Federal Court of Australia

Dass v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCAFC 116

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed.

2.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

1    I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Downes and Feutrill JJ in draft. I agree with their Honour’s reasons but wish to add the following observations.

2    The decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) was made pursuant to s 105 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant’s visa.

3    In the proceeding before the primary judge, the appellant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision under s 476A of the Act. In the appeal, the appellant asserts that the primary judge erred in failing to hold that the Tribunal’s decision involved the following jurisdictional errors:

(a)    whereas the Tribunal found at [338] that paragraph 9.2 of Ministerial Direction No. 110 (the Direction) (“Extent of impediments if removed”) “weighs against revocation”, the Tribunal concluded at [348] that paragraph 9.2 “weighs in favour of revocation”, such that the reasons were incoherent and the decision was legally unreasonable;

(b)    the Tribunal noted at [351] that paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction states that crimes of a sexual nature against a child are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community, even though there was no suggestion of the appellant having committed crimes of such a nature, and the Tribunal accordingly took into account irrelevant material.

4    In CRI026 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19; 355 ALR 216 (CRI026), a Tribunal’s reasons stated that the appellant did not face a real possibility of persecution in Sri Lanka based on his Tamil ethnicity when the appellant was in fact from Pakistan and was not of Tamil ethnicity and his claim for asylum was based on imputed political opinion. The High Court concluded:

[56]    … [S]omehow a typographical error — possibly an error in editing a form of words cut and pasted from a previous decision in another matter — – resulted in references to Sri Lanka and Tamils rather than Karachi and the MQM.

[57]    It is unfortunate that such an error should have been permitted to occur. It suggests a lack of care in final proof reading of reasons for which all three members of the Tribunal were responsible — but the principal burden of which falls on the presiding member — that should not have occurred and should not be repeated. Such errors are likely to create doubts about the validity of decisions which should not arise. Nevertheless, reading the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, it is plain beyond peradventure that in this case it was not an error in the reasoning process of the kind for which the appellant contended and should be disregarded: falsa demonstratio non nocet.

(Citation omitted.)

5    The High Court there distinguished between errors that affect the decision-maker’s reasoning process and errors that have no effect on the reasoning process. In the present statutory context, it is apparent that errors that affect the Tribunal’s reasoning process may amount to jurisdictional errors while errors that have no effect on its reasoning, such as mere typographical errors, are not jurisdictional in nature.

6    A statement of reasons must be read in light of the statutory obligation requiring its preparation: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29 (BVD17) at [38]. The Tribunal’s statement of reasons was required under s 111 of the ART Act. That section provides, relevantly, that if the Tribunal makes a decision under s 105 in a proceeding for review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal must give to each party, in writing, the Tribunal’s decision and a statement of reasons for the decision. The expression “statement of reasons” is defined in s 4 as follows:

statement of reasons, for a decision, means a written statement in relation to the decision that:

(a)    sets out the findings on material questions of fact; and

(b)    refers to the evidence or other material on which the findings are based; and

(c)    explains the reasons for the decision.

7    The Tribunal’s obligation under s 111 of the ART Act was to give the parties a statement of reasons that satisfied the definition in s 4. The legislative intention is that the parties and any Court reviewing the decision should be able to rely upon the statement of reasons as an accurate record of the Tribunal’s findings on material questions of fact, the evidence and other material on which the findings were based and the reasons for the decision. In construing a statement of reasons, an appropriate starting point is that the Tribunal member purposefully constructed the statement intending it to provide an accurate record of the prescribed matters. If, as in this case, the Minister submits that the Tribunal meant something other than what it said, it is necessary to identify an adequate basis for departing from that starting point.

8    The statement of reasons must be read fairly and not in an unduly critical manner: BVD17 at [38]. However, this is not a case where the principle that a Tribunal’s reasons should not be scrutinised “minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error” has any real application: cf. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. That is because it is apparent from the statement of reasons that the Tribunal did make errors. It is not to the point to describe the errors as “obvious errors”. The issue is whether the errors were jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. That requires construction of the reasons to determine what inferences should be drawn as to the nature of the errors and whether they affected the Tribunal’s reasoning.

