FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Applicants in V 6 of 2000 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 764

APPLICANTS in V 6 of 2000  -v-  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 6 of 2000

RYAN J

18 JUNE 2002

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.         The application be dismissed.

2.         The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of 10 December 1999 be affirmed.

3.         The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1                     The applicants have sought a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”), to refuse the application of the first-named applicant (“the applicant”) for a protection visa.  The applicant has claimed that the Tribunal committed an error of law of the kind contemplated by s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in that it incorrectly interpreted the applicable law or incorrectly applied the law to the facts, particularly in its evaluation of the applicant’s claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of her political opinions.

2                     It should be noted that the applicant had originally contended that the Tribunal had failed to make findings of fact as required by s 430(1) of the Act and that consequently it had committed a procedural error under s 476(1)(a).  However, that contention is no longer available as a ground of review since the judgment of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1.

Background and the Tribunal Decision

3                     The applicant, a Tamil, was born in Colombo but returned as an infant to the eastern region of Sri Lanka and remained there for about 15 years when she moved with her family to Colombo.  She completed her education in Colombo and was employed in various capacities until her marriage in 1980.  Later, she returned to part-time work in 1982.  Her husband, the Tribunal found, had a good position as a manager.  Her husband is a Sinhalese and they have three children, one now aged 19 and twins aged 14.

4                     In July 1996 a bomb blast at the Dehiwela railway station killed over 100 people and  injured 500.  Thereafter, the police conducted a house-to-house search in the course of which they found the applicant at home alone and immediately identified her as a Tamil.  The police also discovered an unopened letter which had been sent to the applicant from Canada for on-forwading to a friend in Batticaloa.  When the police opened the letter they found it was written in Tamil and contained a bank draft for 50,000 rupees which the applicant said was “a lot of money for Sri Lanka”.

5                     After the finding of the letter, the applicant claimed, she was taken to the Dehiwela police station where she was tied by the hands and beaten with a baton on her legs.  She was repeatedly asked about the letter which, she maintained, was an innocent family communication.  At the end of the interrogation and maltreatment she was unable to stand.  Nevertheless, on her account, she remained in detention at the Crime Detection Bureau (“the CDB”) for five days until a lawyer retained by her husband procured her release on condition that she report once a week to the police station.

6                     The applicant also relied on her connection with her nephew (“N”), who had returned from Singapore and stayed with the applicant and her family in expectation of attending a family wedding in Batticaloa in June 1996.  The applicant and her immediate family took one of N’s suitcases to Batticaloa while he travelled there independently by public transport.  She then claimed that after her release from the CDB in August 1996 she had been visited by an uncle who told her that N was a Tiger (member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) (“LTTE”) and warned her not to have anything to do with him.  The same uncle said that the army was looking for N and his parents had moved to a neighbouring village for safety. This warning prompted the applicant to leave Sri Lanka.

7                     The applicant also claimed that, after she had arrived in Australia, the police visited her house in Colombo to find out why she had not been reporting.  The applicant’s evidence of what she learned after her arrival in this country has been summarised by the Tribunal as follows;

“Up until her departure she claimed that she was reporting regularly. She heard that the police were angry. She also learned that N’s father had been arrested. The applicant claims that the police have questioned many of her relatives and they have asked them about the applicant.  She is certain that N and  his father would have told the police that N had stayed with her and that they had taken a suitcase with them to Batticaloa for him.

As a result of all of this the applicant claims that she is wanted by the police.”

8                     The Tribunal also noted that the applicant’s claims had been corroborated by her husband.  As well, it canvassed evidence from an Australian medical practitioner to the effect that the applicant is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.

9                     In its “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal observed that the applicant had made two principal claims, one of detention for five days and mistreatment in July 1999, and another of connection with her nephew, an LTTE suspect, which had provoked police interest in her which continued after her arrival in Australia.  Both of those claims were said to found a justifiable apprehension that the Sri Lankan authorities had imputed to the applicant the political profile of an LTTE sympathiser.

