Bellaiche v Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1998] FCA 478

1998FCA0478 - Corrigendum

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MIGRATION LAW - application for Class 816 (special (permanent)) entry permit - whether Department of Industrial Relations assessed applicant’s work experience by reference to the correct data - whether Immigration Review Tribunal committed an error of law - whether Court has power to review Tribunal’s decision.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 11.

Migration (1993) Regulations, reg 816.721.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 29, 63, 337, 338, 341, 346, 348, 349, 475, 476.

Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations, reg 23.

Migration Regulations, reg 2.25A.

Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act 1946 (Cth), ss 28, 35, 41.

Manokian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 3 December 1997, unreported (FCA/Davies J), distinguished.

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ozmanian (1996) 71 FCR 1 (FCA/FC), cited.

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, cited.

Rahim v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 148 ALR 432 (FCA/Sackville J), cited.

Tam Anh Bui v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 9 April 1998, unreported (FCA/Mansfield J), distinguished.

Tanchiatco v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 20 August 1997, unreported (FCA/Branson J), cited.

AVRAHAM BELLAICHE & ANOR V DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

NG 775 OF 1998

SACKVILLE J

SYDNEY

7 MAY 1998

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NG 775 of 1998

BETWEEN:	AVRAHAM BELLAICHE First Applicant NIZA BELLAICHE Second Applicant
AND:	DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS Respondent
JUDGE:		SACKVILLE J
DATE OF ORDER:		7 MAY, 1998
WHERE MADE:		SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The decision of the Immigration Review Tribunal be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Immigration Review Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination according to law.

3. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NG 775 of 1998

BETWEEN:

avraham BELLAICHE

FIRST Applicant

niza BELLAICHE

SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

JUDGE:	SACKVILLE J
DATE:	7 MAY, 1998
PLACE:	SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This case illustrates the difficulties often confronting courts when one of the parties is unrepresented. The present applicants, who are not legally represented, seek orders, inter alia, setting aside a decision of the Immigration Review Tribunal (“IRT”), affirming a decision to deny each of the applicants a permanent visa. The specific complaints made by the applicants concerning the IRT’s decision appeared to lack a sound legal foundation. Nonetheless, the material in evidence seemed to me to raise a significant legal issue, albeit one which the applicants had not identified.

The role that should be played by the presiding Judge in these circumstances is a matter both of difficulty and delicacy. He or she cannot simply become an advocate for the unrepresented applicants, less advocacy intrude into the task of impartial judication. Yet if a judge does not draw to the attention of the parties, in particular counsel for the represented party, to the legal question to which the decision under review gives rise the danger is that an injustice - perhaps a serious injustice - may be caused.

The issue I identified in the present case was whether the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) had correctly applied the criteria specified in the Migration (1993) Regulations for determining whether the male applicant (Mr Bellaiche) had work experience which met Australian education or training standards for his trade as an automotive electrician. If not, a further question arose as to whether this constituted an error of law on the part of the IRT. I put these matters to Mr Beech-Jones, who appeared for the Minister. He made helpful oral submissions, later supplemented by written submissions. In the result I have concluded that the decision of the IRT involved an error of law and should be set aside.

THE APPLICATION

The applicants, Mr and Mrs Bellaiche, commenced proceedings by a handwritten application filed on 23 September 1997. That application identified the decision for which an order of review was sought as

“the decision of department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs made on the 13/1/96 and the decision of the Immigration Review Tribunal (made on the 27/8/97).”

The application stated that the applicant (presumably meaning Mr Bellaiche) was aggrieved by the decision because

“[m]y application for permanent residence in Australia [pursuant to Part 816 of the Migration (1993) Regulations] failed because of inappropriate trade assessment when I am a licenced [sic] trade certificate holder (issued by an Australian Trade Authority) for the...trade as an Auto-Electrician”.

The application did not identify the source of the Court’s jurisdiction to review the decisions challenged by the applicants. Mr Beech-Jones treated the application as having been made pursuant to s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”). Section 476(1) provides that, subject to s 476(2), application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a “judicially-reviewable decision” on any one or more of specified grounds, including the following:

“(e) that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision”.

The term “judicially-reviewable decisions” includes decisions of the IRT: Migration Act, s 475(1). However, the expression does not include an “internally-reviewable decision”: s 475(2)(b). The latter phrase is defined in a manner that excludes from the scope of s 476(1) the decision made by the Minister’s delegate on 13 January 1996 to refuse the application for a visa: see s 338(1) and the definition of “Part 5 reviewable decision” in s 337. The decision made by the Review Officer on 16 May 1996, affirming the delegate’s decision, is also excluded from the term “judicially-reviewable decisions”: see s 475(2)(c) and the definition of “IRT-reviewable decision” in s 346(1)(a). Thus, insofar as the application is intended to seek relief in respect of the decision of the delegate or the Review Officer (bearing in mind that the Review Officer’s decision is not expressly mentioned in the application), the Court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

THE BACKGROUND

The applicants are citizens of Israel. Mr Bellaiche, who was born on 25 February 1966, arrived in Australia in 16 July 1990. Mrs Bellaiche arrived on 14 June 1991. According to material that was before the IRT, Mr Bellaiche worked as an apprentice auto electrician in a repair shop in Beer-Sheva, Israel, from January 1985 to January 1989. After completing his apprenticeship, he was employed as an auto electrician in the same shop, from January 1989 until he left Israel in about June 1990.

The Migration (1993) Regulations

On 4 July 1991, the applicants applied for refugee status. On 2 March 1994, the applicants applied for a class 816 (special (permanent)) entry permit and a class 818 (highly qualified on shore (permanent)) entry permit, in accordance with the Migration (1993) Regulations. A person who had applied for refugee status was eligible, subject to meeting certain other criteria, to apply for entry permits within those two classes.

