FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2004] FCA 543

MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Minister to set aside decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – effect of that decision was cancellation of applicant’s visa – applicant convicted of several serious offences – whether Tribunal’s decision was “original decision” within meaning of s 501A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Minister acted correctly in applying “new” character test in s 501(7)of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether applicant entitled to injunctive relief

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 200, 501, 501A, 501G(1)(e), 502

Migration Legislation Amendment (Strengthening of Provisions relating to Character and Conduct) Act 1998 (Cth) Sch 1, items 32 and 33

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 453 referred to

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 cited

Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 at 953 referred to

Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Limited (1998) 194 CLR 247 at 258 referred to

Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 144 and 157-8 referred to

Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 551-552 referred to

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-41 referred to

W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [32] referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 referred to

SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361 referred to

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431 referred to

Hicks v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757 at [55]-[79] referred to

Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 201 ALR 327 at [30] and [62] referred to

Justice R S French “The Equitable Geist in the Machinery of Administrative Justice”, AIAL Forum, No. 39, September 2003, pp 1-17

HO SONG LU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENEOUS AFFAIRS

V983 of 2003

WEINBERG J

5 MAY 2004

MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	V983 OF 2003

BETWEEN:	HO SONG LU APPLICANT
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENEOUS AFFAIRS RESPONDENT
JUDGE:	WEINBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:	5 MAY 2004
WHERE MADE:	MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	V983 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

HO SONG LU

APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENEOUS AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

JUDGE:	WEINBERG J
DATE:	5 MAY 2004
PLACE:	MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1 This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for what are generally described as constitutional writs. The applicant seeks review of a decision made on 14 March 2002 by the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) under s 501A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). By that decision, the Minister set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 4 July 2001, and thereby cancelled the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501A(2)(b).

background

2 The applicant was born in Vietnam on 15 February 1969. On 11 September 1982, he and his family arrived in Australia. Records of the Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (“the Department”) note that the applicant was an “accompanying person” of his father, though it is unclear whether the father arrived in Australia as a refugee, or under a special humanitarian program.

3 In 1990, the applicant, together with several others, committed what is described as the offence of home invasion. He was arrested, and charged with four counts of robbery with an offensive weapon. Whilst on bail, he and another person were involved in breaking and entering, and stealing from a shop. He was again arrested, and this time charged with three counts of burglary, one count of having housebreaking implements in his possession, and one count of threatening to use an offensive weapon with intent to resist arrest. He was subsequently tried in the District Court of New South Wales, and convicted. In relation to the home invasion, the Court sentenced him to a minimum term of six and a half years, with an additional term of twenty-six months. In relation to the shop burglary, he was sentenced to one year for each offence, to be served concurrently with the head sentence.

4 While serving his sentences, the applicant was, on two occasions, convicted of various offences relating to the possession and use of marijuana.

5 On 9 June 1997, the Minister ordered the applicant’s deportation under s 200 of the Act. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Tribunal. On 12 June 1998, it set aside the deportation order. The Minister lodged an appeal against the Tribunal’s decision in this Court but subsequently discontinued the appeal.

6 On 19 October 1998, the Minister cancelled the applicant’s transitional permanent visa under s 501(1) of the Act, on the basis that he reasonably suspected that the applicant did not pass the “character test”. At the same time, the Minister decided that it was in the national interest for a certificate to issue under s 502 declaring the applicant to be an “excluded person”. The effect of that decision was to preclude the applicant from seeking merits review in the Tribunal. However, the certificate was rendered ineffectual by a decision of a Full Court of this Court in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 453. As a result of Singh, the applicant was able to seek merits review of the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa. On 4 July 2001, the Tribunal set aside that decision, effectively reviving the applicant’s visa.

7 On 14 March 2002, the Minister decided under s 501A to set aside the Tribunal’s decision of 4 July 2001, and again cancelled the applicant’s visa, this time pursuant to s 501A(2)(b). The conditions under which the Minister was entitled to act are set out in s 501A(2)(c), (d) and (e). They are cumulative, and all must be met. Under s 501A(2)(c), the Minister must reasonably suspect that the person does not pass the character test as defined by s 501. Under s 501A(2)(d), it must be established that the person does not satisfy the Minister that he or she passes that test. Under s 501A(2)(e), the Minister must be satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest. At the time the Minister made his decision, he had before him a Minute dated 11 March 2002, a copy of which was exhibited to an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 17 January 2004. Attached to that Minute was what is described as an Issues Paper, of a kind typically used in such cases.

