FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Rural Press Ltd [1999] FCA 1847

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION v RURAL PRESS LIMITED (ACN 000 010 382), BRIDGE PRINTING OFFICE PTY LIMITED (ACN 007 547 024), IAN LAW, TREVOR McAULIFFE, WAIKERIE PRINTING HOUSE PTY LIMITED, PAUL TAYLOR and DARNLEY TAYLOR

S 56 OF 1999

MANSFIELD J

24 DECEMBER 1999

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR DECISION

1                     The applicant has brought proceedings under s 80of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“the Act”) alleging that the respondents have contravened ss 45 and 46 of the Act, or have been involved in contraventions of those provisions of the Act.  The hearing commenced on 8 December 1999.  The matter to which these reasons relate was argued on 6 December 1999, and I gave my ruling at the commencement of the hearing.  These are my reasons for that ruling.

2                     On 29 September 1999, the applicant filed its list of documents.  That list included a category described as records of confidential communications between the applicant and potential witnesses in respect of which it claimed client legal privilege.  There are twelve documents within that category which the fifth to seventh respondents claim should be produced for their inspection.  Those documents are described in the list of documents in the following way (using the numbering adopted by the applicant):

(1)               Original signed statement and attachments of a potential witness dated 4 May 1999 – Document 12-00027

(2)               Original signed statement and attachments of a potential witness dated 5 May 1999 – Document 12-00029

(3)               Original signed statement and attachments of potential witness dated 6 May 1999 – Document 12-00030

(4)               Original signed statement and attachments of potential witness dated 6 May 1999 – Document 12-00031

(5)               Copy witness statement – statement of potential witness and attachments dated 13 May 1999 – Document 12-00034

(6)                Copy signed statement of potential witness dated 31 August 1999 – Document 12-00041

(7)               Copy signed statement of potential witness dated 2 September 1999 – Document 12-00046

(8)               Original unsigned statement of potential witness of September 1999 – Document 12-00042

(9)                Additional evidence from potential witness dated 5 May 1999 – Document 12-00028.

The fifth to seventh respondents have requested the applicant to provide them with copies of those documents under s 157 of the Act.  The applicant has not complied with that request.  This application is made under s 157(3) of the Act.

3                     Section 157 of the Act is in the following terms:

“(1)   Where –

(a)                a corporation makes an application to the Commission under section 88, 91A, 91B or 91C; or

(b)                the Commission proposes the revocation of an authorization under subsection 91B(3) or the revocation of an authorization and the substitution of another authorization under subsection 91C(3); or

(c)                a proceeding is instituted against a corporation or other person under section 77, 80 or 81; or

(d)                an application is made under section 80A or sub-section 87(1A) or 87A(1) for an order against a corporation or other person;

the Commission shall, at the request of the corporation or other person and upon payment of the prescribed fee (if any), furnish to the corporation or other person –

(e)                a copy of every document that has been furnished to, or obtained by, the Commission in connexion with the matter to which the application, notice or proceeding relates and tends to establish the case of the corporation or other person; and

(f)                 a copy of any other document in the possession of the Commission that comes to the attention of the Commission in connexion with the matter to which the application, notice or proceeding relates and tends to establish the case of the corporation or other person;

not being a document obtained from the corporation or other person or prepared by an officer or professional adviser of the Commission.

(2)      If the Commission does not comply with a request under sub-section (1), the Court shall, subject to sub-section (3), upon the application by the corporation which, or other person who, made the request, make an order directing the Commission to comply with the request.

(3)      The Court may refuse to make an order under sub-section (2) in respect of a document or part of a document if the Court considers it inappropriate to make the order by reason that the disclosure of the contents of the document or part of the document would prejudice any person, or for any other reason.

(4)      Before the Court gives a decision on an application under sub-section (2), the Court may require any documents to be produced to it for inspection.

(5)      An order under this section may be expressed to be subject to conditions specified in the order.”

The Contentions

4                     The applicant contends that each of the documents in issue is a document prepared by an officer of the applicant, so that the exemption from the obligation to make production under s 157(1) of the Act applies.  It is accepted by the fifth to seventh respondents that, if each of the documents in issue were prepared by an officer of the applicant, then the exemption provided by subs (1) is an absolute one and that the Court has no power to order a production of those documents.  The fifth to seventh respondents contend that it is not established that any of the documents in issue were prepared by an officer of the applicant, and further that the documents are in reality documents prepared by the proposed witnesses rather than by officers of the applicant.