There appears never to have been any issue that neither applicant satisfied the educational criteria specified in Part 818 of the Migration (1993) Regulations. Nor has there been any issue that Mrs Bellaiche did not satisfy the criteria for the grant of a class 816 entry permit. Therefore, the only disputed question before the delegate, the review officer and the IRT was whether Mr Bellaiche satisfied the criteria for the grant of a class 816 entry permit and, in particular, whether he satisfied cl 816.721(2)(b)(ii) of the Migration (1993) Regulations. I refer to this provision (including the introductory words to cl 816.721(2)) as “par (b)(ii)”.

The requirements for a class 816 (special (permanent) entry permit) include the following:

“816.7 SPECIAL (PERMANENT) ENTRY PERMIT (AFTER ENTRY)

...

816.72 Criteria to be satisfied at time of application (entry permit - after entry)

816.721(1) The applicant is:

(a) a person who:

(i) had not turned 45 before 1 November 1993; and

(ii) meets the requirements of subclause (2) or (3); and

(iii) meets the requirements of subclause (4) or (6); or

(b) a person who:

(i) is a member of the family unit of an applicant who is a person mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(ii) is included in that person’s application;

(2) An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if, on 1 November 1993:

(a) the applicant in Australia had obtained, or had completed the requirements of, a post-secondary educational qualification following an accredited course leading to a trade certificate, advanced certificate, associate diploma, diploma, degree or higher degree; or

(b) the applicant:

(i) held an overseas technical qualification or general academic qualification that is assessed by NOOSR [National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition] as being comparable to an Australian associate diploma, diploma, degree, or higher degree; or

(ii) held an overseas trade qualification, or had work experience, that is assessed as meeting Australian education or training standards for that trade:

(A) by the Department of Industrial Relations; or

(B) if that Department is unable to make an assessment, by the State or Territory authority that the Minister decides is appropriate; or

(i) had been enrolled during the 1993 academic year in an accredited course leading to a trade certificate, advanced certificate, associate diploma, diploma, degree or higher degree; and

(ii) had met the academic progress requirements of the institution at which he or she was enrolled.”

It should be noted that there are at least two dates that may be relevant to the assessment contemplated by par (b)(ii). First, cl 816.721(2) provides that an applicant complies with the sub-clause if he or she meets certain criteria on 1 November 1993. Secondly, there is the date of the assessment itself. In addition, the heading in cl 816.721 refers to criteria that must be satisfied at the time of application (in this case, 2 March 1994). I shall return to these matters later.

A further point should be noted. The IRT proceeded on the basis that, notwithstanding the enactment of the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) and the making of the Migration Regulations, both of which came into force on 1 September 1994, the applications made by the applicants continued to be governed by the Migration (1993) Regulations, although they were to be regarded as applications for permanent visas. In my view, the IRT was correct to take this approach: see Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations, reg 23(1),(3).

The transcript of the hearing before the IRT was not in evidence. But it is clear enough from the documents admitted into evidence that Mr Bellaiche’s primary contention was that he satisfied the requirements of par (b)(ii) because he had work experience in Israel, including his period as an apprentice, that met Australian education or training standards for the trade of automotive electrician. In Mr Bellaiche’s application for the class 816 entry permit, under the heading of “Trade apprenticeship or other post-secondary training” he specified

“5 years of apprenticeship in the auto electrician and Auto Mecanic [sic] trade”.

The First DIR Assessment and the Delegate’s Decision

On 29 September 1995, Trades Recognition Australia, a section of the DIR, wrote to Mr Bellaiche advising him that his application for trade recognition had been considered by the Local (Electrical) Trades Committee. The letter stated that it had been decided that, in accordance with s 41(5) of the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act (Cth) (“TRR Act”), Mr Bellaiche should undergo a trade test in the trade of automotive electrician. The evidence does not reveal why DIR referred to Mr Bellaiche as having applied for a trade certificate, as distinct from a request having been made for DIR to assess his work experience to determine whether it met Australian education or training standards for the trade of automotive electrician. However, other documents in the file show that Mr Bellaiche, on other occasions, completed printed forms appropriate for a person applying for assessment of his or her eligibility for recognition as a tradesperson. Presumably he was supplied with these forms by DIR.

Section 41 of the TRR Act provides for the recognition of “tradesmen”. Local Committees are empowered to issue tradesmen’s certificates (s 35(1)) and may do so if satisfied, inter alia, that

“(d) that person has qualified or qualifies in a country other than Australia, by training and employment, in accordance with the laws and customs of that country, for employment in that country as a tradesman in a trade, or in a trade substantially corresponding with a trade to which this Part applies and his training and employment are such as to provide the skill necessary for the performance in Australia of work ordinarily performed by a recognised tradesman” (s 41(1)(d)).

The TRR Act provides for a number of Local Committees, including Local (Electrical Trades) Committees in each State: TRR Act, s 28. Section 41(5) provides that, before granting a certificate to, or authorising the employment of, any person in accordance with s 41(1), the Committee may require the person to undergo a test of competence in the trade to which he or she seeks to be admitted.

On 17 October 1995, DIR acknowledged receipt of the requisite fee from Mr Bellaiche and advised him that the testing authority, the Department of Technical and Further Education (“TAFE”), would contact him in due course and advise of the time and location of the test. Mr Bellaiche was advised in early November 1995 that the test would take place on 17 November 1995. He duly attended for the test on that day.

By letter of 18 December 1995, DIR advised Mr Bellaiche that his “application for an Australian Recognised trade certificate” had been reconsidered by the Local (Electrical Trades) Committee. The letter said this:

“The requirements for the issue of an Australian Recognised Trade Certificate under the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act, are detailed in Section 41 of the Act. One of the requirements is that you must be able to satisfy the Local Trades Committee, that you have the skills necessary to perform the full range of duties required of a recognised tradesperson in Australia.

After considering all the evidence before it, including an assessment of your performance in a trade test in the classification of Automotive Electrician, the Committee decided that you do not possess the skills necessary to perform the full range of duties required of a recognised tradesperson in Australia, at the present time. The Committee has therefore refused your application.

In view of the above, your file has been closed and no further action will be taken on your application.

