FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77

ORDERS

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    The appellant in NSD1252/2024 and the applicant in NSD1450/2024 is to be provided notice that the Full Court is considering whether to make (proposed orders) in the following terms:

1.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):

(a)    all current proceedings instituted by the applicant in this Court be stayed; and

(b)    the applicant be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue.

2.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court Act, the applicant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the Federal Court Act.

3.    At the time of filing any application pursuant to s 37AR of the Federal Court Act, or any other application, the applicant pay the sum of $200 to the Registrar as security for costs, to be held by the Court in a non-interest-bearing account.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s application for leave to appeal dated 26 September 2024, interlocutory application dated 18 October 2024 and interlocutory applications dated 12 February 2025 in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024 be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024.

3.    The appeal in proceeding NSD 1252 of 2024 be dismissed.

4.    The interim pseudonym order made on 28 October 2024 is vacated.

5.    On or by 9 July 2025, the applicant file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders and any written outline of submissions of no more than 10 pages (of 2.0 line spacing, Times New Roman font, 12pt font size).

6.    The issue as to whether the proposed orders ought to be made be dealt with on the papers by the Full Court.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WIGNEY J:

1    The applicant, who has to date been permitted to use the pseudonym AZO24, applied for leave to appeal a judgment summarily dismissing her proceeding (the primary proceeding) against the respondents, the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of New South Wales (NSD 1450 of 2024). She also applied for leave to appeal (and sought extensions of time in which to apply for leave to appeal) seven essentially procedural orders that were made during the case management of the primary proceeding. Separately, she appealed a judgment dismissing her application for judicial review of a decision of a Registrar to refuse to accept for filing two documents by which the applicant effectively sought to challenge an interlocutory order in the primary proceeding which had already been the subject of a failed application for leave to appeal (NSD 1252 of 2024). The applicant’s leave to appeal and extension applications were heard together with her appeal.

2    I have had the benefit of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Raper J which detail: the unfortunate procedural history of the primary proceeding; the extraordinary nature of the primary proceeding; the reasons given by the primary judge for summarily dismissing the primary proceeding; the applicant’s proposed appeal grounds and submissions in respect of that decision; the nature of the procedural orders which are the subject of the applicant’s other leave to appeal and extension of time applications; the applicant’s arguments in support of her proposed appeal in respect of those orders; the reasons for judgment of the judge (who was not the primary judge) who dismissed the applicant’s judicial review application in respect of the decision not to accept her documents for filing; and the applicant’s grounds of appeal and arguments in respect of the appeal from that judgment.

3    It is both unnecessary and undesirable for me to rehearse her Honour’s comprehensive analysis of those matters. I agree with Raper J that the applicant’s leave to appeal and extension of time applications should all be dismissed with costs, essentially for the reasons given by her Honour. I also agree with her Honour that the appeal should be dismissed. The following brief observations are made essentially to emphasise the unfortunate hopelessness of the applicant’s position and to underline why her relentless pursuit of relief against the respondents in this Court should be brought to an end.

4    The primary judge was plainly correct to dismiss the primary proceedings for the reasons his Honour gave. Like Raper J, I am unable to discern any appealable error on the part of the primary judge. The allegations upon which the applicant’s case relied were farfetched, inherently implausible, unsupported by any cogent or reliable evidence, and in some respects demonstrably false, even if the applicant may have believed them to be true. As the primary judge effectively found, the primary proceeding was deeply flawed and clearly doomed to fail. I agree with Raper J that the applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal and the submissions she advanced in support of them were mostly misconceived and, to say the very least, lacked sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave appeal.

5    The same can be said concerning the applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal and wide-ranging submissions relating to the various procedural orders which are the subject of her extension of time and proposed leave to appeal applications. I agree with Raper J that the applicant’s submissions in support of her challenge to the procedural orders were devoid of merit and that, again to say the least, the procedural orders were not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant them being reconsidered by the Full Court. The utility of the leave applications in respect of the procedural orders is also at best questionable given the summary dismissal of the primary proceeding and the applicant’s failure to demonstrate that she had a sufficiently arguable case to warrant the grant of leave to appeal that dismissal. As already noted, the procedural orders were all made in the course or context of the case management of the primary proceeding. Realistically, the outcome of the primary proceeding would inevitably have been the same – summary dismissal – even if the procedural issues that arose during the case management of the primary proceeding had been determined differently and in the applicant’s favour.

6    As for the appeal, it is readily apparent from the very nature of the documents that the applicant sought to file that the Registrar correctly refused to accept them for filing. The documents were plainly frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. I am unable to discern any error on the part of the Registrar, or any appealable error on the part of the judge who dismissed the applicant’s judicial review application in respect of the Registrar’s decision. I agree with Raper J that the applicant’s grounds of appeal, and the submissions she advanced in respect of them, have no merit and that the appeal must be dismissed.

