Federal Court of Australia

Snow v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2025] FCAFC 98

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The hearing of the substantive appeal and the interlocutory application for Justice Meagher to disqualify herself from hearing the matter, set down for 10:00am (ACDT) on 18 August 2025, be vacated.

2.    The appeal be listed before a Full Court for hearing in the November 2025 Full Court and Appellate sitting period, on an estimate of one day.

3.    Paragraphs 5 to 11 of the orders made on 4 March 2025 be vacated.

4.    Paragraph 2 of the orders made on 27 May 2025 be vacated.

5.    Paragraphs 3 to 5 of the orders made on 18 June 2025 be vacated.

6.    Costs reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

1    By way of an interlocutory application dated 4 July 2025, Mr Christopher Snow applied to the Court for the following orders:

1.    That the 18 August 2025 hearing date for SAD98/2024 be vacated.

2.    That the appeal be listed for hearing in the November 2025 Full Court and Appellate sitting period, with one day set aside.

3.    Liberty to apply.

(the application for an adjournment).

2    Mr Snow is the appellant in the substantive matter, which is an appeal from Snow v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2024] FCA 608. The Secretary of the Department of Social Services is the respondent to the appeal and also the respondent to this application for an adjournment.

3    The background to the appeal is set out in Snow v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2025] FCA 557.

4    The appeal was initially set down for hearing before a Full Court on 4 March 2025.

5    On 16 January 2025, Mr Snow filed an interlocutory application seeking that the Court vacate the 4 March 2025 hearing date and relist the matter before a Full Court in the August 2025 sitting period. On 23 January 2025, Charlesworth J made orders granting that application.

6    The appeal was subsequently listed before us on 18 August 2025.

7    Since the fixing of the August date, Mr Snow has filed a number of interlocutory applications, some of which have been dealt with and some of which remain outstanding. In light of the evidence filed and submissions made in relation to his application for an adjournment, which the parties were content to have decided on the papers, we formed the view that the application should be allowed, and made the orders set out above.

8    These are our reasons.

9    Whether or not an adjournment should be granted is a discretionary question to be considered by reference to the explanation and evidence proffered in support of the adjournment, any prejudice to the other party (and to other litigants and the Court more broadly), the principles of case management and the procedural history of the proceedings: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175. The Court must also consider whether granting or denying an application for an adjournment is consistent with the “overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions” set out in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 at [42] (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ).

10    Mr Snow relied upon the interlocutory application and his affidavit dated 4 July 2025.

11    The Secretary relied upon written submissions dated 18 July 2025.

12    Mr Snow deposed that his reasons for seeking an adjournment were broadly as follows:

(a)    an extraordinary series of severe personal problems, particularly health and housing, but also financial, which for more than two years have impeded preparation of submissions for the substantive and interlocutory matters

(b)    having to self-represent, which has led to much stress which in turn has caused health problems, has increased further stress which has led to further health problems etc

(c)    the location of new evidence and arguments through the discovery in the past few weeks of artificial intelligence (AI – Copilot): it is increasing the workload by requiring additional research and preparation of applications for leave to introduce the new evidence

(d)    the timing of two, current, interlocutory matters which may cause procedural timing difficulties before the substantive hearing.

13    Mr Snow deposed to suffering from numerous serious and chronic health conditions, in support of which he annexed a number of medical reports to his affidavit. The most recent medical report, dated 2 July 2025, was provided by Dr Chris Moy and relevantly stated as follows:

I am the treating General Practitioner for this man.

I can confirm that he is currently suffering from multiple major medical conditions that are impairing him both physically and cognitively[.]

…

As a whole, these conditions have and will continue to significantly affect his ability to work on his legal case due to both physical effects and effects on his concentration.

I understand that he has requested an adjournment in the current legal case and I would support this on the above medical grounds not only because of his impairment but risks to his health in attempts to complete his legal requirements by the current deadlines.

14    The Secretary opposed Mr Snow’s application for an adjournment.

15    The Secretary submitted that Mr Snow is “the moving party to this appeal” and the matter has previously been adjourned at his request.

16    The Secretary also contended that he is “entitled to see finality to the litigation”, and that Mr Snow’s “stated reasons” are insufficient to evidence a significant impairment which would prevent him from “meaningfully” participating in the appeal.

17    The Secretary pointed to the “numerous” interlocutory applications filed by Mr Snow prior to the August 2025 hearing date. He submitted that this “directly collides with the assertion that [Mr Snow] cannot prepare for or participate in the hearing, listed on 18 August 2025” on the basis that Mr Snow is “plainly capable of mounting a case” given his ability to lodge the appeal, conduct the hearing at first instance, identify grounds for his interlocutory applications, file supporting affidavits, make “tactical decisions” about the composition of the Full Court and file and serve various documents.

