Luck v Secretary, Services Australia (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCAFC 103

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Appeal from:	Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2024] FCA 1158

File number:	VID 1050 of 2024

Judgment of:	ROFE, HESPE AND KENNETT JJ

Date of judgment:	11 June 2025

Date of publication of reasons:	8 August 2025

Catchwords:	HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act) – where the appellant has a long and active career as a litigant in Australian courts and tribunals – where the appellant’s litigious activity is characterised by delays, spurious interlocutory applications, refusals to prosecute proceedings once commenced and avoidance of hearings – whether the appellant’s litigious history indicates an abuse of process – whether the Court’s power under s 37AO of the Act to make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative is engaged – whether making a vexatious proceedings order is appropriate – whether the exercise of such power is “procedurally” deficient

Legislation:	Constitution ss 75-77 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2022 (Cth) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AO, 37 AM(1), 37AN, 37AQ(1), 37AR-37AT Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 55(2) Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B, 40 Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 46 r 7A Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.26, 36.75 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) Police Integrity Act 2008 (Vic) s 51

Cases cited:	Ferdinands v Registrar Burns (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 157 Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; 234 FCR 535 Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315 Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited [2023] HCASL 109 Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited [2023] QCA 54 Kuperman, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2023] HCATrans 127 Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 112 Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1506; 107 ALD 538 Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 Luck v Department of Human Services [2010] AATA 6 Luck v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 1805 Luck v James; Luck v Delaney [2015] HCASL 208 Luck v National Duty Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1257 Luck v Nell [2022] HCASL 179 Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice & Anor (Unreported, 24 May 2013) Luck v Principal Officer of IBAC [2014] VSCA 239 Luck v Renton [2006] VSC 90 Luck v Secretary of Services Australia & Ors [2023] HCASL 62 Luck v Secretary of Services Australia [2022] FCAFC 195 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 2) [2014] FCA 798 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 2) [2019] FCA 1290 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 3) [2019] FCA 1335 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2016] FCA 950 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2019] FCA 2071 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2014] FCA 1060 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111; 233 FCR 494 Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540 Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26 Luck [2011] HCATrans 90 Re Luck [2003] HCA 70; 203 ALR 1 Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100; 304 FCR 318 University of Southern Queensland v Luck [2017] FCCA 639

Division:	General Division

Registry:	Victoria

National Practice Area:	Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:	50

Date of hearing:	11 June 2025

Counsel for the Appellant:	The appellant did not appear

Counsel as amicus curiae:	S J Moloney

ORDERS

		VID 1050 of 2024

BETWEEN:	GAYE LUCK Appellant
AND:	THE SECRETARY, SERVICES AUSTRALIA First Respondent COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Second Respondent

order made by:	ROFE, HESPE AND KENNETT JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	11 June 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act):

(a) all current proceedings instituted by Ms Gaye Luck in this Court be stayed; and

(b) Ms Luck be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue.

2. Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Act, Ms Luck be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the Act.

3. At the time of filing any application pursuant to s 37AR of the Act, or any other application, Ms Luck pay the sum of $200 to the Registrar as security for costs, to be held by the Court in a non-interest-bearing account

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

1 The appellant (Ms Luck) commenced this proceeding on 4 October 2024 by filing a notice of appeal. The appeal was listed for hearing on 7 March 2025. We made orders on that day dismissing the appeal and published reasons for those orders on 13 March 2025 (Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26).

2 As those reasons relate, the orders were made in circumstances where Ms Luck (who was not represented) had not attended the hearing, claiming to be on “medical leave” but not having applied for any adjournment on that basis or put before the Court any evidence of incapacity to participate in the hearing. Ms Luck had also filed an interlocutory application seeking the disqualification of two members of the Court. This application was listed for hearing at the same time as the substantive appeal and was also dismissed.

3 The orders made in this proceeding on 7 March 2025 dismissing the substantive appeal (the 7 March orders) included the following notation.

A. The appellant is to be provided notice that the Full Court intends to make orders (proposed orders) in the following terms:

1. Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act):

a. all current proceedings instituted by Ms Gaye Luck in this Court be stayed; and

b. Ms Luck be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue.

4 Order 5 of those orders was as follows.

5. On or by 30 May 2025, the appellant:

a. file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders; and

b. notify the Registry in writing as to whether she wishes to have an oral hearing in relation to whether the proposed orders ought to be made by the Full Court.

5 A copy of the 7 March orders, including the notation setting out the proposed orders, was sent to Ms Luck by email on the day they were made.

6 The question whether vexatious litigant orders should be made was listed for hearing before us on 11 June 2025. At the Court’s request, Mr Stephen Moloney of counsel filed written submissions and appeared as amicus curiae. The Court thanks Mr Moloney for his assistance.

7 Ms Luck did not file submissions or appear at the hearing.

8 We made vexatious litigant orders in the terms foreshadowed. We set out below our reasons for making these orders.

Relevant provisions

9 Section 37AO, which is in Part VAAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act), provides as follows.

37AO Making vexatious proceedings orders

(1) This section applies if the Court is satisfied:

(a) a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or

(b) a person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in an Australian court or tribunal.

(2) The Court may make any or all of the following orders:

(a) an order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the Court already instituted by the person;

(b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in the Court;

Note: Examples of an order under paragraph (c) are an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail, an order to give security for costs and an order for costs.

(3) The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of any of the following:

(a) the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;

(b) the Chief Executive Officer;

(d) a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

(4) The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

(5) An order made under paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is a final order.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Court may have regard to:

(a) proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal; and

(b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal; and

(c) the person’s overall conduct in proceedings conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including the person’s compliance with orders made by that court or tribunal);

including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section.

10 A number of expressions used in s 37AO(1) are defined in s 37AM(1). It is sufficient here to note that “vexatious proceeding” is defined, inclusively, as follows:

vexatious proceeding includes:

(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b) a proceeding instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(d) a proceeding conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

11 Where an order is made prohibiting a person from instituting proceedings (or proceedings of a particular type), s 37AQ(1)(a) provides that the person must not institute such proceedings without the leave of the Court (provision for which is made by ss 37AR-37AT) and that a proceeding instituted in contravention of that prohibition is stayed.

12 Section 37AN provides that Part VAAA does not limit or otherwise affect any other powers that the Court has to deal with vexatious proceedings.

13 The power to make a vexatious proceedings order is engaged by what were described in Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100; 304 FCR 318 at [20] (Lee, Feutrill and Jackman JJ) (Storry) as “four cumulative conditions” contained in s 37AO(1)(a): a person has (1) frequently; (2) instituted or conducted; (3) vexatious proceedings; (4) in Australian courts or tribunals. That power, once engaged, involves the exercise of discretion. The Full Court in Storry, in making vexatious litigant orders after further argument following the disposition of an appeal, described the discretionary exercise as follows (at [17]-[19]).

As was noted in the appeal judgment, a vexatious proceeding order has been described as an “extreme measure” (at [39]). Similarly, as the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Beazley P, Emmett JA and Sackville AJA) explained in Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 (at [56]):

… [A]n order restricting a person’s access to the courts is a very serious matter and thus an order under the VP Act is not to be made lightly. The purpose of the statutory power is not to punish the litigant for past misdeeds. The purpose is to shield other litigants from harassment and to protect the Court itself from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits.

But although the order is, by its nature, exceptional and serious, these and similar observations in the cases should not mean that a judge should shrink away from making a vexatious proceedings order if the preconditions to it being made are established and if it is appropriate to do so. Although an order restricting a person’s access to the courts is not to be made lightly, the extent of the increasing disruption to the efficient management of the Court’s business caused by allowing vexatious proceedings to be instituted and maintained without check is also a serious matter. Further, it should be recognised that the consequence of a vexatious proceedings order is not to impose an insuperable barrier to litigation by a vexatious litigant entirely, but to control it by imposing a requirement for leave.

As Wheelahan J further observed in [Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30] (at [36]), by allowing for such control, the relief authorised by the legislation reinforces the power of the Court “to protect its own processes against unwarranted usurpation of its time and resources and to avoid loss caused to those who have to face proceedings that lack substance”: see Jones v Skyring (1992) 109 ALR 303 (at 312 per Toohey J). As the Full Court (Besanko, Logan and McKerrracher JJ) stated in Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; (2015) 234 FCR 535 (at 545 [31]):

Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers a court to balance the right of one individual of access to justice with other rights namely, a correlative right on the part of the present respondents to finality and the separate right of other individuals also to access this Court. It is for this Court, the present manifestation of a recognition by the Australian Parliament, the origins of which may be traced to an earlier recognition by the United Kingdom Parliament, via the Vexatious Actions Act 1896 (UK) (59 & 60 Vict. C. 51), of a need for a power to effect just such a balance.

Preliminaries

14 Despite order 5 of the 7 March orders, Ms Luck did not file submissions or evidence to oppose the making of the proposed orders, nor did she directly answer the question whether she wished to have an oral hearing in relation to whether the proposed orders should be made. Instead, on 30 May 2025, Ms Luck sent a letter to the Principal Registrar which included the following.

I write to formally confirm that I am unable to file submissions in VID1050/2024, and that this letter constitutes my response in lieu of submissions, for the following reasons:

1. No proceeding remains on foot. The Notice of Appeal was dismissed by order of the Full Court on 7 March 2025. As no reinstatement has been granted or heard, the appeal is no longer extant, and I am not a party to any active matter.

2. Rule 36.75 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) does not permit or support the filing of submissions in a finalised appeal. That rule presumes an application for reinstatement which has not occurred and could not lawfully proceed under the current circumstances. I do not rely on it.

3. The request for submissions under section 37AO lacks procedural jurisdiction. No live proceeding exists. I have filed no originating application or interlocutory process. I am not initiating any new proceeding. Accordingly, I cannot respond as a party and cannot validly elect to be heard orally or on the papers in a matter that no longer exists.

I therefore respectfully state that I do not consent to the making of any order under section 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) being made in the absence of lawful procedural foundation, and I submit that no such order can be made without the restoration of jurisdiction.

I rely on the contents of this letter which is provided as a complete response to the Court’s Note on Orders of 7 March 2025 and the Registry’s invitations and directions of 17 March and 1 May 2025. I request that it be formally recorded on the administrative and judicial record for transparency.

15 It is unproductive to attempt to analyse in detail what Ms Luck was seeking to do here. However, the following points should be made about this communication.

16 First, it was incorrect that “no proceeding remains on foot”. The 7 March orders, while dismissing the substantive appeal, provided for further steps to occur in connection with it. This is not uncommon: for example, when the Court makes final orders disposing of a proceeding it frequently makes procedural orders for the subsequent determination of questions as to costs. The proceeding is neither formally nor in substance at an end until any such consequential issues have been disposed of. The orders that were made in this case, in order to provide procedural fairness to Ms Luck in relation to the Court’s consideration of possible orders under s 37AO, were in substance the same as those made in conjunction with the disposition of the substantive appeal in Storry and in Ferdinands v Registrar Burns (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 157 (Ferdinands).

17 Secondly, r 36.75 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) (which provides for orders that can be made when a party does not appear) has nothing to say concerning written submissions on issues that remain to be decided following the substantive dismissal of an appeal.

18 Thirdly, in the light of the first and second points, the suggestion that Ms Luck was “unable” to file submissions or appear to present oral argument was obviously wrong. Even if it were correct that no proceeding was on foot (and if something of substance followed from that state of affairs), that would not have prevented Ms Luck addressing submissions to the Court concerning the process that it had decided to undertake. Indeed, the appropriate and respectful way for Ms Luck to make whatever point she was attempting to make was to file submissions seeking to persuade the Court; not to purport to impose her own view of the matter. Manifestly, also, it was open to Ms Luck to make submissions on the merits of the proposed orders.

19 Fourthly, what appears to be suggested by Ms Luck as following from the absence of an ongoing proceeding is that any orders the Court might make under s 37AO would lack a “lawful procedural foundation”. Again, it was unsatisfactory for this to be baldly asserted in a letter to the Registry rather than put as a submission to the Court with an explanation of why the conclusion follows. It is the Court, not Ms Luck, that has the authority to decide these issues. In any event, the premise is wrong. The existing proceedings had not been finalised. In any event, given the express provision in s 37AO(3) for the Court to act on its own initiative, it is not clear to us why the existence of a proceeding should be seen as a prerequisite for consideration of the making of orders.

20 Fifthly, to the extent that there may be interesting questions concerning the nature of the power conferred on the Court under s 37AO and the connection between the exercise of that power and one or more “matters” (in the sense in which that term is used in ss 75-77 of the Constitution and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)), Ms Luck did not raise them. She expressly refrained from directing any submissions to the Court, and to the extent that she suggested the existence of any problem it was a “procedural” one. For the reasons outlined above, the suggestion of a procedural deficiency is misconceived. We see no reason not to follow the same procedural course as was taken in Storry and Ferdinands.