10                  The Tribunal’s primary findings of fact were set out in this passage;

“The Tribunal considers that the applicant has exaggerated her profile in Sri Lanka. The applicant is in her mid forties with three daughters. Her husband is Sinhalese and he had a good job prior to their departure for Australia. The applicant herself has never been involved with the LTTE and expresses no support for this group. She has lived in Colombo  all of her adult life and she told the Tribunal that she lived in an area that was mixed. This profile makes it highly unlikely in the Tribunal’s view that she would be imputed with an opinion of support for the LTTE. There is no suggestion that the applicant had any problems with the security forces prior to July 1996. The applicant does not claim to have been charged with any offence either under the general law, the Emergency Regulations or the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Therefore there is no reason why she would be required to report after her claimed detention. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has made up this claim. The Tribunal also does not accept that in the context of doing house to house searches after the Dehiwela bombing that the police would have any interest in detaining the applicant just because they saw an ordinary letter with a bank draft. When these matters are considered together with her profile and situation the Tribunal finds that the applicant’s account that she was detained for five days, tortured and released on condition that she report once per week to be far fetched.  The Tribunal notes that her evidence is supported by her husband. Nonetheless the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has created a profile for herself that did not exist before her departure.”

11                  The Tribunal then considered, in the alternative, whether, if the applicant’s claim to have been detained were correct, the detention had occurred for the reasons she attributed to it, or in the circumstances which she claimed.  The Tribunal said;

“Even if the Tribunal is wrong about this finding the Tribunal does not accept that she was imputed an LTTE profile because in the context of the Dehiwela train bombing the authorities, whilst conducting a house to house search found a letter in Tamil with a bank draft for a sum that was large in Sri Lankan terms for her to forward to a friend in Batticoloa.  Whilst the Tribunal accepts that the authorities in the context of this bombing conducted house to house searches, the Tribunal does not accept that the letter and money were sufficient to impute her with a pro-LTTE profile. The applicant told the Tribunal that as far as she was aware the letter was no more than normal  correspondence between relatives. There was no indication in the letter to indicate that it had anything to do with the LTTE or was meant for anything other than the benefit of the person to whom it was addressed.  She claimed that at the police station she told this to them over and over. In these circumstances the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was imputed with an LTTE profile. The Tribunal also does not accept that she was mistreated in detention as claimed.”

12                  Another question postulated by the Tribunal, as part of a second alternative analysis, was whether, if the applicant had been detained for the reason, and in the circumstances, which she claimed, she had been detained for five days and required to report to the police station after her release.  As to that matter, the Tribunal said;

“Even if the Tribunal is wrong about the applicant’s detention and she was detained because the police saw the letter and money,  the Tribunal does not accept that there is any reason she would be held in the Crime Detention Bureau as claimed. The Tribunal also does not accept that it is plausible that it would take the applicant’s husband five days to have her released from custody. He can vouch for her, is Sinhalese and in the Tribunal’s view would have had no difficulty in securing her release. In addition, as stated above, in the circumstances that the applicant outlines it is not plausible that she would be required to report to the police station once every week. Again the applicant has done nothing wrong and the Tribunal does not accept that the authorities would have any interest in seeing the applicant once per week. There is also no information that the applicant can give the authorities about the LTTE as she has no involvement. So even if the Tribunal is wrong and the applicant was taken to the police station after the Dehiwela bombing the Tribunal concludes that she has exaggerated her period of detention and her having to report afterwards. The Tribunal notes that the applicant has not claimed to have been charged with any offence or been bailed or been in any situation where she might be required to report. ”

13                  The Tribunal noted that the applicant had encountered only one “problem” in many years of residence and had experienced no further difficulties after her alleged detention until her departure for Australia.  Accordingly, the Tribunal was able to reach this conclusion;

“In such circumstances the Tribunal considers that in light of a long period without difficulties during the almost seventeen years of fighting between the authorities and the LTTE, that there is no real chance that she will have any further problems should she return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal is satisfied that this assessment holds whether it is considering the applicants claims in relation to imputed political opinion or in relation to her Tamil ethnicity, or indeed in relation to any other Convention ground.”