7    It remains to briefly address two further issues.

8    First, the applicant filed an interlocutory application in this proceeding in which she sought wide-ranging suppression or non-publication orders which, if made, would have had the effect of prohibiting not only the publication or disclosure of the applicant’s name, but also the publication or disclosure of all the documents that the applicant had filed in this and the primary proceeding. That application was mainly based on the same implausible allegations that founded the primary proceeding, though the applicant also put forward various other unpersuasive arguments. I agree with Raper J that the applicant failed to demonstrate any proper basis for the making of any suppression or non-publication orders, or for her continued use of a pseudonym.

9    Second, I also agree with Raper J that the Full Court should consider making vexatious proceedings orders in respect of her pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). I agree with the orders proposed by her Honour in that regard.

Associate:

Dated: 11 June 2025

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

10    This is an unfortunate case, and this application and appeal and connected hearings has occupied far more of the Court’s attention than can reasonably be justified.  

11    As is evident from the comprehensive reasons of Raper J, which I have had the advantage of reading in draft, the allegations made by the applicant are a combination of the fantastic and the misconceived.

12    I agree with the orders proposed by her Honour.

Associate:

Dated: 11 June 2025

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RAPER J:

13    The applicant (the applicant in NSD1450/2024 and appellant in NSD1252/2024 in both proceedings before this Full Court) (hereafter referred to in both proceedings as the applicant) commenced proceedings on 20 September 2023, seeking relief against the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of New South Wales claiming that they were involved in an alleged unlawful controlled operation or special intelligence operation with respect to her, by reason of the alleged cover-up by them and other foreign governments of the alleged murders by, and death of, an American rock musician, Mr Trent Reznor. The applicant claims that Mr Reznor murdered his family and then committed suicide. According to the respondents, by all accounts, and to their knowledge, this musician and his family remain alive and they have no interest in him or the applicant. The applicant contends that this controlled operation has occurred over many years, and is continuing, and has manifested in a myriad of ways, by which the respondents are said to have sought to intimidate, harass and control her. Without being exhaustive, this includes the Commonwealth’s alleged poisoning of her with a disease in Switzerland in 2019, government agents following her, agents living within her apartment and the placing of optical devices both in the gutter looking down on her dining room table and in the vent of her bathroom, which led to her being filmed, and the footage being released publicly.

14    These allegations have then led to a multitude of proceedings and interlocutory applications. The applicant has commenced five sets of proceedings in this Court: NSD1036/2023, NSD325/2024, NSD942/2024, NSD1252/2024 and NSD1450/2024. The applicant has filed a further 23 interlocutory applications (which are listed in Schedule A to these reasons), and filed voluminous submissions and material.

15    There are two issues to be determined by this Full Court.

16    First, whether to grant the applicant leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment, per Kennett J, delivered on 12 September 2024, summarily dismissing her substantive proceedings: AZO24 v Commonwealth (Summary Dismissal) [2024] FCA 1053 (NSD1450/2024), as well as whether to extend time and grant the applicant leave to appeal various other procedural orders made by Kennett J between June and September 2024.

17    Secondly, whether to allow the applicant’s appeal from the order, made by Needham J, dismissing her application for judicial review of an order made by the Registrar, on 9 July 2024, refusing to accept for filing, pursuant to r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), an interlocutory application and supportive affidavit to “re-open” a leave to appeal an earlier decision of Kennett J not to recuse himself, in AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1004 (NSD1252/2024) and certain other orders made by the primary judge in that proceeding.

18    For the reasons which follow, I would refuse the applicant leave to extend time and appeal from orders made in NSD1450 and dismiss the appeal in NSD1252. I would also refuse her application to extend or make an interim or delay making a final suppression or pseudonym order.

Procedural History

19    On 20 September 2023, the applicant commenced proceedings by filing an originating application and statement of claim against the Commonwealth and NSW, seeking relief under s 107A of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) and various other Acts, alleging unlawful actions and conspiracies which commenced in about June 2017 on authority of the then Prime Minister of Australia and undertaken by several domestic and foreign agencies.

20    The applicant’s originating application includes 30 prayers for final relief in addition to 20 prayers for interlocutory relief on the basis of alleged breaches of federal and state legislation governing telecommunications interception, surveillance and other law enforcement techniques, breaches of international human rights instruments, in addition to a range of tortious claims (assault and battery, conspiracy, and invasion of privacy). The statement of claim comprises some 186 pages and in excess of 368 paragraphs, in narrative chronological form, from 2017 to the present, describing the applicant’s experiences since 2017. The applicant asserts she has been the subject of a “law enforcement controlled operation” or a “special intelligence operation”, on the authority and direction of the former Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, and by extension and adoption of later Prime Ministers, Scott Morrison and Anthony Albanese. The controlled operation is said to have been undertaken by Commonwealth and State agencies, including NSW Police.

