FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ADMIRALTY – Admiralty Rules rr 52 and 53 - application for release of vessel from arrest – whether at commencement of arrest proceedings Federal Court had jurisdiction to arrest vessel – whether South Pacific Shipping (“South Pacific”) was demise charterer – whether demise sub-charterer was terminated by letter prior to time when proceedings for arrest were instituted – cancellation of charterparty by withdrawal of ship – repudiation of the charterparty by non-payment of hire - acceptance of repudiation by letter – history of non-payment of hire as required by charterparty – whether notice is necessary for effective acceptance of repudiation in circumstances where there is no strict insistence on timely payment.
Admiralty Rules rr 52, 53
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3(1), (2), 18
Patrick Stevedores No 2 Pty Limited v The Ship MV “Turakina” (Tamberlin J, unreported 11 May 1998), followed
Etablissements Chainbaux v Harbormasters Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 303, distinguished
Michael Realty Pty Ltd v Carr [1977] 1 NSWLR 553, cited
Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation Limited v Citati [1957] 2 QB 401, distinguished
K E Lindgren, Time in the Performance of Contracts, par 424
J W Carter, Breach of Contract, 2nd edn (1991) par 924
WAITEMATA STEVDORING SERVICES LIMITED v
THE SHIP “RANGITATA” and ECOMAR-SCHIFFARHTS GMBH & CO LIMITED
NG 115 OF 1998
TAMBERLIN J
SYDNEY
15 JULY 1998
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
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NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY IN ADMIRALTY |
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BETWEEN: |
WAITEMATA STEVEDORING SERVICES LIMITED PLAINTIFF
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AND: |
THE SHIP "RANGITATA" First DEFENDant
ECOMAR-SCHIFFARHTS GmbH & CO KG Second defendant
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DATE OF ORDER: |
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WHERE MADE: |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application for release be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
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NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY IN ADMIRALTY |
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BETWEEN: |
WAITEMATA STEVEDORING SERVICES LIMITED plaintiff
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AND: |
First defendant
ECOMAR-SCHIFFARHTS GMBH & CO KG Second defendant
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JUDGE: |
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DATE: |
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PLACE: |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ecomar-Schiffarhts GmbH & Co Kg (“the owner”), a German corporate entity, has applied for release of The Ship “Rangitata” (“the ship”) from arrest by the Court.
The ship was arrested in Melbourne by the Court on 19 February 1998, pursuant to an application made by Waitemata Stevedoring Services Limited (“Waitemata”) in order to recover monies claimed to be owing for stevedoring services.
By bareboat charter, dated 10 June 1996, the ship had been chartered by way of sub-demise charterparty by Deil Shipping BV (“Deil”), a Dutch corporation, to South Pacific Shipping Ltd (“South Pacific”), a New Zealand corporation.
The release application is made pursuant to r 52 of the Admiralty Rules, which relevantly provides:
“Release from arrest by the Court
52(1) A party to a proceeding may apply to the court in accordance with Form 19 for the release of a ship or other property that is under arrest in the proceeding.
(2) …
(3) On an application under subrule (1), the court may order the release from arrest of the ship or property on such terms as are just.”
The basis for the application is that the Court had no jurisdiction to arrest the vessel because at the time the arrest proceeding was commenced South Pacific was not a “relevant person” under s 18 of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”), which provides:
“Right to proceed in rem on demise charterer’s liabilities
18. Where, in relation to a maritime claim concerning a ship, a relevant person:
(a) was, when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer, or in possession or control, of the ship; and
(b) is, when the proceeding is commenced, a demise charterer of the ship;
a proceeding on the claim may be commenced as an action in rem against the ship.” (Emphasis added)
Section 3(1) of the Act defines “relevant person”, in relation to a maritime claim, to mean a person who would be liable on the claim in a proceeding commenced as an action in personam.
Section 3(2) of the Act provides:
“A reference in this Act to the time when a proceeding is commenced is a reference to the time when the initiating process in relation to the proceeding is filed, or issued by, a court.”
The point raised for decision, shortly stated, is that at the time when proceedings were instituted and the ship was arrested, namely at about 2.30 pm on 19 February 1998, South Pacific was no longer a “demise charterer” of the ship because the demise charter had been terminated some hours prior to that time. The bases on which the demise charterer is claimed to have been terminated are twofold.