Consideration

Background: Ms Luck’s history of proceedings in Australia

21 As far as the Court is able to discern, Ms Luck has instituted at least 115 proceedings in Australian courts and tribunals, being self-represented in all but one of these, and filing her documents under several names: Gaye Luck, Gaye Alexandra Luck, Gaye Alexandra Mary Luck, Gaye Alexandra Kuperman and Alex Luck. So far as our research discloses, these proceedings have given rise to at least 148 decisions, 130 of which involved the publication of reasons. Only three of the decisions we have been able to find involved any measure of success for Ms Luck, and these successes have been procedural. A table compiling all the proceedings which Ms Luck has instituted in Australian courts and tribunals and decisions made in those proceedings, of which this Court is aware, is at Annexure A to these reasons. The list is very likely not complete, because not all decisions have been published on the internet, and the figures given in these reasons may therefore understate Ms Luck’s litigious activity.

22 The undertaking of this research by the Court, with the assistance of its staff, is consistent with the power of the Court under s 37AO to act on its own initiative. On 2 June 2025 a draft of the table that appears at Annexure A was sent by the Court to Ms Luck, under cover of an email drawing it to her attention. Ms Luck was therefore on notice, before the date fixed for hearing, of the nature of the information upon which the Court was likely to proceed. While it is unfortunate that this notice was provided after the date fixed for her to provide submissions (and indicate whether she wished to appear), we are satisfied that Ms Luck had an opportunity to draw attention to any error in the table (or to seek further time to do this) and to address the Court as to what should be drawn from it. In the absence of any suggestion that the table contains errors, we see no difficulty in proceeding on the basis that it is correct (albeit, as noted above, probably incomplete).

23 The proceedings commenced by Ms Luck since 1998 have stemmed from several factual disputes and allegations, including:

A slip-and-fall injury Ms Luck allegedly sustained outside a shopping centre in 1995— with a claim she brought against the owner of the shopping centre;

Injury Ms Luck alleges she sustained as a result of inhaling fibreglass particles falling from the ceiling of a rental property during a brief tenancy in Townsville in 1997— with claims brought against the landlord, local council and government, private companies, and medical practitioners who either did treat her (which treatment she was unsatisfied with) or did not treat her;

Ms Luck’s attempt to require (by way of a mandatory interlocutory injunction) that a certain medical practitioner treat her in 2000, when after providing her treatment he determined he could assist her no further;

Purported review of decisions made by Centrelink to refuse certain social security benefits for which Ms Luck was found to be ineligible, and decisions reviewing her entitlement to benefits for which she had qualified;

Claims against universities that Ms Luck attended, including Deakin University and the University of Southern Queensland, involving allegations of discrimination or misconduct by them, or purported review of decisions affecting her enrolment;

A tenancy dispute between Ms Luck and her landlord in Victoria in 2005;

Complaints made against Victoria Police and hospitals Ms Luck or her mother attended, and the Coroner who assessed the death of her mother;

Allegedly being denied entry to the premises of Bunnings and Officeworks stores in November 2021, absent proof of a COVID-19 vaccination or medical exemption;

Ms Luck’s complaints about the handling of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests made to Centrelink, the universities she attended, and police integrity bodies to which she complained; and

Allegations of discrimination, bias or misconduct by courts and tribunals determining her various claims.

24 As noted earlier, “vexatious proceedings” as defined for the purpose of s 37AO include proceedings that are an abuse of process, proceedings commenced without reasonable grounds and proceedings conducted in a manner “so as to harass or annoy [or] cause delay or detriment”. The sheer number of proceedings commenced and prosecuted unsuccessfully by Ms Luck, while obviously suggestive, does not by itself demonstrate the commencement of proceedings that are “vexatious” in any of these senses. It is necessary to consider some particular examples and to make some broader observations concerning categories of cases and Ms Luck’s conduct of them. In doing so we have focused primarily, but by no means entirely, on proceedings that Ms Luck has commenced in this Court. We have taken this approach because, although s 37AO(1)(a) is expressly capable of being satisfied on the basis of proceedings commenced in “any Australian court or tribunal”, the purpose for which power is conferred by s 37AO is to allow the Court to protect its own processes against abuse and its own resources from being drained by pointless proceedings.

Ms Luck’s proceedings in this Court

25 Since 2000, Ms Luck has commenced at least 19 proceedings at first instance and 11 proceedings before the Full Court, resulting in at least 55 published decisions. Only one of these decisions has been in Ms Luck’s favour, and even then only in a procedural sense.

26 Taking this one successful decision as an example, the convoluted history of the case was as follows:

(1) Ms Luck sought review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) of a decision said to have been made by the Department of Human Services in respect of a number of requests she had made under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the FOI Act) to access documents related to her social security entitlements. Ms Luck’s requests were made on 20 January 2009, 9 and 16 February 2009, and 10, 23 and 24 March 2009. On the face of her original application, it appeared (although it was not clear) that the purported decision sought to be reviewed was a letter sent by Dr Rumble, General Counsel in the Department, to Ms Luck on 22 May 2009, enclosing a CD containing the requested documents that the Department was able to locate. This is important to note at the outset because it indicates that the protracted processes that ensued arose from an administrative decision granting Ms Luck what she had sought. Forgie DP dismissed the application, finding that the AAT did not have the power to review the decision of 22 May 2009 or any possible deemed refusal decisions because Ms Luck did not first seek internal review by the Department as required by s 55(2) of the FOI Act: Luck v Department of Human Services [2010] AATA 6.

(2) Ms Luck filed an appeal from the AAT’s decision in this Court on 4 February 2010. As a result of an array of satellite proceedings brought by Ms Luck, which we will not attempt to summarise, the case did not make any real progress until early 2014. When the matter was listed for case management, Ms Luck sought to delay the case management hearing and then made an oral application for the primary judge (Tracey J) to recuse himself on the ground of apprehended bias. This application raised an issue concerning his Honour’s appointment as Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force, which Ms Luck had raised unsuccessfully on three previous occasions in other proceedings. The application was refused and the appeal was listed for hearing.

(3) Ms Luck then made an interlocutory application for a stay or adjournment on the basis of her involvement in a separate proceeding. Tracey J dismissed the interlocutory application, at which point Ms Luck absented herself from the hearing. Tracey J proceeded to hear and uphold an objection to the competency of the proceeding brought by the first respondent. His Honour found that none of the 48 “questions of law” identified in Ms Luck’s notice of appeal was a pure question of law, so that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the purported appeal: Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 2) [2014] FCA 798.

(4) Ms Luck sought an extension of time within which to appeal from Tracey J’s 2014 judgment, which was granted on 3 October 2014 only in relation to the objection to competency: Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2014] FCA 1060 (Mortimer J).

(5) The substantive appeal was listed for hearing on 21 May 2015, together with an appeal by Ms Luck from another judgment of Tracey J. That other judgment (Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1506; 107 ALD 538) had been delivered in 2008 and arose from what appears to have been a separate AAT review of decisions under the FOI Act. In that matter, Ms Luck sought an extension of time in which to appeal from some procedural directions made by the AAT. Tracey J observed that the AAT’s directions had been beneficial to Ms Luck and it was surprising that she should seek to appeal from them. His Honour dismissed the application for an extension of time on the basis that the appeal would be bound to fail, with the AAT having made no operative decision. Ms Luck filed a notice of appeal from Tracey J’s 2008 judgment (which, as the Full Court noted, was subject to an issue as to whether leave to appeal was required). It was first listed for hearing in the May 2009 sittings but was stood over five times on the application of Ms Luck.

(6) Around a month before the hearing listed in May 2015, Ms Luck made an interlocutory application for stay or adjournment of both of the appeals, on the basis of a pending application to have the proceedings removed to the High Court, and a further adjournment application on the basis that she needed time to recover in connection with a medical condition. These applications were also listed to be heard on 21 May 2015. Ms Luck did not attend the hearing. The Full Court made orders dismissing the applications for a stay or adjournment and published reasons on 1 June 2015 (Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ)). The Court’s reasons describe a tangled web of litigation in which Ms Luck commenced multiple proceedings and then in each case used the pendency of the other cases as a basis for delay (either because of attempts to remove related matters to the High Court, or because of the alleged stress of running so many cases). On the interlocutory applications the Full Court reasoned that:

(a) the prospects of success of the removal applications were limited (and they were, indeed, dismissed by the High Court); and

(b) the medical evidence relied on by Ms Luck was not verified, and it misconstrued her involvement in these and other proceedings as ‘litigation duties’ imposed upon her (which adversely affected her health) when in fact the proceedings were all of her own making.

(7) The Full Court delivered judgment on the appeals from Tracey J’s 2008 and 2014 judgments on 21 August 2015. As to the 2008 judgment, leave to appeal was granted and the appeal dismissed, with the Court finding that his Honour’s decision not to extend time was clearly correct: Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 112 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ).

(8) The judgment on the appeal from the 2014 judgment was the occasion on which Ms Luck was successful. The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the primary judge, largely as a result of the reasoning in Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315 (Haritos) (which had been handed down after the judgment of Tracey J). On the basis of this reasoning, the Court held that three of the 48 questions in Ms Luck’s notice of appeal did constitute questions of law; and that, regardless of the prospects of success of the appeal, his Honour ought not to have upheld the objection to competency on that basis: Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111; 233 FCR 494 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ). As noted earlier, Ms Luck did not appear at the hearing on 21 May 2015. We infer that she also did not file submissions. The Court was evidently aware at that time that the judgment in Haritos was shortly to be handed down and deferred its decision on the appeal for that reason. What flows from this is that the point on which Ms Luck succeeded was not one that she raised.

(9) On remittal the matter was heard by Bromberg J, who addressed the three questions of law identified by the Full Court as having been raised in the notice of appeal and on 15 August 2016 dismissed Ms Luck’s appeal on its merits. His Honour found that the AAT did not err in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the impugned FOI decision: Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2016] FCA 950. In his reasons, having recounted some of the procedural history, his Honour observed (at [6]-[8]):

What is striking about the matter is this, which Crennan J noted in the course of Luck [2011] HCATrans 290 at [744]–[750: “the matter carried forward into the Federal Court was a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal refusing review of a decision by the Department of Human Services. The decision made by the Department of Human Services was to grant Ms Luck access to documents as requested by her under the Freedom of Information Act. In other words, the decision was in Ms Luck’s favour” (my emphasis). That is a reference to a decision of a Dr Rumble, to be discussed below, providing to Ms Luck a CD purportedly containing the documents she had requested.

Ms Luck does not see it this way. As she said in a letter dated 4 September 2009 to the AAT, “According to my own computer security protocol, I do not open any documents on my computer received from insecure sources and to receive a CD in the circumstances was inappropriate and unwanted, and as such I have no knowledge of its contents.” On one view, the proceeding has lurched along these seven years because Ms Luck was not prepared to insert a CD into her own computer, or (it appears) to insert it into another computer in, say, a public library, with a view to ascertaining whether it contained what she sought. Or, viewed from another perspective, it is because DoHS has not provided the documents on printed paper, or made them available for inspection in an office somewhere.

The matter is somewhat more complicated than that, as I explain below. But, at base, DoHS’s position is quite simple: it is prepared to give some documents—those that I call below the Section 9 Documents—to Ms Luck. Other documents—Centrelink policy and procedural documents—it says it does not have. It is difficult to imagine, given the closely-defined parameters of the dispute, that the parties could not have found a way through that did not involve such expenditure of public (not to mention private) resources.

(10) Ms Luck then filed a notice of appeal against the decision of Bromberg J. Ms Luck made at least 11 interlocutory applications of procedural nature during this appeal, including four unsuccessful recusal applications against different judges of the Court: Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540 (Kerr J); Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 2) [2019] FCA 1290 (Snaden J); Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 3) [2019] FCA 1335 (O’Callaghan J); Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2019] FCA 2071 (Anderson J). Each unsuccessful recusal application was itself the subject of an application for leave to appeal.

(11) All of the remaining interlocutory applications were dismissed, and the substantive appeal was summarily dismissed, by the Full Court (Farrell, SC Derrington and Raper JJ) in Luck v Secretary of Services Australia [2022] FCAFC 195. This was on the basis that Ms Luck had been made bankrupt and the proceeding was deemed to be abandoned under s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth): at [68].

(12) Ms Luck then made an application to the High Court for an extension of time within which to apply for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s decision. On 20 April 2023, Gageler and Jagot JJ dismissed the extension of time and special leave applications, finding that they raised no question of general legal principle and disclosed no reason to doubt the correctness of the Full Court’s decision: Luck v Secretary of Services Australia & Ors [2023] HCASL 62. Ms Luck’s quixotic attempt to challenge a decision giving her what she had asked for thus lasted for approximately 14 years.

27 The entirety of the proceedings summarised above can properly be characterised as an abuse of process (or proceedings commenced without reasonable grounds), in that they began as applications to review administrative decisions that were in themselves favourable to Ms Luck. The substantive relief originally sought served no useful purpose, and the proceedings must therefore be taken to have been pursued for some purpose other than to obtain that relief. Additionally, the manner in which Ms Luck conducted these proceedings was clearly calculated to “harass or annoy [or] to cause delay or detriment”, with numerous (and uniformly unsuccessful) applications to disqualify judges or remove issues into the High Court, all causative of delay; numerous interlocutory applications by Ms Luck seeking to stay or adjourn her own proceedings; and frequent non-attendance at hearings.