21    The applicant asserts the operation commenced after she attempted, in April and May 2017, to report to Australian and United States police suspected criminal conduct by Mr Reznor, with whom she claims to have been in a close personal online relationship between April 2009 and October 2012. Mr Reznor is the lead singer of the United States-based rock band Nine Inch Nails. The applicant alleges that Mr Reznor died by suicide in December 2017 having murdered his wife and four children and that the operation is directed at covering up the authorities’ failure to investigate the applicant’s reports against Mr Reznor and his subsequent murder/suicide. In addition, the applicant claims that, in 2019, she was poisoned overseas and infected with a disease at the authorisation of Australian authorities.

22    On 1 February 2024, the High Court heard and determined the applicant’s application for leave to file an application, seeking to prevent the Commonwealth from “intervening” in the proceeding before the Federal Court, and sought orders, among others, that the Commonwealth and the State not communicate with the Judges of the Federal Court in the applicant’s absence or without her consent. The application was refused as clearly an abuse of process: In the Matter of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave to Issue or File [2024] HCASJ 3. On 7 March 2024, Kennett J made an order under s 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that the applicant be referred to by a pseudonym. On 12 March 2024, Kennett J refused an application to disqualify himself: AZO24 v Commonwealth [2024] FCA 218.

23    Between 18 and 20 March 2024, the applicant attempted to file an interlocutory application seeking that alleged agents of the respondents said to be living within her apartment building be barred from her apartment and vacate their dwellings, and barred from following her or interfering with evidence in her possession. As a consequence, on 20 March 2024, Kennett J made an order that no document be accepted for filing in the proceeding without a grant of leave by a Judge of this Court pursuant to r 2.27(f) of the Rules: AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 426 at [3]. On the same day, his Honour refused the applicant leave to file an interlocutory application and accompanying affidavit: AZO24 v Commonwealth (No 2), finding that “the evidence proposed to be provided in support of the applicant’s contentions discloses an irrational thought process that does not reflect reality”: at [8].

24    On 28 May 2024, Abraham J dismissed an application for leave to appeal Kennett J’s decision not to recuse himself and to refuse leave to file documents in AZO24 v Commonwealth (No 2): AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555.

25    Prior to the proceedings being summarily dismissed on 12 September 2024, Kennett J made seven orders during the course of the proceeding. Those orders are also the subject of the application to extend time and for leave to appeal and set out below. Those orders included refusing leave for the applicant to require the production of documents, issue subpoenas and stay the proceedings.

26    By alternative tack, on 5 July 2024, the applicant filed an application which sought to “re-open” Abraham J’s decision refusing her application for leave to appeal from Kennett J’s decision to recuse himself and be allowed to file applications without leave. The application was prolix and difficult to follow, seeking relief in the form of a declaration that the Registrar had “breached” s 35A(7)(b) of the Federal Court Act by having refused on 18 June 2024 the applicant’s originating application for judicial review of the decision of Abraham J, that the decision of Abraham J be re-opened with new evidence and a writ of mandamus requiring the respondents to fulfil the obligations under the notice to admit and production of documents. On 9 July 2024, the Registrar refused to accept the documents for filing, pursuant to r 2.26 of the Rules on the basis that he was satisfied that the documents were an abuse of process and frivolous or vexatious.

27    Then, by application, filed on 18 July 2024, the applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar’s decision on 9 July 2024 to refuse the filing of the application to “re-open”. On 2 September 2024, the primary judge, Needham J, dismissed this application for judicial review: AZO24 v Registrar NSD1252. This decision is the subject of this appeal. On 3 September 2024, Kennett J heard the summary dismissal application (the decision arising from this hearing is the subject of the application dealt with concurrently by this Full Court).

28    On 11 September 2024, the applicant filed her notice of appeal from the orders made by Needham J. In addition, the applicant also filed an interlocutory application seeking a “stay” of the proceedings before Needham J (for which only remained the question of what to do with an extant interim pseudonym order made on 28 August 2024), which was dismissed by Nicholas J on 1 October 2024: AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 1151.

29    On 12 September 2024, Kennett J summarily dismissed the applicant’s proceeding: AZO24 v Commonwealth (Summary Dismissal) [2024] FCA 1053.

30    Schedule A to these reasons sets out in short-form a list of applications brought by the applicant in each of the five proceedings she has commenced in this Court, numbering 23 applications, of which some were rejected for filing. The applications were variously directed to compel government agencies to produce vast categories of documents, “suspend or stay” the operation of orders, allowing the filing of further evidence, submissions or applications, suppression and non-publication, and extraordinarily, for persons living within her apartment complex to vacate.

