions and, except where otherwise indicated, I accept their respective accounts as correct and honest.

58                  Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of Mr Davis’ evidence and I do not accept him as a witness of truth.  As previously indicated, Mr Davis’ evidence was concerned mainly with the evidence given by Mr Clamp.  There was no direct rebuttal of the claims made by Mr Schocroft, Mr Quinn, Mr Hollingsworth, Ms Tran-Nguyen or Ms Hutley.  On cross-examination Mr Davis showed a tendency to give self-serving answers - at times even contradicting answers he had given only moments before.  He prevaricated when confronted with inconsistencies in his own evidence and responded frequently that it was just Mr Cobden’s opinion.  It was clear from admissions that he made on cross-examination that not only were parts of his affidavit false but that he knew this to be so when he made the affidavit.

59                  Other aspects of Mr Davis’ evidence were just not credible.  For instance the suggestion that the library copies of software referred to in [53] above were merely backup copies of authorised software that he kept at home is risible given that this was the first mention of this explanation.  Similarly, it is inconceivable that if he had entered into the Rental Agreement with Microsoft that he would have waited until early in 2003 to rely on it.  Other factors that suggest no such agreement was ever made included there being no copy signed by Microsoft and the respondents not acting in accordance with the terms of the agreement; see [53] above. 

60                  Moreover, as the applicant submitted, even if the Rental Agreement had been entered into, on Mr Davis’ own admission, the terms were not complied with and therefore it did not authorise the conduct that occurred.  Under that licence, the licensee must purchase a licence for each computer on which the Microsoft software is installed.  There is no evidence that this was done; rather the evidence is to the contrary.  Clause IV of the Ownership and Licence Certificate at Exhibit C to the Rental Agreement document, requires the licensee to provide Microsoft Operations with details of all hardware and software that the licensee intends to be covered by the Rental Agreement within 30 days of its acquisition.  There is no evidence of any such information being provided. 

61                  I am satisfied by Ms Hutley’s evidence and, in particular, by her account of the applicants’ licensing procedures and records, that the only licence held by the respondents was as a Microsoft System Builder.  The features of such a licence are described in [34]-[36] above.  They include the requirement that the licensee may install one copy only of a Microsoft OEM program on a computer system supplied by that builder and must supply all associated components of the Microsoft Program including CD-ROMs, manuals, certificates of authenticity and end user licence agreements with that computer. 

62                  The evidence of Ms Tran-Nguyen (see [28] above) and Mr Quinn (see [25]-[26] above) shows that the computers supplied to them in June 2001 were loaded with copies of Microsoft Windows 98 and Microsoft Office 97 and that no disks, certificates of authenticity, licence agreements or manuals were supplied with those computers.  It is reasonable to infer that if the software had been loaded in accordance with the licence requirement that they would have been given to the purchasers.  There would have been no reason for the respondents not to comply with the terms of the licence.  I am satisfied that these two instances of actual primary infringement of Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office by the first respondent have been made out.  I am similarly satisfied by the evidence of Mr Hollingsworth that the software loaded onto the computer he purchased in July 2000 was an unauthorised copy.  Mr Hollingsworth was not provided with any manuals, an end user licence agreement, a certificate of authenticity or the original CD-ROMs.

63                  The respondents’ conduct described in the preceding paragraphs is consistent with the conduct described by Mr Schocroft and Mr Clamp.  That evidence provides a picture of Harmony’s business activity both under Mr Davis as sole trader and subsequently, under his control, by Ezy Loans.  I accept that Harmony had a library of unlicensed software that, under the direction of Mr Davis, was used to install Microsoft Programs on the second hand computers purchased by Mr Davis.  I accept that those computers were sold without the supporting manuals, guides and CD-ROMs.  The letter of 30 March 2000 (see [38] above) from Microsoft to the respondents is further support for this conclusion, at least for the period prior to that date.  The fact that Mr Davis signed the undertaking attached to the Microsoft letter and returned it to Microsoft is not consistent with Harmony using licensed software prior to that time.

64                  The evidence I have accepted also supports a finding of secondary infringement under s 38 of the Copyright Act by Ezy Loans and Mr Davis; see [57] above.  In my view, the evidence establishes that the respondents knew, or at the very least had constructive knowledge, that the reproduction of the Microsoft Programs was not authorised by Microsoft. 