14                  The Tribunal regarded as “exaggerated” the applicant’s assertions which were said to give rise to an imputed political opinion by reason of her connection with her nephew.  It went on to say;

“The Tribunal does not accept that there is any real chance that N or his father would have revealed the applicant’s name. Even if he was an LTTE  operative, the Tribunal does not accept that there is any reason for the authorities to consider that the applicant is imputed with an LTTE profile. Even if they made an inquiry as to whether he stayed with the applicant, the Tribunal does not accept that this would lead to any suspicion falling on her, such that she would be imputed with an opinion of support of the LTTE. The Tribunal does not accept that the authorities were looking for the applicant after she departed as claimed. Firstly if they were looking for information about N then they would have been looking for all of the family. Interestingly however in all of this it only seems to be the applicant who claims to be at risk. As stated above the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was required to report and so does not accept that the authorities were also after her for failing to report. Again in the Tribunal’s view someone in the applicant’s position who has lived in Colombo for many years, is married to a Sinhalese man, has three children is not going to be suspected of supporting the LTTE. There is no reason why the applicant would have any knowledge of N that would be of interest to the authorities. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s claim that she has learned that the police have been looking for her after their departure. However in view of the Tribunal’s findings in relation to her reporting and in relation to N the Tribunal does not accept that the authorities have shown any interest in her since her departure. The Tribunal also does not accept that some delay in the issuing of a passport for the applicant indicates that the authorities have any interest in her.

The Tribunal would add that the applicant claims that she assisted N prior to her claimed detention. However the Tribunal notes that the applicant’s story does not indicate that N had been detained at the time of her detention. There is also no suggestion in the applicant’s account the she was questioned at the police station after the bombing about N.”

15                  The Tribunal then reviewed a considerable body of “country information” related to Sri Lanka, including material to which it had been referred by the solicitor who appeared for the applicant.  The conclusions drawn after that review have been stated as follows;

“Whilst it is always difficult moving from the general information to the particular situation of the applicant, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this information. Firstly for some years the security forces have considered young Tamils recently arrived from the north and the east to be of particular interest. Clearly the applicant does not fit this profile. Secondly it can be inferred that those detained for more than a short period to check their identity are the ones at risk of mistreatment in custody. It is in the context of attempting to obtain a confession for use under the ER or PTA  that torture is used. It follows that where someone is detained as part of a cordon and search operation and released within a short period of time they do not fit within this category. It can also be inferred that there is a problem with extortion in Sri Lanka.

This country information does not change the Tribunal’s view that the applicant as a forty five year old Tamil woman married to a Sinhalese man with three children does not face a real chance of persecution either as a result of her Tamil ethnicity or as a result of any imputed political opinion. Indeed taking the country information as a whole the Tribunal is of the view that it reinforces the Tribunal’s view that the applicant would not be of interest to the authorities and would not be imputed with an opinion of support for the LTTE.  She does not fit the profile of a young Tamil recently arrived from the north or east. She has strongly developed roots in Colombo and has a Sinhalese husband who can vouch for her.

The Tribunal notes the history as taken by the medical practitioner but as stated above does not accept that the applicant has been treated in the way claimed. On the other hand  the Tribunal accepts that the applicant has the symptoms described by the medical practitioner. The applicant has lived in Colombo which is an area that suffers from LTTE bombings that randomly take the lives of innocent people. She has young children who she no doubt wants the best for and has risked a lot to stay in Australia where her future has for some time been uncertain. As a result the Tribunal accepts that she has had suicidal ideation and has suffered from depression and that she has the symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. However the Tribunal does not accept that these problems stem from the reasons the applicant has claimed.

... ... ... ... ...

