Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Le Geng [1996] FCA 1149

C A T C H W O R D S

MIGRATION - application for Transitional (Permanent) Visa - whether applicant of "good character" - applicant convicted of several serious crimes - whether evidence of reform - whether decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal to direct that applicant qualifies under "good character" provisions was unreasonable in the administrative law sense - at hearing before Tribunal, Minister's counsel proposed calling further witness - Tribunal suggested evidence of proposed witness not relevant - Counsel refrained from calling witness - Tribunal's reasons suggest that proposed witness' evidence may have been relevant - whether denial of natural justice - prison report received into evidence by Tribunal without Minister's legal representatives being aware of this - prison report relied upon by Tribunal in reaching decision - whether further denial of natural justice.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s.501

Migration Regulations 1993, Schedule 4, Clause 4001

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649

Irving v. Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (not yet reported, Federal Court of Australia, Full Court 30 July 1996, Judgment No. 663/1996)

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 Chan Yee Kin v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

Minister for Immigration v. Gungor (1982) 4 ALD 575

Degerli v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 4 ALN N39

Beckner v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 49

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Wu Shan Liang (1996) 136 ALR 481

Simplot v. Nettlefold (1996) 139 ALR 371

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v. Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Commissioner of Police v. Anderson (not yet reported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal; CA 40469/95, 21 October 1996)

Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs v. State of Western Australia & Ors (Federal Court of Australia, Full Court, not yet reported, 28 May 1996, Judgment No. 395/1996)

Kioa v. West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

v. JIA LE GENG

No. WAG 125 of 1996

CARR J

PERTH

20 DECEMBER 1996

IN THE FEDERAL COURT )

OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA )

DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. WAG 125 of 1996

GENERAL DIVISION )

On appeal from the General Administrative Division of the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal constituted by Deputy President T E Barnett

B E T W E E N : MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

& MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Applicant

and

JIA LE GENG

Respondent

CORAM: CARR J.

PLACE: PERTH

DATE: 20 DECEMBER 1996

MINUTE OF ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The determination in respect of the respondent, made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 23 July 1996, be set aside and the matter in respect of which that decision was made be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, identically-constituted, for further consideration.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT )

OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA )

DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. WAG 125 of 1996

GENERAL DIVISION )

On appeal from the General Administrative Division of the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal constituted by Deputy President T E Barnett

B E T W E E N : MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

& MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Applicant

and

JIA LE GENG

Respondent

CORAM: CARR J.

PLACE: PERTH

DATE: 20 DECEMBER 1996

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

In this application the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs appeals from a determination made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 23 July 1996 to set aside a decision made by a delegate of the Minister (referred to in these reasons variously as "the applicant" or "the Minister"). The delegate's decision, made on 1 December 1995, was to refuse to grant a Transitional (Permanent) Visa to the respondent (referred to in these reasons variously as "Mr Jia" or "the respondent"). The Tribunal remitted the matter to the applicant with a direction that the respondent qualifies for obtaining a Transitional (Permanent) Visa on the basis that he is of good character.

Factual Background

The respondent arrived in Australia on 17 August 1991 to commence a post-graduate diploma in Chemistry at Curtin University, near Perth. On arrival, he was granted an entry permit which expired on 30 July 1992. In the meantime, on 7 September 1991, he lodged an application for refugee status based upon persecution which he claimed to have suffered as a result of being involved in pro-democracy activities in China. It is not necessary to set out the detailed history of that application. It is sufficient to say that it was refused both initially and on review by the Refugee Status Review Committee. By October 1993 matters had reached the stage where a delegate of the Minister had ordered Mr Jia to be deported and he was taken into custody for breaching a condition of his release from former custody. The condition related to the undertaking of employment without the Minister's written permission. On 1 November 1993 the Minister made a statement announcing special criteria for permanent entry permits (Special Entry Permits) for Chinese nationals in Australia. Applications for such permits could not be lodged until 1 March 1994. A custody review officer authorised Mr Jia's release, on certain conditions, in anticipation of Mr Jia making such an application. During the period between 21 November 1993 and 30 November 1993 Mr Jia committed certain indictable offences which resulted in the convictions to which I refer below. On 11 January 1994, while on bail awaiting trial for those offences, the respondent pleaded guilty to charges of performing work whilst being an illegal immigrant and without permission, contrary to s.83(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"), and to using another person's tax file number, contrary to s.8WB(1)(b) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). The respondent served a period of detention in lieu of paying fines and costs. On 10 February 1995, after a
trial in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Mr Jia was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for the following offences:

. one count of assault occasioning bodily harm (five years imprisonment);

. one count of unlawful detention (eighteen months imprisonment);

. one count of making a threat to do unlawful harm (eighteen months imprisonment); and

. one count of sexual penetration without consent (five years imprisonment).

Some of those sentences were ordered to be served concurrently so that the total period of imprisonment was 6½ years, subject to parole conditions. The respondent was acquitted on nine other counts of alleged offences involving the same complainant which were heard at the same trial as the above counts. Mr Jia is still serving his sentence, although he is now eligible for work release. On 18 September 1995 a delegate of the Minister refused Mr Jia's application for a Special Entry Permit on the ground that he had been found not to be of good character. On 5 October 1995 the respondent sought internal review of that decision. A departmental officer determined that the original decision-maker had applied the wrong section of the Migration Act. This resulted in the re-opening and reassessment of the respondent's case. However, on 1 December 1995, a delegate of the Minister refused the application on the same grounds as before. On 8 January 1996 the respondent applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision.

The Legislative Framework

The applicant denied Mr Jia a visa on the basis of s.501 of the Act which, relevantly, is in these terms:

"501(1) The Minister may refuse to grant a visa to a person, or may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person, if:

(a) subsection (2) applies to the person; or

(b) the Minister is satisfied that, if the person were allowed to enter or to remain in Australia, the person would:

(i) be likely to engage in criminal conduct in Australia; or

(ii) vilify a segment of the Australian community; or

(iii) incite discord in the Australian community or in a segment of that community; or

(iv) represent a danger to the Australian community or to a segment of that community, whether by way of being liable to become involved in activities that are disruptive to, or violence threatening harm to, that community or segment, or in any other way.