9    The first error is the contradiction between the Tribunal’s finding at [338] that paragraph 9.2 of the Direction “weighs against revocation”, and its finding at [348] that paragraph 9.2 “weighs in favour of revocation”. Both cannot be true. On one view, this aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning is simply incoherent and, in consequence, the decision is legally unreasonable. The alternative is that the finding at [338] is merely the product of a typographical error. I accept, for the reasons given by the primary judge and Downes and Feutrill JJ, that when regard is had to the reasons as a whole, the error was a mere typographical error and not a jurisdictional error. This conclusion involves an inference that the error is one of proofing and does not reflect a miscarriage of the Tribunal’s reasoning process.

10    The second error is more difficult to assess. The Tribunal noted at [351] that paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction states that crimes of a sexual nature against a child are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community. The appellant’s criminal record was before the Tribunal and does not indicate that the appellant committed any crimes of a sexual nature. One possible inference is that the Tribunal became confused about which case it was dealing with and, consequently, misunderstood the circumstances of the appellant’s case. Another possible inference is that this was another typographical error, possibly from cutting and pasting a passage from another statement of reasons and then failing to adequately proofread the statement of reasons. That was the type of error found to have occurred in CRI026.

11    I do not accept that because the first error involved a typographical error, it should be assumed that the second also resulted from a typographical error. It is necessary to consider the second error on its merits to determine whether it reflects an error in reasoning.

12    It is difficult to understand how an utterly irrelevant passage from another statement of reasons could have been erroneously cut and pasted into the vital, final part of the statement of reasons where the Tribunal explained how it weighed and balanced the various relevant factors. Nevertheless, and not without some misgivings, I conclude that the appropriate inference is that the error was a mere typographical error. In that respect, I adopt the reasons given by the primary judge and Downes and Feutrill JJ. The Tribunal’s error did not involve any error in its reasoning process, and it was not jurisdictional.

13    I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Associate:    

Dated:    4 September 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DOWNES AND FEUTRILL JJ:

14    The appellant (Mr Dass) appeals from the orders made by the primary judge following the decision in Dass v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 40 (judgment or J), in which his Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 10 September 2025 (T). By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to revoke the cancellation of Mr Dass’s visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

15    The decision of the Tribunal was handed down following an earlier decision given by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which was set aside in Dass v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 63 (Dass No 1). In that case, Burley J found that due to certain inconsistencies within its reasons, the Tribunal expressed its reasons with respect to the best interests of Mr Dass’s minor children in Australia (a primary consideration to which the Tribunal was bound to have regard under the applicable ministerial direction) in a manner which was incoherent, which included a conclusion which was capricious, and that these matters resulted in a legally unreasonable purported exercise of the statutory power of review.

16    The original Notice of Appeal was filed by Mr Dass when he was unrepresented, and it contained no intelligible grounds of appeal. Now being legally represented, Mr Dass sought leave to rely upon an Amended Notice of Appeal which contained the following grounds of appeal:

1.     The primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal meant to say in [338] that the extent of impediments if removed favoured revocation.

2.     The primary Judge should have found that the Tribunal’s conclusions as to the weight to be given to the extent of impediments if removed was incoherent and that the Tribunal’s decision was legally unreasonable.

3.     The primary judge erred in finding that [351] of the Tribunal’s reasons was included by carelessness.

4.     The primary Judge should have found that the Tribunal included an irrelevant consideration in its weighing process by referencing paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction 110 which states that crimes of a sexual nature against a child are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community.

17    As leave was not opposed by the Minister; Mr Dass was not legally represented when he filed the Notice of Appeal, but this had changed; and there was no prejudice to the Minister who had been given an opportunity to address (and who had addressed) the additional grounds of appeal which raised legal arguments only, leave was granted at the outset of the hearing of the appeal.

Grounds 1 and 2

18    It is convenient to deal with grounds 1 and 2 together as the parties did. These grounds concern the Tribunal’s assessment of the extent of impediments if removed to Fiji, and the finding by the primary judge that there was no jurisdictional error in that assessment.

19    The Tribunal dealt with the extent of impediments if removed to Fiji at T [329]–[338], [348] and [357]. As the Minister accepted before the primary judge, the Tribunal’s statements of conclusion are inconsistent: at T [338], the Tribunal states that “[t]his consideration (b) weighs against revocation” but at T [348], the Tribunal states that “[o]ther consideration (b) weighs in favour of revocation”.

20    In the judgment, the primary judge dealt with this issue at J [5]–[14]:

When the Tribunal considered the “extent of impediments if removed” that would confront the applicant (made mandatory by cl. 9(1)(b) of Direction No. 110 (“Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA”), which was made, and made binding, pursuant to s 499 of the Migration Act), it said the following (at [331]-[338]):

331. The Applicant is aged 48. He has a history of high cholesterol and elevated blood sugar levels. He has a history of dental problems. He has a history of substance abuse issues. He also has a history of mental health issues.