28 The present proceedings, the history of which was set out in the reasons of the primary judge and the reasons for the 7 March orders, provide another example of a proceeding commenced without reasonable grounds and prosecuted in a manner likely to cause annoyance and delay. Merits review of the decisions about which Ms Luck complained was available but had not been sought; instead, for no sensible reason that could be discerned, Ms Luck invoked the more expensive and less effective process of judicial review. Her submissions before the primary judge included fictitious citations, the investigation of which wasted the Court’s time. Her appeal to this Court against his Honour’s discretionary decision to dismiss the proceeding lacked any real prospect of success. She bombarded the Registry with strident and time-consuming correspondence. She made applications to disqualify two members of the Court which had no proper basis. She refused to file submissions or appear at the hearing, asserting that medical conditions prevented her participation but refusing to put any evidence about those conditions before the Court. Even Ms Luck’s response to the invitation to make submissions concerning potential vexatious litigant orders (discussed above) has been characterised by a refusal to grapple with the issues requiring attention and an attempt to derail proceedings by sending correspondence to the Registry in lieu of presenting argument to the Court.

29 More generally, as far as we have been able to ascertain, Ms Luck has lodged at least 425 documents with the Court through its eLodgment system, 83 of which, or close to 20%, the Court has refused to accept for filing. Whilst some of these have been rejected for more benign or administrative errors, there have been at least 9 occasions on which a Registrar of the Court has refused to accept Ms Luck’s documents for filing on the basis that the documents sought to be filed were considered to be an abuse of process of the Court, or to be frivolous or vexatious, pursuant to r 2.26 of the Rules. On two other occasions, Judges of the Court gave a direction not to accept document(s) for filing pursuant to O 46 r 7A of the (now-repealed) Federal Court Rules (Cth), on the basis that they were an abuse of the process of the Court, or frivolous or vexatious. There have been a further 8 instances where Ms Luck’s documents have been refused for substantial non-compliance with the Rules.

30 A common feature of Ms Luck’s proceedings in this Court is the filing of multiple interlocutory applications, with each one requiring decision by a judge and many of these decisions spawning applications for leave to appeal. On at least 18 occasions, Ms Luck has sought to have one or more of the judges constituting the Court disqualified from hearing a proceeding. Each of these applications, said to be grounded in an apprehension of bias (or actual bias) on various grounds, has been dismissed as being without an arguable basis. Examples of these are recorded in Annexure A. In the lead-up to the listing of the present appeal proceedings, Ms Luck provided a table she had prepared dated 14 November 2024 in which she contended that almost every judge of the Federal Court of Australia should be precluded from hearing her matter. Ms Luck’s interlocutory application to disqualify Rofe and Kennett JJ referred, without any real explanation, to “systemic” issues affecting the impartiality of the Court. In Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26 at [20] we observed:

The underlying proposition appears to be that the court in which Ms Luck has chosen to litigate is unable to determine the proceedings brought by her. What the Court is supposed to do about this alleged problem is a mystery.

31 On at least 19 occasions when proceedings involving Ms Luck in this Court have been listed for hearing, she has either failed to appear or removed herself from the courtroom partway through the hearing. Ms Luck has frequently been granted adjournment applications, often on the basis of medical certificates signed by a general practitioner which have suggested that Ms Luck has been unfit at the given time to appear at the hearing. These certificates (or, when absent, emails from Ms Luck) often suggest that Ms Luck needs a specified (or unspecified) period of time for “rest and recuperation”. On several occasions, judges deciding Ms Luck’s proceedings have observed that the medical certificates provided described Ms Luck’s involvement in court proceedings, at her own instigation, as “litigation duties” imposed upon her, the stress of which adversely affects her health.

Proceedings in other courts and tribunals

32 Ms Luck’s appearances before other courts and tribunals are also indicative of a pattern of behaviour that can be properly characterised as vexatious. Mr Moloney, appearing as amicus curiae, submitted that the most obvious indicia of a litigant being vexatious are individual findings that certain proceedings that have been brought by the litigant were vexatious. A non-exhaustive selection of such findings by other courts and tribunals are canvassed below.

33 Before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), Ms Luck made an application against the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (the Commission), seeking review of a decision of the Commission which (after an internal review process) affirmed a decision to refuse Ms Luck access to documents in possession of the Office of Police Integrity, on the basis that they were exempted under s 51 of the Police Integrity Act 2008 (Vic) (the PI Act). Ms Luck walked out of VCAT shortly after the hearing commenced, after shouting at the VCAT member and making accusations towards counsel for the respondent, when it was pointed out that Ms Luck was using a recording device in the hearing without VCAT’s permission, contrary to its rules: Luck v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 1805 at [5]-[10]. Ms Luck was clearly aware of those rules as she had attempted the same course of action in a previous VCAT hearing: at [12]. Rather than striking out the application, Jenkins VP proceeded to determine it after considering Ms Luck’s written submissions. Jenkins VP summarily dismissed the application, having found that the documents to which Ms Luck sought access were documents that would disclose information relating to an investigation under Part 3 of the PI Act, therefore falling clearly within the exemption in s 51 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), such that the refusal to release documents to Ms Luck was correct. Jenkins VP said at [81]:

I note in passing that Ms Luck’s applications, which span from the year 2000 to present, are consistently proving to be misconceived and vexatious in nature. It could easily be argued that Ms Luck has been afforded a disproportionately large amount of scarce public resources in order to give her fair hearings across a multitude of Tribunal and Court applications.

(citations omitted)

34 Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision and orders of Jenkins VP, appearing before the Supreme Court of Appeal of Victoria. Warren CJ and Whelan J found no error in the decision and no basis established by Ms Luck for the appeal on any of her 25 grounds. Leave to appeal was refused: Luck v Principal Officer of IBAC [2014] VSCA 239. At [32]-[33], their Honours endorsed the following observation made by Nettle JA in the course of refusing Ms Luck leave to appeal from another decision of VCAT in which Ms Luck had been similarly discourteous in similar circumstances (Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice & Anor (Unreported, 24 May 2013) (Nettle and Ashley JJA) at [51]).

If litigants like the applicant behave as discourteously toward courts and tribunals as the applicant behaved towards the Vice President in this case, they ought not be surprised if the results turn out to be not to their liking. To adapt and adopt the observations of Trac[e]y J in Gaye Luck v University of Queensland [[2008] FCA 1594 at [13]], the business of the court, and the business of VCAT no less, cannot and will not be dictated to by the uncontrolled demands of litigants who refuse to abide the rules, practices and a modest degree of courtesy essential to keep the system in operation.

35 In another proceeding before the Supreme Court of Victoria, Ms Luck sought to appeal from an order of the Senior Master of the Court who dismissed Ms Luck’s application for leave to appeal from a ruling of a member of VCAT. The ruling which Ms Luck sought to appeal was apparently in her favour: it was a ruling to adjourn Ms Luck’s hearing before VCAT to allow it to be recorded, as she had requested. The reasons of Bongiorno J (Luck v Renton [2006] VSC 90) record that, when pressed to identify the question of law on which the VCAT member erred and which she wished to raise on appeal, Ms Luck refused to do so, “commenced to shout”, “appeared to become hysterical”, claimed to be ill and, when refused an adjournment, left the Court (at [3]-[4]). His Honour dismissed the application, noting at [5]:

It is necessary for the Court to be aware of the particular needs of unrepresented litigants as referred to in the recent Court of Appeal judgment concerning this appellant: Luck v Renton [2005] VSCA 210. However, in this instance, the apparent total lack of merit in the appellant’s application and her behaviour generally have the consequence that the prolongation of this proceeding imposes considerable and unjustified vexation and injustice on Mr Renton who, it should be noted, is also an unrepresented party who had travelled a long distance at some expense to be present.

36 This is only a small sample of Ms Luck’s proceedings in Victorian courts and tribunals.

37 Across at least 59 file numbers denoting separate proceedings in the High Court of Australia, Ms Luck has had no decisions in her favour. In one of Ms Luck’s early applications before the High Court, she was subject to a direction that the registrar should not issue a writ or statement of claim without the leave of a justice. Gleeson CJ refused that leave in respect of a writ naming 32 defendants including judges of the High Court, this Court and the Supreme Court of Victoria, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, medical officers and an unnamed telephonist employed by the Australian Federal Police. Gleeson CJ held that Ms Luck’s statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. She purported to appeal from the refusal of leave. McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ held that the “appeal” was incompetent, as leave to appeal was required, and that leave if sought would have been refused because the appeal had no prospect of success: Re Luck [2003] HCA 70; 203 ALR 1.

38 Ms Luck’s applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court (numbering 19 by our count) have regularly been dismissed on the basis that the proposed grounds of appeal had no prospect of success. So too have her numerous applications to remove causes pending in other courts into the High Court. An example is Luck v Nell [2022] HCASL 179, where Keane and Edelman JJ dismissed an application to remove a case from the County Court of Victoria. As the removal application did not raise any “cause or part of a cause arising under the Constitution” sufficient to fall within s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), their Honours observed at [1] that: “The application is manifestly hopeless. It is an abuse of process and should be dismissed.”

39 On 13 October 2011 Crennan J made orders and gave extempore reasons in four proceedings commenced by Ms Luck ([2011] HCATrans 290). These were Luck v Federal Court of Australia (an application for prerogative relief, injunctions and declarations against nineteen defendants, apparently arising out of proceedings in this Court and the AAT); Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services (an application to remove a proceeding from this Court arising from a review in the AAT of a decision concerning an FOI request); Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (FOI Principal Officer) (an application for removal of one of the proceedings in this Court involving Tracey J, discussed above); and Luck v Australian Human Rights Commission (an application for prerogative writs in relation to the Human Rights Commission’s handling of complaints by Ms Luck against Centrelink). In each case one or more of the defendants had sought to have the application dismissed or stayed under what was then r 27.09.4 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth). After recounting a series of applications with no obvious prospect of success, multiple adjournments and requests for adjournments (many due to medical conditions which her treating doctor said were exacerbated by the stress of her proceedings) and (unsurprisingly) a request, unsupported by any argument, that her Honour disqualify herself, Crennan J found each application to be vexatious and an abuse of process and dismissed it.

40 The nature of Ms Luck’s approach to litigation is elucidated by one further set of examples, being a sample of Ms Luck’s applications for leave to appeal against decisions of Justices of the High Court, who in turn had refused leave to appeal from decisions of lower courts. The chronology begins with, as far as we are aware, the only proceeding in which Ms Luck has been legally represented (although her representatives later ceased to act citing an inability to obtain instructions).

(1) On 13 February 1998 Ms Luck filed a claim in the District Court of Queensland for damages in the amount of $250,000 against the owner of a shopping centre, for injury she allegedly suffered as a result of slipping on wet tiles.

(2) On 2 September 2002 Ms Luck’s solicitors sought leave to withdraw from the proceeding, having had difficulty getting any instructions from her since December 1999. In response to one of the solicitors’ letters seeking instructions she had written:

I have been prescribed, some months ago, a period of rest, treatment & recuperation for 3 months. ... I will be taking that time as of today and will not be participating in any way with any correspondence, receiving or despatching or matters related to the above references for at least that period of time, to remain stress free.

(3) In November 2002 Ms Luck filed an amended statement of loss claiming damages (mostly aggravated and exemplary) of more than $3.9 billion, without pleadings in support.

(4) In June 2022, after a 19-year delay in prosecuting the District Court proceedings, Ms Luck filed an application for leave to proceed. The respondent filed a cross-application to dismiss the proceeding for want of prosecution. On 26 September 2022 Burnett DCJ dismissed the proceeding, observing that it had been characterised by delay from the outset and giving leave to proceed would significantly prejudice the respondent. This decision has not been published.

(5) Ms Luck appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (the Court of Appeal). On 28 March 2023 Mullins P, Dalton JA and Bradley J dismissed the appeal, with costs, finding no error in the primary judge’s decision to refuse the application to proceed and dismiss the proceedings. Ms Luck’s many grounds of appeal lacked merit: Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited [2023] QCA 54.

(6) Ms Luck applied for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal. On 3 August 2023 Edelman and Gleeson JJ dismissed the application for leave, finding that the decision of the Court of Appeal was plainly correct and the appeal had no prospect of success: Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited [2023] HCASL 109.

(7) On 22 August 2023 Ms Luck attempted to file a notice of appeal against the decision of Edelman and Gleeson JJ, which was not accepted for filing because leave had not first been sought and obtained.

(8) Ms Luck sought leave to file the notice of appeal against the decision of Edelman and Gleeson JJ. On 15 September 2023 Kiefel CJ refused the application for leave as it showed no basis warranting the re-opening of the special leave application already refused, and was “an abuse of process”: Kuperman, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2023] HCATrans 127.