(2) This subsection applies to a person if the Minister:

(a) having regard to:

(i) the person's past criminal conduct; or

(ii) the person's general conduct;

is satisfied that the person is not of good character; or

(b) ..."

Section 501 must be read with Clause 4001 of Schedule 4 to the Migration Regulations. Clause 4001 sets out the Public Interest Criteria for the class of visa sought by Mr Jia. It includes the good character requirement. In summary, as the Tribunal noted, decision-makers may determine that the character requirement is met when, after appropriate inquiries:

. there is no evidence of anything that might justify refusal under s.501 of the Act, to grant the visa; or

. a decision has been made that there is insufficient evidence to justify refusal under s.501; or

. a decision has been made not to exercise the power under s.501, despite being satisfied that the refusal is justified.

The Tribunal's Decision and Reasoning

The Tribunal noted that the Minister was not relying on the migration offences relating to illegal employment as evidence of a lack of good character on Mr Jia's part. The Tribunal said that it also gave little weight to those offences.

The Tribunal focused its attention on the four Supreme Court convictions referred to above ("the Convictions"). The Tribunal said that the accepted facts which constituted the Convictions were:

(a)the respondent assaulted Ms Li You on 21 November 1993 by hitting her in the face, pushing her in the chest and knocking her down on to the footpath;

(b)the respondent detained Ms Li You against her will on 29 November 1993 in his flat by pushing her down on to his bed every time she tried to leave;

(c)the respondent threatened to do unlawful harm to Ms Li You on 30 November 1993 if she did not accompany him to his flat; and

(d)the respondent sexually penetrated Ms Li You, without her consent, in his flat on the morning of 30 November 1993 at the same time as the police arrived at that flat.

The Tribunal referred to the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649 and in particular to passages from the reasons for judgment of Fisher and Lockhart JJ at p.653. The Tribunal said of that case:

"This case is authority for the proposition that the Tribunal, while not having the power to ignore a conviction or set its value at nought, does have the power to consider the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence for the purpose of determining what weight and gravity should be attributed to the conviction as one of the relevant factors in assessing whether the applicant is "of good character" for the purposes of the Act."

The Tribunal then proceeded to examine the circumstances preceding and surrounding the Convictions. Central to this examination was the history of Mr Jia's relationship with Ms Li You, a relationship which the Tribunal described as "complex and bizarre" and "both intensely sexual and emotional". The Minister called Ms Li You to give evidence before the Tribunal. It is not necessary to recite the details of the Tribunal's examination of the evidence concerning the relationship between Mr Jia and Ms Li You. The Tribunal said that it was unable to accept Ms Li You as a witness of credit because some of her evidence to the Tribunal was inherently unbelievable and was in conflict with the transcript of her evidence at the trial which led to the Convictions. The Tribunal accepted Mr Jia's evidence that there had been conflict between him and Ms Li You about her use of his telephone for long, expensive international telephone calls at his expense, despite his frequent objections, and about her compulsive and irresponsible gambling. It further accepted his evidence that on several occasions Ms Li You borrowed his money and lost it at the Burswood Casino ("the Casino") until he refused to lend or give her any more. She then borrowed from other men and Mr Jia felt obliged to repay those loans on her behalf. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Jia was becoming quite distraught because he was unable to avoid the constant drain on his funds caused by what the Tribunal described as "the compulsive gambling addiction of his beautiful partner". The Tribunal also found that, in order to acquire funds to support her gambling addiction, Ms Li You was "involving herself in relationships with men from whom she could borrow money". The Tribunal held that these men included a mutual friend of Mr Jia and Ms Li You, a Mr Ji. The Tribunal also found that on 26 May 1993, a time when Mr Jia and Ms Li You were living together, Mr Jia had withdrawn savings amounting to $11,000 from his bank account in anticipation of
being deported to China. He left this money hidden in his flat while he went to work. Upon return at 9.00 o'clock that night he found that Ms Li You was not at the flat and that the money was missing. The Tribunal found that, despite her denials, Ms Li You in fact had stolen the money and lost it by gambling at the Casino that evening. The Tribunal described how the relationship between Mr Jia and Ms Li You thereafter deteriorated. Ms Li You, at Mr Jia's request, moved out of his flat and into a unit occupied by a Mr Ian Kerr. However, the Tribunal found that the relationship between Mr Jia and Ms Li You continued. The Tribunal found that Mr Jia "... felt under considerable pressure because of the ambiguous "on/off" nature of his relationship with Ms Li You." The Tribunal then considered, in great detail, the events which led up to the incidents in November 1993 giving rise to the Convictions. Those events resulted in two further charges of sexual penetration by Mr Jia of Ms Li You without her consent. He was found not guilty on both of those charges, a further charge of deprivation of liberty and six other charges involving Ms Li You.

The Tribunal considered Mr Jia's present good reputation amongst his peers and friends and his good conduct while in prison. It also considered his job prospects. It noted that other than the Convictions, no past criminal conduct was alleged or relied upon by the Minister.

The Tribunal then examined the decision-making process of the respondent's delegate and considered the provisions of the Immigration Department's Procedure Advice Manual dated 21 May 1993.

I select the following paragraphs from the Tribunal's conclusions, as indicating the main bases for its determination:

"30. In view of the jury's findings and the Judge's sentence, the applicant must have gone beyond what is permissible in the sometimes stormy "give and take" of lovers' quarrels. Nevertheless, the applicant's past criminal conduct is all related to this one stage of this one relationship and does not indicate a long-term tendency to violence, criminal conduct or anti-social sexual behaviour. On the contrary, when the totality of his relationship with Li You is considered, terms like "over tolerant", "weak", "naive", "insecure" seem more applicable to him rather than "oppressive", "violent", "violating", "cruel" or "criminal".

