Federal Court of Australia

Chinacalle v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCAFC 145

Appeal from:

Chinacalle v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 441

File number:

QUD 304 of 2026

Judgment of:

DERRINGTON, STELLIOS AND LONGBOTTOM JJ

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal – automatic cancellation under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 140(1) – where visa held by reason of membership of family unit – where former de facto partner’s visa cancelled upon request – whether membership of family unit must subsist at time of cancellation of primary visa for s 140(1) to be engaged – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Chinacalle v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 441

Rani v Minister for Immigration (1997) 80 FCR 379

Tereva v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 294 FCR 270

Thapaliya v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1741

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Queensland

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

26

Date of hearing:

10 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellant:

Mr G Rebetzke

Solicitor for the Appellant:

Sambi Legal

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr B McGlade with Mr M Angeli

Solicitor for the Respondent:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

QUD 304 of 2026

BETWEEN:

MARIA ALEJANDRA PAZMINO CHINACALLE

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

order made by:

DERRINGTON, STELLIOS AND LONGBOTTOM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.    The appeal be dismissed.

3.    The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal to be taxed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

1    This appeal concerns the construction of s 140(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), which provides as follows:

140 Cancellation of visa results in other cancellation

(1)    If a person’s visa is cancelled under section 109 … 116 … 128 … 133A … 133C … or 137J …, a visa held by another person because of being a member of the family unit of the person is also cancelled.

2    On 13 August 2024, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Minister) notified Ms Chinacalle that her visa had been cancelled pursuant to s 140(1), effective 18 July 2024, being the date on which her former de facto spouse’s visa was cancelled at his request. On this appeal, Ms Chinacalle contends that s 140(1) did not operate to cancel her visa because, by the time Mr Ortega’s visa was cancelled, she was no longer a member of his family unit.

3    For the reasons which follow, Ms Chinacalle’s appeal should be dismissed. The construction of s 140(1) for which she contends is not supported by the text of the provision, construed in its statutory context. Her submissions seek to introduce ambiguity into the language of the section when none exists.

Background

4    In around late May 2023, Mr Ortega, Ms Chinacalle’s then-de facto partner, applied for a Temporary Skilled – Graduate Work Stream (Class VC) (subclass 485) visa. At that time, the criteria for the grant of a subclass 485 visa included primary and secondary criteria: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, cl 485.3 (Regulations). Relevantly, the secondary criteria could be satisfied by a person who was a “member of the family unit” of a person who satisfied the primary criteria: Regulations sch 2, cl 485.311. A person was a “member of the family unit” of another person if they were the spouse, de facto partner or child of that other person: Regulations reg 1.12. Ms Chinacalle applied for a visa on the basis that she met the secondary criteria.

5    On 10 August 2023, Mr Ortega and Ms Chinacalle were granted subclass 485 visas, having satisfied the primary and secondary criteria respectively.

6    Around December 2023, the couple separated. On 9 May 2024, Ms Chinacalle notified the Department of Home Affairs (Department) of the separation, which she claimed was the result of family violence. She did not, however, make any application for a different visa.

7    On 18 July 2024, Mr Ortega’s visa was cancelled at his request.

8    On 13 August 2024, Ms Chinacalle was advised by the Department that her visa was cancelled on 18 July 2024 pursuant to s 140(1) of the Act.

9    On 7 November 2024, Ms Chinacalle commenced proceedings in this Court, seeking a declaration pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act) that her visa was not cancelled by operation of law on 18 July 2024. Her application was heard by the primary judge on 30 July 2025, following which the parties were invited to file and serve supplementary written submissions addressing the issues raised at the hearing.

10    The application was dismissed on 16 April 2026: Chinacalle v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 441 (PJ). In that decision, the primary judge held, firstly, that the Court had jurisdiction to grant relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act on the basis that an automatic cancellation under s 140(1) of the Act is effected by operation of law (PJ [54]); and second, that Ms Chinacalle’s visa was cancelled by operation of s 140(1) of the Act: PJ [72] – [73]. Only the second aspect of her Honour’s decision is the subject of this appeal.