You must now await the decision of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, on your application for permanent residence. If you are unsuccessful in that application, you will be advised by the November 1 Task Force Group, of the appeal process available.” (Emphasis in original.)

Two points should be noted about this letter. The first paragraph restated the requirements of s 41 in terms that differ slightly from the statutory language: compare TRR Act, s 41(1)(d). Secondly, the letter did not expressly refer to the terms of par (b)(ii), nor to the date or dates by reference to which the Local Trades Committee had made its assessment.

On 13 January 1996, Mr Bellaiche was informed by the delegate that his application for a class 816 or class 818 visa had been unsuccessful. The decision of the delegate addressed the question of whether the requirements of par (b)(ii) had been satisfied:

“Mr Bellaiche does not hold an overseas trade qualification or had work experience that is assessed as meeting Australian education or training standards for a trade. Mr Bellaiche was referred to the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) to have his claimed trade as an Auto Electrician assessed. The Local Trades Committee assessed that Mr Bellaiche does not have the skills necessary to perform the full range of duties required of a recognised tradesperson in Australia and refused his application. Mr Bellaiche does not meet the requirements of paragraph 816.721(2)(b)(ii).

It can be seen from this passage that the delegate assumed that DIR’s assessment of Mr Bellaiche’s work experience was an assessment of the kind contemplated by par (b)(ii).

Mr Bellaiche subsequently requested details of the test which he had failed. By letter dated 16 February 1996 from DIR, he was informed that he had failed two of the six components of the test (starter motors and starting system and electronic fuel injection). The letter recorded the examiner’s comments and recommendations as follows:

“Comments

‘Avraham does not display the skills of a person highly skilled with all aspects of the Automotive Electrical Trade’.

Recommendations

‘Recommend that he attend courses 7235H, 7235T, 7235U and 7235V of the Automotive Electrician Trade Courses’.”

The letter continued:

“Specific details of your weak areas in the test, were not supplied. However the four TAFE [Technical and Further Education] course subjects recommended, cover the areas of Starting Systems, Electronic Fuel Injection, Integrated Engine Management and Emission Control.

A successful completion of these TAFE course subjects should raise your skill level sufficiently to allow you to pass a trade test as Automotive Electrician in the future.

A further trade test however, will not be considered by the Local Trades Committee until you provide documentary evidence of having gained a minimum of 12 months employment experience as an Automotive Electrician, since the date of your trade test.”

This letter plainly contemplated that Mr Bellaiche could undertake TAFE courses and further work as an automotive electrician in order to bring his skills to the level required for recognition. The letter did not explain why skills acquired after 1 November 1993 could assist in making the assessment contemplated by par (b)(ii). The letter did not refer to the language of par (b)(ii), but suggested that the standard applied to Mr Bellaiche was whether he had demonstrated “the skills of a person highly skilled with all aspects of the Automotive Electrical Trade”.

According to a letter written by Mr Bellaiche to the IRT on 16 June 1996, he acted upon the advice given in the letter of 16 February 1996, by attempting to enrol at TAFE. He was not, however, permitted to do so because he was told by TAFE that his current visa did not allow study in Australia. The IRT did not refer to Mr Bellaiche’s claim and thus made no finding in respect of it. However, if true, Mr Bellaiche’s comment that he found himself in a “Catch-22 situation”, is entirely apt.

The Review Decision

Following the delegate’s decision to reject the application, Mr Bellaiche applied for review of the decision. On 16 May 1996, the Review Officer affirmed the delegate’s decision. The Review Officer noted that Mr Bellaiche had produced a certificate from the Institute of Automotive Mechanical Engineers (“IAME”) stating that he had been accredited as an associate member of that organisation. He had also obtained a tradesman’s certificate as an automotive electrician, issued by the Motor Vehicle Repair Industry Council on 2 April 1996, although it appears that that certificate was issued on the strength of the IAME certificate. The Review Officer considered that these certificates did not assist Mr Bellaiche:

“The Regulations state that applicants should only be referred to other agencies where the Department of Industrial Relations are unable to make an assessment the claimed trade skills. In this case the trade skills of the applicant were examined by DIR and he was given a trade test in order to assess those skills. The result was that the applicant was found not to possess the skills necessary to perform the full range of duties of a tradesperson in Australia.

I am therefore satisfied that the procedures as specified by the Regulations were followed and that the claimed trade skills of the applicant were not recognised. As the applicant has already been refused trade recognition by DIR the material which he has subsequently presented is not relevant.

I therefore find that the applicant does not hold an overseas trade qualification, or have work experience, that meets Australian education or training standards for a trade.”

The IRT Application and the Second DIR Assessment

Mr Bellaiche then applied to the IRT for review of the Review Officer’s decision. In the letter of 16 June 1996, to which I have already referred, Mr Bellaiche made a number of claims. These included the following:

· He had been given insufficient time to prepare for DIR’s test.

· A part of the test (that dealing with the electronic fuel injection and engine management computer) concerned skills that had not been part of his duties during his apprenticeship. This section of the test “had only recently [been] introduced to the auto electrical trade” and any auto electrician who had done his apprenticeship in Mr Bellaiche’s time “would have struggled to pass the subject”.

· His performance had been adversely affected by stress.

· He had been denied the opportunity to study at TAFE and, therefore, had been denied the chance to satisfy the requirements for a second test laid down by DIR.

· His capabilities were shown by the trade certificates obtained from other bodies.

Mr Bellaiche also provided information concerning the theoretical and practical training he received during his period as an apprentice in Israel. A letter from his employer documented in some detail the practical training Mr Bellaiche received from year to year during the apprenticeship. For example, the letter stated that, towards the end of his second and third years, Mr Bellaiche’s training included

“- CHANGE OF PLUGS AND POINTS, HIGH VOLTAGE LEADS, ADJUSTMENT OF IGNITION TIMING, REBUILDING AND OVERHAULING OF STARTERS AND ALTERNATORS, DYNAMOS, DISMANTLING THEM AND DETECTING PROBLEMS...”.

