Federal Court of Australia
Marlton Group Pty Ltd v Villawood Management Pty Ltd [2026] FCAFC 147
Appeal from: | Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Group Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1429 |
File number(s): | VID 1257 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | THAWLEY, ABRAHAM AND SHARIFF JJ |
Date of judgment: | 20 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from orders releasing the first respondent from the Harman undertaking in order to provide certain documents to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) – where the applicants would suffer substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused because the confidentiality of the documents protected by the Harman undertaking would be destroyed – where possibility of substantial injustice outweighed the low level of doubt about the correctness of the primary judge’s decision and the fact that it was on a matter of practice and procedure – observations made about the relevance of the applicable standard of appellate review – held: leave to appeal granted PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where the documents in respect of which the Harman release was granted appeared to show that the second applicant created and propounded as genuine, including in Court proceedings, a false document in order to obtain a financial advantage of between $6 million and $9 million – where that conduct arguably constituted the Commonwealth offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice and fabricating evidence and the Victorian offence of attempting to obtain a financial advantage by deception – where the primary judge regarded the investigation of the possible commission of those offences as justifying the release from the Harman undertaking in order to provide documents to the AFP – where the conduct of the second applicant was also, in part, the subject matter of criminal contempt proceedings brought by the first respondent against the second applicant and one of his daughters – whether the primary judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to the concurrent contempt proceedings – where the public interest in investigation of the conduct by the AFP was not exhausted by the contempt proceedings – where contempt charges and the Commonwealth and Victorian statutory offences served different purposes and had different potential consequences – where possibility of double punishment was a remote contingency that could likely be avoided – held: primary judge did not err by giving insufficient weight to concurrent contempt proceedings PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where other grounds of appeal alleged failure of primary judge to give sufficient weight to: the extant civil proceedings; the existence of documents not subject to the Harman undertaking; the likelihood of an AFP investigation; the significance of the Court’s own power to refer matters to the AFP; and the significance of a possible stay of the extant civil proceedings resulting from criminal charges being brought – where the applicants also contended that error could be inferred from the result of the primary judge’s exercise of discretion – where a fair reading of the primary judge’s reasoning showed he weighed appropriately each of the matters complained about by the applicants – where the result did not itself bespeak error – held: primary judge did not err |
Legislation: | Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 8 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 36, 43, Pt IB Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 82 |
Cases cited: | Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; 148 CLR 170 Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd v Pacific Corporation Limited (No 2) [2009] WASC 207 Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2016] FCA 550; 343 ALR 351 Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; 161 CLR 98 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21; 112 CLR 483 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Marshall Bell Hawkins Ltd [2003] FCA 833 Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476 Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2018] VSC 666 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; 186 CLR 541 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (No 2) [2003] VSCA 43; 8 VR 571 Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; 188 CLR 501 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; 256 CLR 375 Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1 Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 340; 99 NSWLR 229 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman [1995] HCA 19; 183 CLR 10 Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46; 250 CLR 303 Farm Transparency International Limited v The Game Meats Company of Australia Pty Ltd [2026] HCA 42 Glencore Coal Pty Limited v Franks [2021] FCAFC 61; 284 FCR 622 GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32; 280 CLR 442 Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377 Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; 235 CLR 125 Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Limited [1991] FCA 354; 29 FCR 576 House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 1392; 100 ATR 244 Kanyan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] HCA 52; 426 ALR 613 Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; 256 FCR 90 Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd [2005] FCAFC 3; 218 ALR 283 Lovell v Lovell [1950] HCA 52; 81 CLR 513 Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny [2005] 1 WLR 104 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 Moore (pseudonym) v The King [2024] HCA 30; 282 CLR 460 R v Rogerson [1992] HCA 25; 174 CLR 268 Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57; 200 CLR 386 Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 Roberts v Magistrate Gett [2026] FCAFC 3; 314 FCR 354 Slade v Slade [2010] 1 WLR 1262 Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd [1992] FCA 720; 38 FCR 217 State Government Insurance Office (Q) v Biemann [1983] HCA 34; 154 CLR 539 The King v HCZ [2026] HCA 24; 100 ALJR 1019 Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc [2014] FCAFC 60; 222 FCR 387 Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Group Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 980 Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Group Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1429 Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Investments Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1361 Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; 142 CLR 531 Websyte Corporation Pty Ltd v Alexander [2012] FCA 69; 205 FCR 217 Witham v Holloway [1995] HCA 3; 183 CLR 525 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Victoria |
National Practice Area: | Commercial and Corporations |
Sub-area: | Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance |
Number of paragraphs: | 151 |
Date of hearing: | 16 November 2026 |
Counsel for the applicants: | Mr J S Graham KC with Mr R Chaile and Ms C Dawes |
Solicitor for the applicants: | Mills Oakley |
Counsel for the first respondent: | Mr J W S Peters KC with Mr N Walter |
Solicitor for the first respondent: | Clayton Utz |
Counsel for the second respondent: | The second respondent did not appear |
ORDERS
VID 1257 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | MARLTON GROUP PTY LTD First Applicant ANTHONY RONALD JOHNSON Second Applicant | |
AND: | VILLAWOOD MANAGEMENT PTY LTD First Respondent WALLAN PASTORAL PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WALLAN PASTORAL UNIT TRUST Second Respondent | |
order made by: | THAWLEY, ABRAHAM AND SHARIFF JJ |
DATE OF ORDER: | 20 November 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicants be granted leave to appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THAWLEY J:
Introduction
1 On 30 September 2026, a judge of this Court granted Villawood Management Pty Ltd leave to provide certain documents to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for the purposes of the AFP considering whether to investigate (and investigating) the possible commission of criminal offences by Mr Anthony Ronald Johnson. Mr Johnson and an associated company, Marlton Group Pty Ltd, seek leave to appeal from the primary judge’s orders.
2 The documents the subject of the primary judge’s orders had been obtained by Villawood through compulsory processes in the proceedings. It followed that Villawood’s use of the documents was subject to a substantive legal obligation – often described as an implied undertaking (or Harman undertaking) binding a party that obtains compulsory disclosure (and other recipients of the documents) – not to use those documents, without the leave of the Court, for any purpose other than that for which disclosure of the documents was given, unless the documents have been received into evidence – see: Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; 235 CLR 125 at [96]; Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280.
3 The obligation on a party to discover documents which contain information that may assist another party or might damage the disclosing party’s case is in the public interest, notwithstanding it involves an inroad upon the right of a person to keep his or her own documents private, because it helps the Court ascertain the truth and do justice between the parties – see: Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46; 250 CLR 303 at [44]. Likewise, obtaining documents from a party pursuant to a notice to produce, or from third parties under subpoena, promotes the public interest in discovering the truth. The public interest in disclosure is to be weighed against the public interest in preserving privacy and protecting confidential information: Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 at 895–6; Expense Reduction at [44]. One means by which the law reconciles those competing public interests is by imposing a substantive legal obligation on any recipient of a compulsorily disclosed document not to use the document for any purpose other than that for which disclosure was made – see: Hearne at [3], [102], [105]–[108].
4 An applicant seeking leave to use documents subject to the Harman undertaking for a purpose other than that for which disclosure was given must show “special circumstances”; that is, that there are circumstances which justify leave being granted to use the documents for a purpose other than that for which disclosure was made, contrary to the usual position and notwithstanding the consequential loss of confidentiality: Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Limited [1991] FCA 354; 29 FCR 576 at 579; Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd [1992] FCA 720; 38 FCR 217 at 225; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman [1995] HCA 19; 183 CLR 10 at 37; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Marshall Bell Hawkins Ltd [2003] FCA 833 at [9]–[11]; Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd [2005] FCAFC 3; 218 ALR 283 at [31].
5 Various courts have recognised that the public interest in disclosure of information relevant to the investigation and prosecution of a criminal offence can override the public interest in the preservation of confidentiality in compulsorily disclosed documents: Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476; Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd v Pacific Corporation Limited (No 2) [2009] WASC 207; Websyte Corporation Pty Ltd v Alexander [2012] FCA 69; 205 FCR 217; Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2016] FCA 550; 343 ALR 351; Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2018] VSC 666; Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny [2005] 1 WLR 104; see also: Marshall Bell at [15]. Each case necessarily turns on its own particular facts.