Why leave is refused to extend time and appeal the decision of Kennett J to summarily dismiss the applicant’s proceedings

31    For the following reasons, I would refuse the applicant’s application for leave to extend time and appeal on the basis that the proposed appeal is entirely misconceived and without merit.

32    The applicant requires leave to appeal as the decision was summary dismissal pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act, which requires leave to appeal: ss 24(1A), (1D)(b). The principles which govern the grant of leave to appeal are well established. The Court’s discretion must be exercised judicially in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M(3) of the Federal Court Act: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70 at [2]. In Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398–99, this Court identified the two primary considerations for determining the question of leave to appeal: (1) whether, in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and (2) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.

33    However, when considering whether to grant leave to appeal from interlocutory orders, account is taken of the subject matter of those orders and whether they relate to points of procedure or determine substantive rights. In the latter case, leave will be more readily granted: Décor at 400; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; 104 FCR 564 at [43] per French J, as he then was, (Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreeing). However, an applicant seeking leave to appeal must still show that the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt, and that substantial injustice would flow from the decision to refuse leave: Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Clarke [2015] FCAFC 21; 321 ALR 1 at [17] citing Wills v Australian Broadcasting Company [2009] FCAFC 6; 173 FCR 284 at [31] per Rares J (with whom Emmett J agreed).

34    The applicant also requires the Court to extend time for her to appeal the seven procedural orders, which were dated 21 June 2024, 28 June 2024, 25 July 2024, 31 July 2024, 30 August 2024 and 25 September 2024. The applicant is required under r 35.13(a) of the Rules to file her application for leave to appeal with respect to these interlocutory decisions within 14 days after the date on which the order was made. Accordingly, with respect to each of the orders, the time for filing expired on 5 July 2024, 12 July 2024, 8 August 2024, 14 August 2024, 13 September 2024 and 9 October 2024. The applicant’s application was lodged on 26 September 2024 and accepted for filing on 15 October 2024: r 2.25(1). Therefore, the applicant’s application for leave to appeal from each of those procedural decisions requires a grant of extension of time of 102 days, 95 days, 68 days, 62 days, 32 days and 6 days respectively.

35    When considering whether to grant an extension of time, relevant considerations include the length of the delay, the adequacy of the explanation for the delay, any prejudice that arises from the grant of an extension and the merits of the proposed substantive application: see, eg, SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33].

The summary dismissal decision

36    Kennett J found that the applicant’s substantive claim has “no reasonable prospect of success” and should be dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act, given the applicant has no realistic prospect of being able to establish the central factual allegations underpinning her claim, identified at [23] as being:

(a)    that Mr Trent Reznor (an American popular musician of some note, who to all appearances is very much alive) in fact committed suicide in 2017 after having killed members of his family;

(b)    that the governments of the Commonwealth and NSW had (and still have) an interest in trying to prevent the applicant from publicising this fact; and

(c)    that in pursuit of this interest, those governments have conducted a vast and complex operation, reaching into all aspects of the applicant’s life, intended to spy on and intimidate the applicant (including, for example, placement of road signage delivering subtle threats meaningful only to her, purchasing apartments in the building where she lives, and assigning agents to live in those apartments and spy on or intimidate her).

37    His Honour went on to find that “each of these propositions is obviously extremely implausible”, given, at [24], that:

(a)    There is evidence of a large body of publicly available information to the effect that Mr Reznor continues to write and perform music and appear in public. There is no suggestion of anybody other than the applicant that he in fact died seven years ago in dramatic and (one would think) highly newsworthy circumstances. For the applicant’s claim to be correct, it must be the case that large numbers of music fans and participants in the entertainment industry all over the world have been successfully duped over a period of several years by some unidentified person or persons impersonating Mr Reznor.

(b)    It is very unlikely that such a world wide conspiracy of silence could be successful for so long, with the only person knowing and wanting to expose the truth being the applicant (who had no connection with Mr Reznor except online, and seemingly inferred the truth from a range of cryptic messages and events).

(c)    It is similarly unlikely, even assuming that the Commonwealth and NSW governments wished to cover up the fate of Mr Reznor (which itself seems unlikely), that they would act in so many complicated and indirect ways to silence an individual citizen. Most of the steps which the applicant claims were taken in order to intimidate and silence her involved cryptic messages that relied on her to decode their meanings.

(d)    The alleged covert operation, for all its complexity and (it can be inferred) vast expense, has not been particularly effective in achieving its alleged aim. It did not prevent the applicant asserting in her statement of claim (which is on the Court’s file) that Mr Reznor murdered his family and is dead. Nor did it prevent her asserting that Mr Reznor is dead in open court on 25 July 2024. Nor has either of the respondents (who allegedly wish to suppress this fact) sought any suppression orders, or applied to close the Court on occasions when the content of the applicant’s claims has been referred to.