Infringement of registered trade marks by Ezy Loans and Mr Davis

65                  Microsoft is the registered owner of the Microsoft trade marks and, according to Ms Hutley’s evidence, those trade marks are found on copies of Microsoft Programs such as were installed on personal computers supplied by the respondents.  The evidence of Mr Laye confirms this (see [29]-[30] above).  This is clearly an infringement of the class 9 trade marks being an unauthorised use of the trade mark(s); s 120 Trade Marks Act.  I find that the applicants’ case for infringement of trade marks is made out.

Trade Practices Act claim

66                  The Trade Practices Act claim is premised on the same conduct of Ezy Loans as the copyright and trade marks claims against it.  The Further Amended Statement of Claim alleges that Ezy Loans, in selling and offering to sell the infringing copies of Microsoft Programs to which the Microsoft trade marks have been applied without authorisation, made, expressly or by implication, the following representations contrary to fact:

(a)                            the copies were made with the permission of the first applicant;

(b)                           Ezy Loans was lawfully entitled to provide those copies to the purchasers; and

(c)                            the purchasers were entitled to use those copies. 

The applicants claim that this constitutes misleading or deceptive conduct in breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act and is conduct in breach of subsections 53(a), (c) and (d). 

67                  I accept that these representations are to be inferred from Ezy Loan’s conduct.  On the basis of the findings of fact that I have already made, I accept that these representations are contrary to fact.  As Branson J commented, when considering virtually identical conduct, in Microsoft Corporation v Goodview Electronics Pty Limited (2000) 49 ITR 578 (‘Goodview Electronics’) at [50]:

‘These representations would be likely to induce purchasers of the products to believe that the products would be unlikely to contain viruses and would be covered by guarantees given by Microsoft.  The representation would also hide from purchasers the risk that a court could order the delivery up of the products to the copyright owner (Polygram Records Pty Ltd v Monash Records (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 332 at 333-334).  Such representations were, in the circumstances, misleading and deceptive within the meaning of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act.’

Her Honour’s comments are applicable here and I find that Ezy Loans’ conduct is in breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act.  Moreover a false representation that the copies supplied by Ezy Loans are authorised Microsoft copies carries with it the equally false representation that those copies are of ‘Microsoft standard’ (for instance, as Branson J notes, they would be unlikely to contain viruses).  I am satisfied that the representations referred to in [67] constituted conduct prohibited by subsections 53(a), (c) and (d). 

Fair Trading Act claim

68                  The Fair Trading Act claim is also premised on the same conduct of Mr Davis as the copyright and trade marks claims against him.  As with the Trade Practices Act claims, the Further Amended Statement of Claim alleges that Mr Davis, in selling and offering to sell the infringing copies of Microsoft Programs to which the Microsoft trade marks have been applied without authorisation involves the following, express or implied, representations contrary to fact:

(d)                           the copies were made with the permission of the first applicant;

(e)                            Mr Davis, trading as Harmony was lawfully entitled to provide those copies to the purchasers; and

(f)                             the purchasers were entitled to use those copies. 

69                  I accept that these representations are to be inferred from Mr Davis’ conduct and that they are contrary to fact.  The provisions of the Fair Trading Act, ss 38, 40(a), (e) and (f), on which the applicants rely, are the equivalents of ss 52, 53(a), (c) and (d) of the Trade Practices Act.  For the reasons given in respect of Ezy Loans’ conduct in relation to the Trade Practices Act I find that the Fair Trading Act claim has also been made out.

Mr Davis’ liability for the conduct of Ezy Loans

70                  In addition to the claims made against Mr Davis as sole trader under the Harmony name, the applicants also claim that he is liable,

(a)                  as the person who authorised Ezy Loans’ infringement of Microsoft’s copyright under s 36 of the Copyright Act;

(b)                 as a joint tortfeasor with Ezy Loans in Ezy loans’ copyright and trade mark infringement; and

(c)                  as a ‘person involved’ in Ezy Loans’ misleading and deceptive conduct with the meaning of s 75B of the Trade Practices Act.