The Tribunal should finally add that it has considered the applicant’s claims cumulatively. In the Tribunal’s view even accepting the applicant’s history and that of her nephew there is no real chance that she will be imputed with an opinion of support of the LTTE. Even having spent some time overseas, the Tribunal’s view is that having a Sinhalese husband will protect her from any risk of extortion as mentioned in the Canadian summary above. In relation to her Tamil ethnicity, the applicant lived in Colombo for many years and at least up until July 1996 without problems. As a result the Tribunal does not accept that there is any real chance the applicant faces persecution as a result of her ethnicity should she now return to Colombo. Taking all of the applicant’s claims into account, separately and cumulatively, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not face a real chance of persecution should she return to Sri Lanka.”

16                  The findings indicated above led the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant’s fear of persecution, for the reasons of political opinion or ethnic background, was not well-founded.  As a result, it rejected her application for a protection visa.

Relevant Law

17                  The Refugee Convention and Protocol, incorporated into Australian law by s 36(2) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to protected refugee status if he or she has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion ... ... ...”;  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, Art 1(A)(2).

18                  It has been observed by Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, at p 149, that “The notion of persecution on account of political opinion was conceived in liberal terms [by the Convention’s drafters] ... ... ... [P]rotection on the ground of political opinion was to be extended not only to those with identifiable political affiliations or roles, but also to other persons at risk from political forces within their home community.”  The learned author adds, at p 154, that “[e]ssentially any action which is perceived to be a challenge to a governmental authority is therefore appropriately considered to be the expression of a political opinion”.  Although the latter statement has not been expressly endorsed by judicial authority in this country, the High Court has recognised that political opinion may not only exist as a result of actual political views and actions but may be imputed to an applicant;  “persecution may as equally be constituted by the infliction of harm on the basis of perceived political belief as of actual belief.” (original emphasis);  Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, at 416, per Gaudron J.

19                  Under s 65(1) of the Act, if the Minister or his delegate concludes that a person satisfies criteria specified in the Act or the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), then the visa must be granted.  The Tribunal must review the Minister’s or delegate’s decision denying or cancelling a protection visa if a valid application is made under the Act;  ss 411(1)(c) and 414(1).

20                  Section 476(1) expressed in these terms the relevant ground on which this Court could review a decision of the Tribunal:

“(1)     Subject to subsection (2), application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially-reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds:  ... ...  ...

... ... ... ... ...

(e)        that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision ... ... ...”

Contentions of the parties

(A)  The applicant

21                  Mr J Gibson of Counsel for the applicant contended that the Tribunal’s reasoning proceeded from the erroneous belief that a person must actually hold a political opinion to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion.  The existence of this mistaken belief was, it was said, supported by the Tribunal’s pointing, as reinforcing its conclusion, to the fact that the applicant had never been involved with, or expressed support for, the LTTE.  Accordingly, the applicant argued, the Tribunal must be taken to have overlooked the political opinions which the applicant asserted had been imputed to her.  In addition, Mr Gibson questioned, as a matter of logic, the relevance to the possible imputation to the applicant of support for the LTTE of the Tribunal’s finding that there was no suggestion of LTTE links in the letter found by police.

22                  Reference was next made to two additional statements from the Tribunal’s decision which were said to provide further indications that the concept of persecution for reasons of political opinion had been misapplied.  First, the Tribunal stated that the applicant could not give information to the authorities because she was not an LTTE member.  Second, the Tribunal declared that the applicant did nothing wrong.  According to the applicant, these statements reveal a misunderstanding of what is required in evaluating a claimed fear of persecution for reasons of imputed political opinion.  Finally, any claim by the applicant that she had a “profile” in Sri Lanka was disavowed.  Her case before the Tribunal, it was said, had been that the cordon and search operation after the Dehiwela bombings had initiated her fears.