The first basis is that the charterparty was cancelled, pursuant to its terms, by withdrawal of the ship from the charterparty on the ground of non-payment of hire. This will be referred to as the “cancellation” ground.
The second basis is that prior to commencement of the arrest proceedings, South Pacific had repudiated the charterparty and the repudiation had been accepted by Deil. Notification of acceptance of the repudiation, it is said, had been given to South Pacific by letter dated 18 February 1998 from Deil. This will be referred to as the “repudiation” ground.
The charterparty between Deil and South Pacific included the following clause:
“10 (a) Hire
The charterer shall pay to the owners for the hire of the vessel at the lump sum per fourteen days as indicated in Box 21, commencing on and from the date and hour of her delivery to the Charterers…Hire to continue until the date and hour when the Vessel is redelivered by the Charterers to her Owners.
…
(e) Time
Time shall be of the essence in relation to payment of Hire hereunder. In default of payment beyond a period of seven running days, the Owners shall have the right to withdraw the Vessel from the service of the Charterers without noting any protest and without interference by any court or any other formality whatsoever, and without prejudice to any other claim the Owners may otherwise have against the Charters under the Charter, be entitled to damages in respect of all costs and losses incurred as a result of the Charterers’ default and the ensuring withdrawal of the Vessel. (Emphasis added)
Charterparties
As noted earlier, the applicant for release is a German corporation, which is the owner of the ship. In June 1996, the ship was the subject of a demise charter and a series of sub-demise charters culminating in the relevant sub-demise charter which was from Deil to South Pacific. The sequence of the charterparties was as follows.
On 26 June 1996, a demise charter of the ship was entered into between the owner and Tim Navigation Limited (“Tim Navigation”) which immediately subchartered by way of demise to Pantigua Navigation Limited (“Pantigua”). On the same day a charterparty was then entered into between Pantigua and Deil, which in turn subchartered to South Pacific. The Deil sub-demise charter is dated 10 June 1996. Mr Löwer, who gave evidence for the owner, was unable to explain the circumstances which gave rise to the discrepancy between the dates of the sub-demise charter agreements. He thought that it was simply a matter of filing. However, nothing turns on this discrepancy in dates for present purposes. The reason for having the chain of demise charterparties was said by Mr Löwer to include taxation considerations.
There was, during relevant periods, a considerable degree of inter-relation between the various parties to the charterparties. Mr Löwer, at material times, was a director of Tim Navigation and Pantigua and he had held these offices since 1993. Since October 1992, he had been a shareholder of Deil and he held power of attorney, which gave him a legal right to act on behalf of Deil. This power of attorney included a power to terminate contracts. He had been a shareholder in Tim Navigation and he originally held a 50% interest in Deil. On or about 18 February 1998, he agreed with the other shareholder, Mr Buck, to “take over” the other 50% interest in Deil. Mr Buck, in addition to being a director of Deil, was also a director of Pantigua and South Pacific.
On or about 18 February 1998, Mr Löwer on behalf of the related entities, signed and sent letters of termination in respect of each of the charters comprising the chain outlined above. Prior to writing these letters he had received advice from his New Zealand solicitor. In oral evidence Mr Löwer agreed that one of the reasons for terminating the charter was to try to ensure that ships in the ownership of the German owner would not be arrested. However, he asserted that the main reason for termination was that he considered, that by that date, any further payment of charter hire would not be forthcoming and he had to fulfil his obligations to the shareholders in the ship-owning companies.
Mr Löwer, in addition to the above duties, also performed the role of “legal manager” of the owner. His company Löwer Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG, as “legal manager” of the owner, acts as a general partner and manages all the business affairs of the owner.
The termination letter signed by Mr Löwer, sent by Deil to South Pacific, was in the following terms:
“ …
M/V “Rangitata” – Charterparty dated 10 June 1996
Pursuant to clause 10 of the above charterparty, charter hire is payable by you every 14 days in the amounts referred to in rider clause 35. We note that hire monies have now remained unpaid for more than 60 days.