(9) On 28 May 2024 Ms Luck attempted to file in this Court what appeared to be in substance an originating application for judicial review of the decision of Kiefel CJ. The application with its annexures ran to around 1,450 pages. A Registrar of this Court refused to accept the documents for filing, pursuant to r 2.26 of the Rules, on the basis that they were an abuse of process, or frivolous or vexatious. The Registrar considered that the application had no real prospect of success, as it named numerous respondents who neither made nor were required to make the decisions sought to be reviewed, and where the decision refusing leave was in any case an exercise of judicial power which is not reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

(10) On 23 August 2024 Ms Luck filed an application for judicial review of the decision of the Registrar. Wheelahan J listed the application for hearing on 18 October 2024. On the afternoon of 17 October Ms Luck sent a letter to the Registry claiming that she could not appear because of “stress and trauma” arising from the issues in the proceeding. His Honour indicated a preparedness to adjourn the hearing. Ms Luck wrote to the Registry again, saying that she had not directly requested an adjournment (but nevertheless did not intend to appear), objecting to her earlier letter having been referred to Wheelahan J’s chambers, and insisting that his Honour first needed to deal with her submission that he should disqualify himself. Wheelahan J adjourned the hearing to 29 October 2024. Ms Luck did not seek to adjourn the matter further, but informed the Registry on the morning of the hearing that she would not be appearing and did not appear. Wheelahan J made orders permanently staying the application, finding that the proceeding Ms Luck had sought to commence was a clear abuse of process: Luck v National Duty Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1257.

41 There have also been proceedings commenced against Ms Luck. One class of these pertained to intervention orders sought to be made against Ms Luck, or prosecutions for breach of intervention orders (prosecutions which Ms Luck then sought, unsuccessfully, to have removed to the High Court of Australia): Luck v James; Luck v Delaney [2015] HCASL 208. Bankruptcy proceedings have also been brought by a creditor who had been a respondent in multiple proceedings initiated by Ms Luck and obtained costs orders (amounting to more than $43,000.00) which were unsatisfied: University of Southern Queensland v Luck [2017] FCCA 639.

Should a vexatious proceedings order be made?

42 Ms Luck’s long and extremely active career as a litigant, some aspects of which are discussed above, includes at least the following features:

(a) frequently commencing proceedings that have no proper basis or merit;

(b) commencing proceedings that clearly served no proper purpose (eg seeking to review decisions that were in substance in Ms Luck’s favour), or seeking judicial review where cheaper merits review was available;

(c) multiplying costs by making frequent and often spurious interlocutory applications (particularly applications to disqualify the judge before whom the proceedings are listed), applications for leave to appeal from interlocutory orders, meritless attempts to remove proceedings to the High Court, and appealing from every adverse judgment even where the hopelessness of the case has been made plain;

(d) having commenced proceedings, refusing to prosecute them or undertake the task of explaining her arguments, including failing (or refusing) to attend multiple hearings;

(e) avoiding hearings by claiming (on the basis of questionable evidence or no evidence) to be unwell and to need rest, usually citing stress arising from her own litigation as the cause of illness; and

(f) occasionally, belligerent and disrespectful behaviour in courts and tribunals.

43 This history leaves us in no doubt that Ms Luck is a person who “has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals”.

44 The Court’s power to make orders pursuant to s 37AO is not to be exercised lightly. However, it must also be borne in mind that the nature of the order is not to bar vexatious litigants from instituting proceedings entirely or to impose condign punishment for past litigious misdeeds, but to place any further prospective litigation brought by the litigant under the control of the Court, by imposing a requirement for leave: Storry at [18]. As the Full Court explained in Fuller v Toms [2015] FCAFC 91; 234 FCR 535 at 545 [31]:

45 Noting the “seriousness of the adverse implications for the administration of justice arising from the time taken up by the judiciary” in hearing Ms Luck’s numerous claims, Mr Moloney submitted, citing Storry at [7], that:

… clear authority explains why judges may properly take a proactive role, where appropriate, to identify circumstances where the processes of the Court are being repeatedly or frequently abused by a pattern of apparently vexatious proceedings.

46 The scale and relentlessness of Ms Luck’s litigious activity demand that the proposed orders be made. Her proceedings over the last 27 years have served no useful purpose (including, so far as we can see, for Ms Luck herself) and have imposed an unjustifiable burden on the resources of the respondents, courts and tribunals and their staff. This should not be allowed to continue.

47 The time spent dealing with Ms Luck’s cases by judges and tribunal members and registry staff, and the legal costs incurred by the government agencies and office holders whose decisions she routinely challenges, are a significant drain on public resources. It should also be noted, however, that the respondents to Ms Luck’s proceedings have included businesses and individuals. Although we have not been able to obtain direct evidence of the extent to which Ms Luck has satisfied the various costs orders made against her, it seems safe to infer (given her frequently-asserted ill health and her receipt of Centrelink payments over a considerable period) that her own financial resources are not adequate to meet these orders. One respondent, referred to above, has taken the step of having Ms Luck declared bankrupt. The financial burden of Ms Luck’s proceedings is thus borne, predominantly if not entirely, by the respondents, courts and tribunals.

48 The time and energy of judges and court staff are finite. Every day that one of Ms Luck’s cases is listed before a judge is a day on which other litigants cannot be heard. Every hour spent writing reasons in one of her cases, or dealing with her correspondence, delays the resolution of other disputes.

49 The orders that we have decided to make will, as noted earlier, not prevent Ms Luck from pursuing any claim within this Court’s jurisdiction that has substance. They will impose a filter (in the form of a requirement to seek leave to commence any proceeding) and a modest financial disincentive against pointless or recreational litigation (in the form of a requirement to pay $200 to the registry as security for costs). The latter measure is appropriate because otherwise there is no cost to Ms Luck in commencing proceedings: as the holder of a Pensioner Concession Card she qualifies for a waiver of court fees under the Federal Court and Federal Circuit and Family Court Regulations 2022 (Cth).

50 For these reasons, we determined that the proposed orders should be made.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Rofe, Hespe and Kennett.

Associate:

Dated: 8 August 2025

ANNEXURE A

Proceedings instituted by Ms Luck in Australia to date and resulting decisions

No.	File Name	File Number	Decision date	Decision	Description
Federal Court of Australia
1.	Luck v Secretary, Department of Education, Training & Youth Affairs	VID45 of 2000	02/08/2001	Luck v Secretary, Department of Education, Training & Youth Affairs [2001] FCA 1061 (Goldberg J)	Appeal from decision of the AAT in [2000] AATA 4 regarding Centrelink rent assistance. Ms Luck did not appear; dismissed. His Honour found no discernible error of law or error in the reasoning of the Tribunal.
2.	Luck v Hunter; Luck v Browne; Luck v CSR Limited; Luck v Townsville City Council	VID392 of 2000 VID393 of 2000 VID394 of 2000 VID541 of 2000	08/08/2000	(unpublished— referred to in Luck v Hunter [2000] FCA 1216) (Weinberg J)	These four matters were heard together, arising from the same facts. Weinberg J made orders transferring the four proceedings (which were filed in the Melbourne Registry) to the Brisbane Registry, given that all the respondents were located in Queensland where the alleged wrongs occurred.
3.			23/08/2000	Luck v Hunter [2000] FCA 1216 (Burchett, R D Nicholson and Finkelstein JJ)	Ms Luck applied for leave to appeal against the interlocutory order by Weinberg J. Application for leave to appeal dismissed, with costs.
4.			27/10/2000	Luck v Hunter [2000] FCA 1715 (Dowsett J)	By notice of motion on 24/10/2000, Ms Luck sought to have Dowsett J recused from hearing all four matters, because he was allegedly ‘directly responsible for an act of torture against the applicant’. Ms Luck did not appear, although she asked her parish priest to appear on her behalf to have the matter stood over until she could appear in person as she had ‘conscientious objections to appearing by video or telephone’. Notice of motions dismissed.
5.			07/12/2000	Luck v Hunter [2000] FCA 1956 (Dowsett J)	Dowsett J considered medical certificates Ms Luck provided, finding they gave no indication of when she may be able to engage with her legal proceedings.
6.			07/12/2000	Luck v Hunter [2000] FCA 1957 (Dowsett J)	The Hunter application was brought against a number of medical practitioners and medical centres whom Ms Luck consulted regarding what she believed to be fibreglass particles she ingested whilst residing in rented premises in Townsville. Ms Luck did not appear at the hearing to prosecute her motions, which were made well out of time. Interlocutory notice of motion struck out, with costs.
7.			26/04/2001	Luck v Hunter [2001] FCA 466 (Dowsett J)	The respondents brought notices of motion to have the claims dismissed. Ms Luck did not appear. The statement of claim was struck out as against all respondents except the third (which was in liquidation), fourth (who was not served) and tenth respondents, finding it to be largely vexatious.
8.			28/09/2001	Luck v Hunter [2001] FCA 1470 (Dowsett J)	The tenth respondent applied to dismiss the proceedings as against it. Application dismissed. His Honour considered the proceedings to be vexatious. The remainder of the proceeding was ordered to remain in abeyance.
9.			07/12/2000	Luck v Townsville City Council [2000] FCA 1955 (Dowsett J)	Ms Luck filed a notice of motion seeking a stay of proceedings and leave to appeal in each of the Browne and Townsville proceedings. Ms Luck did not appear at the hearing to prosecute her motions, which were made well out of time. Notice of motion struck out, with costs.
10.			26/04/2001	Luck v Browne [2001] FCA 467 (Dowsett J)	The Browne application was brought against Ms Luck’s landlord and related parties, arguing that while resident in the Townsville premises over a two-and-a-half-month period in 1997, she became ill as a result of the presence of fibreglass particles from the ceiling material. The proceedings were dismissed as against the second, third and fourth respondents for want of any cause of action, and were considered frivolous.
11.			26/04/2001	Luck v Townsville City Council [2001] FCA 468 (Dowsett J)	The Townsville application was brought against a local council and its employees, and two government departments, in connection with Ms Luck’s dispute regarding her health concerns arising from her residence. Dowsett J held that the statement of claim was vexatious and failed to disclose causes of action against the first to fourth respondents.
12.	Luck v Stephen Blamey & Associates Pty Ltd ACN 006 295 405	VID603 of 2000	30/05/2011	(unpublished— referred to in final order accessed through the Court’s file) (Ryan J)	Application dismissed, with costs.
13.	Gaye Alexandra Luck v Deakin University	VID444 of 2008	26/11/2008	Luck v Deakin University [2008] FCA 1781 (Heerey J)	Application alleging that the respondent discriminated against Ms Luck and engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct, by refusing her access to her student record, being a document that she alleged to exist (but which the respondent denied existed). Motion to strike out was adjourned and later dismissed.
14.			17/09/2009	Luck v Deakin University [2009] FCA 1032 (Marshall J)	By notice of motion, Ms Luck sought an injunction restraining the respondent from engaging in conduct in breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth), and requiring it to provide access to her student record. Notice of motion dismissed, as ‘without merit’.
15.			04/04/2014	Luck v Deakin University [2014] FCA 343 (Tracey J)	Recusal application made orally at a directions hearing, based on apprehended bias arising among other things because Tracey J listed three proceedings of Ms Luck’s for directions on the same day (despite them taking a short amount of time). Recusal application dismissed. His Honour noted the consecutive listings were made out of consideration for Ms Luck, to avoid multiple attendances by Ms Luck and in fairness to respondents with common representation.
16.			30/01/2015	N/A: orders made by consent. (Tracey J)	By consent (following court-ordered mediation), Tracey J ordered that the balance of the proceeding be dismissed.
17.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink	VID464 of 2008 VID898 of 2008	08/10/2008	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1506; 107 ALD 538 (Tracey J)	Application for an extension of time within which to commence a proceeding appealing the decision of the AAT in [2008] AATA 718. Application refused, with costs.
18.			21/08/2015	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 112 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ)	An appeal against the decision of Tracey J in [2008] FCA 1506. Appeal dismissed.
19.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland	VID476 of 2008 VID899 of 2008 VID1395 of 2011 VID1396 of 2011	22/10/2008	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2008] FCA 1582 (Tracey J)	Appeal from decision of the AAT in [2008] AATA 539. The respondent by notice of motion moved for an order that the appeal be dismissed summarily. Appeal dismissed.
20.			22/10/2008	Luck v University of Southern Queensland (No. 2) [2008] FCA 1594 (Tracey J)	Recusal application was made repeating grounds as previously made against Tracey J. Refused.
21.			19/06/2009	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2009] FCAFC 73 (North, Graham and Rares JJ)	Appeal against the decisions in VID 476 of 2008, where Tracey J rejected a recusal application, and found in favour of the University’s motion that Ms Luck’s application had no reasonable prospect of success. Application for leave to appeal dismissed; purported appeal dismissed as incompetent.
22.			07/05/2009	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2009] FCA 479 (Graham J)	Recusal application based on apprehended bias arising from Graham J having previously been briefed by the AGS as a barrister. Recusal application dismissed.
23.			07/05/2009	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2009] FCA 521 (Rares J)	Recusal application based on apprehended bias arising among other things from Rares J previously being briefed, when he was a barrister, by the AGS and the same solicitor firm as acted for the respondent. Recusal application dismissed.
24.			08/12/2010	Luck v University of Southern Queensland (No 3) [2010] FCA 1402 (Bromberg J)	Ms Luck made an interlocutory application seeking stay or adjournment in circumstances where three previous adjournments were already granted at Ms Luck’s request. The respondent did not consent to the fourth request. Ms Luck did not appear at the directions hearing. Application refused.
25.			21/04/2011	Luck v University of Southern Queensland (No 4) [2011] FCA 433 (Bromberg J)	Ms Luck sought to set aside various orders made by Deputy Registrars regarding taxation of costs. Proceedings both dismissed pursuant to O 35A of the FCR, on the basis that Ms Luck demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the Court, and the medical evidence provided was unverified, and unclear as to when, if ever, Ms Luck would be in a position to prosecute the proceedings she initiated, in circumstances where she had no apparent likelihood of success.
26.			23/12/2011	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2011] FCA 1335 (Kenny J)	Application for extension of time in which to appeal against the judgment of Bromberg J made eight months earlier. Applications dismissed.
27.	Gaye Luck v CEO of Centrelink & Anor	VID488 of 2008 VID54 of 2009 VID921 of 2015	10/12/2008	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1879 (Tracey J)	Application (made out of time) for judicial review of a decision made by the respondent to restrict Ms Luck’s means of communication with Centrelink due to Ms Luck allegedly being discourteous in phone calls with Centrelink staff. Application for enlargement of time dismissed.
28.			15/10/2008	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (No 2) [2008] FCA 2020 (Tracey J)	Recusal application based on apprehended bias arising from Tracey J’s previous conduct of proceedings, including that his Honour, at the respondent’s request, removed the personal name of the former Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink from the file name, since no relief sought in the proceeding would be enforceable against him personally. Ms Luck sought leave to appeal this order. Recusal application dismissed and leave refused.
29.			04/04/2014	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2014] FCA 345 (Tracey J)	Application made orally during a directions hearing, for recusal on the ground that Tracey J was formerly appointed as Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force. Recusal application dismissed.
30.			20/11/2015	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCA 1234 (Tracey J)	The respondent filed an objection to competency. Objection to competency upheld as the decision which Ms Luck sought to review was not one made under an enactment for the purposes of the ADJR Act.
31.			15/05/2009	Luck v Chief Executive Officer, Centrelink [2009] FCAFC 54 (Moore, Lindgren and Bennett JJ)	Appeal against the interlocutory judgments of Tracey J in VID 488/2008. Appeal dismissed with costs. Ms Luck sought by notice of motion the recusal of Moore and Bennett JJ, on grounds of apprehended bias. Recusal application refused as incompetent.
32.			07/06/2017	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2017] FCAFC 92 (Barker, Moshinsky and O’Callaghan JJ)	An appeal against the decision in [2015] FCA 1234. Appeal dismissed with costs.
33.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland	VID357 of 2009 VID1158 of 2013	01/11/2013	Luck v University of Southern Queensland (No 2) [2013] FCA 1141 (Tracey J)	Ms Luck applied for judicial review of the decisions of the University of Southern Queensland to suspend her enrolment. Application for stay or adjournment dismissed— the medical certificates gave no indication of changed circumstances from previous ones, and it would be unfair for the respondent for the proceedings to continue indefinitely. The respondent raised a notice of objection to competency which was upheld.
34.			11/10/2013	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2013] FCA 1064 (Tracey J)	Recusal application based on apprehended bias arising from Judge’s past commission as Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force; and by previously being briefed by the Commonwealth as a barrister. Recusal application dismissed.
35.			15/10/2014	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2014] FCAFC 135 (Murphy, Pagone and Perry JJ)	Appeal against the decisions in VID 357/2009. Appeal dismissed, with costs. Ms Luck made an application for Perry J to recuse herself for reason of apprehended bias on the basis of her Honour’s voluntary role as squadron leader with the Royal Australian Air Force Legal Specialist Reserves. Recusal application refused.
36.	Gaye Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors	VID65 of 2010 VID512 of 2014 VID898 of 2008 VID1044 of 2016	30/07/2014	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 2) [2014] FCA 798 (Tracey J)	This was an appeal from the decision in [2010] AATA 6. The respondent’s objection to competency upheld.
37.			04/04/2014	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2014] FCA 344 (Tracey J)	Ms Luck made an oral application for recusal on the ground that the judge was formerly appointed as Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force. Recusal application refused.
38.			03/10/2014	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2014] FCA 1060 (Mortimer J)	An appeal against the decision in VID65/2010. Ms Luck made an interlocutory application for extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal. Extension of time granted with leave to appeal on limited grounds— only in relation to the objection to competency.
39.			03/06/2015	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ)	Ms Luck made an interlocutory application for stay or adjournment of the appeal proceedings. Interlocutory applications dismissed.
40.			21/08/2015	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111 (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ)	Appeal allowed and matter remitted to single judge.
41.			16/02/2016	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 3) [2016] FCA 100 (Bromberg J)	Ms Luck made a recusal application on based on apprehended bias arising from Bromberg J’s determination of a previous matter involving Ms Luck. Recusal application dismissed.
42.			15/08/2016	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2016] FCA 950 (Bromberg J)	Appeal dismissed.
43.			15/09/2016	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 5) [2016] FCA 1123 (Bromberg J)	Determination of costs. Ms Luck ordered to pay respondents’ costs.
44.			05/12/2022	Luck v Secretary of Services Australia [2022] FCAFC 195 (Farrell, SC Derrington and Raper JJ)	An appeal against the decision of Bromberg J in [2016] FCA 950. The applicant’s 11 interlocutory applications (including for stay of proceedings, leave to appeal, and other procedural matters) were dismissed. The appeal was dismissed pursuant to the respondent’s interlocutory application for summary dismissal.
45.			18/05/2017	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540 (Kerr J)	Recusal application dismissed.
46.			14/08/2019	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 2) [2019] FCA 1290 (Snaden J)	Recusal application dismissed.
47.			14/08/2019	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 3) [2019] FCA 1335 (O’Callaghan J)	Recusal application dismissed.
48.			06/12/2019	Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services (No 4) [2019] FCA 2071 (Anderson J)	Recusal application dismissed.
49.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor	VID61 of 2015 VID189 of 2015 VID396 of 2017	30/03/2015	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2015] FCA 286 (Davies J)	Application for Bankruptcy notice to be set aside, in respect of Ms Luck’s debt to the University of Southern Queensland. Application dismissed with costs.
50.			05/12/2016	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2016] FCAFC 167 (Collier, Jessup and Katzmann JJ)	An appeal against the decision of Davies J. Ms Luck also made an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, and for a stay. Ms Luck did not appear at the hearing. Interlocutory application dismissed. Appeal dismissed with costs.
51.			29/06/2018	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2018] FCAFC 102 (Logan, Mortimer, Charlesworth JJ)	Appeal from judgment in MLG737/2015, concerning the exercise of power by a Registrar to extend the life of a petition corrective order made after the bankruptcy petition would otherwise have expired. Appeal dismissed by 2:1 majority.
52.			17/08/2018	Luck v University of Southern Queensland (No 2) [2018] FCA 1297 (Logan J)	Application made for stay pending the determination of Ms Luck’s application for special leave to the High Court. Stay granted pending determination of special leave.
53.	Gaye Alexandra Luck v A Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia	VID1100/2023	08/03/2024	N/A	Application for judicial review of the decision of a Registrar to refuse, under Rule 2.26 of the Rules, to accept an application of Ms Luck for filing (Lodgment ID 1273399) which sought judicial review of a refusal of the High Court registry to accept one of Ms Luck’s applications. Application discontinued by Ms Luck.
54.	Gaye Luck v Secretary, Services Australia & Anor	VID411 of 2024 VID1050 of 2024	03/10/2024	Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2024] FCA 1158 (Dowling J)	Application for judicial review of the Respondent’s decision to cancel her mobility allowance. Proceedings dismissed with costs. Dowling J determined that the applicant had available other avenues of review and redress of the impugned decision which had not been exhausted.