11    Ms Chinacalle’s primary position before the primary judge was that the use of the present tense in the language of s 140(1) meant that it operated only when the person whose visa is in question (the “second person”) was still “a member of the family unit” of the person whose visa was cancelled (the “first person”). That was rejected by her Honour, who reasoned as follows:

[65]    Then, “a visa held by another person because of being a member of the family unit of the person is also cancelled”. This is a reference to a visa “held”, past tense, because of being a member of the family unit. The natural textual reading is that the second person (another person) was granted the visa because of being a member of the family unit of the first person. The requirement to “being” a member of the family unit in this context, is not a reference to the second person currently being a member of the first person’s family unit. It is a reference to the second person having been granted and held the visa because of being a member of the first person’s family unit. The textual inquiry is not directed to the current state of affairs of the second person, but to the state of affairs of that person when the visa was granted. Reading in the definition of member of the family unit does not change the meaning of the substantive cancellation provision: (Kelly v R (2004) 218 CLR 216; [2004] HCA 12 at [103] (McHugh J); SkyCity Adelaide Pty Ltd v Treasurer of South Australia (2024) 419 ALR 361; [2024] HCA 37 at [32] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ).

12    Her Honour observed that such a construction was consistent with the nature of s 140(1) as an automatic cancellation provision, and that it was reflective of the derivative quality of visas granted on the basis of familial connection: PJ [66]. On that basis, she concluded that s 140(1) neither created a discretion nor required any inquiry as to the second person’s current circumstances prior to its operation: PJ [66].

13    Further, whilst her Honour accepted that the proper construction of s 140(1) may operate harshly in particular circumstances, she noted that it was open to Ms Chinacalle to obtain another visa prior to the cancellation of Mr Ortega’s visa: PJ [69].

14    Ms Chinacalle now appeals from the primary judge’s decision pursuant to an amended notice of appeal, which she was granted leave to file and rely upon at the hearing on 10 November 2026.

Construction of s 140(1) of the Act

15    The foundation of the appeal is that s 140(1) is ambiguous and the primary judge’s resolution of that ambiguity was wrong. In particular, it is contended that the primary judge, at PJ [65], wrongly seized upon the word “held” in s 140(1), whereas the present-tense words “being” and “is” direct the inquiry to the circumstances existing when the first person’s visa is cancelled. Alternatively, the appellant submits that the primary judge’s interpretation of s 140(1) is inconsistent with the measures in the Act and Regulations dealing with family violence by denying a spouse or partner who leaves an abusive relationship individual consideration of their circumstances prior to the cancellation of their visa.

The text of s 140(1)

16    There is no relevant ambiguity in s 140(1) in this case. It is sufficiently apparent that the provision is directed to the nexus between the second person holding a visa and their membership of the family unit of the first person who is the holder of a relevant visa. That is necessarily implicit by the use of the critical expression, “because of”, immediately prior to the reference to the person “being a member of the family unit”. In other words, the inquiry under s 140(1) is directed to whether the second person obtained their visa because they satisfied a criterion which required them to be a member of the family unit of the first person whose visa was cancelled. It is to be kept in mind that the familial connection is only one of the requirements that needs to be satisfied by the visa holder. Necessarily, at least one other criterion or other criteria will also need to be satisfied: Rani v Minister for Immigration (1997) 80 FCR 379, 395 (Rani).

17    For the purposes of s 140(1), the touchstone of its operation is the statutory criterion of membership of the family unit of the first person, which enabled the second person to acquire the visa. This interpretation was adopted by Sackville J in Rani at 399:

In my opinion, the structure of the Migration Regulations supports the view that s 140(1) was intended to apply only where a visa holder obtained his or her visa by satisfying a criterion explicitly framed in terms of being “a member of the family unit” of another person whose visa is later cancelled. It may be (although it is not necessary to direct in the present case) that s 140(1) applies even where the criterion is expressed to be one of the primary criteria for a visa (as distinct from being one of the secondary criteria). In other words, s 140(1) may apply to a person who acquired a visa by satisfying a primary criterion expressed specifically in terms of being a “member of a family unit” of another person whose visa is later cancelled. But I think the better view is that s 140(1) was not intended to effect the automatic cancellation of the visa held by a person who obtained the visa because he or she satisfied the description in any one of the subparagraphs of the definition contained in reg 1.12 of the Migration Regulations.

See, to a similar effect, Thapaliya v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1741 [29].

18    The administrative logic underpinning this construction is unassailable. Necessarily, the first person’s entitlement to a visa is the lynchpin of the second person’s entitlement to a visa, by virtue of their familial connection. When the first person’s visa is cancelled, that essential element of the basis upon which the visa was granted no longer exists, from which it must follow that the second person’s entitlement to the visa is dissipated. The second person’s visa is derivative in that sense: see PJ [66]. Logically, s 140(1) gives effect to that derivative relationship by providing for the automatic cancellation of the second person’s visa when the essential criterion on which it was granted ceases.

