FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Laverack (formerly AZO24) v Commonwealth of Australia (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCAFC 162

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) and (c) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):

(a)    all current proceedings instituted by Ms Laverack in this Court be stayed; and

(b)    Ms Laverack be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue and obtaining leave.

2.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court Act, Ms Laverack be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the Federal Court Act and obtaining leave in accordance with s 37AT of the Federal Court Act.

3.    At the time of filing any application pursuant to s 37AR of the Federal Court Act, or any other application, Ms Laverack pay the sum of $200 to the Registrar as security for costs, to be held by the Court in a non-interest-bearing account.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

1    This decision concerns whether Ms Laverack should be impeded in her attempts to institute or continue proceedings in this Court because she has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals.

2    In AZO24 v Commonwealth [2025] FCAFC 77, the Full Court considered Ms Laverack’s unfortunate litigation history. In this Court alone, Ms Laverack has commenced five sets of proceedings and, within them, brought 23 interlocutory applications (which were listed in Schedule A to the AZO24 judgment and have been re-attached to these reasons). In her conduct of these proceedings, Ms Laverack filed voluminous submissions and material. When dismissing Ms Laverack’s various applications and appeals, the Full Court made a notation that it proposed to make the orders it has made today, and made provision for Ms Laverack to file and serve, by 9 July 2025, any material upon which she intended to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders and any written outline of submissions of no more than 10 pages. Ms Laverack did not file any evidence or submissions responsive to that notation and provision.

3    For the following reasons, the Court has determined that it is appropriate for a vexatious proceeding order to be made against Ms Laverack.

Applicable law

4    Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers the Court to make a vexatious proceedings order against a person, which includes ordering that any current proceedings are stayed or dismissed, and prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings. Section 37AO provides:

37AO     Making vexatious proceedings orders

(1)     This section applies if the Court is satisfied:

(a)     a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or

(b)     a person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in an Australian court or tribunal.

(2)     The Court may make any or all of the following orders:

(a)     an order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the Court already instituted by the person;

(b)     an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in the Court;

(c)     any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.

Note:     Examples of an order under paragraph (c) are an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail, an order to give security for costs and an order for costs.

(3)     The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of any of the following:

(a)     the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;

(b)     the Chief Executive Officer;

(c)     a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding;

(d)     a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

(4)     The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

(5)     An order made under paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is a final order.

(6)     For the purposes of subsection (1), the Court may have regard to:

(a)     proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal; and

(b)     orders made by any Australian court or tribunal; and

(c)     the person’s overall conduct in proceedings conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including the person’s compliance with orders made by that court or tribunal);

including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section.

5    To understand the effect of s 37AO, it is worthwhile noting a number of its terms defined in s 37AM(1):

Australian court or tribunal means a court or tribunal of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.

institute, in relation to proceedings, includes:

(a)    for civil proceedings—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started against a party; and

(b)    for proceedings before a tribunal—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started before the tribunal; and

(c)    for criminal proceedings—the making of a complaint or the obtaining of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged offender; and

(d)    for civil or criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary to start an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision made in the course of the proceedings.

proceeding:

(a)    in relation to a court—has the meaning given by section 4; and

(b)    in relation to a tribunal—means a proceeding in the tribunal, whether     between parties or not, and includes an incidental proceeding in the     course of, or in connection with, a proceeding.

proceedings of a particular type includes:

(a)    proceedings in relation to a particular matter; and

(b)    proceedings against a particular person.

vexatious proceeding includes:

(a)    a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b)    a proceeding instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to     cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c)    a proceeding instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and

(d)    a proceeding conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

vexatious proceedings order means an order made under subsection 37AO(2).

6    As recognised by the Full Court in Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100; 304 FCR 318 at [20], the power to make vexatious proceedings orders exists where “four cumulative conditions” contained in s 37AO(1)(a) are met: A person has (1) frequently; (2) instituted or conducted; (3) vexatious proceedings; (4) in Australian courts or tribunals. Once the power is engaged, the Court then has a discretion as to whether to make the order or not. The Full Court in Storry observed that the Court’s discretionary exercise is informed by the following (at [17]-[19]):

As was noted in the appeal judgment, a vexatious proceeding order has been described as an “extreme measure” (at [39]). Similarly, as the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Beazley P, Emmett JA and Sackville AJA) explained in Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 (at [56]):

… [A]n order restricting a person’s access to the courts is a very serious matter and thus an order under the VP Act is not to be made lightly. The purpose of the statutory power is not to punish the litigant for past misdeeds. The purpose is to shield other litigants from harassment and to protect the Court itself from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits.