On 9 September 1996, Mr Bellaiche completed a printed form, in which he applied to DIR for

“assessment of [his] eligibility for recognition as a tradesperson in the classification of auto electrician or electrical fitter (automotive) or electrical mechanic.”

The application set out details of his training and experience and attached the certificates to which reference has already been made. The application also provided details of his employment history. That history showed that he had worked as an auto electrician in Sydney from September 1990 to June 1992. Mr Bellaiche stated that thereafter he had been self-employed, although the form did not specify the field in which he was self-employed.

On 25 September 1996, a Senior Skills Assessor at DIR advised Mr Bellaiche that the processing of his application for “Assessment of Trade Qualifications” had been finalised. The letter continued:

“A careful assessment of the information submitted with your application, has revealed that you are unable to satisfy the criteria established for recognition under the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act (TRRA). Unfortunately, you do not possess an acceptable formal qualification, or have the required period of employment on the work ordinarily performed by a skilled tradesperson in Australia. Therefore, you are not eligible for recognition as a tradesperson in Australia in any trade classification covered by the TRRA.” (Emphasis in original.)

On the same date, the Senior Skills Assessor wrote directly to the IRT in response to a letter from the IRT regarding Mr Bellaiche’s second application. (The IRT’s letter was not in evidence.) DIR’s letter was as follows:

“Mr Belleaiche’s [sic] application was considered against trade classifications under the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act 1946 (TRRA trades), and against non-TRRA trade classifications assessed by Trades Recognition Australia under regulations to the Migration Act 1958 on behalf of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (non-TRRA trades).

Assessments in these trades are against specified criteria; viz:

· acceptable formal training outside Australia;

· a specified period of employment experience undertaking the full range of work normally performed by a tradesperson in Australia, and capability of performing that work in Australia.

For TRRA trades these are determined by the Central Trades Committee under the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act; and for non-TRRA trades they are determined by Trades Recognition Australia and are consistent with those for TRRA trades.

....

The documentary evidence Mr Belleaiche [sic] submitted was assessed by a Trades Recognition Australia Skills Adviser. Skills Advisers are qualified tradespeople who are also accredited workplace assessors against competency standards endorsed by the National Training Board.

The Skills Adviser considered the documentary evidence against the criteria outlined above.

You may not be aware but, after considering all the evidence Mr Belleaiche [sic] provided in his first application his case was submitted to the New South Wales Local (Electrical) Trades Committee. The committee decided to refer him for a trade test as an Automotive Electrician. He did not pass that test. Our letters dated 18 December 1995 and 13 February 1996 respectively refer.

In the second last paragraph of the 13 February letter, he was advised that he would have to provide documentary evidence of having gained a minimum of 12 months employment experience as an Automotive Electrician before he could be considered for another trade test. The anniversary of the trade test date is 17 November 1996.

On the basis of the information provided in his second application, there is still a need for him to be trade tested to determine whether he has the skills, knowledge and experience equivalent to an Australian tradesperson.

In regard to the Motor Vehicle Repair Industry Council (MVRIC) Tradesman’s Certificate as an Automotive Electrician. This certificate does not satisfy TRRA recognition requirements.

As previously advised, if he believes he is able to satisfy the requirements of the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act 1946, or for an assessment in a non-TRRA trade, he may lodge a new application at any time in the context of an application for migration to Australia.”

This letter suggests that the test applied for the purposes of the Migration (1993) Regulations was whether the applicant had a specified period of employment experience during which he undertook the full range of work normally performed by a tradesperson in Australia and whether he had demonstrated the ability to perform that work in Australia. The letter appears to accept that Mr Bellaiche could undertake a further test of his skills once he had gained an additional twelve months employment experience as an automotive electrician.

The Third DIR Assessment

Mr Bellaiche replied on 15 October 1996 to DIR’s letter of 25 September 1996. He expressed his astonishment at DIR’s “findings”, and complained that he had not been assessed for the alternative trades nominated in his second application. His letter asked this question:

“Is my case being assessed according to the 816 applicants classification?”

Mr Bellaiche submitted with his letter a third application to DIR for assessment of trade training and experience. This application repeated most of the earlier information provided to DIR. In the employment section history, Mr Bellaiche stated that he had been employed as an auto electrician at a service state in Bondi from July 1992 to September 1993. The application did not explain the apparent inconsistency between this statement and his claim in the earlier application to have been self-employed since July 1992.

On 17 June 1997, the IRT forwarded to DIR Mr Bellaiche’s third application for an assessment of his qualifications and work experience “as an Automotive Electrician (and related trades...)”. The letter requested advice as to whether Mr Bellaiche

“would have had the necessary experience in order to meet the ‘Australian Training Standards’ for this occupation on 1 November 1993”.

It will be seen that this letter specifically refers to the date nominated in par (b)(ii),but in a manner that is not free from ambiguity. I shall return to this letter later.

In a letter dated 27 June 1997, a copy of which was sent to the IRT, DIR advised Mr Bellaiche that his application had been finalised. The letter stated that

“[a] careful assessment of the information submitted with your application has revealed that you are not eligible for classification as a tradesperson because you have insufficient training and experience in any trade classification assessed by Trades Recognition Australia.” (Emphasis in original.)

A Reasons for Decision Sheet was enclosed with the letter. The letter further stated that the file had been closed and no further action would be taken on the application as the outcome of the review was final.

The Reasons for Decision Sheet identified the “classification sought” by Mr Bellaiche as “Electrical Fitter (Automotive)”. It did not explain why it adopted this classification instead of the classifications “automotive electrician” and “electrical mechanic (automotive)” which had also sought by Mr Bellaiche. Nor did it say whether there was any relevant difference between the three classifications. The body of the document was as follows:

“Is relevant formal training claimed? Yes

- are claims verified by documents? Yes

Does documentary evidence demonstrate

adequate relevant training/work experience? Yes

- what is the length of relevant training/work

experience verified by documents? 8 years 4 months

- what is the length of relevant training/work

experience required? 7 years

- are breadth & depth of skills equivalent to

Australian standards? Not clear

Was an interview conducted? no

- were trade level skills confirmed

equivalent to Australian standards? -

Was a Trade test? Yes

- were trade level skills confirmed

equivalent to Australian standards? No

What is the date the equivalent Australian standards

are deemed to have been achieved for migration

to Australia? Not attained

COMMENTS

This is the applicants [sic] third assessment, and the second from the IRT. He was originally trade tested on 17/11/95, at the NSW Meadowbank College of TAFE.

