FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Al Adwan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 706

MIGRATION – application for review – objection to competency – whether application for review filed more than 28 days after notification of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal - whether Migration Regulations, reg 5.03 applies to determine date of notification for the purposes of s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act.

MIGRATION – error of law – whether material error – whether decision of Refugee Review Tribunal should be set aside.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 53, 66, 412(1), 426, 475(1), 476(1), 478.

Migration Regulations, rr 2.16, 4.31, 5.03.

Nirmalan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 672, cited.

Hocine v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 99 FCR 269, cited.

Ayub v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1844, cited.

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77, referred to.

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohommad (2000) 101 FCR 434, cited.

Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 219, considered.

Le Tran Thuy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 59 ALD 427, cited.

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 58 ALD 680, followed.

Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (1998) 83 FCR 574, followed.

Kamkar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 71 FCR 424, distinguished.

Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 386, distinguished.

Sook Rye Son v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 86 FCR 584, cited.

Jayaweera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 395, cited.

Chand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 428, cited.

Uddin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 165 ALR 243, distinguished.

Haddara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 166 ALR 401, cited.

Chand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1743, cited.

Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550, cited.

Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 76 FCR 513, cited.

ABDEL FATEH ABUARAB AL ADWAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 80 of 2001

SACKVILLE J

SYDNEY

14 JUNE 2001

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.                  The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.

2.                  The application be dismissed.

3.                  The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

the proceedings

1                     This is an application under s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”) made on 7 December 2000.  The RRT concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Minister’s delegate refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa.  The RRT reached this conclusion because the applicant had not given his application for review of the delegate’s decision within the period of twenty-eight days prescribed by Migration Regulations, reg 4.31(1) for the purposes of section 412(1)(b), of the Migration Act.   Section 412(1)(b) provides as follows:

“(1)     An application for review of an RRT-reviewable decision must:

(a)               ... ;

(b)        be given to the Tribunal within the period prescribed, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of  the decision; and

            (c)        ... “.

2                     On the RRT’s findings, the delegate’s decision was made on 15 February 2000 and the applicant was taken to have received a letter notifying him of the decision on 22 February 2000.  Since the RRT did not receive the application for review until 11 May 2000, the application was nearly two months out of time.  The applicant, who was not represented in this Court, contends that the RRT’s decision was erroneous in law.  As will be seen, the Minister concedes that the RRT made an error of law, but contends that the error was immaterial to the result.

THE OBJECTION tO COMPETENCY AND REGULATION 5.03

3                     A further problem of timing has arisen in connection with the application filed in this Court.  A letter notifying the applicant of the RRT’s decision was sent to him by registered mail on 8 December 2000.  The application to this Court was not filed until 29 January 2001, some 45 days after 15 December 2000, the date the applicant (according to the Minister) was deemed to have received the letter. 

4                     The Minister filed a notice of objection to competency which (as amended) contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the application for review because it was filed outside the 28 days period provided by s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act.  Section 478(1)(b), which is the counterpart to s 412(1)(b), provides as follows:

“(1)     An application under section 476 or 477 must:

            (a)        ... ; and

(b)        be lodged with a Registry of the Federal Court within 28 days of the applicant being notified of the decision.”

Section 478(2) prohibits the Federal Court from making an order allowing or which has the effect of allowing an applicant to lodge an application outside the period specified in s 478(1)(b).

5                     The Minister’s objection to competency relied on reg 5.03 of the Migration Regulations, which is in the following terms:

 “(1A)   This regulation applies to a document sent by the Minister or a Tribunal to a person in that person’s capacity as:

(a)      an applicant, of any kind, under the Act or these regulations; or

              (b)      …; or

  (c)      ….

(1)       For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations, and subject to the Act and specific provision elsewhere in these Regulations, a document is taken to be received by the person to whom it was sent at the time the document is taken to be received at the address to which the document is sent, which is either:

(a)      if the document is sent from a place in Australia to an address in Australia – 7 days after the date of the document; or

                                    (b)        ….

(2)               Subregulation (1) does not apply to a document unless it is sent within 3 days after the date of the document.”

