FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

Dudzinski v Kellow [2003] FCA 798

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI v AYNSLEY KELLOW, ROY RICKSON, ERROL STOCK, BILL HOGARTH, CORDIA CHU, KEES HULSMAN, LYN HOLMAN, COLIN McANDREW, JOHN SCOTT AND GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY

Q 31 OF 2003

 

 

 

KIEFEL J

BRISBANE

25 JULY 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 31 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

BETWEEN:

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI

APPELLANT

 

AND:

AYNSLEY KELLOW

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

ROY RICKSON

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

ERROL STOCK

THIRD RESPONDENT

 

BILL HOGARTH

FOURTH RESPONDENT

 

CORDIA CHU

FIFTH RESPONDENT

 

KEES HULSMAN

SIXTH RESPONDENT

 

LYN HOLMAN

SEVENTH RESPONDENT

 

COLIN McANDREW

EIGHTH RESPONDENT

 

JOHN SCOTT

NINTH RESPONDENT

 

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY

TENTH RESPONDENT

 

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2003

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

 

1.         The applications filed on 21 July 2003 be dismissed with costs.

 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 31 OF 2003

 

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

BETWEEN:

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI

APPELLANT

 

AND:

AYNSLEY KELLOW

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

ROY RICKSON

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

ERROL STOCK

THIRD RESPONDENT

 

BILL HOGARTH

FOURTH RESPONDENT

 

CORDIA CHU

FIFTH RESPONDENT

 

KEES HULSMAN

SIXTH RESPONDENT

 

LYN HOLMAN

SEVENTH RESPONDENT

 

COLIN McANDREW

EIGHTH RESPONDENT

 

JOHN SCOTT

NINTH RESPONDENT

 

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY

TENTH RESPONDENT

 

 

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE:

25 JULY 2003

PLACE:

BRISBANE

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1                     Mr Dudzinski has asked me to disqualify myself.  I have said that I would not disqualify myself, and that the reasons would appear largely from the transcript, but I shall state them very shortly. 

2                     Mr Dudzinski’s brand of bias is that any judge who holds a view contrary to those that he holds, or requires him to undertake litigation in an efficient and proper manner, one different from the way that he wishes to conduct it, is biased against him.  He has shown a readiness to accuse judges of this Court of all kinds of impropriety.  Even accepting that some litigants in person can truly hold such beliefs, I am coming very close to the view that these applications, that judges disqualify themselves in Mr Dudzinski’s case, are now brought cynically and without such a belief, but it is not necessary for me to determine that.  The application is without foundation.

3                     The application for leave to appeal is from a decision of Dowsett J refusing an adjournment of the appeal, which is due to be heard by a Full Court on 14 August 2003, about three weeks away.  At the time Dowsett J heard it, an even longer period was available.  It is brought from a judgment given by Spender J on 20 February 2003.  The appeal was filed by Mr Dudzinski in March 2003.  The appeal is from a sequestration order made by his Honour, which was based upon a judgment for costs, which had been taxed by the Court.  A review of his Honour’s judgment, which helpfully shows the extent of the history of Mr Dudzinksi’s litigation, shows that some technical points were taken in relation to the bankruptcy notice and the authority of those bringing the proceedings.  Mr Dudzinski has some further grounds in relation to going behind the judgment.  He has had some months to prepare his appeal prior to him recently moving house, which really forms the only basis for the application.  That was a matter considered by Dowsett J, and I can detect no error in Dowsett J’s approach.  I also agree with his Honour that there is an interest in having bankruptcy matters heard and determined.

4                     However, if I had truly felt that Mr Dudzinksi was in a position not to be able to put his case forward, I would be inclined to consider the order he seeks, but I am not so satisfied.  I have no doubt his Honour considered the same question.  Mr Dudzinski explains that he has not had time to prepare because he has had to move house.  The balance of his assertions are allegations of collusion which have prevented him from preparing or alternatively from obtaining an adjournment.  There is no substance to the latter allegations.   As to the former, I can discern no real basis for accepting why, in the period since he has filed his notice of appeal, he should not be substantially prepared for his appeal. If Mr Dudzinski had spent as much time on the appeal as he has on the last two applications, he would have gone even further towards its preparation.  I take it that he has been advised by the Court or its Registrars not to assume that the Full Court will not proceed with his appeal.  If his time is now shorter, it is as a result of his decisions.  It is not necessary for me to draw any conclusion about whether he is deliberately delaying the matter.

5                     His further application to set aside the judgment is based upon fraud, he says.  The application is procedurally misconceived, and it is based upon unfounded allegations of impropriety on the part of his Honour.  Both  applications will be dismissed with costs.

 

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kiefel.

 

 

Associate:

 

Dated:              6 August 2003

 

 

For the Applicant:

In Person

 

 

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Minter Ellison

 

 

Date of Hearing:

25 July 2003

 

 

Date of Judgment:

25 July 2003