55.			07/03/2025	Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26 (Rofe, Kennett and Hespe JJ)	Ms Luck filed a notice of appeal against the decision of Dowling J in [2024] FCA 1158. Interlocutory application made for stay of proceedings pending determination of recusal applications against Rofe and Kennett JJ. Recusal applications and interlocutory application dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
56.	Gaye Luck v The National Duty Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia	VID839 of 2024	29/10/2024	Luck v National Duty Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1257 (Wheelahan J)	Application for judicial review of a decision of the National Duty Registrar to refuse filing of Ms Luck’s judicial review application (Lodgment ID 1325345), seeking review of Kiefel CJ’s decision in [2023] HCATrans 127, which was to refuse leave to file a purported appeal. Application permanently stayed as an abuse of process.
57.	Gaye Luck v Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court of Australia	VID870 of 2024	30/10/2024	Luck v Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1256 (Wheelahan J)	Application for judicial review of the alleged failure of the Principal Registrar and CEO to make a decision to accept or reject for filing a judicial review application lodged on 15 July 2024 (Lodgment ID 1343873), which pertained to the refusal by the Registry of the Supreme Court of Victoria to accept an application for waiver of filing fees. Proceeding permanently stayed. The rejected documents represented an attempt to abuse the Court’s processes; there was no reviewable error.
58.			26/09/2024	Luck v Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 1161 (Wheelahan J)	Ms Luck made an interlocutory application for a hearing in the matter to be expedited, and for leave to amend her application. Ms Luck also made orally a recusal application, based on apprehended bias arising from availability of a video link for members of the public to view proceedings. Recusal application dismissed.
59.	Gaye Luck v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor	VID1273 of 2024	11/02/2025	Luck v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 68 (Dowling J)	Recusal application made based on apprehended bias arising from Dowling J’s previous dismissal of one of Ms Luck’s other proceedings. Recusal application dismissed.
High Court of Australia
60.	Gaye Luck (Formerly Kuperman) v Hunter & Ors	M96 of 2000 M97 of 2000 M98 of 2000 M99 of 2000	20/10/2000	Luck v Hunter & Ors M96/2000 [2000] HCATrans 620; Luck v Browne & Ors M97/2000 [2000] HCATrans 618; Luck v CSR Limited (Bradford Insulation Group) & Ors M98/2000 [2000] HCATrans 619; Luck v Townsville City Council & Ors M99/2000 [2000] HCATrans 621 (Hayne J)	Ms Luck applied for special leave to appeal against the orders of the Full Court of the FCA in Luck v Hunter [2000] FCA 1216, in which she unsuccessfully challenged the decision of Weinberg J to transfer the four proceedings (VID392/2000, VID393/2000, VID394/2000 and VID541/2000) to the Queensland Registry. Special leave applications in each matter dismissed.
61.	Unknown	M134 of 2000	30/11/2000	(unpublished— referred to in [2002] HCATrans 624) (Gleeson CJ)	Ms Luck sought to file a writ and summons which Callinan J thought had so little substance that his Honour directed the Registrar not to allow the process to be issued without leave. Ms Luck then sought leave to issue the writ of summons and statement of claim, which named 32 defendants including judges of the HCA, FCA and SCV among others, whom Ms Luck claimed had tortured her. Leave refused. No arguable cause.
62.	In the matter of an appeal by Gaye Alexandra Mary Luck	M11 of 2001	11/12/2002	Luck, an appeal by M11/2001 [2002] HCATrans 624 (Gaudron J)	Ms Luck filed an appeal against the decision of Gleeson CJ above. Gaudron J walked Ms Luck through the process of filing her written submissions and appeal book, and set a date allowing sufficient time. The balance of Ms Luck’s summons were adjourned sine die— joinder sought by Ms Luck could not be ordered until Ms Luck established an arguable claim.
63.			02/09/2003	Luck, An appeal by [2003] HCATrans 333 (McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ)	Ms Luck attempted to bring a notice of motion for her applications for various constitutional writs to be heard by the Bench of three Justices, despite that the fact that the listing had been for a hearing of the substantive appeal. Ms Luck’s notice of motion dismissed. Appeal stood over to be dealt with on the papers.
64.			04/12/2003	Re Luck [2003] HCA 70; (2003) 203 ALR 1; (2003) 78 ALJR 177 (McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ)	Appeal in above proceedings struck out as incompetent. The decision the subject of the appeal was for the making of an interlocutory order, which required Ms Luck to seek leave in order to appeal it, which she did not. In any case, leave would have been refused; the appeal would have no prospect of success in that the writ of summons disclosed no cause of action.
65.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor; Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland	M50 of 2009 M65 of 2009	16/09/2009	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor [2009] HCATrans 232 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck filed two applications for special leave to appeal against the judgments of the FCAFC in VID54/2009 on 7 and 15 May 2009, and in VID899/2008 delivered on 19 June 2009. Ms Luck sought to extend the time within which to file and serve a summary of argument and draft notice of appeal in each matter, after failing to meet an initial deadline. Crennan J granted extension of time until 30/10/2009; matter adjourned.
66.			24/03/2010	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor; Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2010] HCATrans 74 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck filed a summons on 29/10/2009 seeking a further extension of time. She also sought adjournment of both matters, as well as an order staying pending matters in the FCA, on the basis that Ms Luck is unable to attend to the litigation across both courts. Extension of time granted until 23/04/2010; matter adjourned. Application for stay refused.
67.			28/04/2010	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor; Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2010] HCATrans 116 (Crennan J)	By letters on 30/03, 21/04 and 27/04, Ms Luck claimed she was unable to file the summaries of argument and sought an adjournment or stay as she felt unable to cope with the hearings. Counsel submitted an order should be made that both proceedings be deemed abandoned per r 41.10.4 of the High Court Rules, as the summary of argument had still not been filed 11 months after the application was filed. Ms Luck did not appear at the hearing. Proceedings deemed abandoned, emphasising prejudice to respondents. Crennan J refused a recusal application made by Ms Luck.
68.	Gaye Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors	M85 of 2009	24/03/2010	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2010] HCATrans 75 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck filed an application for an order to show cause, seeking mandamus and other prerogative relief and for declarations and injunctions against various defendants. She then filed affidavits adding a number of defendants and seeking an extension of time within which to file supporting affidavits, whilst also seeking a hearing for an application for urgent injunctive relief to require Deakin University (where she had been a student) and its CEO to provide access to her alleged personal record. Timetabling orders made.
69.			01/04/2010	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2010] HCATrans 86 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck’s interlocutory application was heard. The injunction sought to require the defendants to cease what was alleged to be disability and racial discrimination, harassment and victimisation, arising from various occurrences in Ms Luck’s classes and administrative dealings with the University; to compel them to allow her to attend class from which she had been excluded due to misconduct allegations brought by various staff members against Ms Luck; and to compel them to give access to her student records. The defendants provided evidence to the contrary that one of the lecturers had been granted sick leave for stress resulting from his interactions with Ms Luck, and that the entirety of the visual arts academic staff had indicated they were unwilling to lecture or tutor Ms Luck. Application for interlocutory injunctive relief refused; no prima facie case established, and supervision of the injunction would be impracticable.
70.		M26 of 2010	16/06/2010	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2010] HCASL 146 (French, Bell JJ)	Ms Luck filed a notice to appeal the interlocutory judgment of Crennan J, on the grounds that she was denied natural justice and ‘statutory human rights’. She also sought the same injunctive relief. Special leave application dismissed for want of merit, and summons struck out as an abuse of process.
71.	Gaye Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors	M10 of 2010	24/03/2010	Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors [2010] HCATrans 76 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck made an application for removal of the FCA proceedings VID65/2010, along with various interlocutory applications for relief. Application for interlocutory relief dismissed with costs.
72.		M27 of 2010	16/06/2010	Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors [2010] HCASL 147 (French, Bell JJ)	Ms Luck sought to appeal from the interlocutory decision of Crennan J in [2010] HCATrans 76, on the grounds of a denial of natural justice and ‘statutory human rights’, with an unparticularised assertion that Crennan J “erred in domestic and international law”. Application dismissed— no leave sought and even if it were, the appeal had no prospect of success.
73.	Gaye Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Gaye Luck v Secretary of DHS & Ors; Gaye Luck v CEO of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer); Gaye Luck v AHRC & Ors;	M85 of 2009 M10 of 2010 M52 of 2009 M110 of 2009	09/06/2010	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Luck v Secretary of DHS & Ors; Luck v CEO of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer); Luck v AHRC & Ors [2010] HCATrans 152 (Crennan J)	The respondents in each of these various matters sought that the applications be stayed, or dismissed, or that they be removed from proceedings. On 03/06/2010 Ms Luck applied, by letter, to have these matters stayed or adjourned for two months due to her disabilities, attaching a medical certificate, and pending determination of another HCA proceeding. Proceedings in all four matters adjourned.
74.	Gaye Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors	M85 of 2009	11/08/2010	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2010] HCATrans 210 (Crennan J)	Proceedings further adjourned on Ms Luck’s request.
75.	Gaye Luck v Secretary of DHS & Ors	M10 of 2010	18/08/2010	Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors [2010] HCATrans 212 (Crennan J)	Proceedings further adjourned on Ms Luck’s request.
76.	Gaye Luck v CEO of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer)	M52 of 2009	08/09/2010	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer) [2010] HCATrans 241 (Crennan J)	Proceedings further adjourned on Ms Luck’s request.
77.	Gaye Luck v AHRC & Ors	M110 of 2009	15/09/2010	Luck v Australian Human Rights Commission & Ors [2010] HCATrans 244 (Crennan J)	Proceedings further adjourned on Ms Luck’s request.
78.	Gaye Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Gaye Luck v Secretary of DHS & Ors; Gaye Luck v CEO of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer); Gaye Luck v AHRC & Ors; Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland	M85 of 2009 M10 of 2010 M52 of 2009 M110 of 2009 M8 of 2010 M9 of 2010	14/09/2011	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors; Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (FOI Principal Officer); Luck v Australian Human Rights Commission & Ors; Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2011] HCATrans 261 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck failed to appear at the scheduled directions hearing; hearing set down. Counsel also raised orally the matters of M8 and M9/2010, which Ms Luck filed on 09/02/2010, being removal applications for proceedings in the FCA (VID899/2008 & VID476/2008), which had since been dismissed by Bromberg J on 21/04/2011. Both M8 and M9/2010 dismissed. As there was no longer any matter pending in the FCA, the jurisdiction of the Court for removal pursuant to s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) was no longer engaged.
79.	Gaye Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Gaye Luck v Secretary of DHS & Ors; Gaye Luck v CEO of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer); Gaye Luck v AHRC & Ors	M85 of 2009 M10 of 2010 M52 of 2009 M110 of 2009	12/10/2011	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors; Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (FOI Principal Officer); Luck v Australian Human Rights Commission & Ors [2011] HCATrans 288 (Crennan J)	Ms Luck failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Counsel made submissions relaying the procedural history of the four matters before the Court, and in support of summonses pursuant to rule 27.09.4 ‘for a permanent stay of the various proceedings on the basis that they are vexatious or an abuse of process and because they fail to show a cause of action.’ Proceedings adjourned for judgment delivery.
80.			13/10/2011	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors; Luck v Secretary of the Department of Human Services & Ors; Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (FOI Principal Officer); Luck v Australian Human Rights Commission & Ors [2011] HCATrans 290 (Crennan J)	Applications in all four proceedings dismissed as vexatious and an abuse of process per r 27.09.4 of the High Court Rules. The applications each had no prospects of success, and with respect to M52, concerned interlocutory orders far removed from substantive issues. Crennan J gave careful consideration to Ms Luck’s medical conditions, grief, and difficulties as a self-represented litigant, but her Honour determined that the point had been reached that the proceedings could not continue to be delayed. Recusal application refused. No particulars or submissions were made in support of this application.
81.	Gaye Luck v The Deputy Registrar (RM) of the High Court of Australia - Melbourne Office of the Registry & Ors	M11 of 2012	11/02/2013	Luck v The Deputy Registrar (RM) of the High Court of Australia - Melbourne Office of the Registry & Ors [2013] HCATrans 14 (Gageler J)	Ms Luck filed an application for an order to show cause in the Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking writs and injunctions directed to officers of the High Court Registry, the Attorney-General and the Commonwealth. Ms Luck was aggrieved by various decisions of the Registry and the Court to refuse to accept Ms Luck’s applications that did not comply with the High Court Rules, or otherwise disposed of them in accord with the Rules, and alleged that the Deputy Registrar engaged in intimidating and threatening conduct. Procedural directions made to prepare for hearing.
82.			23/04/2013	Luck v The Deputy Registrar of the High Court of Australia & Ors [2013] HCATrans 86 (Gageler J)	The day before the scheduled hearing, Ms Luck filed a summons seeking among other things an extension of time for compliance with directions as to the filing and service of affidavits. Gageler J permitted enlargement of time as requested in the summons, and the transfer of the file, but otherwise dismissed the summons. Proceedings were adjourned as Ms Luck was too distressed to continue with the hearing of the final application.
83.			05/08/2013	Luck v The Deputy Registrar (RM) of the High Court of Australia - Melbourne Office of the Registry and Ors [2013] HCATrans 166 (Gageler J)	The Attorney-General filed a summons on 03/06/2013 seeking orders that Ms Luck’s third amended application be dismissed pursuant to r 25.03.3 of the Rules, or alternatively, seeking judgment for the defendants per r 27.09.4. Ms Luck sought the recusal of Gageler J, on the basis of apprehended bias said to arise from his Honour’s prior rulings. Recusal application and amended application both dismissed as without foundation.
84.	Gaye Luck v The Deputy Registrar (RM) of the High Court of Australia - Melbourne Office of the Registry & Ors	M104 of 2013	06/03/2014	Luck v Deputy Registrar (RM) of the High Court of Australia – Melbourne Office of the Registry [2014] HCASL 33 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision of Gageler J in [2013] HCATrans 166. Special leave application dismissed. Ms Luck’s written case did not articulate leave questions; nothing was submitted to suggest the decision of Gageler J was in error and the application had no prospects of success.
85.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland and Anor	M112 of 2009	05/08/2013	Luck v University of Southern Queensland and Anor [2013] HCATrans 163 (Gageler J)	Ms Luck filed an application for removal of proceedings VID357/2009 pending in the FCA, on the basis of apprehended bias by Tracey J in determining that matter. Ms Luck failed to file and serve a summary of argument within 28 days as required by r 26.03 of the Rules, or likewise by the various due dates following several extensions of time sought by and granted to Ms Luck, the application was deemed abandoned on that date as a result. Ms Luck’s further summons seeking an extension of time dismissed.