...

38. The applicant's prison record indicates that he has consistently demonstrated good conduct, has applied himself to his studies and to work activities, and has always been respectful to prison staff. A psychological assessment found that he was not in need of treatment as a sexual offender as his offences had been "situational" and not indicative of any continuing pattern. The Tribunal agrees with this assessment but notes that he was required to attend a course on controlling aggression.

39. During approximately 12 months after the offences, while the applicant was free on bail awaiting trial, he obtained legal employment, worked industriously, lived quietly and without trouble, formed a loving and respectful relationship with Anoosh Taidi and her family and paid back to his friends the $5,000 bond which had been forfeited. He proved to be a good member of the Australian society during this period, and retained the respect of his friends and supporters, many of whom gave impressive evidence on his behalf.

...

The Tribunal finds that there is no significant likelihood of undue harm to the Australian community of the applicant re-offending or engaging in further unacceptable conduct in Australia.

41. Insofar as they indicate the purpose behind the legislation regarding deportation, the Tribunal has also studied the matters set out in subsection (1) of s.501 of the Act and is satisfied that none of the types of undesirable conduct set out therein have any relevance to the applicant. Despite the fact that the applicant was convicted of the serious offences referred to above, after considering all the circumstances of that past criminal conduct and viewing it in the light of all the other evidence regarding his character, the Tribunal is not satisfied that, today, the applicant is a person who is not of good character, as that phrase is used in s.501 of the Act. Insofar as his previous brief period of criminal conduct may have indicated otherwise, his subsequent behaviour, and the evidence of present good
character, indicates that he has "reformed" and put those events behind him.

Decision

42. On the basis of this assessment, the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review, and remits the matter to the respondent with a direction that the applicant qualifies for obtaining a transitional (permanent) visa on the basis that he is of good character."

The Grounds of Appeal

Grounds 1 and 2

1. The Tribunal erred in law in directing itself as to the meaning of "good character" as used in s.501(2) of the Act.

2. The Tribunal erred in law in directing itself that "the nature of the circumstances of the offences of which the respondent was convicted were capable of leading to a conclusion that the respondent was a person of good character".

The Minister particularised the second of the above grounds by stating that the following circumstances were not circumstances which were capable of supporting a conclusion that the respondent is a person of good character:

. Mr Jia's subsequent behaviour or conduct;

. the time that has elapsed since the occurrence of the offences;

. the circumstances at the time of the respondent's application for the entry permit;

. the fact that the application is for a permanent visa; and

. that there is no significant likelihood of undue harm to the Australian community or of the respondent re-offending or engaging in further unacceptable conduct in Australia.

Mr G.M. McIntyre, counsel for the applicant, referred to the decision of a Full Court of this Court on the question of "good character" in Irving v. Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (not yet reported, 30 July 1996, Judgment No. 663/1996). In that case (at p.4) Davies J. said:

"It should also be observed that the term "good character" is not precise in its denotation. In one sense, it refers to the mental and moral qualities which an individual has. In another sense, it refers to the individual's reputation or repute, see Oxford English Dictionary, meanings 11, 12 and 13; The Macquarie Dictionary meanings 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Necessarily, when decisions are made in Australia under the Act in relation to persons who are overseas, greater attention tends to be given to objective facts and to reputation or repute rather than to a detailed analysis of the person's inherent qualities. I do not suggest that, in the context, "good character" refers to reputation and repute as such. It does not. But criminal convictions or the absence of them and character references are likely to be an important source of primary information. If there is a criminal conviction, the decision-maker will have regard to the nature of the crime to determine whether or not it reflected adversely upon the character of the applicant. If the conviction was in the past, the decision-maker will turn his attention to whether or not the applicant has shown that he has reformed. If persons speak well of the applicant, the decision-maker will take that into account."

At p.10 of his reasons for judgment Lee J observed:

"Unless the terms of the Act and regulations require some other meaning be applied, the words "good character" should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community. The former is an objective assessment apt to be proved as a fact whilst the latter is a review of subjective public opinion [authorities cited]. A person who has been convicted of a serious crime and thereafter held in contempt in the community, nonetheless may show that he or she has reformed and is of good character [further citation of authority]. Conversely, a person of good repute may be shown by objective assessment to be a person of bad character."

It was common ground in this matter that the application of these principles permitted the Tribunal to have regard to Mr Jia's actual mental and moral qualities as well as his
reputation. In my view, there is nothing in the Tribunal's reasons to suggest that it misdirected itself about the meaning of "good character" or that it approached the task of considering whether it was satisfied that Mr Jia is not of good character, in any manner inconsistent with what was said in Irving's case. In my opinion, the Tribunal did not err in law in the manner claimed in Ground 1 of the notice of appeal. In the end, Mr McIntyre's submission in respect of Ground 1 elided into a submission that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable to the degree referred to in cases such as Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 and Chan Yee Kin v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379. The applicant contended that the respondent having the Convictions recorded against him on 10 February 1995, resulting in a total effective sentence of 6½ years (which in the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Chief Justice had described as "very moderate"), could not be said by any reasonable person to be of good character, whether in terms of actual mental and moral qualities or by reputation.

In relation to the five sets of circumstances particularised above, Mr McIntyre said that the Tribunal had set itself "off in the wrong direction" by having regard to those matters, which are the matters set out in paragraph 8.5.12 of the Procedure Advice Manual ("PAM"). That paragraph sets out the matters to be considered by a departmental officer following an adverse character finding. The Tribunal was engaged in decision-making at the earlier stage. That is true, but it does not necessarily mean that these five sets of circumstances were incapable of supporting a conclusion that the respondent is a person of good character. For example, the first matter - Mr Jia's subsequent behaviour or conduct - is obviously most relevant to an
assessment in July 1996 of whether he is of good character. In that regard, the Tribunal noted that Mr Jia's conduct in the community after the offences during the twelve months on bail awaiting trial and later while in prison had been exemplary. In relation to the time that had elapsed since the occurrence of the offences, the Tribunal said:

"Two years and eight months has elapsed which is a significant period against which to assess a short period of atypical criminal conduct in an otherwise well behaved person."