5                     The applicant contends, alternatively, that if the documents in issue, or any of them, are not exempt from being produced as documents prepared by an officer of the respondent, the Court should refuse to order production of the documents on the ground that it would be inappropriate to make that order.  That is because the documents are privileged from production on the ground of client legal privilege.  The fifth to seventh respondents dispute that the documents are privileged from production on the ground of client legal privilege because, of their very nature, they were not brought into existence for the sole purpose of the proceedings:  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 159 ALR 664.  They also contend that, even if the documents are within the scope of documents covered by client legal privilege, the Court nevertheless has a discretion to order their production under s 157(3).  They rely upon the decision in Arnotts Limited v Trade Practice Commission (No 1) (1989) 21 FCR 297 (“Arnotts”) to support that contention.  The fifth to seventh respondents submit, in effect, that any statements of witnesses which might be privileged from production on the ground of client legal privilege should, because of the context of s 157 of the Act, be the subject of an order for production in any event because the overriding purpose of s 157 is to ensure a fair hearing.  The applicant, whilst accepting that the Court will follow the decision in Arnotts, formally contends that there is no discretion in the Court to order the production of documents under s 157(3) if the documents are properly the subject of a claim for client legal privilege.  In any event, they argue, there are no grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion in the particular circumstances to order the production of the documents.  The applicant also contends that there is prejudice to the applicant if the documents are ordered to be produced, but no particular prejudice was deposed to in the affidavit evidence, and in submissions the only prejudice asserted was that the applicant might be obliged to produce documents which are the subject of client legal privilege, and which otherwise it is not obliged to produce for inspection.  No affidavit evidence suggests that any of the persons who have provided statements or information in the documents in issue desires to be anonymous, or that the disclosure of that person’s name or the contents of any statement might cause some prejudice to that person.

6                     The third matter argued was that, in any event, the fifth to seventh respondents had not established that any of the documents “tends to establish the case” of those respondents so as to enliven s 157(1)(e) or (f).  Accordingly, it contended that the request for their production was not a valid one under subs (1).  That is so, notwithstanding that the documents have been discovered as documents touching upon matters in issue between the parties to the proceedings, as containing statements of potential witnesses, and as being statements of potential witnesses not proposed to be presented by the applicant.

The evidence

7                     The evidence on this application shows that the applicant’s investigations into the conduct the subject of these proceedings commenced following its decision to do so on 22 May 1998.  On 30 October 1998, the applicant reviewed the investigations conducted up until that date, and directed that further specified steps and investigations be undertaken to pursue a potential action for breach of s 46 of the Act.  The minute of the Enforcement Committee of the applicant of that date does not direct that the matter be “prepared for litigating in Court” (as asserted in the affidavit relied upon by the applicant).  The documents in question came into existence only shortly prior to, or after, the commencement of this action on 14 July 1999.  Each of the documents is asserted by affidavit to have been brought into existence:

“(i)    at the request and/or on the advice of the Applicant’s legal advisers for the sole purpose of providing legal advice in respect of contemplated or pending proceedings; and/or

(ii)      after 30 October 1998 (see Discovered Document 5-00009) for the sole purpose of use in contemplated or pending proceedings.”

8                     Documents (1) to (8) referred to above is each said to be a document “… in the contemplated (and pending) proceedings which was physically prepared by” nominated staff members of the applicant.  Document (9) is described as a

“confidential document received from a potential witness in the contemplated proceedings provided in response to requests by ACCC staff or by the witness for incorporation, or possible incorporation, into a draft statement of evidence being in the course of physical preparation by ACCC staff members …”

9                     I do not consider that the claim to client legal privilege is satisfactorily expressed in the affidavit.  The expression in par 8 above is taken directly from the introductory words to schedule 12 to the list of documents, but that list covers a much longer period and many more documents.  The matters expressed in (i) and (ii) are said to be additional or alternative grounds, but there is no attempt to apply them separately to any one document.  In fact, all the documents in issue came into existence after 30 October 1998.  There has been no attempt to identify which of the documents was produced on the advice of the applicant’s legal advisers or how it is that each of those documents is said to be for the sole purpose of providing legal advice in respect of contemplated or pending proceedings.  The evidence shows that no decision to institute proceedings was made on 30 October 1998.  Investigations to determine whether or not to institute proceedings were carried out after that date.  Documents which are part of the applicant’s investigation materials need not be the subject of client legal privilege.