6                     The Minister contended that, since the RRT sent a registered letter on 8 December 2000 to the applicant at his correct address notifying him of the RRT’s decision, the effect of reg 5.03(1) is that he is taken to have received the letter seven days after its date, that is on 15 December 2000.  Accordingly, regardless of whether the applicant actually received the notice, the period of twenty-eight days provided for in s 478(1)(b) expired seventeen days before the applicant actually filed his application in the Court. The Minister relied on the authorities establishing that s 478(1)(b) has the effect that the filing of an application within the time specified is a condition of the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction: Nirmalan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 672 (FC); Hocine v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 99 FCR 269 at 282 per French J; cf Ayub v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1844, at [30] ff.

7                     Regulation 5.03 has taken the form set out in [5] above since 1 July 2000, when Schedule 2 to the Migration Amendment Regulations 2000 (No 3) commenced.  Schedule 2 amended reg 5.03(2) to substitute three days for the period of seven days previously specified in reg 5.03(2).  The earlier version of reg 5.03 was held invalid by a majority of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77 (O’Connor and Mansfield JJ; Tamberlin J dissenting), a case involving the interaction between reg 5.03 and s 412(1)(b) of the Migration Act. 

8                     The majority in Singh held that reg 5.03, in its pre-July 2000 form, was not within the regulation-making power conferred by sub-ss 504(1)(e) and (3) of the Migration Act. These provisions authorise the making of regulations in relation to the giving and service of documents, including regulations providing that a document given to or served on a person in a specified way is to be taken for all purposes of the Migration Act and the Migration Regulations to have been received by the person at a specified or ascertainable time.  Their Honours explained the difficulty this way (at 89-90):

“It is apparent on the face of reg 5.03 that it is capable of operating to abridge the time limits prescribed by reg 4.31, and to do so in a way which might effectively render the right of review nugatory.  That is because it operates so long as the document is sent within seven days after it is dated.  It deems the date of receipt to be seven days after the date of the document.  The date of receipt is determined by reference to the date of the document rather than the date it is sent.  Thus, a document may be sent on the very day it is deemed to have been received.  If the document is sent on the seventh day after it is dated, and it takes some time to be delivered (say, up to four working days: cf s 160 of the Evidence Act), the period of time within which an application for review may be brought will have commenced to run will have effectively been shortened by the time it takes for the document to be received.  It operates when the document is posted from any place in Australia to any other place in Australia.  Of course, in most cases, that consequence will not in fact arise because the document will have been sent on or within a day or so of its date.  But reg 5.03 provides for its operation to deem receipt seven days after the document is dated, whether it is sent on that day or any day within the next succeeding seven days.

In the case of a visa applicant who is in immigration detention, the time within which any application for review to the Tribunal may be brought is seven days from notification of the decision: reg 4.31(2)(a).  If the notice of the decision is sent by pre-paid mail on the seventh day after the notice itself is dated, reg 5.03 provides that the notice is taken to have been received on that very day.  The unsuccessful visa applicant, in those circumstances, would not have received the notice on the day it was posted. Effectively, therefore, reg 5.03 would operate in such circumstances to remove the right of review which the Act grants.”

Clearly enough, the amendment to reg 5.03(2) made by the Migration Amendment Regulations 2000 (No 3) was designed to overcome the difficulty identified by the majority in Singh.

9                     It should be noted that in a recent Full Court decision different views were expressed as to whether Singh had the consequence that there was no room for the valid operation of reg 5.03 in its pre-July 2000 form: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohommad (2000) 101 FCR 434, at 450-452, per Branson J; cf at 457-459, per Marshall J.  Nothing turns on this for present purposes, since Mr Johnson in his submissions on behalf of the Minister accepted that reg 5.03 in that form could not be validly applied to the notification referred to in s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act. 

THE MINISTER’S ALTERNATIVE CONTENTION

10                  The Minister’s alternative contention, assuming that his objection to competency is overruled, was that any error of law committed by the RRT was immaterial to the result.  The Minister conceded that the RRT made an error of law, in that it incorrectly assumed that reg 5.03 in its current form was in force in February 2000, when the delegate’s decision was made.  In fact, of course, at that time reg 5.03 took the form that was ultimately held to be invalid in Singh.

11                  Nonetheless, the Minister’s final position (differing from that adopted in his written submissions) was that the applicant would be bound to fail if the matter were to be remitted to the RRT.  Mr Johnson submitted that the RRT’s findings and the applicant’s own evidence at the hearing in this Court clearly established that the applicant’s agent received actual notice of the delegate’s decision shortly after it had been made on 15 February 2000.  According to Mr Johnson, the effect of sub-ss (4) and (6) of s 53 of the Migration Act, in these circumstances, is that the applicant is taken to have received notification of the delegate’s decision at the time his agent was notified.