332. I accept that the Applicant has few if any family supports to rely upon in Fiji.

333. I accept that he would find readjustment to life in Fiji very difficult.

334. I accept that the Applicant is vulnerable to a deterioration in his mental health if he returns to Fiji and that this may result in him relapsing into drug use.

335. I accept that he may find it difficult to find employment and accommodation.

336. On the other hand, the Applicant has no cultural of [sic] linguistic barriers in returning to the place where he spent his first 25 years.

337. The Applicant would be able to access the same social, medical and economic support as any other citizen of Fiji. In saying this I accept that these may well be inferior to the supports available in Australia. I accept that drug treatment programmes may be much less available and/or adequate.

338. This consideration (b) weighs against revocation.

When the Tribunal turned to weigh the outcome of the various different considerations in the balance, however, it said this (at [341]-[349]):

341. It is necessary to weigh up all of the primary and other considerations.

342. Primary consideration 1 weighs extremely heavily against revocation.

343. Primary consideration 2 very heavily against revocation

344. Primary consideration 3 weighs moderately in favour of revocation.

345. Primary consideration 4 weighs moderately in favour of revocation.

346. Primary consideration 5 weighs very heavily against revocation

347. Other consideration (a) is neutral.

348. Other consideration (b) weighs in favour of revocation.

349. Other consideration (c) is neutral.

It also said (at [357]):

I accept that he would find a return to Fiji, very difficult.

The applicant is thus confronted, once again, with internally inconsistent statements about the basis upon which the Tribunal has decided his application.

The question is thus whether, as was the case with the incoherence considered by Burley J, the result is jurisdictional error.

The Minister accepted, as he really had to, that the statements of conclusions at [338] and [348] were inconsistent. But the Minister submitted that:

20. However it is abundantly clear that read in context, the Tribunal found that consideration 9(b) weighed in favour of revocation; that is, it weighed in favour of the applicant. This is manifest from the number of issues identified by the Tribunal that affect the applicant: his medical condition, including his history of mental health issues and his vulnerability to a deterioration of his mental health as well as possible relapse into drug use; his limited family support in Fiji; and the applicant’s potential difficulty in finding accommodation and employment. The only matters that were not found to militate against him were the lack of cultural or language barriers, and his access to services and economic support available to others in Fiji (though the Tribunal accepted that these, and drug treatment programs, may not be as adequate or widely available as in Australia): [336]-[337].

21. There can be no doubt that the Tribunal considered (despite what is said in [338]) that the matters in 9(b) considered together favoured the applicant, that is, that that factor weighed in favour of revocation. (emphasis included)

The Minister also relied on the well-known maxim that an administrative decision-maker’s reasons “are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which reasons are expressed”: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; [1996] HCA 6 at [31] (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

The question here perhaps reduces, in broad terms, to this: was the Tribunal’s reasoning in substance incoherent, or did an error somehow creep into the written statement of reasons? See, e.g., CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19 at [56]-[57] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Nettle JJ); XYJY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1572 at [64]-[65] (Halley J).

Ultimately, I am satisfied that it is clear that the Tribunal’s statement at [338] was an obvious error. That conclusion flows, I think, from the following matters:

(a)    Paragraphs [331] to [335] each accept a submission made on behalf of the applicant in relation to a particular impediment that he would face if he was removed from Australia. The acceptance of those submissions is thus consistent with a finding that the consideration in question weighs in favour of revocation.

(b)    Paragraph [336] begins with the words “On the other hand…”, and is a finding of the absence of one particular impediment that might sometimes be experienced by a person being removed to another country. That finding (at least considered alone) is thus consistent with a finding that the consideration in question weighs against revocation.

(c)    Paragraph [337] records that the applicant would be able to access the same social, medical and economic support as any other citizen of Fiji; but finds that such supports “may well be inferior to the supports available in Australia” and that “drug treatment programmes may be much less available and/or adequate”. That finding, it seems to me, is thus consistent with a finding that the consideration in question weighs in favour of revocation (in the sense that the ultimate conclusion is that the support available to the applicant will be inferior to that which he would have access in Australia).