10                  In Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 689 (“Grant”), Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ said:

“… [the Court] needs to scrutinize with care claims of privilege made on the ground now under consideration.  It is for the party claiming privilege to show that the documents for which the claim is made are privileged.  He may succeed in achieving this objective by pointing to the nature of the documents or by evidence describing the circumstances in which they were brought into existence.  But it should not be thought that the privilege is necessarily or conclusively established by resort to any verbal formula or ritual.”

11                  In Somerville v Australian Securities Commission (1995) 131 ALR 517 (“Somerville”), Lindgren J at 549-550 was not prepared to accept an affidavit as to the purpose for which documents in question were brought into existence, where the affidavit was couched only in general terms by reference to the sole purpose test laid down in Grant.  His Honour preferred to rule on the claim to privilege based upon an analysis of the relevant statutory background and of the particular circumstances of the case.

Consideration of contentions

12                  It is convenient first to deal with a preliminary submission put by the fifth to seventh respondents.  They submitted that it is not shown that the documents were “prepared” by officers of the first respondent.  In my judgment, the argument that the persons involved in the preparation of the documents in issue were not officers of the applicant must fail.  The deponent of the affidavit relied upon by the applicant to support its claim for non production identifies herself as a senior investigation officer in the Adelaide regional office of the applicant.  When describing the persons who prepared or took the several statements, she identified the persons concerned, including herself, as “staff members”.  I am satisfied that the affidavits sufficiently identifies the persons so involved as to warrant the conclusion that they were officers of the applicant at material times.

13                  The question of whether documents of the present character were prepared by those officers of the applicant is a difficult one.  Perhaps surprisingly, the question has not previously been directly addressed so far as my researches and those of counsel have discovered.  The question was however addressed by Bowen CJ in Trade Practices Commission v T.N.T. Management Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 219 (“T.N.T. Management”) in a general way.  The nature of the documents then in issue does not appear from the report.  It does not suggest that the documents then in issue were statements from potential witnesses.  In that case, the former Chief Justice found that the documents had their physical source in an officer of the then Trade Practices Commission.  His Honour then considered the context of s 157 of the Act, and said (at 224) that its intention:

“… is that a corporation is to be given fair treatment, in the sense that it is to be given copies of documents which the Commission has and which would, speaking broadly, support the Corporation’s case.  This may be compared with the obligation placed upon a prosecutor, who knows of a credible witness who can supply material facts which tend to show an accused is innocent, to make the witness or his statement available to the defence.”  [References omitted]

14                  I respectfully agree with his Honour’s remarks.  Section 157 also appears to endeavour to strike a balance between achieving that intention on the one hand, and to preserve from production working documents of the applicant on the other.  Because the applicant’s functions and powers under the Act include significant powers of investigation of possible contraventions of the Act, and because documents may be prepared for consideration by the applicant, its internal documents prepared in the course of an investigation may not satisfy the sole purpose test to fall under the aegis of client legal privilege:  see Grant.  Nevertheless, s 157 clearly intends that those internal working documents of the applicant should be so shielded from production.  They would clearly fall within the category of documents prepared by an officer of the applicant.  They may be briefing notes, summaries or precisof evidence, commentaries, reports or internal memoranda.  They may contain a variety of material.  They may simply contain a precis of the statements or quotations of statements of proposed witnesses on a particular topic, for ease of reference or for submission to the applicant, or for other purposes.  The other limb of the exemption appears to be based upon the fact that it should not be necessary for the applicant to produce to a corporation or other person documents produced to the applicant by that corporation or other person.

15                  The documents in question, other than document (9), on the evidence were physically prepared by an officer of the applicant.  However, they may also have been “prepared” by the person who provided the information, at least in the case of those documents which are signed by the potential witness.  Counsel for the applicant acknowledged that, in certain circumstances, a document may be “prepared” by two persons.  A witness statement may be prepared by a witness providing in writing that statement.  It may be prepared by the witness providing answers to questions asked by an officer of the applicant, who then either records the questions and answers verbatim or who composes the information provided into a narrative form.  It may be prepared by the witness dictating the proposed statement to an officer of the applicant who is really acting as an amanuensis.  The signing of the document, when prepared, may also have some significance.  In R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260, the court ruled that the transcript, or parts of the transcript, of an examination conducted in a separate proceeding could not be tendered by the accused in the course of a criminal trial.  Cox J at 263, and Duggan J at 266, both concluded that a written statement, if not actually made by the witness, must have been verified by the witness in some way before it can be described as a previous statement “reduced into writing” to constitute a previous statement made by that person in writing, or reduced into writing.  It was necessary for the witness in those circumstances to have written the statement or to have signed it, or in some other way to have authenticated it, for it to be admissible under s 29 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (“the Evidence Act”).