But although the order is, by its nature, exceptional and serious, these and similar observations in the cases should not mean that a judge should shrink away from making a vexatious proceedings order if the preconditions to it being made are established and if it is appropriate to do so. Although an order restricting a person’s access to the courts is not to be made lightly, the extent of the increasing disruption to the efficient management of the Court’s business caused by allowing vexatious proceedings to be instituted and maintained without check is also a serious matter. Further, it should be recognised that the consequence of a vexatious proceedings order is not to impose an insuperable barrier to litigation by a vexatious litigant entirely, but to control it by imposing a requirement for leave.

As Wheelahan J further observed in Fokas [v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30] (at [36]), by allowing for such control, the relief authorised by the legislation reinforces the power of the Court “to protect its own processes against unwarranted usurpation of its time and resources and to avoid loss caused to those who have to face proceedings that lack substance”: see Jones v Skyring (1992) 109 ALR 303 (at 312 per Toohey J). As the Full Court (Besanko, Logan and McKerracher JJ) stated in Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; (2015) 234 FCR 535 (at 545 [31]):

Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers a court to balance the right of one individual of access to justice with other rights namely, a correlative right on the part of the present respondents to finality and the separate right of other individuals also to access this Court. It is for this Court, the present manifestation of a recognition by the Australian Parliament, the origins of which may be traced to an earlier recognition by the United Kingdom Parliament, via the Vexatious Actions Act 1896 (UK) (59 & 60 Vict. C. 51), of a need for a power to effect just such a balance.

7    It is necessary to identify the proceedings that constituted the abuse and/or the conduct within those proceedings that was vexatious. The Court’s task, in approaching the inquiry under s 37AO, includes having regard to other proceedings and orders made in those proceedings as observed by the Full Court in Storry at [21]:

Although it was not in dispute before us, it is appropriate to record that we agree with the views expressed by Wheelahan J in Fokas (at [41]-[66]) that the Court’s evaluation as to whether the section is engaged is framed by s 37AO(6), which expressly authorises the Court to have regard to: other proceedings; orders made in other proceedings; and the conduct of those proceedings, and that s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (which provides that evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact in another proceeding, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding) is not infringed by relying on orders and reasons for judgment in other proceedings for the purposes of considering whether a proceeding is vexatious (and hence whether s 37AO(1) is engaged). In short, this is because the judgments and orders are not relied upon to prove a fact in issue in those other proceedings but rather (as s 37AO(6) authorises) to show the outcome of the proceedings, and the course they had taken, and to record the person’s conduct in those proceedings for the statutory purpose of characterisation.

Correspondence received from Ms Laverack

8    On 11 June 2025, the Court made provision for Ms Laverack to file and serve by 9 July 2025, any material upon which she intended to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders and any written outline of submissions of no more than 10 pages. Ms Laverack did not do so.

9    On 12 June 2025, Ms Laverack sought to file by email to the NSW Registry an application for leave to institute a proceeding which in its terms sought for the decision in AZO24 to be set aside and redetermined “due to a lack of procedural fairness and a denial of natural justice”, along with a supporting affidavit and submissions of six pages in length.

10    Between 3 July 2025 and 8 July 2025, a series of emails were exchanged between Ms Laverack and the Court’s Registry. That exchange included a letter from the Duty Registrar notifying Ms Laverack that the 12 June 2025 application would not be accepted for filing. Ms Laverack’s responses to that letter indicated some confusion as to the form in which her submissions should take. A member of the Court’s Registry responded to Ms Laverack’s correspondence and clarified that the filing of material by 9 July 2025 was a ‘separate issue’ and that she could, if she wished to do so, file any material and submissions that she wished to rely on in opposition of the proposed s 37AO(2)(a) orders. Ms Laverack did not file any such material and instead appeared to maintain that the substance of her application to institute proceedings was ‘exactly the same’ as any material to be relied on opposing the vexatious proceeding orders.