86.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland and Anor	M105 of 2013	06/03/2014	Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor [2014] HCASL 34 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision of Gageler J immediately above. Leave refused on the basis that Gageler J’s decision was clearly correct, and an appeal would enjoy no prospects of success. The proceedings sought to be removed had since been dismissed.
87.	Gaye Luck v Brian James (Member of Victoria Police); Gaye Luck v Trent Delaney (Member of Victoria Police)	M30 of 2012 M32 of 2012	11/11/2015	Luck v James; Luck v Delaney [2015] HCASL 208 (Nettle, Gordon JJ)	Ms Luck filed applications seeking removal of criminal prosecutions against her for breach of interim intervention orders, in the MCV, B12684787 and B13324610. Removal application refused. The application was without merit; no arguable constitutional issue was advanced, but even if one was, it would have been wrong to remove the proceedings. Recusal dismissed.
88.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Peninsula Health and Anor	M55 of 2012 M56 of 2012	11/11/2015	Luck v Principal Officer of Peninsula Health and Anor [2015] HCASL 207 (Nettle, Gordon JJ)	Application for removal from the SCV of proceedings SCi 2753/2012 and SCi 2756/2012, being applications for leave to appeal from decisions of VCAT in No. G945/2011 and No. G946/2011. Removal application refused on the same basis as above. Recusal application also dismissed.
89.	Gaye Luck v Coroner Spanos and Ors	M58 of 2012	11/11/2015	Luck v Coroner Spanos and Ors [2015] HCASL 209 (Nettle, Gordon JJ)	Application for removal from the SCV of an application for extension of time under s 86 of the Coroners Act 2008 (Vic) to appeal from a decision of the first respondent that the death of Ms Luck’s mother on 20/06/2010 was not a reportable death. Removal sought on the basis of an apprehension of bias by the SCV. Removal application refused on the same basis as above.
90.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Victoria Police and Anor	M65 of 2013 M66 of 2013	05/08/2013	Luck v Principal Officer of Victoria Police and Anor [2013] HCATrans 164 (Gageler J)	Ms Luck sought special leave to appeal from the decision of the SCV CoA dismissing her application for leave to appeal from the decisions of Macnamara VP in [2015] VCAT 71, and [2012] VCAT 1617. Rule 41.10 of the Rules required Ms Luck to file her written case in support by 12/07/2013; Ms Luck did not comply and the application was taken to be abandoned. Ms Luck sought an extension of time, which was refused.
91.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Victoria Police & Anor	M106 of 2013 M107 of 2013	06/03/2014	Luck v Principal Officer of Victoria Police & Anor [2014] HCASL 35 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision of Gageler J immediately above; her application for leave was dismissed on the basis that the appeal would have enjoyed no prospects of success.
92.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice and Anor	M67 of 2013	05/08/2013	Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice and Anor [2013] HCATrans 165 (Gageler J)	Ms Luck sought special leave to appeal from the decision of the SCV CoA dismissing her application for leave to appeal from the decision of Macnamara VP in [2013] VCAT 416. Ms Luck required an extension of time which was refused. On the same basis as above.
93.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice and Anor	M108 of 2013	06/03/2014	Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice & Anor [2014] HCASL 36 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision of Gageler J immediately above; her application for leave was dismissed on the basis that the appeal would have enjoyed no prospects of success.
94.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of IBAC & Anor	M33 of 2014	10/12/2015	Luck v Principal Officer of IBAC & Anor [2015] HCASL 217 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision of Warren CJ and Whelan JA in [2014] VSCA 239, including an extension of time within which she could do so. Special leave application dismissed.
95.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor	M116 of 2014	03/09/2015	Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor [2015] HCASL 136 (Nettle, Gordon JJ)	Application for special leave to appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court’s decision to dismiss an appeal in VID1158/2013. Special Leave application dismissed. The application did not advance any reason to doubt the correctness of the Full Court’s decision, which was plainly correct.
96.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor; Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor; Gaye Luck v Secretary Department of Human Services & Ors; Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer)	M50 of 2015 M51 of 2015 M52 of 2015 M53 of 2015	19/05/2015	Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor; Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor; Luck v Secretary Department of Human Services & Ors; Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer) [2015] HCATrans 125 (Nettle J)	Ms Luck sought to consolidate a number of her applications for removal to the High Court of proceedings pending in the FCC and FCA, together with her application in M116/2014 for special leave to appeal from the FCAFC in VID1158/2013. The proceedings sought to be removed were the bankruptcy notice appeal in VID189/2015; the judicial review applications in VID488/2008 and VID444/2008; the appeals against orders of Tracey J being VID512/2014, VID898/2008; and the application brought against Ms Luck for a sequestration order in MLG737/2015. Ms Luck did not appear at the hearing. Applications for stay dismissed in each matter. His Honour was not persuaded on the basis of Ms Luck’s material that a stay would be necessary or justified.
97.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor	M49 of 2015	11/11/2016	Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor [2016] HCASL 286 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought to remove an application from the proceeding below. Removal application dismissed, and summons dismissed, with costs. No sufficient reason was shown to warrant interference with the ordinary appeal process by granting removal; nor for Ms Luck’s interlocutory summons.
98.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor	M53 of 2015	11/11/2016	Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor [2016] HCASL 287 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Ms Luck sought to remove an application from a proceeding below. Dismissed for the same reason as above.
99.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland	M165 of 2016	05/04/2017	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2017] HCASL 75 (Bell, Gageler JJ)	Application for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s judgment in VID189/2015. Special leave refused. The application as amended disclosed no reason to doubt the correctness of the Full Court’s decision.
100.	Luck v University of Southern Queensland	M111 of 2018	13/02/2019	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2019] HCASL 20 (Nettle, Gordon JJ)	Application for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s judgment in VID396/2017. Special leave refused. Questions raised in the amended application were contrary to authority and would enjoy no prospect of success.
101.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer)	M216 of 2015	11/11/2016	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer) [2016] HCASL 282 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Application for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s decision dated 03/06/2015 in VID512/2014, to dismiss Ms Luck’s interlocutory application for stay or adjournment. Application for leave and extension of time dismissed. The proposed appeal did not enjoy sufficient prospects of success.
102.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer)	M217 of 2015	11/11/2016	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink (Freedom of Information Principal Officer) [2016] HCASL 283 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Application for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s decision in VID898/2008. Application for leave and extension of time dismissed. The proposed appeal did not enjoy sufficient prospects of success.
103.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor	M7 of 2016	11/11/2016	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink & Anor [2016] HCASL 288 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Application for leave to file a summary of argument of more than 10 pages in support of Ms Luck’s application to remove this matter from the Federal Court and various orders. Special leave application dismissed. No basis for a removal application was established, and the subject decision was interlocutory such that any appeal would be incompetent.
104.	Gaye Luck v Secretary of Department of Human Services & Ors	M123 of 2016	11/11/2016	Luck v Secretary of Department of Human Services & Ors [2016] HCASL 289 (Kiefel, Keane JJ)	Application for leave to file a summary of argument of more than 10 pages in support of Ms Luck’s application to remove this matter from the Federal Court and various orders. Removal application dismissed. No sufficient reason to interfere with the ordinary appeals process was given.
105.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink	M91 of 2017	08/11/2017	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2017] HCASL 276 (Gordon, Edelman JJ)	Application for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s judgment in VID 921/ 2015. Special leave application dismissed. No question of law or arguable ground was identified that was sufficient to warrant grant of leave; the appeal would enjoy no prospect of success.
106.	In the matter of an application by Luck for leave to issue or file	M19 of 2020	04/08/2020	(Bell J) (unpublished— reasons for decision not publicly available see: Public Access Documents - High Court of Australia)	Ms Luck made an ex parte application for leave to issue or file a proposed writ of summons which proposed to challenge decisions of the Federal Court. Application refused. To grant leave would permit Ms Luck to bypass ordinary mechanisms of appeal and potentially avoid statutory limitations; the particulars were incoherent and to proceed would be an abuse of process
107.	In the matter of an application by Gaye Luck for leave to appeal	M80 of 2020	13/10/2022	In the matter of an application by Gaye Luck for leave to appeal [2022] HCASL 177 (Keane, Gordon JJ)	Ms Luck sought to appeal the decision of Bell J in M19 of 2020. Special leave refused. An appeal would enjoy no prospect of success.
108.	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors	M20 of 2020	04/08/2020	(Bell J) (unpublished- referred to in M62/2021 in reasons of Steward J; see also Public Access Documents - High Court of Australia)	Ms Luck filed voluminous materials in an application for certain constitutional writs. Application dismissed.
109.		M21 of 2020	04/08/2020	(Bell J (presumably)) (unpublished- reasons for decision not publicly available: see Public Access Documents - High Court of Australia)	Ms Luck filed a further application for certain constitutional writs. It is unclear whether this application was likewise dismissed.
110.	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors	M82 of 2020	13/10/2022	Luck v Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2022] HCASL 178 (Keane, Edelman JJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal, out of time, from one of the decisions of Bell J on 04/08/2020 which dismissed her application for constitutional writs (it is unclear from the reasons whether this was M20 or M21 of 2020). Special leave application dismissed.
111.	Luck v Nell	M62 of 2021	10/12/2021	(Steward J) (unpublished- not available for download see: Public Access Documents - High Court of Australia)	Ms Luck applied for removal of proceedings from the County Court of Victoria. Interlocutory application dismissed without hearing per r 13.03.1 of the Rules.
112.			13/10/2022	Luck v Nell [2022] HCASL 179 (Keane, Edelman JJ)	Removal application dismissed. The application did not raise any cause or part of a cause arising under the Constitution as required by s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). It was ‘manifestly hopeless… an abuse of process and should be dismissed.’
113.		M83 of 2021	13/10/2022	Luck v Nell [2022] HCASL 180 (Keane, Edelman JJ)	Ms Luck sought to appeal from the interlocutory order of Steward J on 10/12/2021 in M62 of 2021. Leave application dismissed. The decision of Steward J was ‘plainly correct’ and the application had no prospects of success.
114.	Luck v Secretary of Services Australia & Ors	M6 of 2023	20/03/2023	Luck v Secretary of Services Australia & Ors [2023] HCASL 62 (Gageler, Jagot JJ)	Ms Luck sought an extension of time within which to apply for special leave to appeal from the Full Court’s judgment in VID1044/2016. Special leave application and extension of time application dismissed. The application raised no question of general legal principle and disclosed no reason to doubt the correctness of the Full Court’s decision.
115.	Gaye Luck v Bunnings Group Limited & Ors	M77 of 2021	14/04/2022	Luck v Bunnings Group Limited & Ors [2022] HCATrans 74 (Gleeson J)	Ms Luck sought declarations of negligence, breach of statutory duty, and disability discrimination she suffered, as a result of being denied entry to the premises of the first and second defendants because she did not have proof of vaccination against COVID-19 or acceptable evidence of a medical exemption. Proceedings adjourned. Ms Luck filed an application seeking an urgent directions hearing, injunctive relief and more, which was refused.
116.			19/04/2022	Luck v Bunnings Group Limited & Ors [2022] HCATrans 75 (Gleeson J)	Amended application as against the first two defendants summarily dismissed under r 28.01.02; the balance of proceedings against the third and fourth defendants also dismissed. No arguable cause of action was identified for Ms Luck’s allegations.
117.	Luck v Bunnings Group Limited & Ors	M27 of 2023	14/09/2023	Luck v Bunnings Group Limited & Ors [2023] HCASL 133 (Gageler, Jagot JJ)	Ms Luck sought an extension of time within which to apply for special leave to appeal from the decisions of Gleeson J made in M77 of 2021. Application for extension of time dismissed. There was no reason to doubt the correctness of Gleeson J’s decisions, and it would have been futile to grant an extension of time.
118.	Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited	B25 of 2023	03/08/2023	Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited [2023] HCASL 109 (Edelman, Gleeson CJ)	Application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in No 13003 of 2022. Special leave refused. The decision in the Court of Appeal was ‘plainly correct’ and the appeal had no prospects of success.
119.	In the matter of – an application by Gaye Alexandra Kuperman for leave to issue or file	B49 of 2023	15/09/2023	Kuperman, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2023] HCATrans 127 (Kiefel CJ)	Ms Luck sought leave to issue or file an appeal against the decision of Edelman and Gleeson JJ in B25/2023. She sought this leave after an initial notice of appeal she attempted to file on 22/08/2023 was refused for filing because leave had not first been obtained. Application refused.
120.	Luck v VP Jack A Henderson	M34 of 2023	09/11/2023	Luck v VP Jack A Henderson [2023] HCASL 162 (Gordon, Steward JJ)	Ms Luck sought removal of a cause pending in the MCV, relating to an interim intervention order made against her. She also filed two applications seeking interlocutory relief and sought recusal of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Jagot JJ. Application and interlocutory applications dismissed with costs. The application was considered misconceived.
121.	In the matter of – an application by Gaye Luck for leave to issue or file	M53 of 2023	07/09/2023	Luck, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2023] HCATrans 112 (Gordon J)	An ex parte application for leave to issue or file a writ of summons against seven defendants alleging breaches of duties and negligence or discrimination by multifarious entities. The claims allege Ms Luck was discriminated against as a consequence of her experience in crisis housing experiencing ‘exposure to drug, chemical and other noxious fumes and smoke drift, seeping into [her] unit through all cracks, crevices, doors and windows’ and emanating from her neighbour. Application refused.
District Court of Queensland
122.	Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited	DC No 595 of 1998	26/09/2022	(unpublished— referred to in [2023] QCA 54) (Burnett DCJ)	In 1998 Ms Luck filed a claim for damages in the amount of $250,000 against the respondent owner of a shopping centre, for personal injury she allegedly suffered as a result of slipping on wet tiles on a walkway between the carpark and shopping centre. Ms Luck later filed an amended statement of loss claiming (mostly aggravated and exemplary) damages of more than $3.9 billion, without pleadings in support. After a 19-year delay in prosecuting the proceedings, Ms Luck filed an application for leave to proceed, whilst the respondent filed a cross-application to dismiss the proceeding for want of prosecution. Burnett DCJ dismissed the proceeding.