38    His Honour observed that the problem with the applicant’s claim was not only that the key factual assertions seemed implausible, but that given they each involved fraud or bad faith, as a matter of basic principle, such allegations must be clearly alleged and proved by cogent evidence which had not happened: at [26]. Additionally, there was evidence which contradicted the applicant’s core propositions, namely internet searches which indicated that Mr Reznor remains an active composer and performer and has won various awards since 2017 and evidence of inquiries made and subpoenas issued with respect to the relevant agencies which revealed no controlled operations involving the applicant were being conducted: at [28]. The primary judge observed correctly that this material was hearsay but noted that if a prima facie case in support of summary judgment is established, the onus shifts to the opposing party (in this case the applicant) to point to some factual or evidentiary issues making a trial necessary, which did not occur here.

Proposed grounds of appeal with respect to the summary dismissal decision

39    The applicant’s application for leave to appeal contains 30 grounds and her draft notice of appeal contains 39 proposed grounds. The State of NSW’s written submissions do well to cogently identify the applicant’s central grounds of appeal as they relate to the dismissal order (as opposed to the other procedural orders which are dealt with below), which I adopt:

(a)    The hearing occurred, despite her application for an adjournment, in her absence such that she was not given an opportunity to be heard and the order should be set aside under r 39.05(c) of the Rules (Grounds 1, 2 and 25);

(b)    The dismissal breaches ss 71 and 78 of the Constitution, arts 2, 14 and 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and s 37M of the Federal Court Act (Grounds 3–5);

(c)    The primary judge failed to consider that the applicant would cure her pleadings with an amended statement of claim (which she has not served nor previously raised) removing certain causes of action and adding in claims of trespass, breach of confidence and breaches of various statutes and the ICCPR (Ground 8);

(d)    The primary judge sfailed to consider the impact summary dismissal would have on the applicant (Grounds 11, 21, 31, 32, 34 and 35);

(e)    The primary judge failed to permit the applicant to make submissions and present her evidence and thus did not take into account her evidence (Grounds 17–19 and 27);

(f)    The primary judge failed to consider the need for the applicant to be referred to legal counsel (despite the applicant not seeking such a referral) (Ground 20);

(g)    The primary judge erred in finding that Mr Reznor was alive and there was no controlled operation (Grounds 22 and 24);

(h)    The primary judge did not find that she had no reasonable cause of action and failed to consider that there is a real question to be tried (Grounds 26 and 33);

(i)    The primary judge failed to make findings with respect to alleged obligations of law enforcement agencies and her rights to the various forms of relief (Grounds 28, 29, 36, 37 and 38); and

(j)    The dismissal order was induced by fraud such that it should be set aside under r 39.05(b) of the Rules (Ground 30).

40    For the following reasons, each of these grounds are without merit.

41    No error has been established by the primary judge hearing the summary judgment application in the applicant’s absence. In this case, the applicant made numerous unsuccessful attempts before the hearing to delay or stay the summary judgment hearing pending her judicial review proceeding before Needham J. The primary judge explained in his reasons why he refused these attempts. His Honour set out the applicant’s communications with the Registry as to the apparent reasons for seeking to vacate the hearing. In response, the applicant was informed, on two occasions, by the Court if she wished to have the hearing vacated she would need to have the matter listed. Then on 29 August 2024, the applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking an order adjourning the hearing, apparently on the basis that 3 September (the date upon which the summary judgment hearing was listed) fell in the same week as the fifth anniversary of 8 September 2019, when (the applicant believed) she had been deliberately infected with a disease in Switzerland, on the authorisation of the Commonwealth. The primary judge granted leave to file this application and made it returnable at the hearing on 3 September 2024. The applicant did not appear at the hearing on 3 September 2024.

42    The granting of an adjournment depends on a sufficient explanation with evidence and the consequential detriment to the parties, the court and other litigants: Zetta Jet Pty Ltd v The Ship “Dragon Pearl” [2018] FCA 878 at [37]–[38] per Burley J, citing Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175. The primary judge explained, in his reasons, why he refused the adjournment: The purported distress was only raised after the applicant’s other attempts at delaying the hearing had been unsuccessful and there was no evidence as to why the applicant’s purported distress extended to the whole of the week nor supportive medical evidence: at [16]–[17].

43    An order made in the absence of a party will only be set aside, pursuant to r 39.05(a) of the Rules, in exceptional circumstances where an adequate explanation is provided. Generally, such a course will only be taken where it can be shown that, without fault on the part of the applicant, he or she has not been heard on a relevant question: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (No 2) [2010] FCA 1296; 81 ATR 40 at [10] per Kenny J (whilst the dicta concerned the former O 35 r 7, it is in identical terms to r 39.05(a)). An application under r 39.05 is not an appeal and is not the appropriate means by which to contend that the Court’s orders are affected by an error of law: Polis v Zombor (No 5) [2022] FCA 122 at [43]–[44] per O’Bryan J.