Mr Bellaiche failed the trade test.

As a result of the trade test, Mr Bellaiche was refused recognition and advised to undertake remedial training. The TAFE has specifically advised what modules he required to study to upgrade his skills.

Mr Bellaiche has not provided any evidence of undertaking the skills upgrading courses. He has supplied evidence of undertaking an industry trade test. This is not recognised by TRA. In addition Mr Bellaiche has not provided any new evidence of employment as a tradesperson in Australia. In fact it appears that he has not worked in the trade since September 1993.

Given that Mr Bellaiche has failed to demonstrate that he has undertaken additional training or gained additional experience that would overcome the shortcomings his trade test identified. I have again refused recognition.”

This document accepted that Mr Bellaiche had demonstrated “adequate work experience”. It left unanswered what might be thought to have been an important question, namely, whether the “breadth & depth of skills [were] equivalent to Australian standards”. That issue was said to be “[n]ot clear”. However, in response to the question of what date the equivalent Australian standards were deemed to have been achieved for migration to Australia, the document recorded “[n]ot attained”. The comments appear to have accepted that any upgrading of Mr Bellaiche’s skills after the November 1995 test would have been relevant to his case, as would work experience as an automotive electrician after September 1993.

The IRT Decision

On 26 August 1997 the IRT gave its decision affirming the decision under review. The IRT addressed the question of whether Mr Bellaiche had satisfied par (b)(ii) as follows:

“Mr Bellaiche was assessed by the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) as a tradesperson for the purposes of the legislation. [The IRT then referred to the letter of 18 December 1995 to Mr Bellaiche from DIR, extracts from which have been reproduced above].

Mr Bellaiche was granted a further chance to have his qualifications and work experience assessed by DIR and in a letter dated 25 September 1996 from the Senior Skills Assessor of DIR he was advised that he was not eligible for recognition as a skilled tradesperson in Australia in any trade classification. In submissions to the Tribunal dated 15 October 1996, the Applicant claimed he had new information he could submit to DIR for further assessment and was granted leave by the Tribunal to submit a further application to DIR for assessment. In a letter dated 27 June 1997 from the Skills Adviser of the Skills Assessment Unit, DIR, Mr Bellaiche was informed that he was again considered not eligible for classification as a tradesperson because he had insufficient training and experience in any trade classification assessed by Trades Recognition Australia.

...

In relation to the criteria for a Class 816 entry permit relating to qualifications, work experience, enrolment in an accredited course and business, I find that the applicants do not satisfy 816.721(2) or (3).”

REASONING

What is the Date by Reference to Which the Assessment is to be Made?

I have referred earlier to the terms of the relevant provisions. It is convenient to repeat the language of cl 816 directly relevant to the present case.

“816.72 Criteria to be satisfied at the time of application (entry permit - after entry)

816.721(2) An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if, on 1 November 1993:

...

(b) the applicant:

...

(ii) held an overseas trade qualification, or had work experience that is assessed as meeting Australian education or training standards for that trade:

(A) by the Department of Industrial Relations...”.

The authorities indicate that “work experience” includes experience overseas or in Australia: Tanchiatco v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 20 August 1997, unreported (FCA/Branson J); Rahim v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 148 ALR 432 (FCA/Sackville J), at 437.

Despite the heading in cl 861.721, cl 816.721(2) specifically provides that an applicant meets the requirements of that subclause if, on 1 November 1993, the applicant satisfies the criteria specified therein. It is clear enough that, in a case where an applicant relies on his or work experience, the assessment contemplated by par (b)(ii) is to be undertaken by reference to the applicant’s work experience on (that is, as at) 1 November 1993. This follows from the introductory language to cl 816.721(2) itself and from the use of the past tense in par (b)(ii) (“had work experience”).

It is equally clear that the assessment contemplated by par (b)(ii) will take place, at least ordinarily, after an application has been lodged. This is because the assessment of whether a person’s work experience meets Australian education or training standards can hardly take place, in the ordinary course, until after the lodgment of the application. This is reflected in the use of the present tense in par (b)(ii) when referring to the assessment (“is assessed as meeting Australian...standards”).

What, then, is the date by reference to which Australian training or education standards are to be ascertained? Is it the date the assessment takes place, or 1 November 1993? In my view, it must be the latter. Otherwise an applicant would face the unjust prospect of being unable to rely on any work experience gained after 1 November 1993, yet being assessed by standards that may have changed considerably (for example, by reason of rapid technological developments) by the date of the assessment. Moreover, the assessment itself might be delayed for reasons completely beyond an applicant’s control, thus adversely affecting his or her chances. There is nothing in par (b)(ii) to suggest that such a potentially unjust result is intended.

It seems to me to follow that par (b)(ii) requires DIR’s assessment to be made by reference to the position on 1 November 1993. That is, did the applicant’s work experience (or trade qualifications) at that date satisfy Australian education or training standards at that date? DIR’s task under the Migration (1993) Regulations, whatever its role under the TRR Act may be, is not to assess whether the applicant’s work experience at the date of the assessment meets Australian training or education standards at that date. Its role is a different one.

Was DIR’s Assessment Made as at 1 November 1993?

The question then, is whether DIR made the assessment as at 1 November 1993, as required by par (b)(ii). If it did not, the assessment contemplated by the Migration (1993) Regulations has not been carried out. A separate question then arises as to whether any review is available of the IRT’s decision to affirm the refusal to grant visas.

In order to answer the first of these two questions it is necessary to consider whether DIR’s third and final assessment, which was made on 27 June 1997 following a request from the IRT, was correctly undertaken in accordance with the criteria laid down by par (b)(ii). However, given that DIR’s third assessment referred to the earlier assessments made in 1996, it is convenient to consider the assessments in chronological order.