6 In Bailey, Lee J granted leave to the plaintiff to provide certain documents to the National Crime Authority (NCA), the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the AFP. His Honour approached the question of whether to grant leave by balancing competing factors in order to determine if the public interest is best served by granting a release from the undertaking: at 487.38–40. His Honour observed that the Court must exercise a value judgment to determine where the public interest lies: at 487.41–42. His Honour approached the issue by weighing two competing public interests: that involved in the due administration of the civil law insofar as it depended upon the protection of a party’s right to the privacy and confidentiality of his or her own documents; and that involved in the location and prosecution of criminal offenders: at 488.1-7. The primary judge approached the matter in this way. There was no dispute between the parties at first instance, or on this application for leave to appeal, as to the applicable principles relevant to whether a release should be granted – see: J[11]–[21].
The circumstances in which the release from the implied undertaking was given
7 The relevant factual background may be found in three decisions:
(a) The decision of Anderson J in Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Group Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 980 (Villawood 1). In Villawood 1, delivered on 21 August 2025, Anderson J acceded to Villawood’s application to inspect certain documents over which legal professional privilege had been claimed. His Honour concluded that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the communications effected by the documents had been made for some illegal or improper purpose, such that privilege did not attach to the communications, in accordance with the principles explained in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; 188 CLR 501 at 514.
(b) The decision of Anderson J in Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Investments Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1361 (Villawood 2), delivered on 17 September 2026. On 25 March 2026, seven months after Villawood 1, Mr Johnson (and entities related to him) discovered 17 further documents. These included emails and draft development management agreements (DMAs) that should have been produced in October 2024. After those documents were produced, Villawood instituted criminal contempt proceedings against Mr Johnson and one of his daughters. Anderson J recused himself from hearing these contempt applications by reason of his findings in Villawood 1.
(c) The primary judge’s decision in Villawood Management Pty Ltd v Marlton Group Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1429 (J). The primary judge had before him the documents that had been before Anderson J in Villawood 1 and others including those discovered on 25 March 2026. After examining the documents in detail, the primary judge concluded that some suggested criminal conduct. They appeared to disclose a deliberate attempt by Mr Johnson, over an extended period, to create a document and falsely propound it as genuine (the 2012 DMA), including by giving false instructions to his lawyers, in order to obtain a financial advantage of between $6 million and $9 million: J[83]–[84].
8 The underlying events can be summarised in the following way. Twenty years ago, Mr Johnson was invited by Villawood’s then sole director, Mr Rory Costelloe, to participate in various business projects undertaken by Villawood: Villawood 1 at [9]. Through associated entities, Mr Johnson acquired shares in Villawood and in a related company. Mr Johnson later became a director of both companies.
9 Ten years ago, Villawood and its shareholders entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement requiring cooperation in Villawood’s business, faithfulness in dealings with Villawood and other shareholders, and abstention from conduct prejudicial to Villawood’s interests: Villawood 1 at [15]. Clause 17 of that agreement established a default procedure under which an uncured default suspended the defaulting shareholder’s rights and triggered a compulsory share-acquisition process: Villawood 1 at [16].
10 Mr Costelloe, Mr Johnson and various associated persons and entities engaged in a number of business projects together. These included the development of land acquired in 2010 by Wallan Pastoral Pty Ltd as trustee for a unit trust and the development of land referred to as “Marriott Waters”: Villawood 1 at [11]–[13].
11 Villawood contends that it stood to earn substantial fees in respect of the management of the relevant projects.
12 At a meeting on 23 or 24 February 2023 of unitholders in the trust of which Wallan Pastoral was trustee, Mr Johnson represented that a development management agreement had been entered into with his family company, Marlton, in 2012 and that Marlton would be seeking a fee pursuant to that DMA: Villawood 1 at [19]–[20]; J[27]–[30].
13 Mr Lockwood, one of the unitholders, had not previously been aware of any “2012 DMA”: J[30]. On 18 April 2023, one of Mr Lockwood’s employees requested a copy of the 2012 DMA: J[36]. Various versions were later provided.
14 Some of the 17 documents produced after Villawood 1 included metadata showing when versions of the 2012 DMA were created and modified and included annotations concerning the date and the contents of those versions: J[32]–[41]. On the findings of the primary judge, two of Mr Johnson’s daughters, Ms Beth Johnson and Ms Kara Sabo, created various versions of the “2012 DMA” between March and May 2023: J[30]–[35], [39]–[41]. Versions of the 2012 DMA provided by Marlton differed in material respects: Villawood 1 at [25]–[31]. No explanation has been given for the differences between the versions of the agreement: J[47].
15 A final version of the 2012 DMA dated “January 2012” was created on 16 April 2024: J[46]. Mr Johnson executed it on behalf of both Wallan Pastoral and Marlton.
16 If the 2012 DMA existed in 2012, it arguably entitled Marlton to substantial fees.
17 Relations between Mr Costelloe and Mr Johnson deteriorated. They, together with associated persons and entities, are now involved in seven proceedings in this Court, six commenced in 2024 and one in 2025. One of those proceedings is the Wallan Proceeding, commenced on 5 July 2024. Mr Johnson, as Wallan Pastoral’s sole director, had day-to-day control of the Wallan project, the subject of the Wallan Proceeding: Villawood 1 at [11]. Villawood alleges that:
(a) the Wallan project was governed by an agreement under which Villawood was entitled to development management fees;
(b) Mr Johnson, in breach of his duties, attempted to divert those fees to his family company, Marlton; and
(c) Mr Johnson attempted to cover up his breaches by representing that a development management agreement had been executed in 2012 when in fact no such agreement existed.
18 Another proceeding is the Marriott Waters Proceeding, concerning another development of land. Villawood alleges that Mr Johnson, in breach of his statutory and fiduciary duties, varied deeds so that part of the relevant land would be sold to an entity associated with him, thereby depriving Villawood of management fees and diverting from it an opportunity to acquire the land: Villawood 1 at [12]–[13].
19 On 27 June 2024, Villawood issued a default notice to Marlton and another entity, Calibre Holdings Pty Ltd. The default notice identified the diversion of opportunities and profits, being those now the subject of the Wallan and Marriott Waters Proceedings (amongst other things), as triggers for the default provisions under the Shareholders’ Agreement: Villawood 1 at [17]. Villawood commenced the Wallan and Marriott Waters Proceedings shortly after issuing the notice.
20 In July 2024, Mr Stuart Lewin, a solicitor at Mills Oakley, swore an affidavit (Lewin 1) on instructions from Mr Johnson stating that the 2012 DMA was executed on 12 January 2012 and explaining that it had not been disclosed at that time because no payment was due in the foreseeable future: J[53]. In November 2024, Mr Lewin swore a second affidavit (Lewin 2) withdrawing that account and stating that he now believed that the 2012 DMA was executed in 2022. The second affidavit did not explain how the first account had arisen or why Mr Lewin’s belief had changed: J[61]–[62].
21 In granting Villawood’s application to inspect privileged documents, Anderson J found that Villawood had established a prima facie case that the 2012 DMA was created in 2023, was not executed in 2022, and that Lewin 2 may have replaced one false account with another account that was false, or not full and frank: Villawood 1 at [96], [99]–[100].
22 On 7 April 2026, Villawood filed statements of charge in the Marriott Waters and Wallan Proceedings alleging two instances of criminal contempt by Mr Johnson: the first concerned instructions allegedly given in July 2024 about the execution date of the 2012 DMA (relevant to Lewin 1); the second concerned instructions allegedly given in or about November 2024 regarding the execution date of the 2012 DMA (relevant to Lewin 2). In each instance, the charge alleged that Mr Johnson knowingly gave false instructions to his legal representatives in a deliberate attempt to deceive or mislead the Court: J[111]–[112].
23 On 28 April 2026, Villawood filed a statement of charge in the Marriott Waters and Wallan Proceedings against Ms Sabo, Mr Johnson’s daughter and an employee of Marlton: Villawood 2 at [4] and [17].
24 On 9 July 2026, Villawood lodged for filing a further statement of charge in the Wallan Proceeding alleging that Mr Johnson had failed to produce 17 documents in accordance with a notice to produce dated 27 August 2024 and a Registrar’s orders of 14 October 2024: J[113].