12                  Section 53, so far as relevant, provides as follows:

“(3)     If the Minister sends or leaves a notification to the applicant at the address for the applicant given under subsection (1) or (2), the notification is taken to have been received by the applicant even if it was not received.

(4)             An applicant may tell the Minister that a specified person at a specified address may be given notifications for the applicant about the application.

(5)             Subject to the regulations, only one person may be specified, under subsection (4), in relation to an applicant at any particular time.

(6)             If the Minister has been given the name and address of a person under subsection (4), the Minister must give notifications to the applicant by giving them to that person at that address and a notification so given is taken to have been received by the applicant.”

In considering the Minister’s alternative submission, it is also necessary to have regard to other provisions of the Migration Act and of the Migration Regulations.  Section 66(1) of the Migration Act provides that when the Minister refuses to grant a visa he or she is to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way.  Section 66(2) specifies the matters that must be included in the notification.  Regulation 2.16(1) provides that, for the purposes of s 66(1) of the Migration Act, the Minister is to notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa:

“…

(c)        by sending a notice of the decision to, or leaving a notice of the decision at:

(i)                  the last address given to the Minister by the applicant under subsection 53(4) of the Act; or

(ii)                if the applicant has not given to the Minister an address under that subsection, the last address given to the Minister by the applicant under subsection 53(1) or (2) of the Act…”.

PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT

13                  As I have noted, the applicant has been unrepresented in the proceedings in this Court.  At all hearings he has been assisted by a translator skilled in the Arabic language.  At a directions hearing held on 29 March 2001, I made directions for the filing of affidavits and written submissions.  The matter was set down for hearing on 10 May 2001.

14                  The applicant did not file any affidavits.  The Minister filed and served written submissions in compliance with my orders.

15                  When the matter was called on for hearing on 10 May 2001, the applicant indicated that he wished to give evidence that he had not received the letter sent to him by certified mail on 8 December 2001 until shortly before 29 January 2001, the date his application was filed in this Court.  Counsel then appearing for the Minister stated that, in these circumstances, the matter should be adjourned so that further inquiries could be made.  While I thought that there was some force in the view that the Minister should have anticipated the applicant’s claims, even though the applicant had not filed any affidavits, I adjourned the proceedings until 1 June 2001.  I made further directions for the filing of affidavits and written submissions.

16                  At the hearing on 10 May 2001, I also explained to the applicant that a factual issue might arise as to whether the delegate’s letter of 15 February 2000 had been received by the applicant’s migration agent, Mr Lamba.  I pointed out that there was no evidence then before the Court that the agent had not received the letter.  I also pointed out that if the agent had received the letter, the effect of s 53 of the Migration Act might be that it would not matter that the applicant himself had not received the letter the delegate posted to him on the same day.  I made it clear to the parties that I intended to deal on 1 June 2001 not only with the Minister’s objection to competency but, if necessary, with the substance of the application for review of the RRT’s decision.

17                  The applicant again filed no affidavits.  The Minister filed and served on the applicant detailed written submissions.  In those submissions the Minister accepted that the RRT’s letter of 8 December 2000, which had been sent by registered mail to the applicant, had not been collected by him until 16 January 2001.  The submissions made no other concessions on factual questions.

18                  At the adjourned hearing, the applicant indicated that he wished to give oral evidence.  Mr Johnson did not object to this course notwithstanding the applicant’s failure to comply with the Court’s directions.  The applicant accordingly gave oral evidence and was cross-examined.  The applicant did not seek to call evidence from any other witnesses.

the applicant’s evidence

19                  I have some concerns about the reliability of the applicant’s evidence.  On his account, a surprising number of documents duly posted to, or left for him, at what he says is his residential address have not come to his attention.  I am not, however, prepared to disbelieve his claims that he knew nothing of the RRT’s decision until he received a copy from his agent on 12 January 2001.  According to the applicant, whose evidence on this point I accept, it was the receipt of the document from his agent that prompted him to collect the RRT’s registered letter from the Post Office on 16 January 2001.  It follows that he filed his application in this Court within twenty-eight days from the date he first received actual notification of the RRT’s decision.

jurisdiction

20                  In Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 219, an application was made to the Court to review a decision of the Immigration Review Tribunal (“IRT”).  The IRT had held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the application because it had been filed out of time.  Gyles J expressed some doubt as to whether the IRT’s decision was a “judicially-reviewable decision” within the meaning of s 475(1) of the Migration Act.  In particular, he expressed doubt as to whether a refusal by the IRT to exercise jurisdiction could be regarded as a “decision” for the purposes of the Migration Act: at 222-223.  His Honour acknowledged, however, that the Court had often assumed jurisdiction in similar circumstances.  In the result, he decided to follow established practice and overrule the Minister’s objection to competency. 