Under the heading of "the circumstances of the person at the time of the application" the Tribunal said that those circumstances were that the respondent had a history of two years eight months of good conduct, was surrounded by supportive friends and had good prospects of employment. On the matter of the fact that the application was for a permanent visa, the Tribunal noted that this must be considered of great importance to the Australian public as well as to the applicant. Finally, on the question of undue harm the Tribunal found that there was no significant likelihood of undue harm to the Australian community of the applicant re-offending or engaging in further unacceptable conduct in Australia.

It is clear from paragraph 40 of the Tribunal's reasons that it recognised that paragraph 8.5.12 of PAM was intended to guide officers considering whether to grant a visa after an adverse character finding has been made. When that paragraph is read with paragraph 41, it can be seen that the Tribunal, at this stage of its reasoning, was assuming a situation which, in accordance with paragraph 8.5.2 of PAM, the respondent might be taken to be not of good character simply because of a sentence to imprisonment of not less than one year. Paragraph 8.5.2 of PAM states that in such a
circumstance, as a matter of policy, this would normally be taken to be so. When the Tribunal reached the conclusion expressed in the last sentence of paragraph 41, it was drawing upon all of the evidence which it had examined. It was entitled to use the check list in paragraph 8.5.12 as a convenient reference point (acknowledging as it did, the usual function of that paragraph). Insofar as the Minister relies upon the five particular circumstances above as evidencing unreasonableness of Wednesbury proportions, I reject the submission. But the submission went further than that.

Mr McIntyre contended that any one who commits offences of this type could not reasonably be regarded as a person of good character, because too short a period had expired after the commission of those offences. In those circumstances the Tribunal could not reach the above conclusion reasonably. The Tribunal had, so it was submitted, put the Convictions "at nought" contrary to the principles outlined in the decisions of Daniele; Minister for Immigration v. Gungor (1982) 5 LD 575; Degerli v. Minister for Immigration (1981) 4 ALN 39 and Beckner v. Minister for Immigration (1991) 30 FCR 49.

When considering that submission, it must be borne in mind that the test "to the satisfaction of the [Tribunal]" is a subjective one: Minister for Immigration v. Wu Shan Liang (1996) 136 ALR 481 at p.494. At the same page, four of the judges of the High Court said that:

"... while the subjective nature of the decision no longer can be said to immunise the decision from review, it is necessarily of relevance to the issue of whether there has been an error of law."

Merkel J in Simplot Australia Pty Ltd v. Nettlefold (1996) 139 ALR 371 at p.378 construed that passage as a statement that the subjective nature of the decision was an "important" element in any such review, perhaps on the basis that anything relevant is important. As Mr H.N.H. Christie, (counsel for the respondent) submitted, the true question is not whether or not the respondent is of good character, but whether the Tribunal could not be satisfied that the respondent was of good character.

I do not think that the Tribunal put the Convictions "at nought" as claimed on behalf of the applicant. The Tribunal, in the passage set out earlier in these reasons, acknowledged that it could not do this. A fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons shows that it did not do so and that this was not mere lip service. The Tribunal focused on the Convictions and the circumstances which led to those Convictions. It carefully examined all of those circumstances, and in my view, it was quite clearly entitled to do so when making an assessment of the respondent's character. It then turned to the respondent's subsequent conduct. It formed a favourable opinion about the respondent's credit. The Tribunal considered that the period of time which had expired since the commission of the offences was sufficient to make the assessment which it expressed in paragraph 41 of its reasons. I am not satisfied that no decision-maker, acting reasonably, could have arrived at that decision. Nor do I think that the Tribunal otherwise erred in law. Accordingly these two grounds are not made out.

Ground 3 - "No evidence"

The Minister maintained that the Tribunal misdirected itself in reaching a conclusion that the respondent was of good character based on facts found by inference, or
otherwise, which were not supported by evidence. Some nine factual findings were said to be "not based on the evidence". I deal below briefly, with each one.

Mr McIntyre said that the significance of these factual findings lies in the manner in which the Tribunal came to its ultimate conclusion to prefer Mr Jia's evidence over that of Ms Li You. In that regard, and in respect of each of the nine findings of fact, Mr McIntyre referred me to numerous passages in the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal which he suggested disclosed the source of the Tribunal's various alleged errors in its fact finding process, whether by inference or otherwise. In turn Mr Christie referred me to a slightly lesser number of transcript references and other pieces of evidence. There was some overlap between the two sets of references.

(a) That in order to acquire funds to support her gambling addiction, Ms Li You was involving herself in relationships with men from whom she could borrow money, including the respondent

With regard to this finding, Mr McIntyre said that "... perhaps there is not a lot of strength in this particular ground", if the reference to relationships were taken to be a reference to relationships other than of a sexual nature. It was submitted that there was simply no evidence of any such sexual relationship. The matters of Ms Li You's alleged sexual relationships, and Mr Jia's suspicions and reactions to such relationships, form the subject of complaint in relation to several of the eight other factual findings. In my view, this particular factual finding should be taken at its face value without reading anything further into the word "relationships". There is no doubt that the Tribunal made a finding substantially in the terms referred to above. I have examined the transcript references. In my opinion there was ample evidence for
this finding. First, the Tribunal referred expressly to the evidence of Mr Elio Paladino who had previously funded Ms Li You's gambling debts "in a similar way to the applicant". Secondly, there was the loan described at pp.611-612 of the transcript. Thirdly, there was the further loan of $400 by Mr Yan Li. Then there is Mr Jia's evidence of what he saw taking place between Mr Ji and Ms Li You on a sofa (transcript p.630) and his further evidence (remembering always the Tribunal's strong findings in his favour on credibility) on the next page of the transcript that Ms Li You, very shortly thereafter, explained that conduct as being due to the fact that she owed Mr Jia a few thousand dollars.