25 The contempt applications were initially allocated to Anderson J. His Honour later recused himself from hearing those contempt applications because their subject matter overlapped with his Honour’s earlier prima facie findings concerning the 2012 DMA and because the unqualified language of those findings might cause a fair-minded observer reasonably to doubt that the same issues might be approached impartially in the contempt proceedings: Villawood 2 at [49]–[55], [62]–[65]. The contempt proceedings, which have been reallocated to a different judge, have not yet been heard.
26 Also on 9 July 2026, Villawood lodged its interlocutory application in the Wallan Proceeding seeking release from the Harman undertaking in respect of 32 documents. This was one of the interlocutory applications determined by the primary judge the subject of this application for leave to appeal. The parties agreed that the result in the Wallan Proceeding would dictate the result in each of the proceedings in which an application for release from the Harman undertaking had been made and the issues were debated primarily by reference to that proceeding: J[2].
27 Villawood sought the release with a view to it providing specified documents to the AFP for investigation of possible offences connected with (J[5]):
(a) the creation of the purported 2012 DMA and alleged false instructions to lawyers;
(b) the non-production of documents; and
(c) the alleged deletion of documents from a computer which were the subject of an extant notice to produce.
28 The primary judge released Villawood from the undertaking for 22 of the 32 documents covered by its application. Twenty of those 22 documents had not been before Anderson J. Orders were made in each of the seven proceedings. The applicants raised no issue about the form of the orders made or the fact that Villawood was not a party to each of the seven proceedings.
Leave to appeal should be granted
29 Mr Johnson’s and Marlton’s application for leave to appeal was listed to be heard together with the appeal if leave to appeal were granted.
30 It was common ground that an applicant for leave to appeal must show that the two limbs in Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398–9 are satisfied: (a) that the primary judge’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the appellate court; and (b) that, supposing the decision to be wrong, substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The limbs are cumulative and must be weighed together. For example, leave might be granted in respect of a decision attended by relatively little doubt where serious injustice would result if it were in fact wrong.
31 It was also common ground that the standard of review on any appeal would be one of judicial restraint (in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499), rather than the correctness standard (in Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; 142 CLR 531 at 552).
32 The power to release a person from a Harman undertaking is a discretionary power of considerable breadth: Liberty at [31]. The legal criterion applied tolerates a range of outcomes, rather than a unique outcome: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [49], [152]; GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32; 280 CLR 442 at [16]; Moore (pseudonym) v The King [2024] HCA 30; 282 CLR 460 at [15].
33 Exercise of the power depends upon a range of evaluative considerations and will vary according to the particular document and proposed use. Although exercise of the power affects the confidentiality protected by a substantive legal obligation owed to the Court, it is associated with the practice and procedure of the Court; powers relating to such matters are typically regarded as discretionary in the sense of tolerating a range of outcomes: The King v HCZ [2026] HCA 24; 100 ALJR 1019 at [31]; State Government Insurance Office (Q) v Biemann [1983] HCA 34; 154 CLR 539 at 549; see also: Farm Transparency International Limited v The Game Meats Company of Australia Pty Ltd [2026] HCA 42 at [27].
34 Although the proposed grounds of appeal are not so confined, each of proposed Grounds 1 to 6 includes an alleged failure to give sufficient weight to relevant considerations or a failure “properly” to take a relevant matter into account. Where the standard of review is one of judicial restraint, and the asserted error is a failure to give sufficient weight to a relevant consideration, an appellate court should not intervene merely because the appellate court might have given that consideration greater weight. Unless the primary judge considered an irrelevant matter or excluded a relevant one, inadequate weight warrants intervention only where it amounts in substance to a failure to exercise the entrusted discretion: Lovell v Lovell [1950] HCA 52; 81 CLR 513 at 519; Roberts v Magistrate Gett [2026] FCAFC 3; 314 FCR 354 at [40]. Similarly, a complaint that the primary judge failed “properly” to consider a matter must identify an error of principle, a material factual mistake or a substantive failure to consider the matter: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at [53].
35 The primary judge’s statement that certain matters had “little or no relevance” does not establish that those matters were excluded from the evaluative process: J[95]. His Honour’s reasons expressly identified and addressed the matters said to be of “little or no relevance”. In context, his Honour’s statement conveys that the matters were assessed as carrying little or no weight in the ultimate balancing or evaluation of competing considerations, not that those matters were excluded from evaluation – see: J[124].
36 Supposing the primary judge’s decision to be wrong, substantial injustice would follow if leave were refused, because any error made by the primary judge could not later be corrected: once the documents are given to the AFP, the confidentiality which the undertaking (more accurately, the substantive legal obligation) protects would be destroyed. Further, this would occur in a situation which would expose Mr Johnson to possible criminal investigation.
37 Villawood submitted that no substantial injustice would result because the Hearne obligation is owed to the Court and the Court could itself refer the material to the AFP. The existence of the referral power does not answer the second limb of Décor. No such referral had been made. It cannot be assumed that one will be made. The practical consequence of the primary judge’s orders is that the confidentiality protected by the obligation would be irreversibly lost as soon as the documents are provided to the AFP.
38 Accordingly, leave to appeal should be granted despite: (a) the primary judge’s decision being on a matter of practice and procedure (see Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; 148 CLR 170 at 177); and (b) any doubt as to the correctness of the primary judge’s decision, assessed at an impressionistic level (Kanyan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] HCA 52; 426 ALR 613 at [12], [17] and [19]), being at the lower end of the scale.
39 For the reasons which follow, the appeal should be dismissed.
Ground 1: the contempt proceedings
Summary of Ground 1
40 The primary judge accepted that the contempt charges “cover[ed] the same field” as the first two categories of conduct relied upon in support of the release application, being: (a) the creation of false documents and the giving of false instructions to Mills Oakley; and (b) the non-production of documents in response to a notice to produce and related order: J[115]. His Honour considered that this fact should not weigh heavily against release “given the obvious public interest involved”: J[116].
41 The primary judge had earlier concluded that the documents appeared to disclose a deliberate attempt, extending over a substantial period, to create the purported 2012 DMA and propound it as genuine, including through false instructions to lawyers, for the purpose of obtaining management fees estimated at between $6 million and $9 million: J[82]–[84].
42 The “obvious public interest” to which the primary judge referred was the public interest in the AFP considering whether to investigate the possible offences. Those offences included, in addition to attempting to obtain a financial advantage by deception, offences which potentially struck at the heart of the administration of justice: J[120] and [124].
43 By Ground 1, the applicants contend that the primary judge erred in concluding that Villawood’s simultaneous pursuit of criminal contempt charges, and referral of documents to the AFP for possible investigation of criminal conduct, arising from essentially the same conduct, was not a matter that should weigh heavily against making the orders to release Villawood from the Harman undertaking (the release orders).
44 The applicants contend that the primary judge failed to give sufficient weight to, or otherwise failed properly to consider:
(a) that the alleged creation and use of false documents, the alleged provision of false instructions and the alleged non-production of documents were already the subject of criminal contempt charges to be heard and determined by the Court;
(b) whether an AFP investigation would serve any material public interest additional to that served by the pending contempt proceedings;
(c) Villawood’s failure to explain why the contempt proceedings were inadequate to vindicate the public interest said to justify release;
(d) that the release was sought by a private litigant pursuing both substantive civil claims and criminal contempt charges against an opposing party; and
(e) the potential prejudice to Mr Johnson from concurrent and overlapping criminal processes concerning substantially the same conduct.
45 A proposed ground that the primary judge did not consider the interests of any other persons charged with criminal contempt arising from the same or related conduct was not addressed before this Court and is taken to have been abandoned.
46 By their written submissions, the applicants submitted that, contrary to the primary judge’s conclusion, there were three matters (which were said not to have been addressed by the primary judge) that explained why the existence of the contempt proceedings bore heavily on the balancing process, as a factor militating against the release from the Harman undertaking. These are addressed next.