71                  In their Further Amended Defence, the respondents admit that at all material times Mr Davis was a director of Ezy Loans.  Beyond that, however, the evidence clearly establishes that Mr Davis was personally and closely involved in the conduct of Ezy Loans’ business.  Much of this evidence came from Mr Schocroft who, by reason of the period he had worked with Mr Davis, was well placed to comment on Mr Davis’ role in the Harmony business.  Mr Schocroft’s affidavit gave a coherent account of his experiences at Harmony.  It is, as others have remarked, difficult to assess a witness where evidence is given by affidavit and, inevitably, not told in his or her own words.  On cross-examination however, Mr Davis did not challenge Mr Schocroft’s account of the role that Mr Davis played in the business.  Rather, his cross-examination seemed to be directed to issues of profit and loss, presumably with the calculation of damages in mind.  In any event Mr Schocroft was not shaken in his evidence and I have no reason not to accept his account of Mr Davis’ role in the business. 

72                  While there was some suggestion that Mr Schocroft might, at some stage, have had a managerial role, it is clear, and was admitted by Mr Davis on cross-examination, that Mr Davis was the guiding mind and the controlling hand.  The evidence of Mr Schocroft and Mr Quinn supports the view that Mr Davis was involved in sales as well as management.  Mr Davis purchased the computers sold by Ezy Loans and he instructed employees and contractors of Ezy Loans to install unauthorised copies of Microsoft Programs on the hard drives of those computers and supervised this work.  This role was a continuation of the role that he played in the Harmony business as a sole trader and was described in the affidavits of Mr Davis and Mr Schocroft. 

73                  Section 36 of the Copyright Act states that it is an infringement of the copyright in a literary work if a person who is not the owner of the copyright ‘does’ or ‘authorises’ in Australia an act comprised in the copyright.  The concept of authorisation was considered by the High Court in University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1 where Gibbs J, at 12, said that ‘authorisation’ had been held ‘to have its dictionary meaning of “sanction, approve, countenance”’ and that that it could also mean ‘permit’.  His Honour continued:

‘A person cannot be said to authorize an infringement of copyright unless he has some power to prevent it. … Express or formal permission or sanction, or active conduct indicating approval, is not essential to constitute an authorization. … However, the word “authorize” connotes a mental element and it could not be inferred that a person had, by mere inactivity, authorized something to be done if he neither knew nor had reason to suspect that the act might be done.’

Jacobs J expressed similar views at 21. See also Gummow J’s account of the history of the development of the law in relation to authorisation in WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corporation Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 274 (‘WEA v Hanimex’) at 282-87.  His Honour’s account was approved by the Full Federal Court in Australasian Performing Right Association Limited v Jain (1990) 26 FCR 53 at 57. 

74                  I am satisfied that Mr Davis’ involvement in the infringing conduct of Ezy Loans is such that he can be said to have authorised this conduct.  He was clearly in the position to prevent this conduct either by preventing the installation of Microsoft Programs or by ensuring that only licensed copies were used.  Mr Davis did not directly challenge the witness statements that lead to this conclusion and did not provide any convincing alternative account. 

75                  In WEA v Hanimex at 283, Gummow J made the following comment:

‘Where the infringer is a corporation questions frequently arise as to the degree of involvement on the part of directors necessary for them to be rendered personally liable.  Those questions are not immediately answered by principles dealing with “authorisation” or joint tortfeasance.  Rather, recourse is to be had to the body of authority which explains the circumstances in which an officer of a corporation is personally liable for the torts of the corporation.’

76                  That body of authority was discussed by Lindgren J in Microsoft Corporation v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 231 (‘Polaris’) at 241-5.  His Honour concluded that the appropriate test to determine if the director is liable for the tortious acts of the company is that adopted in Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 where Lord Atkin said, at 14:

‘Prima facie a managing director is not liable for tortious acts done by servants of the company unless he himself is privy to the acts, that is to say unless he ordered or procured the acts to be done.’