(b) Ms Li You engaged in conduct with other men which gave rise to feelings of suspicion and jealousy in the respondent

Once again there is no dispute that the Tribunal made such a finding. So far as Ms Li You's conduct is concerned, the above evidence on its own would suffice. Then there was the incident (pp.628-629) when Ms Li You had agreed to go with Mr Jia to the Casino but very shortly thereafter declined saying that Mr Ian Kerr (with whom she was then either boarding or living) refused her permission to do so. At p.674 there is evidence that Ms Li You was sleeping on the floor of Mr Kerr's bedroom, that Mr Jia "had a little bit suspect" and was ashamed of that situation. Mr McIntyre relied on Mr Jia's denial (in response to a question from the Tribunal) that in one incident he and Mr Ji had been fighting over Ms Li You. I take that into account, but applying the approach explained by Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v. Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at pp.358-360, there was clearly evidence to support this finding. As to whether there was any evidence that the conduct gave rise to feelings of suspicion and jealousy on the part of Mr Jia, the Tribunal saw Mr Jia, believed him and heard his description of how he responded to the conduct. This finding was, in my view, clearly open to the Tribunal.

(c) [Paragraph (c) was abandoned]

(d) The respondent began to suspect Ms Li You was probably involved in sexual relationships with other men to maintain herself and her gambling addiction

There was such a finding. In my view there was sufficient evidence to support it. In addition to the evidence referred to above, I would refer to Mr Jia's evidence at transcript pp.622-623 concerning Ms Li You's preference on that evening to travel home with Mr Kerr, her reluctance to visit Mr Jia's flat a short distance away and Mr Kerr's involvement in the release of $300 held by Mr Jia to Ms Li You (which she then lost at the Casino). This was money which was intended for repayment of an earlier loan obtained for gambling.

(e) The respondent suspected that Ms Li You was honouring some sort of relationship with Mr Ian Kerr rather than giving priority to himself because he faced deportation and would no longer be useful to her

Save that in its reasons the Tribunal said that Mr Jia did not "understand" or "accept" these matters rather than "suspected", the Tribunal made a finding substantially in the above terms. In my opinion, there was more than sufficient evidence to warrant this finding. I refer to the preference given by Ms Li You to Mr Kerr (pp.622-623, 628-629), Mr Jia's expression of suspicion and his reference to his difficult situation and
his trouble with immigration custody (p.674) and the evidence of Mr Zhang Zian Yang in paragraph 10 of his statutory declaration (AB 785).

(f) [Paragraph (f) was abandoned]

(g) [Paragraph (g) was abandoned]

(h) The respondent became very jealous, hurt and confused over Ms Li You's relationship with Mr Ian Kerr and with their friend Mr Ji

Again, it is clear that the Tribunal made such a finding - see paragraph 18 of the Tribunal's reasons and the factual matters set out in that paragraph. So far as Mr Jia's feelings were concerned, Mr McIntyre took me to various passages in the transcript and in particular a passage at p.638 which he said disclosed an apology "quickly given and readily accepted" by Mr Jia. I do not think that it is correct to pick out one small piece of evidence like this, in the context of all of the evidence to which I have referred above, as the main basis for a submission of "no evidence" on this point. Mr McIntyre did not, in the course of argument, take me to all of the page references in a schedule which his instructing solicitor had filed prior to the hearing of the appeal. I undertook, nonetheless, to read all of the passages in that schedule. I have done so. Many of them overlapped with pages upon which the respondent relied. In my view, there was ample evidence before the Tribunal for it to make this finding. I think it is enough for me to point to the evidence referred to, and incorporated by reference, under paragraph (b) above. There is a very considerable degree of overlap between these two findings.

(i) Ms Li You played an ambiguous role hoping to maintain a relationship with both the respondent and Mr Ji

The Tribunal made this finding. Counsel for each party referred me respectively to substantially the same passages in the transcript as those upon which they had respectively relied upon in relation to the above findings. In my opinion it was open to the Tribunal, having believed Mr Jia and disbelieved Ms Li You, to find that the latter played an ambiguous role and that she hoped to maintain a relationship with both the respondent and Mr Ji. Mr McIntyre [in relation to particular (h) above] took me to Ms Li You's evidence to the effect that she did not have a sexual relationship with Mr Ji. The problem with that is (and it flows over to this particular) that Ms Li You's evidence was disbelieved by the Tribunal. When one reads the evidence at, for example, pp.630-631 and 638, given the Tribunal's findings on credibility, one readily comes to the conclusion (as I do) that there was more than enough evidence for the Tribunal to make this finding.

(j) Just a few hours before the sexual offence of which the respondent was convicted, Ms Li You consented to the respondent having sexual intercourse with her

The Tribunal made such a finding (at AB 805). Mr McIntyre criticised the finding by saying that the Tribunal appears to have based it simply on the jury's verdict that Mr Jia was not guilty of the charge of raping Ms Li You on the evening of 29/30 November 1993. Mr McIntyre said that there could be no other explanation for this finding and it was not a necessary conclusion to be drawn from the not guilty verdict. There was a need, so it was put, for a more "focussed process of reasoning". I was tempted to dismiss that submission purely on the basis of the passage in Wu at p.491
where it was said:

"... the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed."

However, I do not do so purely on that basis. It is true that when the Tribunal first refers to that sexual incident (in paragraph 18) it refers simultaneously to the jury's verdict of not guilty. Then (at AB 805) the Tribunal refers to the fact that Ms Li You had consented to that act of sexual intercourse. This time there was no reference to the jury's verdict.

But the evidence before the Tribunal was not confined to the acquittal. There was Mr Jia's evidence about what took place. When that is coupled with the credibility findings, there is no doubt in my mind that this ground of appeal must fail.