In the circumstances, we have no alternative but to terminate the charterparty. Termination is effective immediately. Underwriters and relevant regulatory authorities are being advised accordingly,
Without prejudice to the timing and effect of this notice, please direct your master and crew to bring the ship into its anticipated next port of call. Upon arrival, we as disponent owners will be redelivering the ship to beneficial owners, whose representative will make contact with the master to attend to necessary aspects of redelivery.
In the meantime, and in terns of the other provisions of the charterparty, all of the beneficial owners’ and disponent owners’ rights and remedies are hereby expressly reserved.
Yours faithfully
…”
On the same day letters in substantially similar terms were sent from Tim Navigation to Pantigua and from Pantigua to Deil purporting to terminate the sub-demise charters. In its letter to Pantigua, Tim Navigation stated that it wrote on behalf of the owner with “full power of attorney”. The owner also wrote to South Pacific in these terms:
“…
We, beneficial owners of the abovenamed ship, note, that your charter of the abovenamed ship, pursuant to charterparty dated 10 June 1996, has been terminated by Deil Shipowners b.v. (disponent owners) for non-payment of charter hire.
Pending the exercise by owners and disponent owners of any rights and remedies which may arise against you under the charterparty or otherwise, please advise what, if any proposals you have for payment of the outstanding charter hire, or whether you are in a position to consider re-employment of the ship on some other basis acceptable to the owners.
Yours faithfully
…”
South Pacific was incorporated under New Zealand law on 28 January 1992. It traded from offices at Christchurch. It ceased trading on 19 February 1998, after it had been placed into voluntary liquidation by special resolution of shareholders at that date. At the time it ceased to carry on business it operated seven vessels that carried freight between Australia and New Zealand. In addition, it had two vessels operating on a time charter basis from Tasman Express Line, which had been cancelled on 19 February 1998.
The capital of South Pacific at the time it ceased trading was $7,750,000 and its principal shareholder was Mr Löwer who held 53.6% of the shares. Mr Löwer was appointed director on 20 May 1992 and resigned on 18 February 1998.
According to a liquidator’s report prepared by Mr Gary Traveller of Price Waterhouse, dated 5 March 1998, the estimated total deficiency in the assets of the company was in excess of NZD40 million, subject to costs of administration.
On the fifth page of his report Mr Traveller states:
“We expect to receive a substantial claim from companies related to the shareholders of South Pacific Shipping Limited. We summarise below the liabilities recorded in management accounts as at 31 December 1997 to shareholders and related parties.
Shareholder and Related Party Loans
Related Party Loans – Subordinated $ 9,715,751
Charter hire $12,849,023
Related Party Loans – Other $ 951,388
Balances at 31 December 1997 ($ 23,516,162)
Provisional amounts due to third party trade creditors amount to some $9.45 million. In addition, unsecured staff claims for redundancy etc are estimated to be $1.6m.”
The liquidators note from their “limited review” of the financial results of the company that it was clear that the business had never been profitable. The company had only been able to continue trading due to related parties not requiring payment of significant charter hire on the vessels operated. The company had never reported any profits since incorporation and accumulated losses at 30 June 1997 of NZD33.7 million. Its net losses over the period for financial years 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 were between NZD6 and 7.48 million. As at 5 March 1998, the liquidators estimated that there may be a small dividend available to unsecured creditors of between 3 and 7 cents in the dollar but that this would depend upon a number of contingencies.
Evidence given by Mr Traveller was that the initial capital of the company was NZD1.5 million approximately, which was later increased to NZD7.75 million in 1994. He considered that as at February 1998, a cash injection of NZD6 million would have been necessary to enable South Pacific to deal with its immediate creditors but that even if this occurred it would still continue to incur significant debts. In his view, without a substantial cash injection in the order of six million dollars, the company would be unable to pay its debts even over a period of 60 days. There was no suggestion in the evidence that any such advance was possible.