8 On 9 October 2003, the Minister provided the applicant’s solicitors with a “statement of reasons” dated 6 October 2003, in response to a request by them. On 24 October 2003, the application to this Court was filed. That application was superseded by an amended application filed on 19 February 2004 in which the applicant sought an order in the nature of prohibition preventing the Minister from acting on her predecessor’s decision, and an injunction restraining the Minister from acting on that decision and from treating the applicant as an unlawful non-citizen. The application also sought a declaration that the decision was void, and an order in the nature of certiorari.

9 There are elaborate particulars contained in the amended application. There are two general grounds, and a number of more specific points raised.

10 The first general ground is that the Minister did not comply with the obligation imposed by s 501G(1)(e) to provide the applicant with a written notice that set out the reasons for the decision until the document purporting to do so was delivered on 9 October 2003. However, that document is said not to provide a statement of reasons, but only the “best recollection” of the Minister for the reasons for his decision made nineteen months earlier. It should be noted that this ground was not developed in the applicant’s contentions of fact and law, filed on 19 February 2004. Nor was it addressed in any detail during the course of oral submissions. In these circumstances, nothing further need be said about it.

11 The second general ground contends that it would be unconscionable for the Minister to be permitted to treat her predecessor’s decision of 14 March 2002 as being of legal effect because he only came to make that decision by reason of his own earlier failure to act in accordance with the requirements of the Act, as they then stood. Moreover, it would also be unconscionable for the Minister to treat the decision of 14 March 2002 as valid when it was made in circumstances where the applicant was singled out for special and discriminatory treatment from amongst those who were involved in committing the same offences. This was exacerbated by the failure of the Minister to provide reasons for this special treatment.

12 As noted above, the applicant also seeks, in the alternative, an order in nature of certiorari quashing the decision on the ground that it involves jurisdictional error. There are numerous sub-grounds assigned to the jurisdictional error claimed, but not all of them were pursued in written and oral argument. In substance, the applicant contends:

· on its proper construction, the reference to “the original decision” in s 501A(1) does not include a decision of the Tribunal made after 1 June 1999, when reviewing a decision of the Minister made personally before that date;

· the Minister failed to take into account the following relevant considerations:

* the fact that the other persons involved in the “home invasion” who were also non-citizens, and who were equally culpable in that offence, had been permitted to remain in Australia;

* the fact that the applicant had been previously detained purely because the Minister had erred in providing a certificate under s 502(1) declaring him to be an excluded person;

* the Tribunal’s earlier views, twice expressed, that the applicant should not be removed from Australia on character grounds. Alternatively, the Minister gave no reasons for setting aside those conclusions;

* the fact that the applicant had lodged an application for the grant of Australian citizenship in July 2001;

* the fact that the Issues Paper contained an erroneous description of the applicant’s criminal history whilst in custody in the New South Wales prison system, notwithstanding the fact that these errors had been revealed during the course of earlier litigation between the applicant and the Minister in the High Court in 2001, and in earlier proceedings before the Tribunal;

· the Minister had concluded that the Australian community was entitled to protection from the applicant based on conduct perpetrated thirteen years earlier without any evidence to suggest that the applicant had committed any further offences since;

· there was no basis for the Minister to conclude that “the expectations of the Australian community” were such as to require the applicant to be removed from this country; and

· there was no basis for the finding that it was in the “national interest” within s 501A(2)(e) to remove the applicant in order to “protect the community”.