21                  Mr Johnson specifically accepted that a decision by the RRT that it does not have jurisdiction to review a delegate’s decision on the merits is a “decision of the [RRT]” within s 475(1)(b) of the Migration Act and thus is a “judicially-reviewable decision”. 

22                  In the light of Li v Minister and the position adopted by Mr Johnson, I am satisfied that the decision made by the RRT in the present case is a judicially-reviewable decision and that, subject to the issues raised in the Minister’s objection to competency, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application for review.  The position might be different if the decision were not made by a member of the RRT but by an administrative officer: see, for example, Le Tran Thuy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 59 ALD 427, at 429, per Branson J.

The Delegate’s decision

23                  The applicant is a citizen of Jordan, born on 16 February 1947.  He first arrived in Australia on 24 December 1995, but returned to Jordan for about a month, in September-October 1997.

24                  On 19 November 1999, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  He claimed that he had to leave Jordan because he was under threat of arrest by the secret police.  According to the applicant, he came to the attention of the Jordanian authorities because of his political views, in particular his opposition to the monarchy.  He said that he suffered physical abuse in Jordan and feared for his life if he were forced to return to that country.

25                  The applicant was assisted by a migration agent in the preparation of his application form for a protection visa.  He gave the name and address of the migration agent on his application form, as follows:

VICTOR S LAMBA

BUTTERWORTHS MIGRATION CONSUL

8 BRIDGE ROAD

HOMEBUSH  2140.

He requested that correspondence should be sent to the agent’s address.  The applicant also recorded that his residential address was 7/30 Wigram Street, Harris Park.

26                  As already noted, on 15 February 2000, the Minister’s delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa.  On that day, as the RRT found, the decision record was sent by certified mail to the applicant’s migration agent at the address specified by the applicant in the application form.  On the same day, the case officer forwarded a letter by certified post to the applicant at his Harris Park address, enclosing a copy of the decision record. The letter sent to the applicant was subsequently returned to the Department unclaimed.

the application to the rrt

27                  According to the Department’s file, the applicant contacted the Department on 27 April 2000, apparently in person.  He provided to the Department what purported to be a copy of a letter, dated 20 December 1999, written by his migration agent and addressed to the case officer.  The letter informed the case officer that the applicant would be residing at a new address, namely 18/232 Hector Street, Bass Hill.  There was no record in the Department’s file of any notification of the applicant’s change of address.  In particular, the original of the purported letter bearing date 20 December 1999 was not on the Department’s file.

28                  On 3 May 2000, the case officer wrote to the migration agent enclosing a further copy of the decision record relating to the delegate’s decision.  The letter advised the agent that there was no record on file of any notification of change of address for the applicant. 

29                  On 11 May 2000, the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision with the RRT.  The application gave the applicant’s address as 18/232 Hector Street, Bass Hill.  That address was designated on the applicant’s form as the applicant’s address for service.  The application form also indicated that the migration agent, Mr Lamba, who had previously acted on the applicant’s behalf, continued to represent him.

30                  The application for review was accompanied by a statutory declaration made by the applicant, in the following terms:

“That I am late in filing my application to the RRT because I came to know about the decision from the Department only in the last week of April.

I had written to the Department of Immigration regarding my change of address.

The Department posted me a letter on my old address which I did not receive.

The letter which was sent by him was returned to them as I was not living there.

However they could not find the letter in my file in which I had requested them about the change of my address.

I would like to request you to kindly accept my application.”

31                  On 27 September 2000, the RRT wrote to the applicant at his Bass Hill address.  The letter stated that the Department’s records showed that he had been notified of the delegate’s decision by letter dated 15 February 2000 and asserted that he was taken to have received the letter in the ordinary course of post, unless he could show otherwise.  The letter also pointed out that the application for review of the delegate’s decision had not been received within the prescribed period and it therefore appeared to have been lodged out of time.  He was invited to make submissions in relation to this issue.  A copy of the RRT’s letter to the applicant was also sent to the migration agent.