11     On 15 September 2025, Ms Laverack sent the following email to the Registry:

Hello,

I am now back from overseas and would like the Court to resume my proceedings, based on my past emails in regards to my accurate submission made in June 2025 that was contesting the orders made following judgement that should have been heard before the justices in those proceedings.

The Australian government infected me with the flu virus a couple of weeks ago mid port on my way home, which I have deciphered by them accessing my locked suitcase in the hotel and inserting a viral contaminant into my SPF facial cream. They had arranged for an older couple to be seated on the plane next to me on my flight from London (they were Australian) in which the woman coughed and made out she had a bad flu, then revealed a bag with picture of daschund dogs on it like the agents have this dog next door to me and she pulls out a book with title “Save me” with a picture of a woman and a boy on the cover- therefore was all prearranged to do this to me. I am still unwell and have been sick for over a week. I just returned yesterday. I am sure (as are a whole lot of other people as they advertise and gloat to everyone about what they do) you are all aware of these facts.

At some point you need to step up and tell the government (Albanese) to stop this evil bullshit. This is pure evil. It is outside all proportions.

I consider my trip a success. I proved absolutely nothing bad happened (from my end). I got away from a horrible abusive place for a while and encountered lots of warm and friendly people. I didn't get to see the person I set out to (bring Brian Eno, yet this also proved how ridiculous the prevention of this was). The bad things that happened were the things they did to me - that are irrational and futile.

You people misinterpret many things.

I would like a lawyer assigned please.

Thank you

Anna Laverack

12    Ms Laverack was informed by the Court that the matter was proceeding on the papers on the basis of any material and submissions filed by 9 July 2025. Ultimately, Ms Laverack filed no evidence or submissions that were directed to the question of whether the Court could or should make the proposed order under s 37AO of the Federal Court Act.

Consideration

Ms Laverack’s history of proceedings in Australian courts

13    As was observed by this Court in AZO24 at [14], Ms Laverack has commenced a multitude of proceedings and interlocutory applications:

These allegations have then led to a multitude of proceedings and interlocutory applications. The applicant has commenced five sets of proceedings in this Court: NSD1036/2023, NSD325/2024, NSD942/2024, NSD1252/2024 and NSD1450/2024. The applicant has filed a further 23 interlocutory applications (which are listed in Schedule A to these reasons), and filed voluminous submissions and material.

14    The Court has reproduced in these reasons the same Schedule A setting out those further interlocutory applications, noting the addition of the application attempted to be filed on 12 June 2025. It is apparent from this list that Ms Laverack has achieved no substantive success from any of these applications.

15    The source for each of these proceedings arises from fanciful allegations: Ms Laverack commenced proceedings on 20 September 2023, seeking relief against the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of New South Wales claiming that they were involved in an alleged unlawful controlled operation or special intelligence operation with respect to her. This operation was said to have occurred because the State and Federal governments were involved in an alleged cover-up of the alleged murders by, and death of, an American rock musician, Mr Trent Reznor. Ms Laverack claims that Mr Reznor murdered his family and then committed suicide. According to the Commonwealth and the State of New South Wales, by all accounts, and to their knowledge, this musician and his family remain alive and they have no interest in him or the applicant. This alleged controlled operation is asserted to have manifested, and be continuing, in a myriad of ways: Without being exhaustive, this includes the Commonwealth’s alleged poisoning of her with a disease in Switzerland in 2019, government agents following her, agents living within her apartment building and the placing of optical devices both in the gutter looking down on her dining room table and in the vent of her bathroom, which led to her being filmed, and the footage being released publicly.

16    As adverted to above, a “vexatious proceeding”, as defined in s 37AM(1), includes a proceeding that is “an abuse of process” or is “without reasonable ground” or proceedings conducted in a way so as “to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose”. Whilst, by numerical equation, the mere number of unsuccessful proceedings and interlocutory applications do not bespeak vexation, the following review of certain of the proceedings and applications illustrate why the Court can be satisfied that it is appropriate to make a vexatious proceedings order.