13 There were several other points raised in the amended application. There was no substance in any of them. They were not developed in oral argument, and I do not propose to deal any further with them.

the applicant’s contentions

14 During oral submissions, Mr Hurley, on behalf of the applicant, developed some of the grounds set out in the amended application. He also raised several new grounds, some of which had not been addressed in his written contentions. As I understood them, Mr Hurley’s submissions, in their final form, were as follows.

the meaning of “original decision” in s 501A

15 Mr Hurley submitted that the Tribunal’s decision of 4 July 2001 was not relevantly an “original decision” within the meaning of that expression in s 501A, and could not therefore form the basis of the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa under that section. His argument, in substance, was that although the Tribunal had made a decision that appeared to fall within the terms of s 501A(1)(d), and therefore to constitute an “original decision”, Parliament could not have intended a decision on appeal from the Minister personally to be so regarded. Otherwise, a decision by the Minister to cancel a visa would be reviewed by the Tribunal, which in turn, would have its decision not to cancel the visa further reviewed by the Minister. That would be both absurd and unfair.

16 Section 501A was inserted into the Act by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Strengthening of Provisions relating to Character and Conduct) Act 1998 (Cth) (“the Amendment Act”), and came into effect on 1 June 1999. It relevantly provides as follows:

“(1) This section applies if:

(a) a delegate of the Minister; or

(b) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;

makes a decision (the original decision):

(d) not to exercise the power conferred by subsection 501(2) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;

whether or not the person satisfies the delegate or Tribunal that the person passes the character test and whether or not the delegate or Tribunal reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test.

Action by Minister—natural justice applies

(2) The Minister may set aside the original decision and:

(a) refuse to grant a visa to the person; or

(b) cancel a visa that has been granted to the person;

if:

(d) the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test; and

(e) the Minister is satisfied that the refusal or cancellation is in the national interest.

…

Minister's exercise of power

(5) The power under subsection (2) or (3) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.

…

Decision not reviewable under Part 5 or 7

(7) A decision under subsection (2) or (3) is not reviewable under Part 5 or 7.”

17 If Mr Hurley’s submission that the Tribunal’s decision of 4 July 2001 was not an “original decision” within the meaning of this section is correct, the Minister would lack power to set aside that decision the section. It would follow that he could not cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501A(2)(b).

the character test

18 Mr Hurley next submitted that the Minister had applied the wrong “character test” when he reconsidered the Tribunal’s decision. It was common ground that the Tribunal had to apply the “old” character test when it came to make its decision on 4 July 2001. See generally, s 501A and, in particular, the transitional provisions contained in Schedule 1 to the Amendment Act. Those provisions are as follows:

“32 Transitional--review of adverse pre-commencement decisions under the Migration Act 1958

(1) Despite the amendments of sections 500 and 502 of the Migration Act 1958 made by this Act, those sections and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 continue to apply, in relation to a review of a decision made under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 before the commencement of this item, as if:

(a) those amendments had not been made; and

(b) section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 had not been repealed by this Act.

(2) The repeal and substitution of subsection 500(4) of the Migration Act 1958 made by this Act does not imply that an application may be made, or could have been made, to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of a decision to which a certificate under section 502 of the Migration Act 1958 applies.

33 Transitional--setting aside and substitution of non-adverse pre-commencement decisions under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958

(1) This item applies if:

(a) a delegate of the Minister; or

(b) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;

makes, or has at any time made, a decision (the original decision):

(c) to grant a visa to a person as a result of not exercising the power conferred by section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (as in force at any time before the commencement of this item or as continued in force by item 32) to refuse to grant a visa to the person; or

(d) not to exercise the power conferred by section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (as in force at any time before the commencement of this item or as continued in force by item 32) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.

(2) Section 501A of the Migration Act 1958 applies to the original decision in a corresponding way to the way in which it applies to a decision referred to in subsection 501A(1) of that Act.”

19 Mr Hurley submitted that item 32(1)(b) made it clear that the “old” test was applicable in relation to a review of a decision made under s 501 that had been made before the commencement of the Amendment Act. Accordingly, the old test applied to the Tribunal’s review, in July 2001, of the Minister’s decision taken in October 1998. That view of item 32 was confirmed by the Explanatory Memorandum to what became the Amendment Act, which referred to sub-item 32(1) as ensuring that the existing merits review system continued to apply to decisions to refuse to grant or cancel a visa where the decision was made under existing s 501 of the Act (that is, prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act).