77                  In Polaris Lindgren J said of this test at 243:

‘The “procured or directed” test, sometimes referred to as the "authorised, procured or directed" test, focuses attention on the relationship between the director's intention and the particular corporate conduct which the law characterises as tortious.  What seems to underlie this test is the notion that, necessarily, companies can engage in tortious conduct only through human beings, and, at least ordinarily, where a particular human being involved and responsible to an appropriate extent can be identified, he should, as a matter of policy, be liable.  After all, even if the aggrieved party did not sue him, apparently he would be liable to indemnify the company in respect of its liability to the aggrieved party.’

Polaris was followed in Henly Arch Pty Ltd v Clarendon Homes (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 443 and Goodview Electronics. 

78                  In view of the conduct described in [72]-[73] above, I am satisfied that, as a director of Ezy Loans, Mr Davis is liable for the tortious conduct of that company and moreover, he is jointly liable with Ezy Loans under ss 36 and 38 of the Copyright Act and for infringement of the Trade Marks Act.  To the extent that, as Gummow J comments in WEA v Hannimex at 283, the common law principles as to the liability of joint tortfeasors require ‘some common design’ I am satisfied that Ezy Loans and Mr Davis had that common design.

79                  On the same basis I am satisfied that Mr Davis is also liable under s 75B of the Trade Practices Act.  That section extends liability for, inter alia, breaches of ss 52 and 53 to a person who:

‘(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention;

(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention;

(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or

(d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention.’

80                  Although under ss 75B(c) opinions may differ as the extent of knowledge required (see Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Cassidy (2003) 205 ALR 402), the issue does not arise in this case.  Mr Davis was fully aware of Ezy Loans’ conduct and, as I have found, he also authorised, procured and directed it.  That being so his liability under s 75B is made out; Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty Ltd v Wright (1989) 16 IPR 189 at 209. 

Relief sought by the applicants

81                  I have found that both respondents are both liable for breach of copyright, infringement of trade marks, misleading and deceptive conduct.  In addition I have found that Mr Davis is liable in respect of Ezy Loans’ conduct as a joint tortfeasor, as a director of the company and as an accessory under s 75B of the Trade Practices Act.   The applicants claim injunctive relief in respect of all counts, and damages under ss 115(2) and 115(4) of the Copyright Act, s 126 of the Trade Marks Act, ands 83 of the Trade Practices Act.  The applicants acknowledge, however, that they are not entitled to ‘double count’ and both in their written submissions and through their counsel at the hearing they accepted that damages for breach of copyright would likely overlap the other heads of damages and therefore they would not press for relief other than in respect of copyright. 

82                  Before dealing with the specific issues relating to damages and injunctive relief, by way of background to those issues it is appropriate that I make some comments about my view of the respondents’ conduct.  The applicants submit that the respondents’ infringements were both calculated and deliberate.  In their written submissions they make a number of points including the following, all of which are supported by evidence that I have accepted:

·                    over a period of time both respondents, through Mr Davis, offered to install infringing software in computers being sold and refused to supply authentic and licenced Microsoft Programs.  They continued this conduct even after being served with the application and statement of claim in this proceeding;

·                    they used the same licence key and CD ROM’s to install infringing software on the hard drives of computers being sold to customers;

·                    they continued to install infringing software even after MPL wrote to Mr Davis in March 2000 advising him of the respondents’ obligations under Australian copyright and trade mark law and after the respondents’ had entered into an undertaking not to continue with such conduct; and

·                    the infringing conduct continued even after both Mr Clamp and Mr Schocroft had expressed concerns about the illegality of the conduct.

83                  This conduct shows a flagrant disregard for the applicants’ rights, a characterisation that is reinforced by the concession Mr Davis made about the prices at which it was feasible to sell second-hand computers; see [55] above, and by his attitude to the proceeding, in particular, his readiness to make false statements in his evidence both in chief and on cross-examination; see [48]-[55] above.  The respondents’ conduct was ‘deliberate, deceitful and serious’; Microsoft Corporation v ATIFO Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 643 at 648.  This aspect of the respondent’s conduct is relevant to the nature and extent of the relief that should be given in this matter. 