NSD1036/2023

17    In AZO24 v Commonwealth (No 2) [2024] FCA 426, Kennett J refused Ms Laverack leave to file an interlocutory application and accompanying affidavit. In making that finding, his Honour observed, at [4], that Ms Laverack’s application has “no prospect” of success and that the “Court’s time and resources should not be spent hearing the application”. Additionally, his Honour observed that the relief sought was “extraordinary”, at [4], and totally unsupported by the evidence at [5]. Then, at [8], his Honour made a finding that the evidence proposed to be provided in support of Ms Laverack’s contentions “discloses an irrational thought process that does not reflect reality”.

18    In AZO24 v Commonwealth (Summary Dismissal) [2024] FCA 1053, Kennett J summarily dismissed Ms Laverack’s application. His Honour observed the following with respect to the commencement of and manner in which Ms Laverack conducted the proceedings:

(a)    Ms Laverack’s failure to serve documents: at [1];

(b)    Ms Laverack having commenced, without any prospect of success, an application for leave to appeal from his decision to disqualify himself and the decision to refuse the filing of the interlocutory application in AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 426, which was refused, attempted to make an application to “re-open” the leave to appeal: at [5]-[6].

(c)    Ms Laverack’s applications for adjournments were made without proper evidence: at [7]-[18];

(d)    The voluminous nature of Ms Laverack’s pleadings and prayers for relief: Ms Laverack’s originating application sought at least 49 separate orders, and the statement of claim comprised 368 paragraphs over 185 pages, plus a one page schedule: at [19]-[20]. Ms Laverack’s claims had no realistic prospect of success: at [23], and were “obviously extremely implausible”: at [24].

19    This decision was one of the two decisions which were the subject of the hearing before the Full Court in AZO24.

NSD325/2024

20    In AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555, Abraham J refused leave for Ms Laverack to appeal from Kennett J’s decision to not recuse himself and to not accept Ms Laverack’s interlocutory applications for filing. In coming to this conclusion, her Honour considered that Ms Laverack’s proposed appeal enjoyed “no prospect of success”: at [43].

NSD942/2024

21    In AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 976, Needham J observed that certain of Ms Laverack’s interlocutory orders sought were an abuse of process: at [17]. In AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1004, Needham J refused to accept an interlocutory application for filing and dismissed Ms Laverack’s application for judicial review, noting variously that the “orders sought to be varied or set aside are themselves frivolous or vexatious, and an abuse of process”: at [50]. This decision was the second of the two decisions which were the subject of the hearing before the Full Court in AZO24.

22    In AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 4) [2024] FCA 1212, Ms Laverack sought to unsuccessfully reagitate a number of decisions which had already been determined: at [1].

The High Court matters

23    In addition, account may be taken of the following High Court proceedings commenced by Ms Laverack at [126]-[134] in AZO24:

126     In addition, the applicant has made five unsuccessful applications in the High Court.

127     In In the Matter of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave to Issue or File [2024] HCASJ 3, on 1 February 2024, Beech-Jones J refused leave to file or issue an application for leave for a constitutional or other writ, filed on or about 14 December 2023, on the basis that the proceeding sought to be commenced was (at [7]), “clearly an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious.”

128     In In the Matter of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave to Issue or File (No 2) [2024] HCASJ 14 (Beech-Jones J), on 29 February 2024, Beech-Jones J dismissed the applicant’s application dated 22 February 2024 for orders restricting the identification of her identity in relation to her proceedings. Having regard to the public interest in open justice, his Honour was not satisfied that it was necessary to make any of the orders sought by the applicant: [7]. This decision appears to relate to his Honour's decision of 1 February 2024, relating NSD1036/2023.

129    In In The Matter Of An Application By Anna Laverack For Leave To Appeal [2024] HCASL 123, on 9 May 2024, Gordon and Steward JJ refused leave to appeal against a decision of Beech-Jones J dated 1 February 2024, to refuse the applicant’s ex parte application for leave to issue or file the application dated 14 December 2023, because an appeal would enjoy no prospects of success: [2].

130     In In The Matter Of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave To Appeal [2024] HCASL 124, the applicant sought leave to appeal Beech-Jones J’s decision dated 29 February 2024, in which his Honour refused the applicant’s application seeking orders restricting the identification of her identity in relation to her proceedings in this Court [1]. On 9 May 2024, Gordon and Steward JJ refused leave to appeal on the basis that their Honour’s considered an appeal would enjoy no prospects of success and did not raise any questions of law of public importance [2]-[3].