32                  On 29 November 2000, the RRT received from the applicant the letter (or a copy of the letter) that had been sent to him on 27 September 2000.  The letter was accompanied by a statutory declaration which, apart from the date, was in identical terms to the declaration supplied by him in May 2000.  A handwritten note on the back of the statutory declaration was in the following terms:

“Please send me your letter to this my address

18/232 Hector Street BASS HILL  NSW  2197”

The note bore the same signature as the statutory declaration.

the rrt’s decision

33                  The RRT referred to the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and to the Migration Regulations. The RRT’s summary of the effect of reg 5.03 shows that, as Mr Johnson conceded, it had in mind the form of the regulation as amended on 1 July 2000.  The substance of the RRT’s reasoning is as follows:

“The notice of the delegate’s decision was dated 15 February 2000.  The Tribunal is satisfied that its contents complied with the statutory requirements.  The Department’s file records indicate that the applicant had given the Minister an address under s 53(4) of the Act and that the notice was sent by certified mail to that address on 15 February 2000.  This address was the address of the applicant’s adviser.  A copy was also sent to the applicant at his residential address.  The letter sent to the applicant’s residential address was returned unclaimed.

The Tribunal is satisfied that the notice was sent within the proscribed [sic] time to the correct address.  The applicant is therefore taken to have received the notice on 22 February 2000.  The Tribunal accepts that the application for review was received on 11 May 2000, which is 86 days after the date of the decision.

According to the Department’s file, on 27 April 2000, the applicant contacted DIMA and provided the Department with a copy of a letter from his adviser, dated 20 December 2000, in which the adviser told the Department that the applicant’s residential address had changed.  This letter did not indicate that the applicant’s address for service had changed.  In a letter to the applicant’s adviser, dated 3 May 2000, the Department advised that it had noted the change of address but stated that there was no earlier record that the address had been changed.  This letter also noted that the Departmental decision had been notified to the adviser on 15 February 2000.

In his Statutory Declaration of 14 November 2000, the applicant stated that he was late in applying for review because he did not receive a copy of the decision until 27 April 2000.  He stated that he had informed the Department of his change of address but that the Department had sent the notification of his decision to his old address.

The Tribunal is satisfied, on the basis of the evidence before it, that the notification of the Department’s decision was sent to the applicant at the address which he provided in his application for a protection visa…as his address for service.  The Tribunal is satisfied that this address was that of his adviser, a registered migration agent.  The Tribunal notes that neither the applicant nor his adviser has contended that the notification of the Departmental decision was not received at that address.  The Tribunal notes in this regard that this letter to the address for service was not returned unclaimed.

As the review application was received by the Tribunal outside the mandatory time limit, it is not a valid application and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision.”

34                  As can be seen from this passage, the RRT found that the letter of 15 February 2000 was sent by the RRT by certified mail to the address supplied by the applicant pursuant to s 53(4) of the Migration Act. It is clear enough that the RRT relied on reg 5.03 to support its finding that the letter was taken to have been received by the agent on 22 February 2000, seven days after the date it bore.  The RRT then relied on s 53(6) of the Migration Act to conclude that the applicant had to be taken as having received the letter on 22 February 2000.

THE OBJECTion TO COMPETENCY

35                  The facts relevant to the objection are these:

·        On 7 December 2000, the RRT made its decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the applicant’s application for review of the delegate’s refusal to grant him a protection visa.

·        On 8 December 2000 the Registry of the RRT sent a letter to the applicant attaching the RRT’s decision and reasons for decision.  The letter was sent by pre-paid registered post to the applicant’s address for service as specified in his application for review to the RRT.

·        The applicant did not receive the letter until 16 January 2001, when he collected it from the Post Office.

·        The applicant first learned of the RRT’s decision when he received a copy of the decision and reasons for decision from his migration agent on 12 January 2001.  It was this event which prompted the applicant to attend at the Post Office on 16 January 2001.

·        The applicant filed the application for review in this Court on 29 January 2001.  This was within twenty-eight days of receiving a copy of the RRT’s decision and reasons for decision.

·        The application for review in this Court was filed more than twenty-eight days after the date the letter was taken to have been received by the applicant, in accordance with reg 5.03(1)(a).  That date was 15 December 2000.