The public interest was not exhausted by the contempt proceedings
47 First, the applicants submitted that:
(a) the public interest which an investigation by the AFP might serve (the detection and punishment of interference with the course of justice) was already directly engaged by the pending contempt proceedings, which are “essentially criminal in nature”, referring to Witham v Holloway [1995] HCA 3; 183 CLR 525 at 534; and
(b) accordingly, it was necessary for the primary judge to weigh whether the public interest in a criminal investigation by the AFP justified release in circumstances where the conduct would be addressed by the Court in dealing with the contempt charges in any event.
48 At the heart of the applicants’ complaint is the contention that the primary judge did not address what additional public interest would be served by a possible AFP investigation.
49 It is necessary to make two preliminary observations. First, the applicants’ characterisation of the public interest which an investigation by the AFP might serve as “the detection and punishment of interference with the course of justice”, although correct in part, is materially incomplete: AS at [18]. A statutory offence protects the public interest reflected in its elements and purposes. His Honour accepted Villawood’s submission that the relevant documents arguably disclosed three offences: the Commonwealth offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice (s 43 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) and fabricating evidence (s 36 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) and the Victorian offence of attempting to obtain a financial advantage by deception (s 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)): J[85]–[92].
50 The Victorian offence was relevant, because the AFP’s functions include investigating State offences with a federal aspect – see: Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 8(1)(baa); J[99]–[102].
51 The conduct alleged in the statements of charge against Mr Johnson overlaps most closely with the possible offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The statements of charge against Mr Johnson are formulated as: (a) knowingly giving false instructions in relation to the date of execution of the 2012 DMA; and (b) deliberately and wilfully not producing 17 documents required to be produced under a notice to produce and an order of a Registrar.
52 The statements of charge do not allege that Mr Johnson was involved in the fabrication of evidence. The particulars to the charges that Mr Johnson twice knowingly gave false instructions include an allegation that he knew the 2012 DMA was not created and signed in 2012, but not that he was involved in its creation or fabrication. Similarly, the statements of charge do not allege that Mr Johnson attempted to obtain a financial advantage by deception.
53 The second preliminary point is that, even leaving aside the differences between the possible statutory offences and the contempt charges as formulated, criminal contempt proceedings in this Court and prosecutions for statutory offences do not serve identical ends or protect identical interests.
54 Contempt is sui generis in nature and is principally concerned with protecting the due administration of justice: see Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57; 200 CLR 386 at [109]–[112]. Contempt proceedings have been described as essentially protective as to the judicial function and the role of the courts: Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; 256 FCR 90 at [95] and [97].
55 The criminal offences to which the primary judge referred are creatures of statute and protect the public interest underlying the particular offences. The offences included fabrication of evidence and attempting dishonestly to obtain a financial advantage. Those possible offences arise from substantially overlapping facts but are not coextensive with the contempt charges. They involve statutory elements and protect public interests which are not exhausted by determining the particular contempt charges alleged.
56 Returning to the applicants’ argument, the primary judge did not expressly identify at [116] the respects in which an AFP investigation might serve public interests additional to those served by the existing contempt proceedings. His Honour’s reasons are nevertheless to be read as a whole. That the primary judge saw an additional public interest being served by an AFP investigation emerges from his Honour’s separate identification of the statutory offences at J[84]–[92] and the contempt charges at J[111]–[115]. His Honour considered that additional public interest obvious: J[116].
57 Criminal contempt proceedings and a trial of a criminal charge have different functions and juridical foundations and potentially have different consequences.
58 To say that proceedings for contempt are criminal in nature is not to equate them with the trial of a criminal charge: Witham at 534. A contempt proceeding is not a prosecution on indictment or a summary prosecution for a statutory offence in the Court’s statutory criminal jurisdiction. Proceedings for criminal contempt in this Court are brought in its civil jurisdiction, although they are criminal in nature: Kazal at [95]–[104]. The same is true of contempt proceedings in the Victorian and New South Wales Supreme Courts: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; 256 CLR 375 at [35], [42]; Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 340; 99 NSWLR 229 at [38]–[40], [56]–[57].
59 The different nature of the processes is significant. First, contempt proceedings are not investigatory in nature. Like all proceedings, they are conducted in accordance with the Court’s rules, including those relating to evidence and procedure. Granting leave to provide the documents to the AFP might lead to an investigation into whether an offence has been committed. Any investigation would be carried out by an independent agency, the AFP, with the investigative tools at its disposal. An investigation might in turn lead to prosecution and trial in a court of competent jurisdiction.
60 Secondly, the contempt proceedings would determine the particular charges formulated and pursued by Villawood, an interested party. The charges are directed to the integrity of the Court’s processes for resolution of disputes. The contempt proceedings as formulated against Mr Johnson do not allege an attempt to obtain a financial advantage by deception or, at least directly, the fabrication of evidence. Any prosecution of a statutory offence would be conducted by an independent prosecuting authority.
61 Thirdly, the potential consequences may be different. Punishment for criminal contempt is directed principally, although not exclusively, to vindicating judicial authority and protecting the administration of justice: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21; 112 CLR 483 at 498; Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; 161 CLR 98 at 115. Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which governs sentencing for federal offences, does not apply when this Court punishes for contempt, although ordinary criminal sentencing considerations may inform the punishment imposed – see, for example: Kazal at [101]–[104]. By contrast, a conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction leads to the punishment prescribed for the offence determined and imposed in accordance with any applicable statutory sentencing regime.
62 The applicants submitted that Villawood advanced no contention below concerning any additional public interest served by an AFP investigation, and that the primary judge did not perform any such assessment: ARS at [5]. Rather, the applicants submitted, the primary judge decided the application on the basis of Villawood’s concession that it “did not dispute that the contempt charges cover the same field”. They submitted that Villawood should not be permitted to support the primary judge’s exercise of discretion by reference to contentions not advanced below, referring to Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1 at 7–8.
63 Villawood submitted to the primary judge that the documents suggested the possible commission of the Commonwealth and Victorian offences mentioned above. Villawood submitted that the conduct was deliberate and advertent and travelled beyond ramifications for the private rights of the parties: T29.20–30.4. Significant reliance was placed on the Victorian offence of attempting to obtain a financial advantage by deception: T16.25–18.16. That offence arose from substantially overlapping facts but was not coextensive with the contempt charges as formulated and protected a public interest extending beyond interference with the Court’s processes. Although it could have expressed the position more clearly, Villawood also submitted that the public interest served by an AFP investigation was not exhausted by the contempt proceedings: T32.9–19.
64 Further, whether the public interest protected by a contempt proceeding is coextensive with that protected by prosecution for the three possible offences mentioned is substantially a question about the nature, elements and purposes of the charges and offences. The statements of charge, statutory provisions and proposed use of the documents were all before the primary judge. Argument at first instance concerned: whether the contempt applications adequately vindicated the public interest; whether an AFP investigation would be duplicative; whether the offences involved merely private wrongs; the scope of the possible statutory offences; and the weight to be given to the public interest in investigation. To the extent Villawood has articulated its case more clearly before this Court, its submissions largely involve refinement in legal argument based on material before the primary judge, not a new factual case.
65 The possible offences and the contempt charges arose from overlapping facts but were not coextensive. It was open to the primary judge, on the material before him, to conclude (as he did) that an AFP investigation could serve public interests additional to those served by adjudication of the contempt charges as formulated.
Double punishment and Mr Johnson’s status as Villawood’s civil adversary
66 The second matter that the applicants submitted the primary judge failed to consider was that concurrent contempt proceedings and a police investigation would expose Mr Johnson to being twice pursued, and twice punished, for one course of conduct at the instance of his civil adversary.
67 The applicants referred to Websyte at [18], in which Jessup J treated it as relevant that the initiative to set in train the criminal process was taken by the applicant for relief in the substantive civil proceeding. Given the course of oral argument at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, the decision in Websyte and Mr Johnson’s status as Villawood’s civil adversary are discussed under Ground 2 below.
68 The applicants did not specifically contend before the primary judge that Mr Johnson might ultimately be punished twice for the same conduct, although they did refer to the possibility that Mr Johnson would be exposed to overlapping punitive processes. Accordingly, that specific submission was not addressed by the primary judge.