44    As the primary judge observed, at [16]–[18] and [30], no adequate explanation was given by the applicant for (a) the adjournment application, (b) her failure to serve any submissions or evidence (despite being given over one and a half months to do so) and (c) her failure to appear at the 3 September 2024 hearing.

45    Similarly, the applicant’s argument (e), that the primary judge failed to permit her to make submissions and present her evidence, fails for the same reasons. No cogent explanation was provided as to why the applicant did not serve her submissions and affidavits (two of which are dated 14 August 2024 before the 3 September 2024 hearing) and did not appear. I am not satisfied upon reviewing this evidence, that it advances her case any further but rather reinforces the apparent implausibility of her claims and inability to provide any factual foundation for her cause of action. The first affidavit comprised 49 pages in length. It contains a disparate history of evidence filed in the proceedings. The affidavit then details the “law enforcement controlled operation” which the applicant believes she has been subject to, including mass unlawful surveillance. It also details an incomprehensible connection between colours, director Mr David Lynch, Mr Reznor (and his alleged suicide), her birthday and Hillary Clinton. It also states that no costs order should be made because of the financial difficulty it would cause and her ongoing medical condition. The second affidavit also of 14 August 2024 comprises 21 pages and is more of the same material, including incomprehensible connections between lyrics of songs of Mr Reznor and herself, claiming that she has never spoken to him but that they have engaged in “correspondence” through the release of his songs and videos and interviews.

46    I reject the submission, argument (b), that a summary dismissal order infringes ss 71 or 78 of the Constitution or ICCPR art 2 (which imposes on State parties, among other things, to enact laws that give individuals rights to obtain judicial remedies – it says nothing about being guaranteed remedies where a claim is spurious), ICCPR art 14 (which provides that all persons are equal before the law and is concerned with defendants in criminal proceedings) or ICCPR art 16 (which provides that everyone is to be recognised as a “person before the law”). No person has an unfettered right to bring and maintain proceedings. There is express power, pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act, to make such an order and such an order is consistent with the overarching principle under s 37M, to determine all proceedings before the Court and to efficiently use judicial and administrative resources and to dispose all matters in a timely manner such that limited judicial resources (together with significant costs) would be wasted by permitting flawed proceedings to proceed through to final hearing.

47    I do not accept that there was a purported failure, propounded by argument (c), of the primary judge to consider that the applicant could cure her pleadings by amendment. No such argument was made to the primary judge nor had any proposed amended pleading been provided to the primary judge. Further, it was apparent from the applicant’s submissions before this Court that, regardless of how she reframed her causes of action to include trespass, breach of confidence and statutory breach, the underlying core allegations are deficient, such that no amendment would cure her case: Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118 at [22] per French CJ and Gummow J.

48    Contrary to argument (d), the primary judge was not required to specifically consider the impact summary dismissal would have on the applicant. Further, I do not accept the applicant’s assertion, as part of this argument, that the primary judge ought to have referred (or this Court ought to consider or refer) her matter as a “special case”, pursuant to s 25(6) of the Federal Court Act, or to a “special inquiry”. No cogent submission was made as to how and why such requests could have been, or should now, be acceded to. No such request was made of the primary judge nor could it have been or could be now. The primary judge rejected as “implausible” the factual premises upon which such a referral is said to have been justified. I have reviewed all the evidence which the applicant relied upon below and, by supplementation, does now. The primary judge was correct to reject, as implausible, the applicant’s central factual allegations. However, the primary judge adverted to the seriousness of taking such a step and that it must be only taken with great care (at [21]) and thereafter, according to this approach, carefully considered the applicant’s case and exposed his reasons.

49    By argument (f), the applicant contends that the primary judge failed to consider the need for her to be referred to legal counsel. I reject this contention. There was no requirement for such consideration, the applicant made no such submission before the primary judge and regardless there was no evidence or suggestion by the applicant that she had ever made an application for a referral to a lawyer pursuant to r 4.12(1). Even if such a referral were made, the referral is an administrative act, which obliges that attempts are made to arrange but does not require the securing of such assistance: There is no guarantee of representation: Taylor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 319 at [12] per French J.

50    The applicant submits that the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Reznor is alive and there was no controlled operation and should have made various findings to the opposite, consistent with her thesis (arguments (g) and (i)). Both arguments misapprehend the primary judge’s task and reasons. The primary judge summarily dismissed the proceedings. As required of him, he did so before a trial and before any factual findings could be made. Rather, as was open to him, the primary judge determined that the applicant’s proceedings had no reasonable prospects because there was no realistic prospect of her central factual allegations being established.