(d)    Overall, therefore, in paragraphs [331] to [337] the Tribunal accepted the existence of material impediments that would be faced by the applicant if he were removed. The potential impediment that the Tribunal found would not affect the applicant was not one that could be seen as eliminating, overcoming or reducing the others that he would face. There can be no doubt, it seems to me, that the Tribunal determined that the applicant would face a number of substantial impediments if he were removed. Indeed, on its face, the statement of conclusion in [338] is inconsistent with (and could not be sustained by) the reasoning that preceded it.

(e)    That conclusion is reinforced, although I would have reached the same conclusion in any event, by the terms of [357]. That is, it is clear that the Tribunal was operating on the basis that the applicant “would find a return to Fiji, very difficult”.

It follows that I accept the Minister’s submission that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons discloses that it found that consideration 9(1)(b) weighed in favour of revocation. …

(Emphasis original.)

21    After setting out the Tribunal’s reasons, Mr Dass submits that:

…[T]he Tribunal was thus engaged in a weighing process involving competing factors. At the end of listing those competing factors the Tribunal stated its conclusion without further elaboration as to why it reached that conclusion. The Tribunal has attributed opposite weights at [338] and [348] each of which could have been open on the facts identified by the Tribunal.

It is not a case where only one answer was open on the facts identified by the Tribunal. It is submitted that in these circumstances the primary Judge erred in substituting his own assessment of the competing factors when he reached the conclusion that the Tribunal must have meant a different conclusion at [338]. The primary Judge should have found the same incoherence as Burley J found in Dass Number 1.

22    By his submissions, Mr Dass does not grapple with the reasoning of the primary judge, especially at J [13], and nor does he identify any error of legal principle. For our part and with respect, we can discern no error in his Honour’s analysis of the Tribunal’s reasons, and we agree with his Honour’s analysis of the Tribunal’s reasons, viewed as a whole. In particular, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons shows that it found the extent of impediments if removed consideration to weigh in favour of revocation of the visa cancellation decision (i.e. in favour of Mr Dass).

23    Further, contrary to Mr Dass’s submissions, it is not the case that more than one answer was open on the facts identified by the Tribunal. Rather, as the primary judge identified, the statement of conclusion in T [338] is inconsistent with, and could not be sustained by, the reasoning that preceded it. The statement of conclusion in T [338] is therefore a typographical error, which is a product of error in the preparation and proofreading of the reasons, rather than one that demonstrates the Tribunal’s reasoning to be illogical, irrational, arbitrary, capricious, lacking an intelligible justification or otherwise legally unreasonable.

24    In these circumstances, the existence of the inconsistency in [338] of the Tribunal’s reasons is insufficient to amount to incoherence of the kind found by Burley J in Dass No 1, and nor is it sufficient to establish that the exercise of power by the Tribunal was legally unreasonable.

25    For these reasons, grounds 1 and 2 must fail.

Grounds 3 and 4

26     These grounds relate to the Tribunal’s reference in T [351] to cl 8.1.1(1) of Direction 110 and “crimes of a sexual nature against a child”, and the primary judge’s finding that the Tribunal did not proceed on a wrong assumption that Mr Dass had committed crimes of a sexual nature against children, and did not allow that matter to intrude into its reasoning at J [20].

27    At T [351], the Tribunal stated:

I note that paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction states that crimes of a sexual nature against a child are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community.

28    It is common ground that there was no information before the Tribunal that the applicant had been accused or convicted of any crime of a sexual nature against a child and the Tribunal’s reasons contained no references to any such accusations or convictions.

29    After setting out T [351], the primary judge addressed this issue at J [18]–[21]:

That is, on any view, an irrelevant observation for the Tribunal to have made:

(a)    There was no suggestion that the applicant had ever committed any crime of a sexual nature against a child.

(b)    It cannot be explained as a superfluous summary of the terms of Direction No. 110. That had already been done at [194] and following (and in particular at [206] where the terms of cl. 8.1.1(1) were comprehensively summarised). And furthermore paragraph [351] appears in the section headed “Conclusion”, which is where the Tribunal said it was weighing up all of the primary and other considerations that it had in fact previously considered.

The applicant submitted that it should thus be inferred that the Tribunal had “been distracted from the applicant’s individual circumstances” and that the reference “infected [the ultimate weighing process] as the Tribunal has failed to demonstrate in its reasons that it was acting on a coherent and consistent understanding of the appellant’s circumstances” (citing, in support of the submissions, ALZ18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1035 at [88] (Cheeseman J)).