Injunctive relief

84                  I am satisfied that, in principle, injunctive relief is appropriate because the respondents’ infringing conduct is likely to continue in the absence of such relief; Goodview Electronics at 592.  However, the breadth of the injunctions sought has caused me some concern.  There is only flimsy evidence of infringement of the trade marks in class 16.  Nevertheless, like Branson J in Microsoft Corporation v Blanch [2002] FCA 895; (2002) AIPC 91-813 at [40] (‘Blanch’), I am prepared to accept that a respondent willing to infringe trade marks in class 9 may similarly be willing to infringe trade marks in class 16.  My greater concern is with the definition of ‘Microsoft Programs’, advocated by the applicants which is, ‘the computer programs, associated manuals and documentation (including versions created or released subsequent to the date hereof)’ followed by a comprehensive list of almost 200 Microsoft programs. 

85                  The applicants’ evidence focused on the respondents’ use of specific application software and operating systems such as Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office;  there was express mention of Microsoft Office, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access and Microsoft Powerpoint.  There was some, slight, evidence that the respondents’ breaches of copyright extended to other programs, including games programs and internet software.  So much was identified in the evidence of Mr Laye who annexes to his affidavit screenshots of various programs that were installed on the computer sold to Mr Hollingsworth.  Even so, the list of programs submitted by the applicants goes well beyond the scope of the evidence. 

86                  In Blanch Branson J, considering a similar expansive claim for commented at [39]: 

‘In justification of their claim for injunctions broadly formulated, the applicants placed reliance on the decision of Steinfeld QC in Microsoft Corporation v Plato Technology Limited [1999] FSR 834.  The learned Deputy Judge noted at 839 that the purpose of an injunction is to protect a person from some future infringement of his rights which he reasonably apprehends.  In that case the defendant was accepted to have infringed the copyright of Microsoft Corporation in Windows 95 unwittingly and it was willing to give an undertaking not to deal in any Windows 95 products which it knows or ought upon reasonable inquiry to know to be counterfeit.  Steinfeld QC at 845 observed:

“Save that in my judgment any injunction or undertaking ought to extend to all Microsoft software products (the evidence does not suggest any reason for singling out Windows 95 as more prone to being counterfeited than any other Microsoft software products) it seems to me that such would constitute the most by way of injunctive relief to which the plaintiff is in this case entitled.”

I accept that the applicants may reasonably apprehend that a respondent willing to infringe trade marks in class 9 may similarly be willing to infringe trade marks in class 16.  It is with far greater hesitation that I conclude that the applicants may reasonably apprehend that the respondents may infringe copyright in the wide range of computer programs in respect of which they have sought an injunction.  However, in the end I have been persuaded that a real practical difficulty attends any attempt to reduce the list.’

87                  With the same hesitation, I agree with the approach of Branson J and am prepared to give injunctive relief in the form sought by the applicants. 

Damages

Compensatory damages

88                  The applicants seek compensatory damages pursuant to s 115(2) of the Copyright Act.  One accepted means by which to measure compensatory damages is to apply a ‘going royalty rate’.  In this case there is evidence of such a rate and I propose to apply this test. 

89                  On 18 October and 13 November 2001 the applicants served on the respondents notices to admit to facts that were not disputed.  It is therefore not in contention that from the period of 1 January 1998 to the date of commencement of these proceedings, Microsoft Licensing received net revenue of over $125.00 in respect of each licensed copy of Microsoft Windows distributed to or by OEM’s in Australia and that Microsoft received net revenue of over $500 in respect of each licensed copy of Microsoft Office distributed by authorised distributors in Australia.

90                  The evidence of Mr Clamp and Mr Schocroft provide a basis for estimating the number of copies of infringing software that were installed by the respondents in the relevant period.   On the basis of that evidence the applicants estimated that:

·        During the period from July 1999 to March 2001 Mr Davis, as sole trader, reproduced 373 infringing copies of Microsoft Windows which he sold to customers;

·        During the period from July 1999 to March 2001 Mr Davis, as sole trader, reproduced 348 infringing copies of Microsoft Office which he sold to customers;

·        During the period from 21 June 2001 to May 2002 Ezy Loans reproduced 150 infringing copies of Microsoft Windows which it sold to customers;

·        On about 15 June 2001 Ezy Loans supplied infringing copies of Microsoft Windows 98 and Microsoft Office 97 Professional to Ms Tran-Nguyen;

·        On about 15 June 2001 Ezy Loans supplied infringing copies of Microsoft Windows 98 and Microsoft Office 97 to Mr Quinn.