51    The applicant contended, by argument (h), that the primary judge failed to conclude that there was a real question to be tried. It is apparent that the applicant misunderstands the basis for the summary dismissal and the applicable test arising under ss 31A(2) and (3) of the Federal Court Act.

52    Further, the applicant contended, without foundation, that the summary dismissal was induced by fraud, and ought be set aside, under r 39.05(b) of the Rules. The applicant alleged, without any apparent foundation, that the dismissal was aimed to benefit the respondents and that the respondents had been privately conversing with the primary judge and other members of the Court. No such assertion was or could be made out on the applicant’s submission and evidence. Where serious allegations of this kind are made an applicant must (and in this case the applicant has failed to) put forward exact particulars of fraud and fresh, unambiguous, admissible evidence establishing fraud: Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 5) [2004] FCA 1262 at [60] and [66] per French J.

53    Lastly, the applicant submitted, that she ought to be able to invoke the exception to the requirement for leave given the interlocutory decision is one “affecting the liberty of an individual”: s 24(1C)(a) of the Federal Court Act. This submission must be rejected. Such an exception is limited to cases of “direct incarceration or other total deprivation of physical liberty”: Hastwell v Gunning [2021] FCAFC 70 at [20] citing the holding in Talacko v Talacko [2010] FCA 239 at [43].

Proposed grounds of appeal with respect to seven orders

54    Proposed grounds 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–16 and 39 concern the following seven interlocutory orders made by the primary judge, namely: (a) an order made on 21 June 2024 deferring the requirement for the respondents to respond to Notices to Admit; (b) refusing leave on 28 June 2024 for the applicant to file an interlocutory application seeking production of documents; (c) a refusal, purportedly on 25 July 2024 but rather on 23 July 2024, of granting the applicant leave to file such an application; (d) an order on 25 July 2024 dismissing the applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 17 July 2024 seeking to stay the primary proceedings; (e) refusing leave on 31 July 2024 for the applicant to issue a subpoena to the Prime Minister of Australia; (f) orders made on 30 August 2024 refusing leave to file an interlocutory application for a letter of request for evidence abroad under the Hague Convention to take evidence from the Attorney General of the State of California and the Secretary of the California Health and Human Services Agency; and (g) orders 1 and 3 made on 25 September 2024 dismissing with costs the applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 12 September 2024 to maintain the pseudonym and suppression orders pending appeal and redacting an annexed statement of claim.

The broad thematic challenges to these procedural orders are without merit

55    These orders are challenged on the basis of seven arguments, which for the following reasons, are without merit.

56    First, on the basis of purported actual and apprehended bias said to arise, for many reasons, including that the primary judge took a prejudicial view from the outset and demonstrated actual bias, by essentially each and any refusal to accede to the applicant’s requests.

57    An assertion of actual bias would require proof that the primary judge had prejudged the issues and could not be swayed by the evidence at hand such that the primary judge was so committed, by prejudgment, that the conclusion formed was incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR at [72] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J. To succeed in establishing apprehended bias requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits and also to articulate the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from a course of deciding the case on its merits: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [8] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Neither of these bases can be made out in this case.

58    I do not accept that the mere fact that a docket judge has taken interlocutory steps which disappoint one side or the other is sufficient to give rise to an apprehension of bias. As observed by the Full Court in Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19 at [11]:

11     Claims of apprehended bias arise not infrequently, as they have in this appeal, in respect of interlocutory proceedings. The usual position in relation to interlocutory proceedings is that an apprehension of bias is not per se manifested by an unfavourable finding. That is because often there will be instances prior to a final decision where a judge will require steps to be taken or not taken which disappoint one side or another in a proceeding. It is inherent in the interlocutory process that such preliminary decisions are made. Unfavourable findings, in such circumstances, are not to be taken by a fair-minded person as an expression that the judge has other than an impartial and unprejudiced mind in relation to the substantive proceeding. Such a conclusion is no more than a specific application of the more general principle stated in Asden Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris [2017] FCAFC 117, where Greenwood, Davies and Markovic JJ said at [49]:

The test for apprehension of bias is forward looking and objective. The test is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls at [31]; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 344 at [6]. The test requires an objective assessment of the connection between the facts and circumstances said to give rise to the apprehension and the asserted conclusion that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to bear upon the issues that are to be decided: Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls at [67].