20 Mr Hurley contended, however, that when the Minister came to review the Tribunal’s decision, under s 501A, he had erroneously applied the new character test. That test, which is now contained in s 501(6), was said to be “mechanical”, being applicable if the person has a substantial criminal record, as defined by s 501(7). That subsection provides:

“For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if:

(a) the person has been sentenced to death; or

(b) the person has been sentenced to imprisonment for life; or

(d) the person has been sentenced to 2 or more terms of imprisonment (whether on one or more occasions), where the total of those terms is 2 years or more; or

(e) the person has been acquitted of an offence on the grounds of unsoundness of mind or insanity, and as a result the person has been detained in a facility or institution.”

21 Mr Hurley submitted that the new character test stood in stark contrast with the old test, which was formerly contained in s 501 of the Act, prior to its amendment in 1998. That section provided for a two-stage process for a refusal to grant, or cancellation of, a visa. The first stage required a decision-maker to make a finding of fact as to whether a person was “not of good character”. The second stage conferred upon the decision-maker a discretion to grant, or not to cancel, a visa, despite a finding that the person was not of good character.

22 According to Mr Hurley, the Issues Paper dated 11 March 2002 made it plain that he had applied the current provisions of the Act regarding the character test, rather than those that ought to have been applied. It was at least implicit in Mr Hurley’s contentions that the applicant may have done better under the old character test than he did under the new character test.

23 Mr Hurley relied primarily upon item 33(2) in support of his contention that the Minister ought to have applied the old character test. He submitted that because item 32(1)(b) required the Tribunal to apply the old character test, and item 33(2) rendered the new power under s 501A applicable to the “original decision” “in a corresponding way” to the way in which it applied to a decision referred to in s 501A(1), the same test had to be applied by the Minister as had been applied by the Tribunal.

Other jurisdictional errors

24 Mr Hurley argued that the Minister’s decision was invalid because it failed to take into account matters that he was bound to take into account. These included the Tribunal’s reasons (which appear not to have been before the Minister), and the fact that the only reason the Minister could revisit that decision was because of his own previous error in having granted an invalid certificate.

25 In addition, Mr Hurley complained that the Minister had been given erroneous information about the applicant’s criminal history. The Issues Paper stated at par 4 of Part B that the applicant had received:

“[a] [t]otal sentence for drug offences in 1993 and 1997 [of] 9 months served concurrently with his prison term”.

26 At par 22 of Part B of the Issues Paper, the Minister was told:

“The resultant sentences [the sentences for the 1993 and 1997 drug offences] were to be served cumulatively with the main sentence.”

27 In fact, the applicant received three sentences of one month each, wholly concurrent. He had been convicted before the Bathurst Local Court on 28 June 1993, and fined a total of $800.00 for possession and use of cannabis. He had also been convicted before the Glen Innes Local Court on 24 February 1997, and sentenced to a term of one month’s imprisonment for possession of a prohibited drug, one month’s imprisonment for possession of equipment for self-administration, and one month’s imprisonment for self-administration. All three sentences were to take effect from 24 September 1997, and were to be served concurrently. Obviously, the person who prepared Part B of the Issues Paper had failed to appreciate the disconformity between what was contained in pars 4 and 22.

28 Mr Hurley also argued that the Minister’s decision should be quashed because, at the time he made it, the Issues Paper informed him, erroneously, that the original character decision, taken some years previously, had been made by a delegate. In truth, the Minister himself had made that decision.

29 Mr Hurley next submitted that the Minister had failed to have regard to a relevant consideration, namely the fact that the applicant had been singled out for discriminatory treatment. At the very least, he ought to have provided reasons as to why the applicant’s co-offenders had been permitted to remain in this country.

30 Finally, Mr Hurley argued that, taken cumulatively, the matters raised showed that the Minister had not given genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s case. He also submitted that the Minister had acted in bad faith, and that the decision was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

Equity

31 Mr Hurley argued that even if jurisdictional error could not be shown, the applicant was entitled to injunctive relief under ordinary principles of equity. He submitted that it would be unconscionable to allow the Minister to exercise a power to cancel the applicant’s visa, under s 501A, when that power could never have been invoked had the Minister not previously erred in issuing an invalid “excluded person” certificate. The applicant, having succeeded on merits review before the Tribunal, was entitled to retain the fruits of that success.