69 The applicants’ submission that the primary judge’s orders expose Mr Johnson to being twice pursued and twice punished for the same conduct does not reflect the immediate consequence of the primary judge’s orders and cannot be treated as a likely consequence of those orders. The primary judge’s orders do not commence an investigation, less still a prosecution. Those orders permit 22 documents to be provided to the AFP so that it may decide whether to investigate.
70 If criminal proceedings eventuate as a result of any investigation carried out by the AFP, then questions concerning the order in which proceedings should be determined, or whether the criminal contempt proceedings should be stayed, will arise for determination. In particular, if Mr Johnson were to be charged with the Commonwealth offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice, then this would have obvious relevance to the contempt proceedings, including to whether they should be stayed and, if they were not stayed, to any punishment imposed if the contempt charges were proved. If (which seems unlikely) overlapping conduct were ultimately established in two processes, the court imposing the later punishment would ordinarily take account of punishment already imposed so as to avoid double punishment – see: Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377 at 2381; Slade v Slade [2010] 1 WLR 1262 at [34]–[38]; Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc [2014] FCAFC 60; 222 FCR 387 at [18]–[20].
71 Accordingly, the possibility of overlapping punitive processes was a relevant potential consequence of granting the release. Its then present significance was limited by the contingencies involved. The release orders did not themselves commence an investigation or prosecution; and, if overlapping proceedings and punishment later arose, their sequencing and the avoidance of double punishment could be addressed at that stage. It was for the primary judge to weigh those circumstances with the other relevant considerations.
Villawood’s explanation for seeking the release from the Harman undertaking
72 Thirdly, the applicants contended that Villawood did not explain the necessity for a concurrent criminal investigation by the AFP when the conduct was already the subject of both civil and criminal scrutiny by the Court at the instance of Villawood.
73 They submitted:
(a) The explanation given by Villawood – that the release was sought “because of the gravity of the conduct and the fact that the conduct has continued” – did not address or explain why Villawood was pursuing both contempt charges and a concurrent criminal investigation – J[122];
(b) Villawood bore the onus of “pointing to a public interest which overrides the public interest in ensuring the confidentiality of documents obtained by way of discovery” (referring to Bailey at 491) or of demonstrating “cogent and persuasive reasons why it should be released” (referring to Holpitt at 578); and
(c) Contrary to the primary judge’s conclusion at J[122], the absence of an explanation for why Villawood was seeking to pursue a further criminal process against Mr Johnson was a matter which bore on whether Villawood had discharged that onus and which told against release, referring to British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (No 2) [2003] VSCA 43; 8 VR 571 at [53].
74 Contrary to the premise underlying the applicants’ submission, Villawood was not required to establish that an AFP investigation was “necessary”. It was required to establish special circumstances or good reasons justifying release and to confine the proposed release to what was “necessary or appropriate” in the interests of justice or the public interest: Marshall Bell at [13], referred to in Glencore Coal Pty Limited v Franks [2021] FCAFC 61; 284 FCR 622 at [28]; Liberty at [31] and [35].
75 Villawood’s explanation as to why it wanted both contempt proceedings and an AFP investigation – namely the gravity and alleged continuation of the conduct – did not identify different public interests which might be served by those different processes but provided some explanation for why it was pursuing both processes.
76 Villawood’s failure to explain more fully why it sought an AFP investigation in addition to the contempt proceedings was relevant to whether Villawood had established circumstances sufficient to warrant a release from the Harman undertaking. For the reasons already given, the documents disclosed the possible commission of the Commonwealth and Victorian offences, and the differences between adjudication of the formulated contempt charges and investigation by the AFP explained why the two processes could serve public interests that were not coextensive.
Conclusion on Ground 1
77 Villawood’s status as a private litigant, its interests in the civil proceedings, and the fact that it had instituted criminal contempt proceedings were each relevant circumstances to be weighed together with all of the relevant considerations.
78 The primary judge considered the possible offences to be “serious enough to warrant close scrutiny by the AFP”: J[124]. It was open to the primary judge to take the view that the public interest was served in permitting Villawood to refer the documents to the AFP, notwithstanding the contempt proceedings and Villawood’s interests in the proceedings. The primary judge did not treat the contempt proceedings as irrelevant or misunderstand the interrelationship between those proceedings and the release application. His Honour concluded that the overlap between the conduct charged as contempt and the first two categories of conduct sought to be referred to the AFP was not a matter that should weigh heavily against making the release orders. That conclusion was informed by his findings concerning the seriousness of the alleged conduct.
79 Although the primary judge did not expressly state that an AFP investigation would serve a public interest additional to that served by the pending contempt proceedings, that conclusion is apparent from the reasons as a whole, including his Honour’s findings concerning the nature and seriousness of the possible statutory offences, the contempt charges as formulated, his Honour’s statement that the public interest was “obvious” and his Honour’s observations concerning the public interest in investigation: J[124].
80 Ground 1 is not established.
Ground 2: the civil proceedings
Summary of Ground 2
81 Mr Johnson and Marlton contend that the primary judge failed to give sufficient weight to, or failed properly to take into account, the fact that the relevant conduct was associated with private wrongs for which civil remedies were available, including remedies already being pursued by Villawood and related parties in the seven existing proceedings: J[117]–[120].
82 Mr Johnson and Marlton observed that the conduct which would be the subject of any criminal investigation was pleaded as breaches of duty and misleading conduct which entitled Villawood to relief and was relied upon in shareholder default notices issued by Villawood: AS at [21].
83 The applicants’ oral argument addressed Grounds 1 and 2 together, emphasising Villawood’s status as the applicants’ civil adversary under Ground 2.
Consideration
84 Mr Johnson and Marlton submitted to the primary judge that the present case was “the paradigm of the case Lee J described in Bailey, namely an alleged offence that ‘essentially involve[s] the infringement of private or individual rights’, for which ‘adequate civil remedies will be available to the wronged party’”: J[119].
85 In Bailey, the plaintiff in defamation proceedings alleged that certain documents discovered by the defendants, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and a journalist, revealed the probable commission of a criminal offence or offences. The discovered material included documents which likely comprised all or part of a confidential brief given to the DPP by the AFP for the purpose of considering whether criminal charges should have been brought against the plaintiff. It was not known how this material came into the possession of the defendants. In substance, it was contended that some or all of the documents were likely obtained by the defendants through a breach of s 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) or s 60A of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth): at 480–1. The plaintiff sought, and was granted, leave to disclose the documents to the AFP, the DPP and the NCA for those bodies to investigate whether offences had been committed and, if so, by whom: at 477.
86 In balancing the various competing factors in Bailey, Lee J made a number of observations. First, his Honour observed that it is clearly in the public interest generally to bring offenders to justice: at 489.2. However, this does not mean that documents would be released in every case merely because an offence has been committed. An infringement may be of a trivial or inconsequential nature or the application for leave might be brought, not for the purpose of promoting the public interest, but rather out of malice or spite on the part of the applicant: at 486.39–42. Neither malice nor spite was asserted in the present case.
87 Secondly, his Honour emphasised that all of the circumstances must be looked at in order to determine the nature and extent of the countervailing public interest raised: at 486.50–52.
88 Thirdly, his Honour observed that adequate civil remedies may suitably serve the public interest where the wrong essentially concerns private rights, stating at 489.13–27:
There is a clear distinction to be made between offences which essentially involve the infringement of private or individual rights and offences which it may be in the public interest to uncover.
89 In this context, his Honour referred to a useful example given by senior counsel for the defendants at 489.28–35:
In the example postulated by senior counsel for the defendants, although technically a defamation may give rise to both civil and criminal proceedings, a plaintiff who wishes to vindicate himself by correcting any slur against his reputation may adequately and fully do so by way of an action for damages for defamation. The public interest having been served by the bringing of the wrong-doer to justice in a Court of law, no further or greater public interest could usually be served by the bringing of criminal proceedings.
90 Fourthly, his Honour compared that example with the position where no adequate civil remedy could be pursued and where criminal proceedings were the exclusive or perhaps superior means of protecting the public interest: at 489.36–40. In Bailey, the only possible remedy lay with the criminal authorities and that was a factor which weighed in the applicant’s favour: at 489.48–49.