Payment History
Mr Löwer caused a search to be made of the accounting records of Deil in order to ascertain the indebtedness of South Pacific to Deil for charter of hire fees. That search indicated that the last payment of charter hire fees by South Pacific to Deil for the charter was made on 5 December 1997, and that no further payments had been received since that time. He attached to his affidavit a copy of a statement of unpaid charter fees owing to Deil by South Pacific. This showed that the first ten payments due under the charter had been transferred to loans and had not been paid. The charterparty provided for payment of charter hire money, partly in DM and partly in NZD. The figures indicate, in respect of the period 25 November 1996 to 21 March 1997, that some payments were made but they were many months in arrears. In respect of hire monies due or after 4 April 1997, it appears that there had been no payments. The most recently recorded payment was that of 5 December 1997, and this was in respect of hire due as at 21 March 1997. The evidence was that apart from some general telephone calls from Mr Löwer, no action was taken to collect outstanding fees and it is clear that prompt payment of the hire charges was never insisted upon. In cross-examination, Mr Löwer agreed that he did not ask anyone at South Pacific when charter fees would be paid for specific vessels in the fleet. No payment had been made in respect of amounts falling due between 4 April 1997 and 18 February 1998. No complaints were made as to non-payment because “Deil was a related party”.
Sequence of Events
Evidence was led for the owner from Mr Sharrock, a marine surveyor, to the effect that at about 12.00 pm on 19 February 1998, he went on board the ship and hand delivered four documents to the Master. These documents included notice of termination from the owner to the Master. The Master, Captain Cooke signed an acknowledgment dated 19 February 1998 to that effect that he had received the documents. Between 12.30 pm and 1.00 pm on 19 February 1998, Mr Sharrock notified Patrick Stevedoring that the bareboat charterparty was terminated on 18 February 1998. In that time period he also contacted an employee of the Port Shipping Services Pty Ltd, the agents for South Pacific and notified them the demise charter had been terminated on 18 February 1998. The arrest proceedings were filed at 2.30 pm on 19 February 1998.
The resolution to wind-up
Expert evidence was filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the second defendant as to the effect of a voluntary liquidation under New Zealand law in relation to the operation of the then existing employment contracts with the crew. It is not necessary to canvass that evidence in detail because Mr Stubbs, the solicitor who gave evidence on behalf of the owner, accepted in cross-examination that a voluntary winding-up of a company does not, by itself, automatically terminate employment contracts made with the company under New Zealand law.
Cancellation ground
The case for the owner is that the letter of 18 February 1998 from Deil to South Pacific operated pursuant to cl 10(e) of the charterparty to withdraw the vessel from the charter. Counsel for the owner submits that, therefore, as at the commencement of the arrest proceeding on 19 February 1998, South Pacific was no longer a demise charterer of the ship and therefore was not “a relevant person” for the purpose of s 18 of the Act. The principal submission and subsidiary arguments advanced in this matter in relation to this aspect of the case are substantially similar to those put forward in the case of Patrick Stevedores No 2 Pty Limited v The Ship MV “Turakina” (unreported 11 May 1998). The demise charterparties in that case and the present were in the same terms. In my judgment in that case, I did not accept the above line of argument and for the reasons given by me in that proceeding. I reject the submissions put forward on cancellation of the contract and withdrawal of the ship in the present case. My reasons in that judgment largely turned on the important distinction between a charterparty by demise and one which is made otherwise than by demise, such as a time charterparty or a voyage charterparty.
Although there is a line of authority to support the proposition that clauses similar to cl 10(e) can operate in relation to a time charter, such a clause does not, in my opinion, operate in the case of a demise charter because redelivery of possession of the vessel is required in the case of the demise charter and that had not taken place. I also rejected an argument that the employment contracts of the crew members had been terminated as a consequence of the resolution to wind up South Pacific. The reasons are more fully set out in the earlier decision.
Repudiation
In Patrick Stevedores No 2 Pty Limited v The Ship MV “Turakina”(supra) no argument was made to the effect that the charterparty had been lawfully terminated as a consequence of an acceptance by the owner of the repudiation by South Pacific, arising from the non-payment of hire as required by the charterparty. However, in the present case, that submission was advanced and developed in detail, in addition to the earlier submission based on cancellation and withdrawal pursuant to the terms of the Charterparty.
In the present case, the owner submits that by not paying hire charges, South Pacific had repudiated the demise charter. It is said that Deil was, therefore, entitled to terminate the charterparty without any notice prior to the letter of 18 February 1998.