32 Mr Hurley cited several cases in support of this argument. He referred to Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 at 953; Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Limited (1998) 194 CLR 247 at 258; Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 144 and 157-8; and Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 551-552. These cases discussed the role that equitable remedies might play in public and administrative law. Mr Hurley also referred to a paper by Justice French titled “The Equitable Geist in the Machinery of Administrative Justice”, presented to an Australian Institute of Administrative Law seminar on Recent Developments in Administrative Law, in Sydney, on 22 May 2003, and published in AIAL Forum, No. 39, September 2003, pp 1-17.

33 Mr Hurley submitted that equity would grant relief against “equitable fraud”, which included the exercise of a discretionary power in circumstances where that exercise would be unreasonable, or would constitute a fraud on the power. He claimed that there had been a fraud on the power in this case because of the various matters previously identified as giving rise to jurisdictional error.

the respondent’s contentions

the meaning of “original decision” in s 501A

34 Mr Star, on behalf of the Minister, submitted that Mr Hurley’s argument regarding the meaning of the expression “original decision” in s 501A(1)(b) was misconceived. The decision that was the subject of review before this Court was a decision by the Minister to cancel the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501A(2)(b). That provision conferred upon the Minister the power to set aside “the original decision”, being a decision of the Tribunal not to exercise the power conferred by s 501(2) to cancel the applicant’s visa. Any decision by the Tribunal that met that description was an “original decision” as defined by s 501A.

35 Mr Star submitted that the transitional provisions contained in the Amendment Act did not assist the applicant. Item 33 could not be invoked, in the manner for which Mr Hurley contended, to alter the ordinary and natural meaning of the expression “original decision”. There was no justification for reading into s 501A(1)(b) words of limitation that were plainly not there. Accordingly, the Minister had power to cancel the applicant’s visa.

36 Mr Star supported his argument by reference to the Explanatory Memorandum to what became the Amendment Act. He referred in particular to pars 114, 117 and 118 of that Memorandum. He also submitted that Mr Hurley’s argument could not be reconciled with the policy underlying the Amendment Act. Mr Hurley had assumed, incorrectly, that the legislature could not have intended to allow the Minister to exercise his power under s 501A in relation to a decision by the Tribunal that had set aside an earlier decision that the Minister had personally made. According to Mr Hurley, this would create an appeal from “Caesar to Caesar”.

37 However, Mr Hurley’s submission was misconceived because it ignored the fact that the Minister’s decision under s 501A would always be subject to judicial review. It was no quirk, or unintended result of the transitional provisions, that the Minister was able to exercise the power under s 501A in relation to the Tribunal’s decision. That would also have been the case if, for example, the Minister had chosen not to issue a certificate under s 502 when he personally made the original cancellation decision in 1998.

the character test

38 Mr Star submitted that the Minister had correctly applied the “new” character test on 14 March 2002, when he decided to cancel the applicant’s visa. He, like Mr Hurley, relied on item 33(2) in support of his contention. Mr Hurley had submitted that it made no sense to have the Tribunal apply the “old” character test, and the Minister, on reconsideration, the “new” one. Mr Star, however, submitted that item 33(1) preserved the old character test for the Tribunal, once it had been established that a valid “excluded person” certificate had not been granted. Item 33(2), when given its ordinary and natural meaning, made it plain that the new test was to be applied when the Minister exercised the power under s 501A.

39 Mr Star’s referred to par 118 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which observed that item 33 specified that s 501A applied to the original decision, and provided for the Minister acting personally to set it aside, and substitute another. Before the Amendment Act came into force, there had been no s 501A. Plainly, therefore, it was the new regime under the Amendment Act that governed the exercise of the Minister’s power. There was no justification for reading into the transitional provisions, or s 501A, words of limitation of the kind for which Mr Hurley contended.

Other jurisdictional errors

40 Mr Star submitted that none of the matters relied upon by Mr Hurley established jurisdictional error. He began by submitting what is perhaps trite, namely that this was an application for judicial review, and that the merits of the relevant decision were for the Minister, and not for this Court. He contended that a number of the arguments put forward by Mr Hurley did, in fact, invite merits review.