91 Fifthly, his Honour observed that the offences, if committed, were ones which were “serious enough to warrant the close scrutiny of the authorities”: at 489.49–50. He observed that the provisions referred to had, as their evident intention, the maintenance of confidence in the executive arm of government, in particular in relation to the impartial investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct. He observed at 490.2–7:
Unauthorised disclosure of documents prepared in the course of and relating to criminal prosecutions has, in my opinion, the certain and serious ability to undermine public confidence in the criminal process and, as this case demonstrates, the potential that serious damage may be caused to persons the subject of those investigations, particularly where no prosecution results [as was the case in Bailey].
92 Sixthly, his Honour emphasised that the offences were of a nature which one might readily expect may not be easily detectable by the relevant authorities: at 490.7–8.
93 Having referred to the seriousness of the offences and the fact that the offences were ones which might not readily come to light, his Honour stated: “These factors point strongly to the conclusion that there is a strong public interest to be served by the investigation of activity of this kind”: at 490.9–11.
94 The primary judge disagreed with the applicants’ submission that the present case was the paradigm of the case Lee J described in Bailey as one which “essentially involve[s] the infringement of private or individual rights”. His Honour observed that, although the conduct that Villawood sought to be investigated arose in the context of private litigation, that did not make the potentially criminal conduct a private matter: J[120]. The primary judge stated that the matters raised by the release applications before him had the potential to strike at the heart of the administration of justice, referring to R v Rogerson [1992] HCA 25; 174 CLR 268 at 280 where Brennan and Toohey JJ stated:
… The course of justice is perverted (or obstructed) by impairing (or preventing the exercise of) the capacity of a court or competent judicial authority to do justice. The ways in which a court or competent judicial authority may be impaired in (or prevented from exercising) its capacity to do justice are various. Those ways comprehend, in our opinion, erosion of the integrity of the court or competent judicial authority, hindering of access to it, deflecting applications that would be made to it, denying it knowledge of the relevant law or of the true circumstances of the case …
95 The fact that Villawood was already pursuing civil remedies was relevant because those remedies might address the economic consequences (assuming there to be such consequences) of Mr Johnson’s alleged conduct for Villawood (and other relevant parties). In this regard, it might be noted that, on 29 October 2024 – between Lewin 1 and Lewin 2 – Wallan Pastoral and Marlton agreed to terminate the 2012 DMA pursuant to a Deed of Termination of Development Management Agreement, Mr Johnson signing for Wallan Pastoral and for Marlton: Villawood 1 at [42]. The parties did not refer to this in their chronologies or submit that it had any significance to the issues, including whether Marlton maintained a claim for fees under the 2012 DMA before it was terminated.
96 In any event, assuming that there are economic consequences of Mr Johnson’s conduct, and that those consequences are to be addressed in the civil proceedings, that does not mean that the investigation of possible statutory offences could not serve a separate public interest. Bailey does not stand for the proposition that the availability of a civil remedy precludes release unless criminal proceedings are the exclusive means of vindicating the public interest. The availability of an adequate civil remedy is relevant because it may show that the public interest arising from a private wrong can be served without collateral use of protected documents. Conversely, one or more factors may nevertheless favour release, including: the seriousness of the possible offence; the public interest protected by the offence; the prospect that the conduct would otherwise evade investigation; and the identity of the proposed recipient.
97 The applicants emphasised that, in Bailey, the possible offences were ones which might not be easily detectable by the relevant authorities, whereas in the present case, the conduct was at least partially identified in Villawood 1. Villawood 1 did not consider whether any offence had arguably been committed and was undertaken for the confined purpose of deciding whether to allow inspection of privileged documents. Villawood 1 could not alert the AFP to the analysis of the released documents undertaken by the primary judge, most of which were not before Anderson J. Those documents included draft DMAs, metadata and communications which led the primary judge to reach conclusions which went beyond those made by Anderson J in Villawood 1 – see: J[84]; Villawood 1 at [96]–[100].
98 As mentioned, in relation to Villawood’s position as Mr Johnson’s civil adversary, the applicants relied on Websyte. Websyte developed internet websites and engaged in advertising. It alleged that the respondents, whilst employed by Websyte, took steps to establish a business for the marketing and sale of printer cartridges over the internet and that they reproduced Websyte’s software for use in their business. This was said to give rise to infringements of copyright under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), breaches of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), breaches of employment contracts, breaches of equitable duties of confidence and trespass: Websyte at [2].
99 Websyte commenced proceedings to obtain a search order (an Anton Piller order) on an express undertaking not to use any information obtained as a result of the execution of the order for the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding other than the proceeding in which the order was made, unless the Court granted leave: at [3].
100 After inspecting documents obtained after execution of the order, Websyte (by its director Mr Meyers) informed Victoria Police that it wished to press charges under s 247G of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), which concerns unauthorised access to or modification of restricted data held in a computer: Websyte at [5].
101 Websyte then filed a Statement of Claim in the proceeding which included extracts from documents obtained under the search order: Websyte at [6]. Shortly after, Mr Meyers met with the detective handling the investigation, provided him with the Statement of Claim and discussed the possibility of Websyte seeking a release from its undertaking so that it could provide information obtained under the search order to the police, telling the detective that “the information obtained at the Anton Piller search may be useful for them, for their investigation”: Websyte at [8].
102 Websyte then applied for the release, relying upon an affidavit given by the detective, who was by that time investigating the respondents for possible offences under s 247G of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and under s 132AJ of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
103 Jessup J referred to the various factors set out in Liberty at [31] and the decision of Lee J in Bailey. In particular, Jessup J set out the passage in Bailey where Lee J had observed that there is a clear distinction to be made between offences which essentially involve the infringement of private or individual rights and offences which it may be in the public interest to uncover: Websyte at [15]. His Honour stated that the offences being investigated “correspond with civil wrongs in relation to which the applicant sues in this proceeding” and that, in substance, what was now being considered was “the addition of a criminal sanction to the civil remedies which are available here”: Websyte at [17]. Jessup J considered that the offences being investigated involved the infringement of private or individual rights rather than involving conduct which injured or damaged the community which it may be in the greater public interest to uncover: Websyte at [17].
104 Having made those observations, his Honour immediately continued – in the sentence particularly relied upon by the applicants – by stating that “[a] related consideration is that the initiative to set in train the criminal process with respect to the conduct of the respondents was taken by the applicant itself”: at [18]. His Honour described this factor as being of “some relevance”.
105 Jessup J considered further matters relevant. His Honour considered that the Statement of Claim was provided by Mr Meyers to the detective not solely for the purpose of the proceeding and was, therefore, provided contrary to the undertaking which Mr Meyers had given to the court in obtaining the search order: Websyte at [21]. This was seen to compromise the applicant’s position in seeking a favourable exercise of the Court’s discretion. It also affected the detective’s evidence because that evidence depended in part upon information provided to the detective in breach of an undertaking given to the court.
106 Further, Jessup J was “influenced” by the fact that the applicant might instead have taken the matter directly to the police, who themselves might have used the conventional search procedures for which the criminal law provides to obtain the documents: Websyte at [23]. His Honour noted that such a procedure would have left the applicant without control over the proceeding and would be unlikely to have produced such sweeping and immediate access to the respondents’ documents as the applicant obtained under the search order. By adopting the course it did, the applicant obtained direct and exceptional relief at the cost of express “categorical undertakings”. His Honour considered that the court should not “give any currency to the notion that search orders can be used as what might be, in effect, the first of a two-step process in which, if the documents so recovered appeared to be incriminating, the second step might involve a criminal prosecution for what is essentially the same delict”.
107 After weighing all the considerations, his Honour refused release from the express undertaking which Websyte had given to secure its Anton Piller order: at [24].
108 In the present case, the possible offences are not confined to conduct injuring Villawood’s private economic interests. The offences include alleged fabrication of evidence and attempted perversion of the course of justice. Villawood had not executed an Anton Piller order in place of an available police process. Rather, the documents were obtained through compulsory processes in existing proceedings. In any event, the fact that Websyte initiated the criminal investigation was considered only to be of “some relevance”. That conclusion was informed by the level of Websyte’s involvement with the police’s consideration of an investigation, which is not comparable to the present case.