19    Contrary to Ms Chinacalle’s submissions, this construction does not require the reading of additional text into s 140(1). Rather, it is apparent from the natural meaning of the words used. As Counsel for the Minister rightly identified, the interpretation for which Ms Chinacalle contends effectively reads two separate limbs into the provision: firstly, that the person has obtained a visa on the basis of being a member of the relevant family unit; and second, that the person remains a member of that family unit. The primary judge rightly rejected that construction because there was no support for it in the text of s 140(1), which refers only to the first limb: PJ [67].

20    Likewise, the appellant’s attempt to invoke Rani for the broad proposition that the text of
s 140(1) is ambiguous is misguided. The ambiguity identified by Sackville J in that case concerned whether s 140(1) extended to a visa obtained by satisfying a criterion corresponding to one of the components of the definition of “member of the family unit” in reg 1.12 of the Regulations, or was confined to a visa obtained by satisfying a criterion expressly framed in terms of membership of the family unit: Rani 395 – 399. That issue does not arise in this case, and Rani provides no support for the appellant’s construction.

21    For these reasons, the text of s 140(1) refers to the causal connection between the familial relationship and the visa held by the second person. Necessarily, the existence of that connection is determined by reference to the basis upon which the visa was granted and, therefore, the circumstances existing at that time.

Context

22    The language employed elsewhere in the Act and Regulations does not require a different result. Ms Chinacalle points, in particular, to s 243 of the Act and reg 1.12(5) of the Regulations, in which express language is used to identify circumstances existing at the time of the grant of a visa: “on the basis of satisfying a criterion for the visa because of being the spouse or de facto partner of another person” (s 243(1), emphasis added); “holds a visa … granted on the basis that the person was a member of the family unit of a person who held a visa” (reg 1.12(5), emphasis added). However, the mere fact that different language is employed in those provisions does not, of itself, alter the meaning conveyed by the text of
s 140(1). It is also necessary to keep in mind that reg 1.12(5) expresses the relevant temporal nexus by reference to the facts in existence at the particular time, rather than by express reference to the grant of the visa. Additionally, it deals with a scenario involving a prior visa holder’s transition to a new visa, which is substantially different from that which is the subject of s 140(1), and no interpretive support can be gained from it.

23    Subsection 140(1) must also be read in light of s 140(2). That provision applies where s 140(1) does not apply but another person nevertheless “holds a visa only because the person whose visa is cancelled held a visa”. In that circumstance, cancellation is not automatic but is subject to Ministerial discretion. Importantly, both subsections direct attention to the basis upon which the secondary visa was acquired. The distinction is that, where the causal connection identified in subsection (1) is membership of the first person’s family unit, cancellation follows automatically from the cancellation of the visa granted to a person who satisfied the primary criteria. The relationship between the two subsections tends to confirm the interpretation adopted by the primary judge.

24    Nor do the family violence provisions of the Act and Regulations support the appellant’s construction. Ms Chinacalle submits that the automatic operation of s 140(1) denies a person in her position the opportunity to apply for a visa and include in the application a claim of family violence (see Regulations reg 1.23(10)). Even accepting that consequence, it provides no basis for departing from the ordinary meaning of s 140(1). In any event, there was nothing preventing Ms Chinacalle from seeking to obtain another visa on that basis after her separation from Mr Ortega and before his visa was cancelled. Further, she may still do so in the future, though, due to the effluxion of time, she is required to apply from overseas. Those circumstances provide no basis for the submission that the primary judge’s construction of
s 140(1) was, in effect, “draconian”: adopting the language used in Tereva v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 294 FCR 270, 275 [14]. Similar observations may also be made in respect of Ms Chinacalle’s criticism of the absence of a regime for notification of cancellation under s 140(1). Whilst automatic cancellation without prompt notification may have adverse consequences for a person’s ability subsequently to apply for another visa, that possibility does not warrant a departure from the plain and ordinary meaning of s 140(1).

Conclusion

25    For the reasons set out above, and substantially for those given by the primary judge, Ms Chinacalle’s construction of s 140(1) should be rejected. Her visa was therefore cancelled by operation of law upon the cancellation of Mr Ortega’s visa on 18 July 2024.

Disposition and costs

26    For the foregoing reasons, the appeal should be dismissed. The Minister should have his costs of the appeal on the standard basis, as assessed or otherwise agreed.

I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Derrington, Stellios and Longbottom.

Associate:    

Dated:    20 November 2026