91                  The applicants submit that they are entitled by way of compensatory damages to the net amount that would have been received from licence fees for each copy of Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office supplied.  On the basis of the above estimates they claim the following amounts:

Microsoft Windows:

o       Ezy Loans: $125.00 x 152, a sum of $19,000.00

o       Mr Davis: $125 x 373, a sum of $46,625.

Microsoft Office:

o       Ezy Loans: $500 x 2, a sum of $1000.00 (in respect of the computer supplied to Mr Hollingworth)

o       Mr Davis: $500 x 348, a sum of $174,000.00

The totals of the compensatory damages claimed, therefore is $220,625.00 for Mr Davis, and $20,000.00 for Mr Davis and Ezy Loans jointly and severally.  The applicants explain that the reason for the significant difference is that Ezy Loans did not generally offer Microsoft Office after about July 2001.

92                  I am satisfied that these amounts are reasonable in the circumstances and err, if at all, on the conservative side.  The evidence supports the claim that the infringing conduct continued after both Mr Clamp and Mr Schocroft left the respondents’ employ but, for reasons that I have already mentioned, there is no evidence in respect of subsequent periods.  I see no reason not to accept these estimates and propose to order damages accordingly.

Additional damages

93                  In addition to compensatory damages the applicants also seek additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act.  Section 115(4) provides:

‘Where, in an action under this section –

(a)               an infringement of copyright is established; and

(b)       the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so, having regard to:

(i)         the flagrancy of the infringement; and

….

(iii)             any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement; and

(iv)             all other relevant matters;

the court may, in assessing damages for the infringement, award such additional damages as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.’

94                  In Raben Footware Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 93, Burchett J, having referred to his understanding of the element of penalty incorporated in s 115(4) said at 93,

‘Although s 115(4) requires the court to “hav[e] regard to ... the flagrancy of the infringement”, the question to be decided is whether “the court is satisfied that it is proper” to make the award of additional damages, having regard also to the other matters stated in the subsection.  In this context, I think “the flagrancy of the infringement” must refer to the degree of flagrancy evinced by it, and glaring impropriety is not essential, depending on the presence or absence of other factors.  Indeed, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria (op. cit. sec. 24.31) suggests that the same phrase, in the corresponding United Kingdom provision, does not make flagrancy “an essential pre-requisite to the making of [an order for additional damages]”.  In my opinion, this is also true of the Australian provision.’

95                  The discussion of compensatory damages in [89]-[93] above shows that the respondents derived considerable pecuniary benefit from their infringing conduct.  For reasons set out above at [81] to [83] I am also satisfied, not only that the respondent’s conduct was flagrant but that their approach to this proceeding demonstrates, ‘a deliberate pattern of conduct by the respondents in which they recognised the illegality of the enterprise they were engaged in and actively sought to conceal it’; Goodview Electronics at [61].  In particular I refer to the total failure of the respondents to observe orders for discovery (including discovery of business records evidencing their dealings in Microsoft software) which, as the applicants submitted, means the applicants can never know the full extent of the infringements.  It is important to more than the applicants that copyright infringers are not encouraged to think that by ignoring court proceedings they can escape the consequences of calculated infringement of the rights of others in the pursuit of profits.  This is especially so in relation to infringement of copyright in computer software which is so easy to conceal; see Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 17 IPR 69 (‘Autodesk’) at 77-78.  For these reasons I am satisfied that this is a case where substantial additional damages are warranted. 

96                  The Court has a broad discretion in relation to the quantum of additional damages.  While I have considered the awards made in a number of previous cases including Autodesk, Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240, Goodview, Atifo and Microsoft Corporation v Glostar [2003] FCA 210 ultimately it is the facts of the instant case that must inform the decision.  I regard this an extreme case and one in which the additional damages should send a clear signal of the Court’s disapproval of the respondents’ conduct; Bailey v Namol Pty Limited (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 113-114.  I accept that both respondents should be subject to additional damages but Mr Davis personally must take the greater responsibility.  I propose to order that additional damages in the amount of $50,000 be awarded against the respondents jointly and additional damages in the amount of $300,000 be awarded against Mr Davis personally.  

Associate:        

Dated:              2 September 2004