41 Mr Hurley’s contention that the Minister had failed to take into account relevant considerations had to be assessed in light of the well-known observations of Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-41. In particular, this ground could only be made out if the Minister had failed to take into account a consideration that he was bound to take into account in making his decision. The factors that the Minister was bound to consider in making that decision were to be determined by construing the statute conferring the discretion. If the relevant provision stated the considerations to be taken into account expressly, the Court would have to determine whether these were exhaustive. If they were not exhaustive, the Court would have to determine whether the matter, scope and purpose of the Act required, by implication, any additional considerations to be taken into account.

42 Mr Star noted that s 501A did not refer expressly to any of the matters that Mr Hurley contended had been disregarded. Nor was the Minister required to have regard to them by reason of any implication to be drawn from that section, or the Act as a whole. He relied in particular upon the observations of French J in W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398, which he submitted contained an accurate summary of the relevant principles at [32].

43 Mr Star submitted that the special position of the Minister, as the decision-maker, had to be taken into account. He referred to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 as support for that proposition.

44 Mr Star then turned to the errors contained in the Issues Paper regarding the applicant’s criminal history. He submitted that no inference of bad faith could be drawn from those errors. He referred to SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361 where the Full Court observed that it was a large step to jump from a decision involving errors of fact to a finding that the decision-maker had acted in bad faith. He referred also to Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431 where another Full Court said that there was no such thing as “deemed or constructive bad faith”. In substance, he submitted that mistakes happen, but that did not mean that a decision made in circumstances where erroneous facts had been placed before the decision-maker was necessarily invalid.

45 More fundamentally, Mr Star submitted that the errors made by the author of the Issues Paper could not have affected the exercise of the Minister’s discretion. The offences involving cannabis, committed whilst the applicant was in prison, paled into insignificance when compared with the armed robbery, and the various other offences that he had committed. Whether the applicant was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment or one month, and whether that sentence was cumulative or concurrent, did not matter in the least so far as the Minister was concerned. Mr Star referred in that regard to the observations of French J in Hicks v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757 at [55]-[79].

46 Mr Star challenged Mr Hurley’s contention that the applicant had been “singled out” for special treatment. There was nothing to support that contention. The position of the co-offenders may have been quite different to that of the applicant, either because of their antecedents, or because their prospects of rehabilitation were significantly greater than his. In addition, there may have been other matters that influenced the decision, in their cases, not to have them removed.

47 Finally, Mr Star submitted that there was no substance in Mr Hurley’s “cumulative” Wednesbury unreasonableness point. He referred to the recent decision of the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 201 ALR 327 at [30] and [62]. He submitted that it could not be said in this case that the Minister had reached a decision that was so unreasonable “that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith” or “so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the [minister]”.

Equity

48 The last point dealt with by Mr Star was Mr Hurley’s contention that injunctive relief should be available even if the Minister’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. He submitted that there was no substance in this point. He argued that if jurisdictional error could not be demonstrated, the applicant’s claim would really amount to merits review under the guise of equitable relief.

49 Mr Star accepted that there might be circumstances where equitable relief could be granted where, for one reason or another, prerogative relief might not be available. He submitted, however, that this did not mean that an injunction could be granted as a freestanding remedy. There had to be a cause of action that was cognisable, and nothing short of jurisdictional error would suffice.

50 Mr Star acknowledged that it might theoretically be possible that equitable relief could be granted in circumstances where, by reason of his or her own failure to comply with the requirements of a statute, a decision-maker became empowered to reconsider an individual’s case, to the detriment of that individual. However, he submitted that such relief was not warranted in the present case. Moreover, even assuming that what Mr Hurley put regarding the Minister having taken advantage of his own error was correct, it did not merit treating the Minister’s decision as “unconscionable”.

Consideration

the meaning of “original decision” in s 501A

51 The Tribunal’s decision seems to me to fall squarely within the expression the “original decision” in s 501A(1). That expression takes its meaning from s 501A(1)(c) and (d). Mr Hurley seeks to have a qualification or gloss placed upon the expression, such that the Tribunal’s decision, having been made in relation to an earlier decision of the Minister that predated the commencement of the Amendment Act, should be immune from reconsideration by the Minister.