16                  In T.N.T. Management, Bowen CJ appears to some extent to have anticipated such issues.  His Honour said (at 225):

In my opinion the words “prepared by an officer … of the Commission” refer to a document which has been drawn up by the officer, whether or not any particular contribution of ideas is evident in the contents of it.  This appears to be the ordinary meaning of the word “prepare” in relation to writings or documents.  It is consistent with the position in other fields of the law.  [References omitted]

It is true that if this interpretation is correct it would mean that where a person telephoned the Commission and proceeded to relate facts which would tend to prove the innocence of the corporation and this conversation was recorded in a memorandum by an officer of the Commission, it would not have to be made available under s. 157, whereas if the same person wrote a letter to the Commission setting out the facts favourable to the corporation, this letter would have to be made available.  On the other hand, if something more than physical authorship is required, it is difficult to define where the line should be drawn.  Whatever test would have to be applied it would seem to lead to an awkward inquiry into the intellectual contribution of the officer.  The inquiry might be not unlike that which takes place in determining whether a work is an original literary work entitled to copyright.”

Those observations appear to have been referred to with approval by the Full Court (Bowen CJ, Beaumont and Gummow JJ) in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (No 1) (1989) 21 FCR 297 at 302 (“Arnotts”).

17                  His Honour’s example of the telephone conversation touches upon the present issue.  The evidence does not disclose how the documents in issue were prepared by officers of the applicant.  Some may have been prepared by the giving of telephone instructions.  However, the evidence is clear that the documents (other than document (9) listed above) were physically prepared by officers of the applicant.  I also respectfully agree with the observations of the former Chief Justice that it is not necessary for any such document to involve some element of intellectual activity to fall within the protection.  The difficulties involved in such an inquiry are evident.  Nonetheless, the compilation of data may involve some element of intellectual activity.  It could not have been intended that an enquiry into the degree of intellectual activity involved in the preparation of a document by an officer of the applicant was contemplated by the simple expression “prepared by an officer” of the applicant.  Such an inquiry would not serve that purpose of s 157 which is to protect the applicant’s internal working papers from production, even if they are not truly the subject of client legal privilege.  The word “prepare” is defined in the Macquarie Concise Dictionary (2 ed, page 773) as “to make ready, or put in due condition, for something”.  The measure of its scope is the act of physical preparation or creation.

18                  Counsel for the fifth to seventh respondents referred to R v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 (“Calabria”) (reversed on other grounds by the High Court in R v Calabria (1983) 151 CLR 670).  There a solicitor had taken a statement from a potential witness in the nature of alibi evidence for the purposes of defending criminal proceedings.  The potential witness died before trial.  The accused sought to tender the statement under s 45b(2) of the Evidence Act.  It provides:

“A document shall not be admitted in evidence under this section where the court is not satisfied that the person by whom, or at whose direction, the document was prepared could, at the time of the preparation of the document, have deposed to his own knowledge to the statement that is contained or implicit in, or may be inferred from, the contents of the document.”

19                  The learned trial judge took the view that the person by whom or at whose direction the statement was prepared was not the deceased potential witness but the solicitor.  However, on appeal, King CJ at 430 described that view as involving a “misunderstanding of the section”.  His Honour said at 431 that the person referred to in the subsection must:

“… be the maker of the statement contained in the document.  The phrase “person by whom” is used to describe the maker of the statement who also prepares the document containing it.  The phrase “or at whose direction” is used to describe the maker of the statement where the statement is made knowing that some other person is recording or is likely to record it in a document.”

20                  It was urged that the same approach should be adopted in relation to s 157 of the Act.  However, the physical preparation of the document by an officer of the applicant does not mean that the statement also may not be the product of the potential witness concerned.  I have discussed above the possibility that a witness statement may be “prepared” by two persons, because that word may be used in different contexts.  The purpose of provisions such as s 45b(2) is to facilitate the admissibility of a document in circumstances where the maker of the document is deceased.  It is not frustrated because the document may also have been prepared by an officer of the applicant.  In the circumstances of Calabria, it was physically prepared by the solicitor, but also, for the purposes of s 45b(2), prepared by or at the direction of the deceased witness.  Calabria does not, in my judgment, support the conclusion that a document cannot be the product of some other person in some other legislative context to qualify as a document prepared by an officer of the applicant under s 157 of the Act.