In my view, DIR’s first assessment was not made in accordance with par (b)(ii). The letter of 18 December 1995 from DIR expressly concluded that Mr Bellaiche did not possess “the skills necessary to perform the full range of duties required of a recognised tradesperson in Australia, at the present time” (emphasis supplied). The fact that DIR was concerned with Mr Bellaiche’s then current skills is reinforced by the letter of 13 February 1996, which advised him to undertake TAFE courses to raise his skill levels sufficiently to enable him to pass a trade test in the future. Doubtless, DIR was endeavouring to be helpful, but (as Mr Beech-Jones accepted) any refinement of Mr Bellaiche’s skills after 1 November 1993, let alone December 1995, could hardly have been relevant to the question posed by par (b)(ii).

The second assessment, although not quite as clearcut, reflected a similar approach. The letter of 25 September 1996 addressed to Mr Bellaiche stated that

“You are unable to satisfy the criteria established for recognition under the [TRR Act].... [Y]ou are not eligible for recognition as a tradesperson in Australia in any trade classification covered by the [TRR Act].”

This letter contained no reference to the Migration (1993) Regulations, nor to the fact that the relevant date by reference to which the assessment was to be carried out was 1 November 1993. It is expressed (in the present tense) in terms of the TRR Act, not by reference to the requirements of par (b)(ii).

The more detailed letter of 25 September 1996, addressed to the IRT, referred in general terms to the “regulations to the Migration Act 1958”, but did not say that the assessment had to be made as at 1 November 1993. The letter also stated that, provided Mr Bellaiche obtained a minimum of twelve months employment experience after the first trade test, he could be considered for another trade test. This statement strongly suggests that DIR was considering whether, at the time of the assessment, Mr Bellaiche had “the skills, knowledge and experience equivalent to an Australian tradesperson”. Work experience gained in Australia in 1995 and 1996 could hardly shed light on an assessment which had to be made as at 1 November 1993.

The third assessment, made by DIR on 27 June 1997, followed a letter from the IRT requesting advice as to whether Mr Bellaiche would have had the necessary experience to meet the “Australian Training Standards” for this occupation on 1 November 1993. Despite the terms of this request, it is clear, in my view, that DIR did not direct its attention to the position on 1 November 1993. There is nothing in DIR’s letter of 27 June 1997, or in the accompanying reasons, to suggest that it did. On the contrary, the covering letter is expressed in the present tense. Moreover, the comments in the accompanying reasons refer to Mr Bellaiche’s failure to provide any new evidence of employment as a tradesperson in Australia, a failure that could not be relevant to any assessment made as at 1 November 1993. The last paragraph of the comments notes that Mr Bellaiche had failed to demonstrate that he had undertaken additional training or gained additional experience that would have overcome the shortcomings in his trade test. Once again, that paragraph makes sense only if the author was considering whether Mr Bellaiche’s training and experience at the date of the report were such as to warrant recognition. It follows that DIR was considering whether Mr Bellaiche’s work experience at the date of the assessment met standards current at that date.

In his written submissions, Mr Beech-Jones pointed out that DIR’s reasons included this passage:

“What is the date the equivalent standards are deemed to have been achieved for migration to Australia? Not attained.”

He said that this should be construed as demonstrating that DIR intended to find that at no stage, including 1 November 1993, had Mr Bellaiche attained the requisite Australian training or education standards. I am mindful of the need to give a beneficial construction to DIR’s reasons: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1986) 185 CLR 259, at 272. However, having regard to the other matters to which I have referred, I do not think that this question and answer shows that DIR did anything other than consider the position at the date of the assessment.

Did the IRT Err in Law?

In Rahim v Minister, which was decided shortly after the IRT’s decision in the present case, I summarised the requirements imposed by par (b)(ii) as follows (at 439):

“It follows that, in my view, a decision-maker applying par (b)(ii) must consider, first, whether the applicant’s work experience is in a “trade”. Next, if the applicant does have work experience in a trade, the decision-maker must consider whether there are Australian education or training standards for that trade. This is a factual inquiry which, to use the language of Branson J in Tanchiatco v Minister, must consider whether the trade in which the applicant has work experience is “one in respect of which Australian education or training standards can sensibly be identified” (at 4). If the factual inquiry is resolved favourably to the applicant, it is then necessary for the decision-maker to consider whether the applicant’s particular work experience is assessed as meeting the relevant Australian education or training standards. The last stage of the inquiry must be carried out in accordance with the process set out in par (b)(ii).

In summary, it seems to me that par (b)(ii) requires the decision-maker in a work experience case to undertake what might be described as a three stage process, as follows:

The first task is to ascertain whether the applicant has work experience in a “trade”. In undertaking this task a broad construction of the term “trade” should be adopted. Part of the first task is to identify the “trade” in which the applicant has had work experience.

The second task is to ascertain whether there are Australian education or training standards for the trade in which the applicant has work experience.

The third task (which arises only if the second is resolved in the affirmative) is to ascertain, in accordance with the process set out in par (b)(ii), whether the applicant’s work experience is assessed as meeting the Australian education or training standards for the particular trade.

I should make clear that, by describing the process as a three staged one, I do mean to imply that there must always be a rigid division in the decision-maker’s reasons. Obviously, there is a close relationship between ascertaining whether the applicant has work experience in a trade and determining whether the relevant trade has Australian education or training standards. There are likely to be factual issues common to both questions. The precise approach taken by decision-makers may vary from case to case, depending on the issues and the nature of the evidence. However, I think that in a given work experience case, if the applicant is to satisfy the requirements of par (b)(ii), each of the questions I have identified must be answered favourably to the applicant.”