131     In In the Matter Of An Application By Anna Laverack For Leave To Issue Or File [2024] HCASJ 21 (Gleeson J), Gleeson J refused the applicant’s application dated 22 May 2024 for an order that she be “granted a permanent pseudonym in the records of the Court to restrict identifying me to the public” in the three proceedings in this Court, on the basis that her Honour was not satisfied that they were required on the basis of “safety risk to the applicant” (as the applicant contended), nor that the orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice [12].

132     Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers the Court to make a vexatious proceedings order against a person. A consequence of making such an order includes making an order that the person is precluded from instituting proceedings without the leave of the Court: s 37AO(2)(b), s 37AQ(1)(a). The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative: s 37AO(3). However, the Court must not make such an order without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard: s 37AO(4).

133     It may be accepted that the making of such an order is an “extreme measure”: Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 (at [56]). The purpose of the relief is not to bar vexatious litigants from instituting proceedings entirely or to impose punishment but to place prospective litigation under the control of the Court to protect the Court’s processes against unwarranted usurpations of its limited resources: Storry v Parkyn [2024] FCAFC 67 at [39].

134     These proceedings and the applicant’s other litigious activity have consumed time and resources of the Court.

The Full Court proceeding

24    The proceedings before the Full Court in AZO24 concerned Ms Laverack’s application for leave to appeal from Kennett J’s decision to summarily dismiss her substantive proceedings, referred to at [18] above, and an appeal from the decision of Needham J dismissing Ms Laverack’s application for judicial review of an order made by the Registrar, referred to at [21] above. As to the first matter, Ms Laverack’s application for leave to appeal contained 30 grounds and her draft notice of appeal contained 39 proposed grounds. All of those grounds were found to be entirely without merit. As to the second, Ms Laverack propounded 12 grounds of appeal that were prolix and tantamount to submissions. Again, those proposed grounds were found to be entirely without merit.

25    The entirety of the proceedings referred to above are properly characterised as being an abuse of process or proceedings commenced without reasonable grounds. Further, the content of the reasoning referred to above and the orders made reveal that the manner in which Ms Laverack conducted those proceedings was vexatious. It is unnecessary to deal with all of the proceedings separately that are referred to in the attached table: Storry [51].

26    The Court is of the view that the evidence reveals that Ms Laverack has “frequently” instituted or conducted proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals. Clearly enough, Ms Laverack has filed multiple proceedings and multiple applications within each of those proceedings, amounting to a frequent institution of proceedings in Australian courts and tribunals: Storry at [22].

27    Given the cumulative, four preconditions have been met, we turn to whether to exercise the discretion and make the vexatious proceeding order. The above discussion amply illustrates that Ms Laverack has instituted a number of proceedings without merit arising from implausible allegations. Her litigious history also reveals an inability to accept the finality of decisions and the Court’s repeated non-acceptance of the plausibility of her claims. It may be accepted that such orders will inhibit Ms Laverack’s ability to maintain or institute any proceedings without leave. However, we are of the view that such orders are necessary to give finality to the perceived underlying dispute.

28    Such an order is necessary not only to protect Ms Laverack but also to protect the Court’s resources so that they are available to other litigants. As observed by the Full Court, in Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; 234 FCR 535 at [31] per Besanko, Logan and McKerracher JJ:

Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers a court to balance the right of one individual of access to justice with other rights namely, a correlative right on the part of the present respondents to finality and the separate right of other individuals also to access this Court. It is for this Court, the present manifestation of a recognition by the Australian Parliament, the origins of which may be traced to an earlier recognition by the United Kingdom Parliament, via the Vexatious Actions Act 1896 (UK) (59 & 60 Vict. C. 51), of a need for a power to effect just such a balance.

29    Here such an order is necessary to effect such a balance. As observed in Storry, at [6], the stark contemporary reality is that there are an increasing number of controversies being brought before the Court and a finite number of judges able to manage and determine those matters. The import of s 37M(3) of the Federal Court Act requires that the Court not remain passive and take appropriate steps to identify early and to quell abuses of the Court’s processes so that those claims by other litigants which have merit are able to be dealt with.

30    For these reasons the Court is satisfied that the proposed orders should be made.

Associate:

Dated:    18 November 2025

Schedule A