(B)  The Minister

23                  Mr P Gray of Counsel for the Minister contended in response that the Tribunal was aware that a person may be persecuted for imputed political opinions, citing several passages where the Tribunal used the word “imputed”.  In addition, it was submitted that the Tribunal’s finding that she had not been involved in, or supportive of, the LTTE was merely probative of the overall conclusion.  The Tribunal did not indicate that it found those facts dispositive of the matter.  Moreover, it was contended, any mistake in the Tribunal’s treatment of the letter found by the police was made in according weight to the evidence and was not an error of law.  The Tribunal’s statements that the applicant had not been an LTTE member and had done nothing wrong referred back to the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant had not been required to report to the police.  Those statements did not rule out the possible attribution of an LTTE profile by the Sri Lankan authorities;  however, the Tribunal did not find any imputed or actual opinion.  Finally, the Minister contended that the Tribunal’s use of the word “profile” was merely a shorthand expression to describe the applicant’s background.  All other complaints by the applicant went to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision.

Reasoning

24                  After a careful reading of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, I am unable to conclude that it erroneously considered that a fear of persecution for reason of political opinion could only be referable to actual, as opposed to imputed, opinions.  It is clear from the opening paragraph of its “Findings and Reasons” that the Tribunal was alive to the distinction and aware that an imputed political opinion could support a well-founded fear of persecution.  In that paragraph it observed;

“The applicant makes two principal claims. The first is that she was detained in July 1996 and mistreated. This occurred after the bombing at the Dehiwela railway station and the applicant claims that she was held for five days and released. She claims that she had to report to the police after this. The second claim is that her nephew, who stayed with them, was discovered to be in the LTTE and as a result after her arrival in Australia the police came looking for her. For both of these reasons the applicant claims to have been imputed with a political  profile of support of the LTTE.”

25                  Furthermore, in the passage quoted at [10] above, the Tribunal observed that the applicant’s “profile” which, in the context, meant her age, marital status and residential history, “makes it highly unlikely in the Tribunal’s view that she would be imputed with an opinion of support for the LTTE” (emphasis added).  Similarly, in the first sentence of the extract quoted at [11] of these reasons, the Tribunal observed that it did not “accept that she was imputed an LTTE profile” (emphasis added).  “LTTE profile”, in that context, was clearly used as a synonym for political support for, or sympathy with, the LTTE. 

26                  In relation to the letter found by police at the applicant’s home, the Tribunal observed, towards the end of the extract to which I have just referred, that there was nothing in it “to indicate that it had anything to do with the LTTE”.  Almost immediately after that observation the Tribunal declined to “accept that the applicant was imputed with an LTTE profile” (emphasis added). 

27                  The logic of that connection between the letter and the unlikelihood of imputation to the applicant of LTTE sympathies is that the absence of a reference in the letter to the LTTE excluded the letter as a reason for the police or the authorities to regard the applicant as an LTTE sympathiser or supporter.  However, it is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole that it did not consider that the exclusion of the letter as a basis for the imputation concluded the question of whether the relevant political opinion had been imputed at all to the applicant.

28                  The statement in the paragraph quoted at [12] above that “There is also no information that the applicant can give the authorities about the LTTE as she has no involvement” has to be understood in the context of the Tribunal’s primary belief that the applicant had not been detained at all.  On the assumption that it had been wrong in rejecting that claim, the Tribunal went on to indicate that her inability to furnish information about the LTTE made it “implausible” that the applicant had been detained for as long as five days or had been required to report weekly thereafter to a police station.

29                  Similarly, the statement in the same paragraph of the Tribunal’s reasons that “the applicant has done nothing wrong” has to be interpreted in the same context.  It was advanced as a reason for rejecting the claim in respect of the reporting condition on the assumption (contrary to the Tribunal’s primary finding) that the applicant had been detained at all.  On that assumption, the Tribunal referred to the applicant’s having done nothing wrong as making it unlikely that she would have been required to report once a week.