(k) Shortly before and after the respondent had unlawfully detained Ms Li You in his flat, Ms Li You visited the respondent in the flat voluntarily

The Tribunal did make this finding (at AB 805). Insofar as it suggests that Ms Li You had visited Mr Jia's flat voluntarily on 30 November 1993, it appears inconsistent with the Tribunal having noted (at AB 800) that on that occasion she accompanied Mr Jia back to his flat as a result of a threat unlawfully to harm her (for which Mr Jia, so the Tribunal noted, was convicted).

However, when one reads the whole of paragraph 29 of the Tribunal's reasons, it is clear that the Tribunal had not forgotten the fact that Ms Li You, on that occasion, went to Mr Jia's flat as a result of threats. The distinction, drawn later in that paragraph, between "just a few hours before" and "shortly before" is to be explained, in my opinion, on the basis that the latter was a reference to earlier visits than that made on the evening of 29 November 1993. For that reason, I do not think that the complaint about this finding has been made out.

Ground 4 - Natural Justice

The Minister makes two complaints that the Tribunal denied him natural justice. The first was that the Tribunal had made findings of fact favourable to Mr Jia, and consequently against the Minister's interest, based on:

. the respondent's credibility;

. an unfavourable finding as to the credibility of Ms Li You (who was called by the Minister);

. findings as to the existence of a relationship between Ms Li You and Mr Ji; and

. findings as to the nature of that relationship based on Mr Jia's evidence,

all without allowing the applicant to proceed with "an expressed intention to call Mr Ji to give evidence in support of the applicant's case".

Counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no basis for this complaint for the following reasons:

. the Minister had been put on notice that it was an essential part of the respondent's case that there was a relationship between
Mr Ji and Ms Li You or that at the very least the respondent had reasonable grounds to suspect such a relationship. This included a reference to this matter in two versions of a statement of facts and contentions filed on behalf of the respondent;

. furthermore the respondent had given evidence before the Tribunal of what he had observed of that relationship;

. initially the Minister's counsel had told the Tribunal that he did not propose to call Mr Ji as a witness;

. when, at the end of the second day of hearing (see AB 777) counsel for the Minister told the Tribunal that he intended to call Mr Ji, there ensued an exchange between the Tribunal and counsel which, so the respondent contended, precludes the existence of any basis for a contention that the Tribunal refused to allow the Minister to proceed with his expressed intention of calling Mr Ji as a witness.

At the hearing in this Court, an affidavit was tendered (and received into evidence) sworn by the solicitor within the office of the Australian Government Solicitor having the conduct of this matter on behalf of the applicant ("the applicant's solicitor"). In that affidavit, the applicant's solicitor deposed to the fact that Mr Ji attended before the Tribunal on 25 and 26 June 1996 for the purpose of giving evidence on behalf of the applicant and that it was intended to lead evidence from Mr Ji to support the evidence of Ms Li You and to contradict the evidence of the respondent. In particular, so the applicant's solicitor deposed, it was intended to lead evidence from Mr Ji on the basis of statements to the applicant's solicitor "... that he was a married man and father, and had never at any time been involved in a sexual relationship with Ms Li You". The applicant's solicitor was not cross-examined and I accept her evidence.

I have examined the relevant passages of the transcript. The context was one where what was supposed to be a one-day hearing was into the late afternoon of a second
day. The following exchange occurred:

"MR McINTYRE: I was intending to call Mr Ji as well, just to talk about the allegation concerning his sexual involvement with You Li, because that seems to be one issue which is not covered in the trial, of course, so that ---

THE D. PRESIDENT: How far down this route can we go?

MR McINTYRE: Well, I mean, if I am content, if you indicate to me that you do not think that will be helpful to you, then I perhaps would not be bothered calling ---

THE D. PRESIDENT: Well, Mr Jia has said that eventually he became suspicious of Ji. But where is the relevance for this matter? I mean, there is a whole lot of interaction that has gone on between these people. I do not see how it is going to help me with my decision as to what sort of person Mr Jia is now and what weight I should put to the fact that he has been convicted of rape. It does not surprise me that in a relationship like this, of the type which both parties are describing, really that there is going to be thrust and counter-thrust and truths and untruths and distortions and whatever. But the fact is, Mr Jia has been convicted of the offences that he was convicted of."

It is true that, a few minutes later, when asked by the Deputy President whether he would be happy with putting in written submissions, Mr McIntyre replied in the affirmative.

However, this was in the context of the above exchange and I accept Mr McIntyre's submission that the Tribunal had told him in effect that Mr Ji's evidence would not be relevant or helpful. The test for procedural unfairness in such a situation is not simply that counsel has inferred or formed an impression or belief that a matter is not in issue or that certain evidence will have no bearing on that issue or the outcome of the proceedings. I respectfully agree with the following passage from the reasons for judgment of Mahoney ACJ in Commissioner of Police v. Anderson (not yet reported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal; CA 40469/95, 21 October 1996 at p.5):

"For there to be procedural unfairness, it will ordinarily be necessary that, by reason of what was done by the Court or by a party during the proceeding, it was proper and reasonable for the parties to form that conclusion and to act upon it until the conclusion of the proceeding."

In that case the Court found no procedural unfairness but the facts were, in my opinion, clearly distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case.

In this matter I think that it was proper and reasonable for the Minister's counsel to form the impression that the Tribunal did not regard the matter of Mr Ji's alleged sexual involvement with Ms Li You as being of any relevance to its decision. I have concluded from reading the Tribunal's decision that, contrary to the impression created at the hearing, it did rely to a significant extent on a finding of a relationship between Mr Ji and Ms Li You. I refer in particular to the findings at (h) and (i) above and more generally those at (a) and (b) above. I accept also that the Tribunal based its conclusion on a comparison of the credibility of Mr Jia and Ms Li You. In those circumstances, Mr Ji's evidence could have played a part in both the determination of that credibility and, in turn, the respondent's character.