Supreme Court of Queensland
123.	Gaye Alexandra Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited	Appeal No 13003 of 2022	28/03/2023	Kuperman v Permanent Trustee Australia Limited [2023] QCA 54 (Mullins P, Dalton JA, Bradley J)	Ms Luck appealed the decision immediately above. Appeal dismissed with costs. The Court found no error in the primary judge’s decision to refuse the application to proceed and to dismiss the proceedings. Their Honours held a great number of grounds of appeal put forward by Ms Luck had no merit.
Magistrates’ Court of Victoria
124.	Gaye Luck v Anna Nell	Unknown	26/02/2021	(unpublished— referred to in [2023] VCC 1622)	Ms Luck applied for a personal safety intervention order against the respondent, which was refused.
County Court of Victoria
125.	Gaye Luck v Anna Nell	AP-21-0233	17/08/2023	Luck v Nell (Ruling) [2023] VCC 1622 (Robertson J)	Ms Luck appealed against the decision of the MCV above. Ms Luck requested an adjournment of a directions hearing on the basis of a medical certificate. Robertson J made orders adjourning the hearing, which noted Ms Luck’s absence, but omitted to note that the respondent was also absent. Ms Luck sought recusal of Robertson J on that basis, which was refused as there was no logical connection between this omitted note (if it was even required to be noted) and any apprehension of bias. It is unclear whether the substantive matter concluded in the absence of a further published decision.
Supreme Court of Victoria
126.	Gay [sic] Luck v Stephen Blamey and Associates Pty Ltd	4429 of 2000	03/03/2000	Luck v Stephen Blamey & Associates Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 77 (Beach J)	Application for mandatory, interlocutory injunction to compel a medical practitioner, who previously treated Ms Luck and then determined he could assist her no further, to fulfil a contract of personal services to treat her. Application dismissed. Beach J opined that a mandatory injunction for a contract to provide personal services is one the court is very reluctant to grant, especially on an interlocutory basis, and Ms Luck did not satisfy the Court that it would be appropriate in this case.
127.	Alex Luck v Kevin Renton & Ors	Unknown	Unknown	(Hargrave J) (unpublished - referred to in [2005] VSCA 210)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from VCAT’s orders that her landlord must employ a tradesman to complete urgent repairs requested by Ms Luck, but that her landlord was not responsible for a previous tradesman’s failure to complete them. She required an extension of time to do so which was refused by Master Evans. On appeal before the Practice Court, Ms Luck had not prepared to provide submissions on her substantive appeal and so provided none at the hearing, as she wanted an adjournment. Hargrave J dismissed Ms Luck’s interlocutory applications for adjournment of the hearing, for an order requiring VCAT to provide a full transcript and original sound recordings of its hearing; and for an injunction to restrain VCAT from hearing another application brought by her landlord for possession of the premises, until her appeal was determined. After offering Ms Luck an opportunity to make submissions on the substantive appeal, to which she responded with disappointment about the result of the other applications “there would not be much point”, Hargrave J proceeded to dismiss that appeal.
128.		6650 of 2005	23/08/2005	Luck v Renton & Ors [2005] VSCA 210 (Maxwell P and Harper AJA)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from Hargrave J’s orders above. The appeal was dismissed with respect to most of the orders, but in the second of the three decisions in Ms Luck’s favour identified in this table of proceedings, the appeal was allowed with respect to the application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Master. Their Honours remitted it for re-hearing in the Trial Division to allow Ms Luck procedural fairness, as they considered she was not given a satisfactory opportunity to present her arguments before Hargave J following the refusal of the adjournment request, albeit with their Honours saying ‘nothing as to the merits of those applications’. It is unclear how the matter was decided on remittal, without a published decision.
129.		8169 of 2005	27/02/2006	Luck v Renton [2006] VSC 90 (Bongiorno J)	Ms Luck appealed from an order of Senior Master Mahony dismissing an application for leave to appeal from a ruling of a member of VCAT, handed down on 02/09/2005, which was a decision to adjourn the VCAT proceedings to allow them to be recorded, at Ms Luck’s own request. When pressed at the hearing to identify the question of law Ms Luck wished to raise on her appeal, Ms Luck refused to, walking out. Appeal dismissed.
130.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Peninsula Health and Anor	M55 of 2012 M56 of 2012	(unknown)	(unpublished— referred to in [2015] HCASL 207)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision in [2012] VCAT 481 being to proceed with the hearing in Ms Luck’s absence after she walked out of the Tribunal, alleging that this constituted disability discrimination. It is unclear in the absence of a published decision whether these proceedings have finalised.
131.	Luck v Coroner Spanos and Ors	M58 of 2012	27/07/2012	(Mukhtar AsJ) (unpublished— referred to in [2015] HCASL 209)	Ms Luck filed an application for extension of time under s 86 of the Coroners Act 2008 (Vic) to appeal from a finding of the first respondent that the death of Ms Luck’s mother on 20/06/2010 was not a reportable death. Mukhtar AsJ ordered that the application be adjourned pending the determination of Ms Luck’s removal application to the High Court in M58/2012, which was unsuccessful. It is unclear in the absence of a published decision whether these proceedings subsequently finalised.
132.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission & Anor	M33 of 2014	01/04/2014	Luck v Principal Officer of IBAC [2014] VSCA 239 (Warren CJ, Whelan JA)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision in [2013] VCAT 1805, summarily dismissing the application for FOI review. Ms Luck also sought to appeal against the decision not to order that the Tribunal’s reasons be suppressed. In the course of proceedings, Ms Luck sought an adjournment on the basis of pending High Court matters. Applications for adjournment and for leave to appeal refused. Ms Luck sought the recusal of Warren CJ on the basis of apprehended bias, which was also refused.
133.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Victoria Police	Unknown	17/05/2013	(Nettle, Ashley JJA) (unpublished - referred to in [2013] HCATrans 164)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decisions of Macnamara VP in [2015] VCAT 71, dismissing one FOI review, and [2012] VCAT 1617, notwithstanding that this second decision was in Ms Luck’s favour, requiring Victoria Police to process that part of her FOI request. One day before the hearing, Ms Luck sought an adjournment for, among other things, alleged medical symptoms of which she gave no evidence. Both applications for leave to appeal were heard together and dismissed, on the basis that Ms Luck failed to appear without any medical evidence given in support.
134.	Gaye Luck v Principal Officer of Department of Justice	Unknown	24/05/2013	(Nettle, Ashley JJA) (unpublished - referred to in [2013] VCAT 1805 and [2013] HCATrans 165)	Ms Luck sought leave to appeal from the decision of Macnamara VP in [2013] VCAT 416 to strike out proceedings. Two days before the hearing, Ms Luck sought an adjournment and did not appear at the hearing. Leave to appeal refused— even if there was some doubt about the scope of the Tribunal’s power under s 78 of the VCAT Act to strike out proceedings in the relevant circumstances, the Tribunal’s decision was not productive of substantial injustice, as a strike out does not dismiss proceedings and she could bring a fresh application if it were necessary.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
135.	Alex Luck v Kevin Renton & Ors	Unknown	20/05/2005	(unpublished - referred to in [2006] VSC 90 and [2005] VSCA 210)	This application pertained to Ms Luck’s tenancy dispute with her then-landlord Mr Renton, seeking an order requiring Mr Renton to carry out specified urgent repairs. The Tribunal adjourned these proceedings to allow for recording of the Tribunal hearing, apparently at Ms Luck’s request. The order seeking urgent repairs was made, but the tradesmen employed by Mr Renton failed to complete repairs after a disagreement arose with Ms Luck at the premises and he left without finishing the job. When Ms Luck reopened the proceedings seeking compensation from Mr Renton for the tradesman’s failure, the Tribunal determined that Mr Renton was not responsible for the tradesman’s actions, but ordered Mr Renton to employ another tradesman to complete the repairs.
136.	Gaye Luck v Peninsula Health/ Frankston Hospital	G945 of 2011 G946 of 2011	30/03/2012	Luck v Peninsula Health (General) [2012] VCAT 481 (R. Davis SM)	Ms Luck sought documents from the respondent relating to her mother’s hospital records and her own (as well as records relating to two children she said she escorted to the hospital), but the respondent alleged that certain of those documents did not exist. She then made applications to the Tribunal (one of them out of time), for those documents to be released. Ms Luck sought R Davis SM to recuse himself on the ground of bias, which was considered and refused. Ms Luck walked out of the hearing saying she was sick, after interrupting the Senior Member and respondent’s solicitor, and refusing R Davis SM’s offer to adjourn proceedings if she felt unwell. The hearing continued in Ms Luck’s absence, and at its conclusion procedural and case management orders were made allowing Ms Luck to file material in support of a request for an extension of time and for the existence of documents to be ascertained. In the absence of further published decisions it is unclear how this proceeding concluded.
137.	Gaye Luck v Police (Vic) FOI Division	G261 of 2012 & G519 of 2012	25/10/2012	Luck v Victoria Police FOI Division (General) [2012] VCAT 1617 (Macnamara VP) (unpublished - referred to at paras [5]-[6] of [2013] VCAT 2211)	Ms Luck sought access to extensive material through FOI relating to her dealings with Victoria Police, who sought to narrow the scope of her request. Ms Luck then commenced proceedings seeking an order that the request she made was not one which Vic Pol could refuse as too voluminous. In one of the three identified decisions in Ms Luck’s favour across this table of proceedings, Macnamara VP made an interlocutory determination that part of Ms Luck’s FOI request letter constituted a separate FOI request which was not so voluminous, obliging Victoria Police to process it. Remainder of the proceedings adjourned part-heard.
138.			20/12/2012	Luck v Victoria Police FOI Division (General) [2012] VCAT 1946 (Macnamara VP) (unpublished - referred to at para [7] of [2013] VCAT 2211)	In the same matter as immediately above, Ms Luck sought interlocutory orders from VCAT, requiring Victoria Police to grant her electronic access to certain documents in its LEAP system. Application dismissed— insofar as the grant of any access under the procedural powers of the VCAT Act was sought as a substitute for final relief under the FOI Act, it would be an abuse of process.
139.			22/02/2013	Luck v Victoria Police FOI Division (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 2211 (Macnamara VP)	Following the interlocutory determinations in [2012] VCAT 1617 and [2012] VCAT 1946, Ms Luck initiated separate proceedings (heard together) reviewing a purported deemed decision of Victoria Police to refuse the documents requested by Ms Luck. The respondent sought for the application to be struck out as vexatious, on the basis that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding as Ms Luck had not invoked the relevant internal FOI review processes. Application summarily dismissed.
140.			(unknown)	Luck v Victoria Police (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 206 (unpublished— referred to in footnote 39 of 2013] VCAT 1805)	This appears to have been an interlocutory decision in the course of the same proceedings, however in the absence of publication or detailed reference to it, it is not clear what the decision was.
141.			23/01/2015	Luck v Police (Vic) [2015] VCAT 71 (Macnamara VP)	Victoria Police sought dismissal of these ongoing proceedings for want of prosecution or by way of strike out, citing disadvantage and expenses it would incur if the proceedings were indefinitely adjourned. Application struck out, Macnamara VP stating (at [8]): ‘In the present situation whereby this matter has been adjourned from time to time, it is unsatisfactory for the parties and the Tribunal.’
142.	Luck v Department of Justice	Unknown	14/05/2013	Luck v Department of Justice [2013] VCAT 416 (Macnamara VP) (unpublished - referred to at paras [11]-[13] of [2013] VCAT 1805 and in [2013] HCATrans 165)	Ms Luck sought review of the respondent’s decision to refuse to grant her access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic). At a directions hearing, Ms Luck was observed using a recording device, and the Vice President directed her to turn it off, as the decision whether to record proceedings is at the Tribunal’s discretion. Ms Luck refused to do so, and the hearing was briefly adjourned; upon return, Ms Luck had left the Tribunal. Application struck out pursuant to s 78 VCAT Act; by refusing to comply with a direction and by leaving the hearing Ms Luck had conducted the proceeding vexatiously.
143.	Gaye Luck v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission	G1010 of 2012	10/10/2013	Luck v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 1805 (Jenkins VP)	Ms Luck sought review of an internal review decision made by the respondent to refuse access to documents in the possession of the Office of Police Integrity (OPI) on the basis of exemption under s 51 of the Police Integrity Act 2008. The documents in question related to nine complaints regarding conduct of members of Victoria Police and Protective Service Officers. Ms Luck walked out, and the application was summarily dismissed (on the respondent’s motion) as the documents Ms Luck sought access to were documents that would disclose information relating to an investigation under Part 3 of the PI Act, falling clearly within the exemption in s 51 of that Act. The refusal to release documents to Ms Luck was correct.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
144.	Gaye Luck v Secretary, Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs	850 of 1999	07/01/2000	Luck v Secretary, Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs [2000] AATA 4 (Gibbs SM)	Ms Luck sought review of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal on 23/02/1999 to affirm the decision of a Centrelink delegate on 24/01/1998 to reject her application for rent assistance. The decision was itself already internally reviewed by Centrelink and affirmed. Review application dismissed; Ms Luck was not eligible for rent assistance under the AUSTUDY Regulations, due to her age and otherwise not meeting the circumstances prescribed by the Regulations.
145.	Gaye Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink	0861 of 2008	15/08/2008	Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] AATA 718 (Friedman SM)	Ms Luck applied for review of various decisions of the respondent and various agencies. The Tribunal held an interlocutory hearing to determine whether it had jurisdiction to determine the application, and determine the issues for consideration. Procedural and case management orders made.
146.	Gaye Luck v University of Southern Queensland	1091 of 2008	29/05/2008	Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2008] AATA 539 (Friedman SM)	Ms Luck applied for review of a deemed refusal of the University to release certain documents to her under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Application dismissed. The AAT had no jurisdiction to review a deemed refusal by the University to release documents under FOI, as the University was not established under a Commonwealth enactment as required by the FOI Act.
147.	Gaye Luck v Department of Human Services	3329 of 2009 & 3331 of 2009	19/10/2009	Luck v Department of Human Services [2009] AATA 800 (Forgie DP)	Ms Luck sought to review a decision made by the respondent in respect of her FOI requests made on 20 January, 9 and 16 February, and 10, 23 and 24 March 2009 (which was ostensibly a decision to release the available requested documents via CD). The Respondent contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the decision. Forgie DP made an interlocutory ‘decision’ to hold a hearing to determine what the decision under review actually was to determine the jurisdiction question.
148.		3331 of 2009	08/01/2010	Luck v Department of Human Services [2010] AATA 6 (Forgie DP)	On 21/10/2009, Ms Luck sought a stay of this matter until the High Court had considered her application alleging a breach of procedural fairness arising from the Tribunal’s decision to list a hearing to determine the jurisdiction question. Forgie DP refused the request for a stay finding there was no genuine matter to be litigated in the High Court and proceeding would not limit that Court, and so proceeded to dismiss the review application on the basis that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction as Ms Luck did not first seek internal review as required by the FOI Act.

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