In the present case, the IRT made no express finding in its reasons that Mr Bellaiche had work experience in Israel in a particular trade. Nor did it expressly make a finding as to whether there were Australian education or training standards for the trade in which Mr Bellaiche had work experience. The letter of 17 June 1997 referred to Mr Bellaiche’s experience as an automotive electrician “and [in] related trades”, but did not specifically identify which trade was the appropriate one. It also referred to “the ‘Australian Training Standards’ for this occupation” without specifying what those standards were (although it is possible that the expression has a well understood meaning not revealed by the evidence) and whether the standards were in force on 1 November 1993.

I do not think it is necessary to comment further on these matters, since I think that an error of law occurred at the third stage of the process identified in Rahim v Minister. In order to understand the role of the IRT at this stage, it is necessary to recall the review process established by the Migration Act. The delegate was empowered to grant, or not grant, a visa to the applicants: Migration Act, ss 29(1), 63(1). In making that decision, the delegate had to consider whether Mr Bellaiche satisfied the relevant criteria governing a class 816 entry permit, including par (b)(ii). The role of the Review Officer was to review the delegate’s decision (s 341(1)) and to affirm, vary or set aside the decision: s 341(2). The IRT’s role, in turn, was to review the decision made by the Review Officer: s 348(1). It could exercise all the powers and discretions conferred on the person who made the decision (s 349(1)) and could affirm, vary or set aside the decision (s 349(2)).

In my opinion, the IRT’s role in the present case was not limited to referring to DIR the assessment required by par (b)(ii). It is quite true that par (b)(ii) contemplates that the assessment required by par (b)(ii) will be made by DIR (unless it is unable to do so). But it does not follow that the IRT’s role is spent once it asks DIR to make the assessment, even assuming that the request made by the IRT is in the terms contemplated by par (b)(ii).

In order to determine whether the IRT should have affirmed the decision of the Review Officer it was necessary, in my opinion, for the IRT to be satisfied that an assessment of the kind contemplated by par (b)(ii) had taken place. It was not necessarily the IRT’s role to reconsider an assessment made by DIR to determine whether its decision was correct. But I think the IRT had to satisfy itself that DIR had purported to undertake the assessment contemplated by par (b)(ii). If DIR asked the wrong question (as I think occurred in this case), the IRT was bound as a matter of law to request DIR to consider the right question. In such circumstances, the IRT was obliged to withhold its decision until DIR undertook the necessary inquiries and provided an assessment (whether favourable or unfavourable to the applicant) of the kind contemplated by par (b)(ii). Once DIR asked and answered the correct question, it may be that the IRT was bound to accept the answer (although I need not resolve that issue).

In the present case, as I have explained, DIR’s response to the IRT’s request showed that DIR had not undertaken the assessment contemplated and required by par (b)(ii). Thus the IRT did not have before it a document purporting to record an assessment undertaken by DIR in conformity with par (b)(ii). In my opinion, by acting on DIR’s letter and reasons, without considering whether DIR had undertaken the assessment required by par (b)(ii), the IRT erred in law.

Did the Error Matter?

I do not think that the IRT’s error was a trivial one. According to DIR’s June 1997 report, Mr Bellaiche had not worked as an auto electrician since September 1993. The conclusion was consistent with the information contained in Mr Bellaiche’s third application, which had been referred by the IRT to DIR. A decision-maker assessing Mr Bellaiche’s work experience as at 1 November 1993, by reference to training and education standards in force at that date, might have discounted his poor performance on some aspects of the test (which was conducted in November 1995) because of his absence from the trade for over two years. I do not mean to suggest that it is necessarily inappropriate to test a person’s knowledge of or skills in a trade after the date by reference to which his or her knowledge or skills are to be assessed. But a decision-maker might well make allowances for the passage of time since the relevant date. In some cases the decision-maker might consider that so much time has elapsed from the date by reference to which the assessment is to take place that a test would serve little purpose.

Mr Bellaiche also claimed in the correspondence with the IRT that some aspects of the test reflected recent advances in technology and that he could not have been expected to acquire the necessary technical skills during his apprenticeship. It is not clear whether the advances in technology were reflected in Australian education or training standards in force on 1 November 1993 , since DIR did not explore this issue. If Mr Bellaiche’s claims were well-founded, it is possible that he was tested on issues not forming part of the standards applicable on 1 November 1993.

None of this is intended to suggest that Mr Bellaiche would necessarily have been assessed by DIR as satisfying par (b)(ii), had the IRT pointed out DIR’s erroneous approach and requested a reassessment in accordance with the appropriate criteria. But it is certainly possible that a different result might have been reached. In my view, Mr Bellaiche should not be denied the opportunity to have his work experience correctly assessed in accordance with the criteria laid down by par (b)(ii).

Is There Power to Grant Relief?

Mr Beech-Jones submitted that, even if DIR had misconstrued its role in making the assessment required by par (b)(ii), the Court had no power to review either the IRT’s decision or DIR’s decision. His argument ran as follows:

(i) The subject matter of the IRT’s decision was to affirm the earlier decision to refuse to grant visas to the applicants. The IRT was bound to accept the assessment made by DIR of Mr Bellaiche’s work experience. Thus, even if DIR had erred, there was no error of law by the IRT itself.

(ii) DIR’s assessment of Mr Bellaiche’s work experience, made pursuant to par (b)(ii), was a separate decision from that of the IRT. Mr Beech-Jones accepted that DIR’s decision was within the expression “other decisions made under this Act, or the regulations, relating to visas”, used in the definition of “judicially-reviewable decisions”: Migration Act, s 475(1)(c). Thus, subject to the filing of a timely application, Mr Bellaiche could seek review of DIR’s decision.

(Iii) However, Mr Bellaiche could not challenge DIR’s decision in this case because he had failed to act within the period defined by the Migration Act. Section 478(1) requires an application for review of a judicially-reviewable decision to be lodged within twenty-eight days of the applicant being notified of the decision. Section 478(2) provides that the Federal Court must not make an order allowing, or which has the effect of allowing, an applicant to lodge an application outside the twenty-eight day period. Since Mr Bellaiche was notified of DIR’s third assessment by a letter of 27 June 1997 (which, on the evidence, Mr Bellaiche had received), the time for seeking review of DIR’s decision had expired before the application in the present proceedings was filed on 23 September 1997. It was too late to apply to amend the proceedings to seek review of DIR’s decision.