It is easy to see how such a situation came about when one appreciates the context of a case where an applicant was represented by a lay person, the hearing had lasted twice as long as anticipated, the hour was late and counsel was not available the following day. But this does not, in my view alter what I consider to have been an unwitting procedural unfairness to the applicant.

The applicant's second complaint of denial of natural justice was that the Tribunal had regard to prison records in reaching its decision, being records which were not made available to the Minister for consideration of their content, in order to enable the Minister to address that content at the hearing. I shall refer to those records as "the Corrective Services file".

In summary, the respondent's contentions at the hearing in regard to this complaint were as follows:

. if the Tribunal had regard to the Corrective Services file, this did not amount to a breach of natural justice; but even if it were a breach of natural justice, it was a trivial matter for which it was not appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to allow the appeal;

. the Tribunal was entitled to inform itself of any matter as it thought fit - a reference to s.33(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ("the AAT Act");

. the respondent, in his statement of facts and contentions had referred to his prison history and said that a report could be obtained from the prison, although he was unable to do so;

. the respondent had given evidence at the hearing that he had not been required to undertake a sex offenders programme but had completed an aggression control course;

. the respondent was not cross-examined about his conduct either while he was on bail or while in prison;

. the Corrective Services file would appear to be little more than a confirmation of the above, and it was necessary for the applicant to show that he had been caught by surprise by the Tribunal's reliance on information of which he was unaware; and

. even if there had been a breach of natural justice, it was normally necessary for the applicant to put before the Court the response which he would have made if the material on which the Tribunal relied had been referred to him.

The applicant's solicitor also dealt with this matter in her affidavit. In essence she swore that neither the applicant nor its counsel had been advised of the existence of, or obtaining by the Tribunal of, any reports or documents from the Ministry of Justice. In view of events which transpired after I reserved judgment in this matter, I shall not refer further to that evidence.

During the course of the hearing, I invited counsel's views about whether I should read the Corrective Services file. Mr Christie, for the respondent, said that I should read the file but Mr McIntyre said that I would be able to dispose of this point without reading the file. In the end, I made the Corrective Services file available to both counsel (but only to counsel) for their perusal and invited counsel to address me further when they had done that.

Following such perusal, Mr McIntyre said that it was difficult to know whether it would have made any difference to the applicant's case if he had had access to the Corrective Services file at the hearing before the Tribunal. He did not know what the Minister might have said about its contents.

After I had reserved my judgment in this matter, the applicant's solicitor found a letter dated 21 June 1996 from the Tribunal to the Australian Government Solicitor enclosing a copy of a confidentiality order in relation to the Corrective Services file. These were documents which the applicant's solicitor had sworn neither she nor counsel nor the applicant were aware of. The parties advised my associate of this turn of events. I then asked the parties whether they were able to agree upon the facts of this particular
matter. They were able to do so and, on 3 December 1996, filed a memorandum of agreed facts. That memorandum was substantially in the following terms:

1. In the respondent's "Further Statement of Facts and Contentions" dated 10 April 1996 and filed at the Tribunal, he sought the Tribunal's assistance to obtain certain prison reports relating to him.

2. At a telephone directions hearing on 30 April 1996 before the Tribunal, which was attended by the applicant's solicitor, the respondent and Mr McKay, Mr McKay indicated to the Tribunal that he had been unable to obtain copies of reports from the prison as to the results of considerations for the respondent's participation in a sex offender treatment program and a general prison report/file relating to the behaviour of the respondent in prison.

3. The learned Deputy President stated that the Tribunal would seek to obtain such reports.

4. At a further directions hearing before the Tribunal on 13 June 1996, the learned Deputy President stated that the reports had been requested by the Tribunal on 7 May 1996 but had not been received. He stated that the Tribunal would again seek to obtain the reports.

5. Between 13 June and 21 June 1996 the Tribunal received from the State Ministry of Justice, the Bunbury Prison Corrective Services file relating to the respondent together with representations from that Ministry that the file be kept confidential.

6. By order made on 21 June 1996 the Tribunal made a Non Disclosure Order which (omitting formal parts) was in the following terms:

"1. Being satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of the evidence, the Tribunal, pursuant to section 35(2)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, prohibits the disclosure to any other person other than:

- Tribunal members and staff necessarily involved in the processing of this application;

of the following documents received in evidence by the Tribunal in relation to the proceedings:

- The applicant's Corrective Services File held by the Ministry of Justice ("the confidential documents").

2. If an Order is made by the Tribunal to disclose the confidential documents to the applicant, the confidential documents shall be edited to remove the names and other identifying features of staff members of the Ministry of Justice."

7. By letters dated 21 June 1996 the Tribunal forwarded to both the respondent and to the Australian Government Solicitor copies of the Non Disclosure Order and also six further pages of documents relating to the respondent's academic records and educational courses apparently undertaken whilst in prison.

8. The Non Disclosure Order was received by the Australian Government Solicitor on behalf of the applicant and was seen by the applicant's solicitor and counsel prior to the hearing before the Tribunal on 25 June 1996. However it was assumed by the applicant's solicitor and counsel that the Order referred to, and only to, the documents attached to it rather than to a separate prison file.

9. The Non Disclosure Order and the "Corrective Services file" referred to therein was not specifically referred to by either party or by the Tribunal during the course of the hearing on 25 and 26 June 1996.

On 5 December 1996 the parties told my associate that they were agreeable to my making directions for the filing of further written submissions on this particular matter. I made those directions and the parties have filed those submissions.