109 The question was whether, in all the circumstances, the public interest in facilitating investigation of the possible statutory offences outweighed the public interest protected by the substantive legal obligation reflected in the notional Harman undertaking.
110 The existing civil and contempt proceedings were relevant, but neither involved an investigation by an independent policing authority, including into whether the full range of possible statutory offences identified by the primary judge had been committed. Villawood’s status as Mr Johnson’s civil adversary was also relevant, but not determinative.
111 The primary judge found that the alleged conduct underlying the possible offences potentially affected the Court’s capacity to administer justice and arguably involved an attempt dishonestly to obtain a substantial financial advantage. Those matters extended beyond compensating Villawood or resolving private civil disputes: J[120]. The fact that aspects of the alleged conduct had come to light in the civil proceedings and had been described in Villawood 1 did not mean that the possible offences had been investigated or that they would come to the attention of the AFP: J[124]. The primary judge gave the potential criminal conduct considerable weight and was not persuaded that the existing civil proceedings and availability of relief in those proceedings, alone or together with the other countervailing considerations, justified refusing Villawood’s application for release from the Harman undertaking. His Honour did not err in that approach.
112 Ground 2 should be rejected.
Ground 3: the significance of documents not subject to a Harman undertaking
Summary of Ground 3
113 The applicants submitted to the primary judge that:
(a) there was a range of material available to Villawood, not impressed with the implied undertaking, which could be provided to the AFP, including Villawood 1, open correspondence between the parties, copies of pleadings and interlocutory applications; and
(b) Villawood “does not explain why such documents are not sufficient to enable the AFP to decide whether to commence an investigation, whereupon the AFP would have available its own investigative powers”: J[103].
114 The primary judge concluded that Villawood’s possession of documents that may not be covered by the Harman undertaking was not a reason to refuse release from the undertaking, especially when it was not explained by the applicants what each of the “non-Harman” documents might relevantly demonstrate: J[104].
115 Mr Johnson and Marlton contend that the primary judge erred in finding that Villawood’s possession of the non-Harman documents that could be (but had not been) provided to the AFP for the purposes of considering whether to investigate, had “little or no relevance to the exercise of the discretion”, referring to: J[95], [103]–[104]. They contend that the primary judge:
(a) misallocated or reversed the burden of persuasion by requiring Mr Johnson and Marlton to establish that the available non-Harman documents would be sufficient to enable the AFP to decide whether to commence or pursue an investigation; and
(b) failed to give sufficient weight to, or failed properly to take into account, the significance of documents not subject to a Harman undertaking and the failure of Villawood to explain why such documents were not sufficient to enable the AFP to decide whether to commence or pursue an investigation.
Consideration
116 The applicants’ contentions involve two connected propositions: (a) there was non-Harman material available and relevant to a decision by the AFP about whether to investigate; and (b) Villawood bore the onus of establishing that the non-Harman material identified by the applicants was insufficient for the AFP to decide whether to investigate.
117 As to (a), the existence of non-Harman material relevant to a decision by the AFP about whether to investigate was relevant to Villawood’s application for release from the undertaking because it bore on the question of whether there was good reason to grant the release. However, the applicants did not seek to demonstrate, by reference to the content of the non-Harman documents, that the material: (i) was sufficient for the AFP to decide whether to investigate; or (ii) already disclosed, partly or wholly, what was disclosed by the documents the subject of Villawood’s application. Aspects of the alleged conduct had been described in Villawood 1, but 20 of the 22 documents the subject of the release orders had not been before Anderson J, and those documents included drafts and metadata bearing directly on when the purported 2012 DMA was created and altered. The applicants did not identify non-Harman material which revealed such matters. The documents for which release was granted included material not shown to be disclosed by the non-Harman material, including the drafts and metadata bearing directly on when and how the purported 2012 DMA was created and altered. It was not sufficient merely to point, without proper explanation, to an alternative category of documents.
118 It was open to regard the specific documents identified by Villawood as likely to make a real contribution to the question whether to investigate.
119 The present case is quite different to Marshall Bell, on which the applicants relied. In that case, ASIC sought a release in respect of all discovered documents, documents which might be discovered in the future and future affidavits: at [16]. ASIC did not identify which particular documents were relevant to the immediate proposed use of considering whether to convene a hearing concerning a dealer’s licence. ASIC already had access to affidavits and receiver’s reports which were not protected by a Harman undertaking and on the basis of which the Court had made critical observations about the relevant conduct. ASIC adduced no evidence that this material was insufficient to enable the immediate decision to be made. ASIC also treated the information required to decide whether to convene a hearing as coextensive with that which might later be required to conduct the hearing. Merkel J rejected that approach because it involved a conflation of purposes and, if a hearing were convened, ASIC could then exercise its statutory powers to obtain relevant documents, and any need for the discovered documents at that later stage was speculative: Marshall Bell at [21]–[26].
120 Villawood, by contrast, identified the documents for which release was sought and the particular proposed use. The primary judge examined the documents, assessed their connection with the specified possible offences and granted release for 22 of the 32 documents. The immediate purpose was not expressed at large or conflated with an unidentified later use. Nor did the applicants identify a body of unrestricted material shown to disclose, with comparable specificity, the matters appearing from the drafts, communications and metadata.
121 As to (b), Villawood bore the burden of establishing sufficient justification for release. It did not bear a separate burden of disproving the adequacy of every possible alternative course suggested by the applicants, where the applicants did not identify with any precision what the alternative materials disclosed – see: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; 186 CLR 541 at 547. The primary judge’s observation that the applicants had not identified what the non-Harman materials would demonstrate cannot be understood as transferring the onus of establishing “special circumstances” for the release away from Villawood. Rather, the primary judge’s observation addressed the applicants’ failure to explain the factual foundation for their contention that the non-Harman materials provided an adequate alternative means by which the AFP could decide whether to investigate. The primary judge did not “misallocate the burden of persuasion” or reverse the onus.
122 The possibility that the AFP could first assess a less complete body of material, consisting largely of assertions (such as open correspondence and pleadings) and conclusions drawn from the evidence (such as Villawood 1), and then seek underlying drafts, communications and metadata by other means, was relevant, but did not weigh strongly against release when the identified documents were likely to contribute materially to the AFP’s immediate decision whether to investigate.
123 The primary judge did not err in concluding that the existence of categories of non-Harman documents did not materially diminish the justification for the confined release sought.
Ground 4: the likelihood of an AFP investigation
Summary of Ground 4
124 Mr Johnson and Marlton submitted to the primary judge that the subject matter of the postulated investigation was not within the AFP’s investigatory priorities. They submitted that the AFP’s investigatory priorities were set out in a Ministerial Direction issued on 16 July 2026 and concerned protecting “Australia’s National Security”, strengthening social cohesion and resilience and contributing to “Regional Security”. They submitted to the primary judge that none of these “bear any relationship to the kinds of offences alleged by [Villawood]”: J[97].
125 The primary judge stated: “The notion that it is not within the mandate or ‘priorities’ of the AFP to investigate Commonwealth offences against laws of the Commonwealth only needs to be stated to be rejected”: J[98].
126 The primary judge concluded that, “[g]iven the apparent seriousness of Mr Johnson’s conduct, I would not relegate to the realm of ‘speculation’ whether the AFP would investigate”: J[96].
127 The applicants contend that the primary judge erred in finding that the prospect or likelihood of the AFP investigating the relevant conduct had “little or no relevance to the exercise of the discretion in this case”, referring to J[95]–[98].
128 They contend that the primary judge failed to give sufficient weight to, or otherwise failed properly to take into account that:
(a) there was no pending investigation by the AFP, and the AFP was not seeking the documents;
(b) Villawood had not yet approached the AFP and had not yet gauged whether the AFP would investigate the matter if approached;
(c) Villawood was already pursuing criminal contempt charges against Mr Johnson which covered the same field and those charges were pending before the Court, which was a matter relevant to assessing whether there was a public interest sufficient to require the conduct of any investigation; and
(d) the subject matter of the postulated investigation was not within the Ministerial Direction to the AFP issued on 16 July 2026, referring to J[97].