It must be said that, if the reasoning is correct, it produces remarkably harsh results. It is one thing for s 478 to impose a “stringent” time limit (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ozmanian (1996) 71 FCR 1 (FCA/FC), at 28, per Sackville J) in circumstances where an applicant for a visa is notified of the relevant decision and advised of the need for an application for review to be filed within the prescribed period. It is quite another for time to run in respect of a critical decision where the person adversely affected is simply not told of the stringent time limit. In this case, not only did the letter of 27 June 1997 to Mr Bellaiche not advise him of any right of review, but it asserted that Mr Bellaiche could lodge a new application at any time, at least if he had substantial information not previously submitted.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider the authorities relied on by Mr Beech-Jones. He referred principally to Manokian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 3 December 1977, unreported (FCA/Davies J), followed in Tam Anh Bui v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 9 April 1998, unreported (FCA/Mansfield J).

In Manokian, the relevant criteria for a visa included the following:

“The applicant

...

(c) is free of any disease or condition which, during the applicant’s proposed period of stay in Australia, would, in the opinion of a Commonwealth medical officer:

(i) require significant care or significant treatment (or both); or

...

(iv) result in the applicant becoming a significant charge on public funds.”

Regulation 2.25A(1) of the Migration Regulations provided that in determining whether an applicant satisfied the above criterion, the Minister “must seek the opinion of a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth”. Regulation 2.25A(3) provided as follows:

“The Minister is to take the opinion of the Medical Officer of the Commonwealth on a matter referred to in subregulation (1)...to be correct for the purposes of deciding whether a person meets a requirement or satisfies a criterion.”

The IRT had before it two reports from Commonwealth Medical Officers (“CMOs”) expressing the opinion that the applicant did not satisfy the relevant criterion. The IRT considered that it did not have power to go behind this opinion. Davies J held that ruling to be correct and said this (at 2):

“In my opinion, the approach taken by the Immigration Review Tribunal was correct. The subject matter of the proceedings before the Review Officer and before the Immigration Review Tribunal was a decision to refuse to grant a non-citizen a visa. In my view, the opinions of the Commonwealth medical officers, which I would accept to be decisions for the purposes of legislation such as the Migration Act and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), were not decisions refusing to grant a visa.

Counsel for the applicant, Mr J R Young, put the submission that, in a case such as the present, the decision to refuse to grant a visa involves the making of two decisions, one by a Commonwealth medical officer and one by an officer of the Department and that both the officer of the Department the Commonwealth medical officer participated in the making of the decision to refuse to grant a visa.

In my opinion, however, the opinion of the Commonwealth medical officers cannot be given that categorisation. The function of Commonwealth medical officers is to determine whether certain health criteria which are specified in the public interest criteria of the Regulations is satisfied. Their decision is not a decision refusing to grant a visa. The visa was refused in a decision made by the officer of the Department. It was his powers which the review officer and subsequently the Immigration Review Tribunal could exercise. The primary decision-maker had no power to go behind the certificate of the Commonwealth medical officer that was before him, and in my opinion the Act gave no further power to the review officer or the Immigration Review Tribunal to go behind that certificate.”

I do not think that the decision in Manokian carries with it the consequence that the only remedy open to Mr Bellaiche was to seek review of DIR’s decision (assuming that he was able to act within the time limit specified by s 478 of the Migration Act). In both Manokian and Tam Anh Bui the CMOs provided reports in relation to the health of the respective applicants that addressed the criteria specified in the regulations. In other words, they purported to answer the correct question, even though in each case it was said that they had erred in doing so. Moreover, reg 2.25A(3) expressly bound the Minister, and thus the IRT on an application for review, to take the opinion of the CMOs “on a matter referred to in subregulation (1) to be correct”. Once the CMOs provided an opinion on whether an applicant met a criteria stated in the regulations, the IRT had no function to perform.

The position in the present case is different. The assessment of Mr Bellaiche’s work experience undertaken by DIR was not expressed in terms of the criteria laid down by par (b)(ii). It is fair to say that DIR’s assessment, on its face, did not constitute an assessment of the kind required by par (b)(ii). Furthermore, par (b)(ii), although stating that the assessment of work experience is to be made by DIR, does not contain any direction equivalent to that in reg 2.25A(3). That is, par (b)(ii) does not expressly require the Minister or the IRT to accept the assessment of DIR as correct. As I have already explained, it may well be the case that if DIR asks the right question it is not the IRT’s role to reconsider the “merits” of DIR’s assessment. However, I think that if DIR does not address the correct issue, the IRT is bound to defer its own decision until DIR does apply the criteria laid down in par (b)(ii).

It follows that I do not accept the first step in Mr Beech-Jones’ argument. I think that the IRT erred in law in acting on DIR’s assessment and that the IRT’s decision to affirm the refusal to grant a visa is amenable to review pursuant to s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act.

I should mention that Mr Beech-Jones, in his written submissions, suggested that DIR’s assessment “might be considered” a decision reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“ADJR Act”), because it was made under s 41 of the TRR Act. If this suggestion is correct I would have power (as Mr Beech-Jones conceded) under s 11 of the ADJR Act to grant an extension of time to Mr Bellaiche in which to lodge an application for review of DIR’s decision. In my opinion, however, Mr Beech-Jones’ suggestion is not correct. DIR’s assessment, although on one view it purported to be made under the TRR Act, was in truth one that should have been made pursuant to the Migration (1993) Regulations. DIR’s erroneous approach did not convert its assessment into one made under the TRR Act.

Conclusion

The IRT’s decision should be set aside. The matter should be remitted to the IRT, differently constituted, for determination according to law. The respondent should pay the applicants’ costs.

I certify that this and the preceding twenty-six (6) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Sackville

Associate:

Dated: 7 May, 1998

Counsel for the Applicant:	Self represented

Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr R Beech-Jones

Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing:	28 April, 1998

Date of Judgment:	7 May, 1998

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