I consider the circumstances of ALZ18 to be quite different to those present here. There really is nothing in the decision at all to suggest that the Tribunal, as a matter of substance, proceeded in any way at all on the wrong assumption that the applicant had committed crimes of a sexual nature against a child, or allowed that consideration to intrude into its reasoning in any way. It follows that it cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to demonstrate a coherent and consistent understanding of the circumstances of the applicant. It is a stray reference that can only be explained, I think, by carelessness:

(a)    It is a curious summary of cl. 8.1.1.(1) in the context of this case because the only category of crime that it mentions as being viewed very seriously by the Government and the community is sexual crimes against children. It does not mention at all, for example, “acts of family violence”, which are also mentioned in cl. 8.1.1.(1) and which were relevant to the applicant.

(b)    Immediately after “noting” that one irrelevant aspect of cl. 8.1.1(1), the Tribunal went on to describe the applicant’s criminal offending. That is to say, at [353] the Tribunal recorded that the applicant “has engaged in acts of family violence over many years, breaching AVO’s in the process”. The applicant’s criminal history had previously been considered at length and in detail earlier in the Tribunal’s reasons.

(c)     In those circumstances, the obvious inference is that the Tribunal meant to “note” that aspect of cl. 8.1.1(1) relating to family violence, and through carelessness somehow (perhaps by copying and pasting the wrong paragraph from a template) referred to a different, and irrelevant, aspect.

I just cannot see, however, that the Tribunal, in substance, has taken account of an irrelevant consideration or otherwise allowed its reasoning to miscarry. As such, the applicant’s second ground of review must also fail.

(Emphasis original.)

30    Mr Dass submits that, because of the irrelevant reference at T [351]:

…It should inferred [sic] that the Tribunal has been distracted from the applicant’s individual circumstances. In this context the reference to this in the ultimate weighing process infected that process as the Tribunal has failed to demonstrate in its reasons that it was acting on a coherent and consistent understanding of the appellant’s circumstances ALZ18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1035 at [88] [sic]

It is submitted that the Court should not share the primary Judge’s view at [20] that the Second Error was a stray reference that could only be explained by carelessness. The primary Judge reasoned that the obvious inference is that the Tribunal meant to “note” that aspect of cl. 8.1.1(1) relating to family violence, and through carelessness somehow (perhaps by copying and pasting the wrong paragraph from a template) referred to a different, and irrelevant, aspect. However the substance of [351] sets out the words of paragraph 8.1.1(1)- it is not simply a mis-numbered paragraph reference. In these circumstances the Court cannot be sure that the Tribunal has not in fact mixed up the nature of the offending the appellant had engaged in -rather than simply identifying the wrong part of cl 8.1.1 of the Direction. Given the terms of the Direction, if the Tribunal has in fact mixed up the nature of the offending, then this was a matter which potentially was very significantly adverse to the appellant. In these circumstances the Court should not simply excuse the inclusion of this adverse matter as “carelessness”.

31    Viewed in isolation, it is apparent that T [351] is indicative of the Tribunal taking into account a factor that, based on its findings of material facts, was of no relevance to its review of the delegate’s decision. However, when the reasons are read as a whole and having regard to the Tribunal’s detailed identification of the (correct) material facts concerning the criminal history of Mr Dass and the very serious acts of family violence committed by him, we do not agree that the Tribunal was distracted from the individual circumstances of Mr Dass. We share the primary judge’s view in this regard.

32    The Tribunal does not, in its decision, make any findings, or engage in any substantive consideration, of “crimes of a sexual nature against a child” by Mr Dass. Earlier in its reasons when referring to cl 8.1.1(1)a), the Tribunal emphasised in bold text that the Direction provides that “acts of family violence” may be considered “very serious” (at T [206]): cl 8.1.1(1)a)iii. This was done after the Tribunal had set out, in detail, Mr Dass’s criminal history earlier in its reasons at T [35]–[153], which included reference to such acts. The statement in T [351] is the only reference to crimes of a sexual nature against a child (apart from the reference to the content of the Direction itself). Following T [351], there is no further reference to crimes of a sexual nature against a child. Rather, the Tribunal referred to Mr Dass’s “extensive and serious criminal history” (at T [352]) and explained that by reference to “acts of family violence over many years, breaching AVO’s in the process” (at T [353]).