21                  For the reasons given, I consider that the documents in issue, other than document (9) above, are documents prepared by an officer or officers of the applicant because, on the evidence, they were physically prepared or created by such officers.  It is evident that s 157 therefore does not necessarily lead to a corporation or other person against whom proceedings are brought under the Act being afforded fair treatment in the sense described by Bowen CJ in T.N.T. Management (at 224).  The applicant may be entitled to withhold a statement of evidence of a material witness, even if that information may tend to establish the case of a respondent corporation or other person, if that statement was physically prepared by an officer of the corporation or other person.  This should be compared with the obligation of disclosure upon the prosecution in criminal proceedings:  Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163; R v Mills [1998] 1 Cr App R 43.  However, in my view, that is a consequence of balancing the respective interests of the applicant and the corporation or other person against whom proceedings under the Act have been instituted.

22                  Accordingly, I conclude that the Court has no power under s 157(2) of the Act to direct the production of the documents (1)–(8) listed above.  The applicant acknowledged in submissions that document (9) is not of the same character.  Given its description in the list of documents and in the evidence, I find that document (9) was not a document prepared by an officer of the applicant.

23                  It should be mentioned that, on this application, no point was taken regarding the documents which formed attachments to documents (1)-(5) listed above.  I have assumed that those documents, if they are not otherwise exempt from being produced, have been made available to the respondents.

24                  In Arnotts, the Full Court determined that s 157 did not abrogate the client legal privilege of the applicant in documents which properly attracted that privilege.  It specifically decided, however, that the Court is empowered, but not obliged, to refuse to make an order under s 157(2) of the Act in respect of a document which is the subject of client legal privilege.  It further decided that the Court’s power to refuse to make such an order is derived from s 157(3) of the Act.  The Court said (at 304):

“However, the Court may refuse to make any order in respect of a document or part of a document if it considers it inappropriate to do so, because such disclosure would “prejudice any person” (a phrase which includes but is not confined to the Commission) or “for any other reason”.  One such reason, in our view, would be the legal professional privilege which the Commission otherwise would enjoy against disclosure.  In this way, the doctrine of legal professional privilege is accommodated rather than abrogated by the scheme of s 157.  If, in a given case, the Court orders disclosure (without or subject to conditions) despite what otherwise would be the operation of the privilege, then to that extent and in that particular situation the common law privilege of the Commission has been qualified or diminished by the order of the Court in exercise of its statutory powers.

By qualifying or diminishing the scope of the Commission’s common law privilege on the one hand and by affording the Commission an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice or other reason in a particular case, on the other hand, the legislative scheme contained in s 157 achieves an appropriate balance of the respective interests involved.”

25                  The Court’s reference to the respective interests involved will include that a corporation is to be given fair treatment in that it is to be given documents which the applicant has and which would support the corporation’s case in the sense of tending to establish that case.

26                  It is clear that witness statements prepared for the sole purpose of legal proceedings are the subject of client legal privilege:  Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 487; A-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (1992) 38 FCR 452; Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63.  The formulaic claim to client legal privilege asserted in the affidavit relied upon does not satisfy me that the version (whether the original or a copy) of document (9) listed above falls within that category of documents.  I have had regard to the date of that document.  It is not clear when the decision to institute these proceedings was made.  I have borne in mind the observations of Lockhart J in Somerville at 525-526 as follows:

“Fundamental to legal professional privilege is the notion that the privilege is that of the client (or others with whom the client has a common interest in the litigation, a matter to which I shall return), being a client in a solicitor/client relationship.  Only confidential communications which are referable to the solicitor/client relationship enjoy the protection of legal professional privilege.  There is no client with respect to litigation commenced by the Commission in the name of a person pursuant to s 50 until the proceeding has begun or at least until the decision has been made by the Commission to commence the proceeding.  Before then the Commission is pursuing its investigative function under the ASC Law and the Corporations Law.  …

The Commission’s investigations may or may not result in criminal or civil proceedings being instituted by the Commission.  Documents brought into existence may attract public interest immunity, but they do not attract legal professional privilege under the litigation limb.”