In support of its argument the owner relies on the judgment of Devlin J in Etablissements Chainbaux v Harbormasters Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 303. That case concerned a contract for the sale of marine engines. The contract arose from an exchange of correspondence passing between the buyer and seller during June and July 1951. The contract called for payment in sterling by irrevocable letter of credit to be opened in London within a few weeks of the contract date.
On 22 October 1951, by which date no letter of credit had been established, the seller without any prior notice informed the buyer that it would not deliver the goods and that it considered the contract had been terminated. No engines had been delivered. The sellers, in terminating the contract, relied on the protracted delay that had previously occurred with respect to establishment of the letter of credit. A question arose as to whether the sellers were entitled to terminate without notice, having regard to previous correspondence between the parties concerning the difficulties which the buyer was experiencing in obtaining the required amount of sterling to cover the purchase.
As at 22 October 1951, his Lordship found there was no reasonable prospect of the French buyer obtaining the necessary amount of sterling currency until the end of the year. In these circumstances he held that the contract had been lawfully terminated by the seller. He considered that by 22 October 1951, a reasonable time for establishing the letter of credit had expired and that it was not necessary to give prior notice of intention to terminate because it was evident that any reasonable extension of time, such as 14 days or a month, would not have availed the buyers. His Lordship said at 313:
“…but the broad principle seems to me to be this, that if the defendant can show that if had granted a reasonable time it would have availed the plaintiff nothing at all, then the omission to make provision for reasonable time in the contract becomes irrelevant and does not defeat the defendant’s claim that it is a good notice terminating the contract.”
In the present case the owner says that this principle is applicable and that no prior notice was required by Deil before terminating the demise charterparty with South Pacific. This is said to be so because it was apparent on the evidence that by 18 February 1998, South Pacific was hopelessly insolvent that it could not pay the outstanding hire within a reasonable time.
The Chainbaux decision was referred to by Glass J in Michael Realty Pty Ltd v Carr [1977] 1 NSWLR 553 at 567. However, the reference is simply a passing one wherein his Honour observes that before the principle can operate time must have been an essential stipulation. See also the discussion by K Lindgren in Time in the Performance of Contracts par 424 and in Carter, Breach of Contract, 2nd edn (1991) at par 924.
In my view, the Chainbaux judgment does not advance the owner’s case. The gravamen of the decision in that case was that no useful purpose would be served by fixing a reasonable time for payment in circumstances where the letter of credit clearly could not have been established within any reasonable time. In that case it was evident throughout the period of the contract that the seller was insisting on the method of payment called for by the contract. For example, in August and September 1951, the seller had refused to accept an alternative proposal that payment be made by cheque. This insistence is further apparent from a letter of 11 October 1991, noting the assurance by the buyer that a letter of credit would be obtained. There was no suggestion of the seller refraining from exercising its rights because the buyer was a related party.
By way of contrast, in the present case, it cannot be said that there was any insistence on payment of any specific amount of hire due in respect of The “Rangitata” in the form of action or correspondence. The periods of total non-compliance were lengthy and repeated. For example, the payment due on 29 November 1996 was not made until 11 July 1997. The payment due on 27 December 1996 was not paid until 30 September 1997 and the payment which fell due on 21 March 1997 was not made until 5 December 1997. No payment was ever made in respect of instalments due to be paid between March 1997 and February 1998. During those periods there is no evidence of any specific insistence on payment of those amounts.
The extent of the non-compliance was substantially greater than that referred to in the Chainbaux case. Moreover, given the history of massive losses, there is no indication that as at 21 March 1997 there was any reasonable prospect that any further payments could be made by South Pacific. However, the distinguishing feature in the present case is that there is no suggestion of any insistence on compliance with the terms of the charterparty with respect to payment of hire prior to the peremptory termination by Deil.
Indeed, Mr Löwer in cross-examination agreed that he had never specifically asked anyone at South Pacific when the charter fees in respect of the “Rangitata” would be paid. There is no evidence of any written request or follow-up action to pursue outstanding monies owing in respect of the ship. Mr Löwer gave some evidence that he made some general requests for payment of charter hire during “normal telephone calls” in the weeks after the end of December. But the evidence indicates that he simply mentioned the matter to the employees of South Pacific and that there were non-specific requests which did not mention the “Rangitata” in particular.