36                  The facts in this case are relevantly identical to those of Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 58 ALD 680.  In Kumar, Mansfield J reviewed at length the authorities that have addressed the relationship between s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act and reg 5.03(1) of the Migration Regulations. His Honour followed the decision of Beaumont J in Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 574, that reg 5.03(1), in these circumstances, deems the applicant to have received the letter sent by the RRT by pre-paid post at the time specified, namely seven days from the date of the letter.  Beaumont J said this (at 581):

“Whatever literal differences there might be in the language [of s 478(1)(b) and reg 5.03], I am of the view that if the Act and the regulations, viewed (as they should be) as a single legislative plan, are read together, the clear purpose emerges that the operation of a deeming provision by which an applicant is deemed or taken to have received a document, must necessarily be equated with notification of the applicant of the document – in this case, the decision.”

37                  Mansfield J recognised (at 686) in Kumar that some decisions have held that an applicant is not “notified” of an RRT decision for the purposes of s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act unless he or she has been actually notified: Kamkar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 71 FCR 424 (North J); Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 386 (Merkel J).  Mansfield J pointed out, however, that reg 5.03(1), at the time these cases were decided, did not include the opening words “For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations”.  In his Honour’s view, the presence of these words means that reg 5.03(1) must be taken into account in determining when an applicant has been “notified” of a decision of the RRT for the purposes of s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act. 

38                  Mansfield J declined to follow dicta of Burchett J in Sook Rye Son v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 86 FCR 584 (FC), at 589-590, supporting the contrary view.  His Honour concluded that he should follow Susiatin as a case directly in point.  Not only did Mansfield J not consider the decision in Susiatin to be wrong, he thought it was correct.  In his opinion, the meaning of reg 5.03 was simply “intractable”. 

39                  I note that Burchett J subsequently reiterated his views in Minister v Mohammad, at 440, but the other members of the Full Court did not address the question.  I also note, for the sake of completeness, that the same result as in Kumar was reached in two other decisions of single Judges of the Court, although without reference to the authorities: Jayaweera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 395 (Heerey J); Chand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 428 (Mathews J).

40                  As the discussion in Kumar demonstrates, the course of authority in this Court on the relationship between reg 5.03 and s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act has not been entirely uniform.  In my view, the appropriate course is for me to follow the two reasoned decisions precisely in point, namely Susiatin and Kumar.  Those decisions of course concerned reg 5.03 in the form it took prior to the amendment which came into force on 1 July 2000.  But the amendment makes no difference to the reasoning in each case.  They remain precisely in point.

41                  I recognise, as Lee J did in Ayub v Minister at [36] that reg 5.03 when applied to s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act has the “capacity to work substantial injustice”.  I also recognise that different minds can differ (and indeed have differed) as to the questions of construction.  However, I do not regard the decisions as plainly wrong.

42                  I should add that I have not overlooked the judgment of Hely J in Uddin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 165 ALR 243, at 250-251, in which his Honour expressed a preference for Burchett J’s comments in Sook Rye Son over the approach of Beaumont J in Susiatin.  Uddin was decided shortly before Kumar, but was not referred to by Mansfield J.  However, Hely J was not specifically concerned with the relationship between s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act and reg 5.03(1), but with the application of reg 5.03 to s 426 (which obliges the RRT to notify an applicant that he or she is invited to appear before the RRT to give evidence).  Accordingly, his Honour’s comments were made in a different statutory context and were not directed to the precise issue resolved in Kumar.  See also Haddara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 166 ALR 401, at 407-408, per Lehane J.

43                  Not surprisingly, the applicant raised no issue as to the validity of reg 5.03 in its current form.  I have therefore not had the benefit of any argument on the question.  The validity of reg 5.03 in its current form was, however, argued in Chand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1743.  Moore J found it unnecessary to resolve the question, but expressed the view (at [4]) that the argument in support of invalidity was “untenable”.

44                  It is difficult, in my view, to see how reg 5.03 in its present form could render a right of review under the Migration Act nugatory.  A letter or document cannot now be deemed to be received the very date it was sent.  Regulation 5.03(1) in its present form only applies if the document is sent within three days of the date it bears.  The receipt of the document is taken to occur seven days after that date.  It is also difficult to see how the other problems identified in the majority judgment in Singh (at 90-91) could arise under the current reg 5.03.  There is therefore no basis for me to hold that reg 5.03 in its current form is invalid.  (I note that the majority in Singh appears to have incorrectly assumed, at two points in the judgment, that reg 5.03 deems receipt of a document to occur on the date of the document itself, rather than seven days after that date: see at 90 [46], 91 [49]: see Minister v Mohammad, at 458, per Marshall J.  Nothing turns on this for present purposes.)