52 There is nothing in the language of s 501A, or the transitional provisions contained in the Amendment Act, to support that construction. The expression “original decision”, as defined in s 501A, should be given its ordinary and natural meaning. It follows that the Minister had power to reconsider the Tribunal’s decision.

53 Mr Hurley’s references to Caesar sitting in judgment upon Caesar are evocative. However, they do not assist in the construction of the Act. Whether, as a matter of policy, the Minister should be permitted to set aside a decision of the Tribunal that had previously set aside the Minister’s decision is a matter for the legislature, and not for this Court.

the character test

54 I accept the respondent’s submissions regarding this matter. In my view, the question is simply one of construction. It is a matter for the Parliament as to which version of the character test the Minister should apply when exercising the power under s 501A. Both item 33(2) of the Schedule to the Amendment Act and pars 114, 117 and 118 of the Explanatory Memorandum support the view that the Minister, on reconsideration under s 501A, should apply the new character test. That is precisely what he did.

55 I should add that even if the Minister had erred in applying the wrong character test, it would not follow that the application for review would succeed. There is no great difference between the two tests. If it were clear that the Minister would inevitably have cancelled the applicant’s visa under the old test, as well as under the new test, it would be futile to remit this matter for reconsideration. The case for cancelling the visa was a powerful one, irrespective of which test was applied.

Other jurisdictional errors

56 I accept that there may be some substance in Mr Hurley’s complaints regarding the provision of inaccurate information to the Minister concerning the applicant’s criminal history. There is no excuse for the Minister to be provided with information that is other than completely accurate regarding matters of this kind. It ought to be relatively simple for officers of the Department to obtain accurate records of the criminal history of any person whose removal from Australia on character grounds is in question. Any officer given the task of preparing an Issues Paper for the Minister should certainly be aware of the difference between sentences that are cumulative, and those that are concurrent.

57 In some cases, erroneous information regarding a person’s antecedents might lead to the invalidity of a decision to remove that person on character grounds. In the present case, however, the objective facts strongly suggest that the matters that were erroneously placed before the Minister played little, if any, role in his decision. It was the very serious offences committed in 1990, coupled with the fact that some of those offences were committed whilst the applicant was on bail, that plainly swayed the Minister, and not the cannabis offences committed at a later time.

58 I reject the contention that the applicant was “singled out”. It is entirely possible that there were differences between his position, and that of his co-offenders, that explained why the Minister did not order their removal. There is simply no evidence, or other material, before the Court on this subject.

59 I do not propose to deal at length with the other matters raised by Mr Hurley. The Minister was not “bound” to take into account, when making his decision under s 501A, that he had previously cancelled the applicant’s visa and issued an erroneous “excluded person” certificate. Nor was he “bound” to take into account that but for his error, the opportunity to invoke the s 501A discretion may not have arisen. There is nothing in s 501A, or in the structure or text of the Act that suggests that these matters, or any others identified by Mr Hurley, had to be taken into account.

60 The fact that the Issues Paper wrongly informed the Minister that the earlier decision had been taken by a delegate, rather than by him personally, was of no consequence. There is nothing approximating Wednesbury unreasonableness, or bad faith, in the Minister’s decision. The applicant had a lengthy criminal history, including some offences that were very serious. It was open to the Minister to conclude, as he did, that the applicant should be removed on character grounds. I accept the respondent’s submissions in relation to each of these matters. I accept, in particular, the submission that some of the matters raised invite merits review.

equity

61 Mr Hurley’s submission is, so far as I am aware, novel. It invites merits review under the guise of seeking equitable relief. I do not think that any of the authorities to which he referred support his contention. In the absence of any authority that binds me to accept his contention, I reject it.

conclusion

62 In short, although I accept that there are aspects of this case that are troubling and, in particular, that the Issues Paper was prepared carelessly, and contains several errors of a factual nature, I am not persuaded that the applicant has made good his claim for judicial review. In my opinion, none of the errors contained in the Issues Paper influenced the Minister’s decision in any way. None of the other matters that Mr Hurley raised give rise to jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the application will be dismissed. The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Weinberg.

Associate:

Dated: 5 May 2004

Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr T Hurley

Solicitors for the Applicant:	Haines & Polites

Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr D I Star

Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing:	2 March 2004

Date of Judgment:	5 May 2004

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