Counsel for the owner also referred to the judgment of Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation Limited v Citati [1957] 2 QB 401, where his Lordship decided that a voyage charterparty might be lawfully terminated for anticipatory breach in circumstances where the charterer, as a consequence of its own delay, was unable to load cargo within the prescribed time notwithstanding that the time for performance of the loading had not arrived. The question whether, in fact, such conduct had prevented performance was not determined by his Lordship but was referred to arbitration.
This decision is no assistance in the present case because there is no suggestion in that case of any non-insistence by the owner on the performance by the charterer of its obligations under the charter. Furthermore, there is no suggestion in the present case that South Pacific had, by its conduct, evinced an intention to repudiate the charterparty by rendering it impossible to perform the charterparty. In addition, Citati did not involve any question as to whether notice was necessary prior to acceptance of the repudiation and consequent termination of the charterparty.
In my view, the position in the present case as at 18 February 1998 was that the original “time of the essence” requirement had been clearly waived. The continuous and repeated ignoring of the non-payment and the acquiescence in payments being months out of time evidences a variation of the charterparty to the effect that payment of hire would be made at a time when South Pacific considered it appropriate to make the payment or when Deil demanded payment. Support for this conclusion is said to be found in the fact that the parties were “related” and the non-insistence on payment was stated to have arisen from this factor. The liquidator’s report shows that South Pacific had incurred consecutive annual losses in the order of NZD6 to 7.5 million dollars in the years 1994 though 1997 and that it could not have been expected to pay hire out of earnings. This must have been clear to the owner and Deil. No doubt it is for this reason that payment of hire was not insisted upon.
The consequence of the arrangements evidenced by the continuous and lengthy course of dealing between the parties in relation to hire was that in the absence of any clear and specific demand for payment by Deil, it could not be alleged that Deil had failed to discharge its obligations under the demise charter in such a way as to give rise to a repudiation of the charterparty.
Before repudiation for non-payment could be established it was necessary for Deil to make a prior demand for payment of the outstanding hire. In the present case, I am not satisfied that there was any demand for payment of the hire of the “Rangitata” before termination. Accordingly, since no demand was made for payment of the outstanding hire prior to the letter of 18 February 1998, the hire had not become due and payable and the purported termination of the demise charter was ineffective. The evidence does not establish that there was any intent on the part of South Pacific to repudiate the charterparty with Deil.
For the above reasons, I do not accept the submission that the demise charterparty had been lawfully terminated by Deil prior to commencement of the arrest proceedings in this Court with the consequence that Deil remained a demise charterer at that time. Accordingly, South Pacific was a “relevant person” for the purpose of s 18 of the Act and the Court had jurisdiction to arrest the ship.
Other Matters
As in the case of “The Turakina” claims were ventilated at the hearing of the release application on behalf of the Master and crew of the ship and by the Admiralty Marshal seeking payment of security for the claims as a condition of release in the event that the release application was successful.
The claim of the Master and crew included an assertion of a maritime lien against the ship for wage and other related entitlements. The claim of the Marshal was said to arise from the undertaking given by the owner under r 41 coupled with the entitlement of the Marshal under r 53 to insist upon payment of costs and expenses of the Marshal relating to the arrest and/or custody of the vessel.
Because the application for release has not been successful, it is unnecessary to canvas the merits of either of these claims or to quantify an appropriate sum to be set aside by way of security to meet these claims.
The application for release should be dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs at a suitable time to be arranged after they have had the opportunity to consider these reasons.
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I certify that this and the preceding thirteen (13) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin |
Associate:
Dated: 15/07/98
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Counsel for the Applicant: |
Dr A S Bell Mr M Green |
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Solicitor for the Applicant: |
Michell Sillar |
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Counsel for the Plaintiff: |
Mr D A Cowdroy QC Ms L Muston |
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Solicitor for the Plaintiff: |
Conway Leather Shaw |
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Solicitor for the Admiralty Marshal: |
Mr Douglas Coleman Mr Michael Whitehead |
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Solicitor for the Master and Crew: |
Mr J Levingston |
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Date of Hearing: |
15 and 20 May 1998 |
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Date of Judgment: |
15 July 1998 |