30                  When the passages to which Counsel for the applicant referred are understood in the way just indicated, they do not signify any disregard or misunderstanding of the concept of persecution for reason of an imputed political opinion.  Rather, they indicate an explanation for the Tribunal’s rejection of an alternative factual basis which might have supported a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of an imputed political opinion, namely support for, or sympathy with, the LTTE.  Having primarily found without qualification that the applicant had not been detained or mistreated at all, the Tribunal was not obliged to embark on any alternative explanation of that kind.  Having done so, the fact that a different view might be taken of the logic or reasonableness of its approach, does not convict the Tribunal of an error of law.  As Gleeson CJ and McHugh J said in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, at 629;

“These may or may not be valid criticisms of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal concentrated its attention on Mr Eshetu's explanation of his fears.  Having rejected that explanation, it did not embark upon a search for some alternative explanation which he did not advance.  Once again, different minds could form different views about the reasonableness of that approach.  However, it involves no error of law.  The ultimate question was whether the Tribunal was satisfied about something.  The approach adopted by the Tribunal does not manifest a legally erroneous view as to what it was about which it needed to be satisfied.  For the Tribunal to conclude that, although it was satisfied that Mr Eshetu feared persecution, an examination of the reasons he advanced as to why he held that fear failed to satisfy the Tribunal that the fear was well-founded, does not reflect any misunderstanding as to the meaning of the concept of a well-founded fear.”

31                  Similar reasoning requires rejection of the contention that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant to have claimed a “profile” before the Dehiwela bombings which supported the authorities’ having imputed to her support for, or sympathy with, the LTTE.  It is true that the word “profile” is used in somewhat different senses at various points in the passages already quoted from the Tribunal’s reasons.  For example, the reference to a “political profile of support for the LTTE” in the passage quoted at [24] above is to a brand of political opinion characterised as support for the LTTE.  The same analysis commends itself to the use of the word “profile” where thrice appearing in the paragraph quoted at [11] of these reasons.  On the other hand, in the very next sentence after that just quoted from [10] above, the word “profile” is used in the sense of a collection of ethnic, geographical and social characteristics which might be thought to support the imputation to their possessor of a particular political opinion.  Using the word in that sense, the Tribunal considered that the applicant had “exaggerated her profile in Sri Lanka.”  Likewise, it said at the end of the same passage that “the applicant has created a profile for herself that did not exist before her departure.”  The true “profile” (in this latter sense) which the Tribunal found in the same paragraph to be possessed by the applicant was held to make it “highly unlikely ...  that she would be imputed with an opinion of support for the LTTE.” 

32                  An elastic or inconsistent use of the word “profile’ which has become fashionable in decisions of the Tribunal and of courts in relation to applications for protection visas, does not betoken an error of law.  As the High Court has observed in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 LCR 259, at 271;

“In [Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280] a Full Court of the Federal Court (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ) collected authorities for various propositions as to the practical restraints on judicial review.  It was said that a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language . . .  nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker [Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287].  The Court continued [Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287]:  “The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”

These propositions are well settled.  They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed [See McAuliffe v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609 at 616].  In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision.  This has been made clear many times in this Court.”

33                  In the present case the Tribunal did not attribute to the applicant a claim that any event occurring before the cordon and search operation after the Dehiwela bombings had supported her claim that the authorities had imputed pro LTTE sympathies to her.  Rather, it evaluated the likelihood of such an imputation against the applicant’s background as an adult, and later as a married woman in Colombo before and after the Dehiwela bombings and against what it found had happened to her in the cordon and search operation which did not extend beyond a search of her house and the finding of the letter enclosing the bank draft.  I can discern no error of law in this assessment of the merits of the applicants’ claim.  This was not a case like Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajadurai [2000] FCA 1671 to which I was referred by Counsel for the applicant where the Tribunal had failed completely to deal with a claim that was central to the application.

Conclusion

34                  For the reasons explained above, the applicant has failed to make out in any particular the ground of review based on an error of law which was the only one remaining available to her after the decision of the High Court in Yusuf (supra).  The application must therefore be dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:              18 June 2002