Consideration
129 The matters that the applicants contend were given insufficient weight were relevant, but the weight to be given to the various competing factors was a matter for the primary judge. His Honour was aware that there was no pending investigation and that Villawood had not yet approached the AFP. His Honour was aware of the pending criminal contempt proceedings. Ultimately, his Honour concluded, after “weighing the factors [he had] examined in the balance”, that the public interest in investigating the possibility of the criminal offences outweighed the public interest in ensuring the confidentiality of documents obtained by way of discovery (or subpoena): J[124]. His Honour regarded the seriousness of the offences, if committed, as important. The alleged fabrication of evidence to mislead a court, and the alleged attempt to obtain a substantial financial advantage by deception, would, if established, be serious.
130 The primary judge did not find that an AFP investigation was probable or certain. His Honour concluded that the possibility of investigation was sufficiently real, given the apparent seriousness and character of the conduct, to support the proposed use of the documents. The absence of an existing request or investigation was relevant, but it was not dispositive. The primary judge has not been shown to have erred in treating the possibility of an AFP investigation as sufficiently real to support the specified proposed use.
Ground 5: the significance of the Court’s own power to refer
Summary of Ground 5
131 The applicants contend that the primary judge erred in finding that it was of “little or no relevance” (J[95]) that the Court could itself refer matters to the authorities: J[105]–[106].
132 They contend that the ability of the Court to exercise its own powers to address the relevant conduct, in the context of the Court already scrutinising that conduct in its disposition of the civil proceedings and the criminal contempt charges, is a matter that necessarily bears upon whether there is in fact a public interest in the conduct of a further criminal investigation.
Consideration
133 The Court can itself refer matters to the AFP or other authorities. Before the primary judge, Mr Johnson and Marlton referred to Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 1392; 100 ATR 244 at [485] where, after lengthy proceedings had concluded, Perram J directed that his reasons be referred to relevant authorities.
134 The primary judge did not err in concluding that the power of the Court to make a direction along the lines made by Perram J in Hua did not weigh significantly in the balance against making a release order: J[95] and [106]. The existence of the Court’s power did not itself reduce the public interest served by the proposed use. Nor had the Court decided to exercise that power. In those circumstances, the alternative possibility that the Court might later make a referral did not materially weaken Villawood’s case for the confined release it sought. It was open to take the view that the public interest lay in present referral to the police through release of the undertaking, rather than a possible later referral depending on what course the litigation took. The primary judge did not err on the basis contended by Ground 5.
Ground 6: the significance of a possible stay of the substantive proceedings
Summary of Ground 6
135 Mr Johnson and Marlton contend that the primary judge erred in finding that the prospect that the proceedings before the Court could be stayed pending any concurrent criminal process had “little or no relevance”, referring to J[95], [107]–[108]. They contend that the primary judge:
(a) failed to give sufficient weight to, or properly take into account, the question whether the public interest in a criminal investigation justified a Harman release in circumstances where the release entailed the prospect of a stay of the proceedings in the Court; and
(b) elided the question whether there was a sufficient public interest to justify the Harman release with the question whether a stay of the proceedings would be in the public interest, referring to J[108].
Consideration
136 The primary judge (J[108]):
(a) agreed that there would be a prospect that the civil proceedings might be stayed if Mr Johnson were to be charged with one or more of the offences identified; and
(b) considered that this issue should not have any particular significance to the release applications, because whether a stay might be granted if there were criminal charges brought against Mr Johnson would depend on many factors and the Court would resolve any stay application if and when it arose.
137 The possibility that an investigation might later produce circumstances supporting a stay did not require the Court to prevent those circumstances from arising by refusing Villawood’s application.
138 The primary judge did not elide the question of whether there was a sufficient public interest to justify the Harman release with the question whether a stay of the proceedings would be in the public interest. Read in context, his Honour accepted the possibility that criminal charges might eventually lead to an application for a stay but considered the then present weight of that possibility to be limited because it depended upon a sequence of contingent events and any stay application would be determined by reference to the circumstances existing if and when any such application came to be made.
139 The release orders did not themselves alter the progress of the civil proceedings. Any disruption depended upon subsequent decisions by the AFP and prosecuting authorities, followed by an application in which the interests of justice would be assessed against the then prevailing circumstances.
140 The prospect of a stay of the civil proceedings was relevant. The primary judge acknowledged the prospect of a stay but considered that prospect carried limited weight: J[107]–[108]. His Honour’s reasoning does not confuse the question whether to grant a release, having regard to the public interest, with the question whether a future stay would be in the public interest. Rather, his Honour was assessing the weight to be given to a potential future consequence of granting the release.
141 Ground 6 is not made out.
Ground 7: the overall discretion
Summary of Ground 7
142 By Ground 7, the applicants contend that the primary judge’s errors are manifested in, and can be discerned from, the result of his judgment: AS at [34]. They contend that the conclusion at J[124] rests on a single finding, namely that the offences “if committed, are serious enough to warrant close scrutiny by the AFP”. The applicants submitted that the seriousness of any offending was only part of the inquiry, not its end. What was required was a careful weighing of the public interest in a police investigation against the public interest in holding a litigant to its undertaking. That assessment was to be undertaken in a setting where this Court was already seized of the conduct, both civilly and as a matter of criminal contempt, and where there were other considerations which bore upon the assessment and militated against release. According to the applicants, those considerations were all disregarded or subordinated to the seriousness of the alleged conduct, and the careful weighing did not occur: AS at [36].
143 The applicants submitted that the present case is one where error may be inferred from the result: AS at [37].
Consideration
144 Whilst the primary judge gave significant weight to the seriousness of the alleged conduct, his Honour did not rely upon that matter in isolation or to the exclusion of the various considerations put forward by the applicants.
145 The primary judge referred to the factors commonly considered in exercising the discretion to release listed in Liberty at [31], namely: the nature of the documents; the circumstances under which the documents came into existence; the attitude of the author of the document and any prejudice the author may sustain; whether the document pre-existed litigation or was created for that purpose and therefore expected to enter the public domain; the nature of the information in the document (in particular whether it contains personal data or commercially sensitive information); the circumstances in which the document came into the hands of the applicant for release; and most importantly, the likely contribution of the document to achieving justice in the other proceeding (or for the collateral purpose, here providing the documents to the AFP). The primary judge then considered each of those matters sequentially from J[22]–[122] before expressing his conclusion that, “weighing the factors I have examined in the balance”, a release should be granted for 22 of the 32 documents: J[124].
146 The primary judge examined each document carefully and considered whether those documents revealed conduct which might constitute an offence of the kind advanced by Villawood. A release was sought for 32 documents and granted for 22. The refusal of release for the documents concerning the alleged deletion of documents, because Villawood could not identify what had been deleted and there was no direct evidence connecting Mr Johnson with the deletions, indicates that his Honour assessed whether release was justified by reference to the identified documents and the categories of conduct they were said to disclose. His Honour’s orders were made after considering the parties’ submissions, including as to the likelihood of an AFP investigation, the existence of alternative non-Harman material, the existing criminal contempt proceedings, the existing civil proceedings, Villawood’s explanation for why it sought a release, potential prejudice and the scope of the documents for which release was sought. The primary judge weighed the public interest in an investigation against the public interest in preserving confidentiality and did not disregard or treat as irrelevant the various matters referred to by the applicants. The weight which the primary judge gave to the various factors was not such as to suggest that, in substance, his Honour failed to exercise the entrusted discretion – see: Lovell at 519; Bugmy at [53].
147 The result does not bespeak error in the sense described in House at 505. It is tolerably clear how the primary judge reached the result his Honour did. That result is neither unreasonable nor unjust. Contrary to the applicants’ submission, this is not a case in which it can be inferred from the result that there has in some unidentified way been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposed in the court of first instance.
148 Ground 7 is not made out.
Conclusion
149 If error had been established it would have been appropriate for this Court to exercise the discretion itself, as all parties accepted. Having regard to the various considerations mentioned above, the appropriate exercise of discretion would have been for this Court to grant the release in respect of the 22 documents identified by the primary judge.
150 Leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty (150) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Thawley. |
Associate:
Dated: 20 November 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM AND SHARIFF JJ:
151 We agree with the orders of Thawley J for the reasons given.
I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Abraham and Shariff. |
Associate:
Dated: 20 November 2026