33    For the same reasons as given by the primary judge, the decision of ALZ18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1035 (Cheeseman J) was based on very different facts and does not assist Mr Dass in this appeal. The reasons of the Tribunal in this case bear closer resemblance to those considered in CRI026 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 355 ALR 216; [2018] HCA 19 (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Nettle JJ) to which the primary judge also made reference. There, the Tribunal included an observation which was ostensibly based upon a finding of a material fact that had nothing to do with the visa applicant’s protection claim. That observation “other things being equal” implied that the “Tribunal’s reasoning process had gone seriously awry”: CRI026 at [54]. However, closer examination of the Tribunal’s reasons in that case demonstrated that the Tribunal had reached its conclusions about the visa applicant’s protection claims based on the findings of material facts set out in other parts of the Tribunal’s reasons: CRI026 at [55]. Viewed in that context, the incongruous observation was “truly intended to be a formal restatement” of a conclusion expressed earlier in the reasons: CRI026 at [56]. Ultimately, reading the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, it was “plain beyond peradventure” that there was not “an error in the reasoning process of the kind for which the [visa applicant] contended”: CRI026 at [57]. Here, by parity of reasoning, the Tribunal’s note or observation about cl 8.1.1(1)a)ii. of the Direction at T [351] was intended to be a reference to the earlier reference to cl 8.1.1(1)a)iii of the Direction at T [206], aspects of which had been emphasised in bold text.

34    For these reasons, the primary judge was correct to find that the Tribunal, in substance, had not taken account of an irrelevant consideration or otherwise allowed its reasoning to miscarry.

35    For these reasons, grounds 3 and 4 must also fail.

Further observations about the Tribunal reasons

36    Although the errors in the Tribunal’s reasons were not of such a character as to demonstrate jurisdictional error in this case and it is unnecessary to say anything further to dispose of the appeal, nonetheless we wish to add that we agree with and endorse the primary judge’s observations at J [23]–[27] about the unfortunate nature of the errors in the Tribunal’s reasons. Taking into account that the Tribunal has a very significant case load and that decisions must be made within relatively short time frames, the primary judge’s observations are worth repeating and emphasising:

It is worth elaborating a little on why errors like the ones relied upon by the applicant are unfortunate. An unnecessary doubt about the validity of a decision such as the present might be thought to affect a range of different people, but chief amongst them is the person whose future residence in Australia is at stake.

The applicant has resided in Australia for over 23 years. He considers that it is likely that, if he is returned to Fiji, he will be made homeless as he has no family support in that country, and low employment prospects. He has struggled with addiction to drugs, and the removal of his family support here, along with his likely prospects in Fiji, seem to him to augur poorly for his prospects of fighting that addiction. On any view, the decision being made by the Tribunal was of the highest significance to the applicant. It was, by definition, life-changing. The fact that the Tribunal deals with a great many applications of this kind does not diminish even slightly the human impact on each and every individual applicant. Each such applicant is entitled to have their individual application given proper and careful consideration on its own merits by the Tribunal.

It is entirely understandable that an applicant, presented with reasons for decision of the Tribunal that contain internal inconsistencies, typographical and other errors or infelicities, might feel as if his or her application had not been treated with the seriousness and care appropriate to the significance of the human impact of the outcome. They may harbour a concern that the Tribunal did not reason rigorously to its ultimate stated conclusion. They may persuade themselves that the Tribunal’s true subjective reasons are not reflected in the construction ultimately given to the decision. I can imagine that many applicants in such a situation would find it difficult to take complete comfort from a decision of a judge that, despite what the Tribunal said, it is plain that it meant something else. The end result is that a stain attaches to the legitimacy of a lawful decision in the eyes of the one person to whom it is most important that it appear flawless.

Fundamentally, it seems to me, that is the most important reason why it is unfortunate that unnecessary doubts about the validity of a decision should be created by carelessness. It is not, for example, because of the potential for the generation of expensive and time-consuming litigation (although that is, no doubt, an important reason in itself). It is because there is a human being whose life has been irreparably changed as a result of a decision of the Tribunal, and who may, with some justification, feel that his or her case was not given the attention it deserved.

Nevertheless, for the reasons I have given, I consider it to be clear beyond peradventure that the errors upon which the applicant relies are, indeed, simply unfortunate, and regrettable, errors that do not conceal the Tribunal’s true reasoning process, and which do not reveal any jurisdictional error.

(Emphasis original.)

Conclusion

37    The appeal should be dismissed, with costs to follow the event.

Associate:

Dated:    4 September 2026