18    The Secretary also submitted that Mr Snow has had months to prepare and “ample opportunity to engage with the appeal process”. The Secretary contended that Mr Snow had not filed material which would support his submission that he could not participate in the hearing, but rather, had filed material which merely indicated that he may be unable to “present his case in the best possible light”. The Secretary submitted that “that is a feature common to many litigants throughout Australia” and relied upon the following statement of Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12 at 16 [19]:

Many people who appear before administrative tribunals, and many litigants in courts, including some litigants in this court, suffer from psychological disorders or psychiatric illness. That may affect their capacity to do justice to their case. Fairness does not ordinarily require the court or tribunal to undertake a psychiatric or psychological assessment to investigate the extent to which the person in question may be at a disadvantage; and ordinarily it would be impossible to tell. …

19    The Secretary conceded that his Honour’s comments in SGLB were “made in a slightly different context” but submitted that “they reflect the reality that some degree of an impairment will not necessarily justify an adjournment, without more”.

20    Finally, the Secretary submitted that Mr Snow’s request for an adjournment was contrary to s 37M(1) of the Act, which reads as follows:

37M The overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions

(1)    The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:

(a)    According to law; and

(b)    as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

21    There is some force in the arguments mounted by the Secretary. It is true that these proceedings have been on foot for some time; that a further adjournment to the November Full Court sitting will mean that some 16 months will have elapsed since the filing of the original notice of appeal; that the Secretary is entitled to a final resolution of the issues; and that Mr Snow has made a number of interlocutory applications and filed material with the Court.

22    It is also true that the overarching purpose of the Court is to facilitate the just, lawful, quick, inexpensive and efficient resolution of disputes: s 37M(1) of the Act. However, regard must also be had to s 37M(2)(a) of the Act which states that “[w]ithout limiting the generality of subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes … the just determination of all proceedings before the Court”.

23    It is in the exercise of a Court’s discretion that a decision to adjourn a hearing is made: Thornberry v The Queen (1995) 69 ALJR 777. That discretion will miscarry where the refusal of the adjournment ultimately prevents a party from adequately presenting their case: Thornberry at 777.

24    As to the Secretary’s reliance on SGLB, that case was an appeal which focused upon the procedural fairness, or lack thereof, afforded to an applicant seeking a protection visa, who had demonstrably struggled to provide consistent evidence. The relevant question in SGLB was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal was obliged to obtain a second psychiatric or psychologist’s report in respect of the mental state of the visa applicant, for the purposes of understanding and assessing his evidence and establishing his fitness to participate in the hearing. When the remarks of Gleeson CJ are read in that light, they do not stand for the proposition asserted.

25    As Flick J stated in Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 3) [2016] FCAFC 149 at [10]:

Difficult questions invariably arise where any litigant is self-represented, especially where a litigant suffers from a medical condition. Inevitably a Court must proceed upon the basis of evidence that is before it and, to a lesser extent, upon its own assessment of the ability of a litigant to properly advance a case for hearing.

26    In Kennedy, no adjournment was granted because the medical condition suffered by the applicant in that case was “not sufficient to deny him a real and meaningful opportunity to present his appeal for resolution”: at [12] per Flick J. In that case, it was also observed that “while we do not doubt that Mr Kennedy has felt pressured and anxious about his issues with his current employer and the appeal, we are not satisfied that any interest, including his own, would be served by delaying the resolution of the appeal”: at [39] per Jagot and Bromwich JJ.

27    In the present case, Mr Snow’s unchallenged evidence is that he is suffering from stress due to the impending appeal and the associated workload involved in preparing for it. He has concerns about the challenges he faces as a litigant in person. Critically, he relies on recent medical evidence from his treating general practitioner, which clearly outlines his serious medical conditions and the impact of this appeal upon him and expresses support for his adjournment application on medical grounds.

28    The Secretary has neither challenged this medical evidence nor provided evidence or submissions as to any prejudice he may suffer as a result of the proposed adjournment. Conversely, it is clear that refusing Mr Snow’s application for an adjournment would prejudice him by putting him at risk of being unable to present his case adequately.

29    Taking into consideration the principles set out in the authorities referred to above (including the need to ensure the just determination of the issues between the parties, Mr Snow’s unchallenged medical evidence and the absence of evidence or submissions as to any detriment the Secretary might suffer were the adjournment to be granted), the Court granted the application for an adjournment and made orders accordingly.

Associate:

Dated: 30 July 2025