27                  I have considered the evidence of the decision making processes of the applicant.  The fact that the provider of the statement was responding to requests by staff of the applicant (if that be the case) is consistent with the document being sought as part of the applicant’s investigative processes or only as material potentially to be adduced at the hearing.  It is not clear whether that document was provided in response to a request made by the exercise of some power under the Act, or informally.  The affidavit is hard to understand.  It suggests the document may have been provided in response to a request “by ACCC staff or by the witness”.  In Somerville, Lindgren J at 547 discussed when documents are brought into existence for “use in litigation” (the expression used in Grant at 683).  His Honour referred to several possible purposes for which the documents then under consideration may have come into existence.  He included the performance of statutory functions in the public interest which were broader than the exercise of the power to institute and maintain proceedings.  As his Honour pointed out, documents brought into existence in the course of an investigation for the purpose of deciding whether to institute proceedings, as well as for use in the potential proceedings if that occasion arose, do not attract client legal privilege:  National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648.  On the evidence, that may also have been the case with respect to document (9) listed above.  Accordingly, I am not satisfied that that document meets the sole purpose test required by Grant.  The applicant did not advance any other reason for the Court’s refusal to make an order under s 157(3) in respect of that document.

28                  Even if document (9) listed above is the subject of client legal privilege, in these circumstances I would not exercise the power to refuse to order the applicant to comply with the request for its production.  As stated in Arnotts, I have a discretion whether to do so.  I have taken into account that one purpose of s 157 is that the respondents be given fair treatment in the way explained above.  I have also taken into account the nature of the document itself.  It is within a category of information which typically is provided to the defence in the case of criminal prosecutions:  Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 at 668.  There is, as I have found, no particular prejudice to the applicant by allowing the respondents to inspect the documents.  Indeed its inspection may assist the fulfilment of the overall interests of justice in reaching a fair and proper result in the proceedings.  No prejudice to any other person has been asserted.

29                  Logically, an early question to be addressed on this application was whether the documents in issue are documents in connection with the principal proceeding and which tend “to establish the case of” the fifth to seventh respondents.  The argument proceeded largely upon the basis that the documents did have that character, so the main focus was upon whether the documents were prepared by officers of the applicant.  The parties addressed the question whether the documents had that tendency as a subsidiary issue.  It is really no more than a question of fact.  The evidence is sparse.  As Bowen CJ noted in T.N.T. Management (at 222), there is an onus on the fifth to seventh respondents as this is their application to satisfy the Court that the documents fell within that description, but their capacity to give evidence on the topic is very limited.  They do not know who has provided the statements, or their contents.  The applicant has provided no information as to their contents, in particular as to the source or content of document (9) listed above.  In T.N.T. Management, Bowen CJ said at 225-226 that the words “tends to establish the case” of the corporation or other person

“… do not mean that the documents must tend to place the case of the corporation beyond dispute.  It is, I consider, sufficient if the document supports the case of the corporation and so tends to establish that case (see generally, Vines v. Djordjevitch (1955) 91 C.L.R. 512).  Although the word “tends” gives the phrase a wide ambit, the word “establish” has a narrowing effect.  In my view a document which might suggest some line of inquiry which could be of assistance to a corporation in conducting its case, does not answer the description of a document which tends to establish that case.”

and later at 226 his Honour said:

“In my opinion, …, if a document tends to impeach the plaintiff’s case, it tends to establish the defendant’s case within the meaning of the section.”

30                  I infer from the description of document (9) listed above, in particular, that it is evidence from a potential witness and that its contents are directly material to some matters in issue in these proceedings.  It is unclear whether the “additional material” is material not included in a witness statement of a witness who the applicant proposed to call on other matters, or whether the “additional material” led to the decision not to call the potential witness at all, or whether for other reasons the decision was made not to call the potential witness.  The fifth to seventh respondents cannot provide information on those matters.  The applicant has not done so.  In these circumstances I also infer that document (9) listed above, in the sense described by Bowen CJ in T.N.T. Management, is a document which tends to establish the case of the fifth to seventh respondents.

31                  Accordingly, pursuant to s 157(2) of the Act, I direct the applicant to comply with the request of the fifth to seventh respondents made on 17 November 1999 in respect of document (9) listed above.

32                  Since these reasons were prepared, the High Court in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67 has determined that the sole purpose test for client legal privilege as discussed in Grant is not the proper test to determine whether a communication is protected from disclosure by reason of client legal privilege.  That decision does not affect this ruling.

Associate:

Dated:              24 December 1999