In written submissions filed on his behalf, the applicant submits that the fact that the circumstances (referred to in paragraph 8 above) were such as to allow for the incorrect assumption about the documents i.e. that the Non Disclosure Order referred only to the six documents attached to it, were sufficient to amount to a denial to him of procedural fairness. Counsel's wrong assumption, so it was put, was distinguishable from the incorrect inference drawn by counsel in Commissioner of Police v. Anderson. Even a correct assumption by counsel for the applicant about the documents, the subject of the Non Disclosure Order, or their content, so it was submitted, would not necessarily have put the applicant on notice that the Tribunal would consider the content of those documents in arriving at its decision or have given the applicant an opportunity to respond to or comment on the documents. The applicant cited Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Torres Strait Islander v. State of Western Australia & Ors
(Federal Court of Australia, Full Court, not yet reported, 28 May 1996, Judgment No. 395/1996) ("Djaigween") in support of this proposition. The applicant contended that procedural fairness demanded that the Tribunal make the applicant aware of the content of the Corrective Services file and give him an opportunity to deal with it because it was -

(a) against the applicant's interests;

(b) credible;

(d) of likely significance.

The applicant relied on Kioa v. West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at p.628; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 and South Australia v. O'Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378 at pp.389, 403 and 409-410; and Djaigween (at pp.25-26).

In response, the respondent says that the applicant had notice from the Tribunal prior to the hearing on 25 June 1996 that it (the Tribunal) had received the Corrective Services file concerning the respondent into evidence and that the Tribunal had prohibited disclosure of that file to any person other than the Tribunal and its staff. The respondent claimed that there was no ambiguity in the Non Disclosure Order. The respondent submitted that the documents attached to that order could not have been "the Corrective Services file". This was because, as disclosure had been prohibited, a copy of the file could not be sent to either party with the order. Secondly, the documents attached did not remotely resemble "a Corrective Services file". The respondent submitted that there had been a misunderstanding which was
entirely the fault of the applicant. In those circumstances, it could not be said that the applicant had been denied natural justice, when he had failed to realise what evidence was before the Tribunal. The applicant had, so it was put, ample opportunity at the hearing to correct any misunderstanding on his part. The respondent submitted that to find that there had been a breach of procedural fairness in these circumstances "would mean that no judgment would ever be final". As counsel for the applicant had an opportunity to inspect the Corrective Services file during the hearing of the appeal before this Court, the applicant had to show at least that there was a possibility that the applicant would have responded to or made use of the offending material. Counsel for the applicant had not done this. Finally, it was submitted that there was nothing in the file which raised any new issue or from which any additional cross-examination or submissions could reasonably arise. Accordingly, the respondent submitted that for the appeal to succeed on this ground "would be an exercise in futility".

The applicant's reply to those submissions stated that neither the applicant's solicitor nor any officer of the applicant has inspected the Corrective Services file and no instructions had been given to the applicant's counsel as to any use that could have been made of the material. The applicant says that it is not in a position to make a proper assessment of the material and does not concede that no use could or would have been made of it.

The respondent's behaviour while in prison was obviously a matter which the Tribunal regarded as of substantial importance in reaching its conclusion. For example, I refer to paragraph 38 which is set out earlier (at p.8) in these reasons.

I have read the Corrective Services file. Having done so, I can understand fully why the information contained on that file may have been a substantial factor in the Tribunal's decision-making process.

In Djaigween the Full Court, agreeing with the decision at first instance, confirmed (at p.32) that applicants for judicial review do not need to show that matters which they have not had the opportunity to contradict did in fact work to their prejudice.

I think that, in all the circumstances, procedural fairness required the Tribunal to tell counsel for both parties that it intended to have regard to the contents of the Corrective Services file when making its decision. I consider that in those circumstances it would have been very likely that counsel for each party would have sought and been granted access to the file on a confidential basis. There is a handwritten document on the file itself, suggesting that course as being acceptable to the Ministry of Justice. The transcript of proceedings before the Tribunal shows that, as is usual, at the start of the proceedings the matter of what documents were in evidence was dealt with. For example, the documents prepared in accordance with s.37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (colloquially referred to as "the T documents") were specifically referred to. Later three other documentary exhibits were tendered and received into evidence, marked as Exhibits A1, A2 and A3. There was no mention of the Corrective Services file and it was not admitted into evidence as an exhibit, even as an exhibit to be kept confidential. It is true that the Non Disclosure Order refers to "... the following documents received in evidence by the Tribunal." But that Order had attached to it six documents all of which were headed with a fax heading which
read "Bunbury Regional Prison". The first document was also headed "Department of Corrective Services". It seems to me that it was quite possible that the Order was mistakenly drafted, in that it referred to the Corrective Services file as received in evidence rather than "lodged with the Tribunal" being another relevant alternative referred to in s.35(2)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). By having the six documents (referred to above) attached to it, the Non Disclosure Order was sending what could fairly be described as a "mixed signal". I reject the respondent's contention that any misunderstanding was entirely the fault of the applicant's solicitor and counsel.

In final written submissions in reply, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that disclosure of the Corrective Services file to the Minister could not possibly have made any difference to the conduct of the hearing or to the result. I am unable to make such a finding on the materials before me. I cannot rule out as a reasonable possibility, the likelihood that the Minister would have sought to cross-examine Mr Jia on matters contained in the Corrective Services file or have otherwise responded to that information. It may be that after the Minister has had full access to the Corrective Services file and has taken whatever consequential steps he chooses, the result of the proceedings before the Tribunal will be the same. However, I cannot rule out as a possibility, that the result may be different: Stead v. State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141. This situation appears to have arisen due to an unfortunate communication breakdown. The equally, if not more unfortunate, result is an inadvertent denial of procedural fairness.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, I consider that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in both of the abovementioned respects. The parties were agreed that if I so found, the decision should be set aside and remitted to an identically-constituted Tribunal for further consideration. There will be orders accordingly. In view of the fairly limited degree of success on the applicant's part, my provisional view is that there should be no order as to costs. However, I will hear counsel on that matter.

I certify that this and the preceding thirty-two

(32) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for

Judgment of Justice Carr.

A/g Associate:

Date: 20 December 1996

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G.M. McIntyre

Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr H.N.H. Christie

Solicitor for the Respondent: Legal Aid W.A.

Date of Hearing: 11 November, 1996

Date of Judgment: 20 December, 1996

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