45                  For these reasons, I conclude that the effect of reg 5.03(1) is that the applicant must be taken to have been notified of the RRT’s decision on 15 December 2000 for the purposes of s 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act.  This is so notwithstanding that, on the facts found by me, he was not actually notified of the decision until 12 January 2001.  The application to this Court was therefore filed outside the period specified by s 478(1)(b).  The Minister’s objection to competency must be upheld.

was the rrt’s decision correct?

46                  Since I have upheld the Minister’s objections to competency, it is not necessary to consider whether, had the application to this Court been filed within time, an order should be made setting aside the RRT’s decision.  I think it appropriate, nonetheless, to indicate what conclusion I would have reached on that issue had the objection to competency been overruled.

47                  As I have noted, Mr Johnson conceded that the RRT had made an error of law in assuming that reg 5.03, as amended on 1 July 2000, was in force in February 2000.  He submitted, however, that the error was immaterial because the RRT, if the matter were to be remitted to it, would be bound to conclude that the applicant’s agent received actual notification of the delegate’s decision shortly after 15 February 2000.  Section 53(6) of the Migration Act would then have the consequence, so he argued, that the notification is taken to have been received by the applicant at the time the agent received actual notification of the delegate’s decision.

48                  The RRT found that the applicant had provided the RRT with the address of his agent as his address for service.  The address so provided complied with the requirements of s  53(4) and (5) of the Migration Act see Chand v Minister, at [14], [15] per Moore J.  The RRT also found that the notice was sent by the case officer by certified mail to the correct address of the agent.  It follows that the notice was given in conformity with the requirements of reg 2.16(1)(c).  Moreover, in my view, it is implicit in the RRT’s reasoning that it found that the applicant’s agent actually received the notice sent by certified mail.  Otherwise, there would have been no point to the RRT’s comment that the notice had not been returned unclaimed, nor to its observation that neither the applicant nor his adviser had contended that the notice had not been received at the agent’s address.

49                  The RRT made no finding as to the date notice was actually received.  The reason for this omission is clear enough.  On the RRT’s analysis it was unnecessary  to specify the actual date of receipt, since it relied upon reg 5.03 to conclude that the deemed date of receipt was 22 February 2000.  But had the RRT recognised that it could not rely on reg 5.03 (because the regulation in that form was invalid), I think it inevitable that the RRT would have concluded on the material before it that the notice had been received by the applicant’s agent shortly after it was sent by certified mail on 15 February 2000.  The findings made by the RRT pointed strongly to this conclusion and there was no evidence to the contrary.  It is true that the applicant asserted that he had learned of the delegate’s decision only in late April, but his statutory declaration said nothing to indicate that his agent had not received the notice shortly after it had been sent to the agent by certified mail.

50                  Where the RRT’s reasons reveal an error of law, the normal course is to remit the matter so that the RRT can make the necessary factual findings to resolve the application.  However, if such an order would be futile because the RRT’s reasoning, or the material before the RRT, shows that it would reach the same result if the law had been applied correctly, it may be appropriate simply to dismiss the proceedings: Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550, at 560-61 per Sackville J.  The test is whether the error of law could have affected the outcome of the case: Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 76 FCR 513 (FC) at 519, per Burchett J.  In my opinion, for the reasons I have given, it has not been shown that the RRT’s error of law could have affected its decision that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the application for review of the delegate’s decision.  Accordingly, had the Minister’s objection to competency been overruled, I would have dismissed the applicant’s claim for relief.

51                  I have reached this conclusion without reference to the evidence given by the applicant in this Court.  It is not for the Court to make additional findings of fact in order to fill gaps left by the RRT.  It may be worth noting, however, that the applicant accepted in cross-examination that his agent had known for some time about the notice sent by the case officer, but had simply failed to tell him (the applicant) of its existence.  The applicant also acknowledged that the agent had known about the notice “when it wasn’t too late”, but had not passed on the information to the applicant.  Taken in context, I understood the applicant to be accepting that the agent did not tell him that the notice had been received until more than twenty-eight days had passed from the date of its actual receipt by the agent.

CONCLUSION

52                  The Minister’s objection to competency should be upheld.  The application should be dismissed, with costs.

Associate:

Dated:              14 June 2001

The Applicant was unrepresented.