59    Similarly, as observed more recently by the Full Court in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2023] FCAFC 174; 416 ALR 24 at [260], citing this holding in Doggett:

260     Ordinary judicial practice also involves judges making decisions. The decisions might include, as here, decisions on interlocutory applications, rulings on evidence in the course of the trial, and the making of findings following trial. Ultimately, the judge has to give final judgment. Judicial decisions usually involve one party being successful, and another being unsuccessful. The fact that a party has been unsuccessful should not, without more, lead the fair-minded lay observer to think that the judge has done other than bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to bear on the matters in issue: Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19 at [11] (Kerr, Davies and Thawley JJ). That is because the focus of the reasonable apprehension of bias is not on whether the judge decided the case adversely to one party, but whether the judge did not decide the case impartially or without prejudice: Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342 at 352 (Mason J). Therefore, apprehended bias will not generally be established by pointing to adverse findings in the judgment under challenge, even where the findings involve strong adverse credit findings: Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 8) [2019] FCA 1382 at [25] (Wigney J), citing Royal Guardian at [234] (Ward JA, Basten JA and Emmett AJA agreeing) and Knaggs v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 83; 170 A Crim R 366 at [95] (Campbell JA, Mason P and Tobias JA agreeing). It follows also that, even if the judge is shown to have been in error in relation to some rulings or findings, that would not ordinarily speak to whether the fair minded lay observer might think that the judge might not have brought an impartial mind to bear on the issues. That is because the fair-minded lay observer would appreciate that the administration of justice is a human process which accommodates the possibility of error by providing for appeals. The existence of error does not normally carry with it a reasonable apprehension that the judge was not impartial in the conduct of the trial or in the consideration of the case.

60    The further main basis for the applicant’s allegation was her reagitating of her previous unsuccessful argument that by reason of the primary judge, having been appointed by the present Federal Government his Honour had been intentionally appointed to represent the respondents’ wishes and appeared to have been conversing with the respondents outside the proceedings and being fed information (together, Grounds 6, 12 and 16). There is an apparent symmetry between this allegation and that previously raised and rejected by Abraham J in AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555 at [19]–[25] and Needham J in AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 4) [2024] FCA 1212 at [5]–[6]. The applicant provided no evidence as to support her allegation of the primary judge’s ex parte conferral with the respondents.

61    Secondly, the applicant alleged that the orders ought not to have been made by reason of a purported denial of procedural fairness said to arise for multiple reasons. All of which must be rejected. In part the allegation of denial of procedural fairness was said to arise because of the alleged deprivation of a final hearing, for example after discovery, admissions and interrogatories. The power to summarily dismiss a proceeding can occur at any time. Where that power is exercised lawfully it cannot be defeated by an allegation founded on an obvious and lawful consequence, the proceedings are dismissed before final hearing. In addition, the applicant sought to contort her discontent with orders not being made in her favour into an allegation of a denial of procedural fairness, again without any supportive submission or evidence. This included the allegation that she was not permitted to obtain admissions and documents before the summary dismissal hearing, the denial of an adjournment of the summary dismissal hearing and the denial of the opportunity to amend her pleadings. For the reasons already given above, none of these assertions constitute a denial of procedural fairness. The applicant was given an adequate opportunity to address the Court each time the matter was listed or to file evidence and submissions in support of her numerous interlocutory applications.

62    Thirdly, the applicant alleged that the primary judge engaged in “improper conduct” by purportedly failing to provide reasons (or delayed providing them) for the interlocutory orders made in the proceeding and making orders or setting dates that were said to contain some symbolic or inferential significance designed to prejudice her (Grounds 13 and 15). The evidence reveals that reasons were provided with respect to the majority of the various interlocutory orders and the summary dismissal order. In any event, a judge is not required to give reasons for every interlocutory decision made: New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation v Orr [2019] NSWCA 231; 100 NSWLR 578 at [68] per Bell P.

63    Fourthly, it was alleged, without foundation, that the “proceedings have been subject to prejudice”, drawing on common allegations raised immediately above, namely by how the Court, through the Registry, has managed the proceeding and her requests, including assigning a judge appointed by the current Federal Government, alleged delays and failing to respond to the applicant’s emails within 24 hours (Ground 10). None of the submissions and evidence relied upon by the applicant support this allegation, and additionally for the reasons given above they must be rejected.

64    Fifthly, the primary judge allegedly erred by stating that the applicant’s application under the Hague Convention was “too late” and “a fishing expedition” (Ground 14). However, the applicant provided no persuasive basis as to how this conclusion was erroneous.

65    Sixthly, the applicant sought to challenge the interlocutory orders on the basis of an alleged false statement made by the primary judge that he does not know whether Mr Reznor is deceased and erred by failing to find that the respondents and their legal representatives know that Mr Reznor is deceased (Ground 23). The primary judge did not make any such “false statement” nor failed to make the purported (correct) finding for the reasons already given. This was not required of the primary judge when determining whether the proceedings ought be summarily dismissed.

66    Seventhly, the applicant alleges that the primary judge erred in dismissing her pseudonym application after the summary dismissal hearing (Ground 39). For the reasons, already given, the applicant failed to demonstrate error in the primary judge’s reasons dismissing the applicant’s pseudonym order. The purported basis for the ground is by way of circular argument, seeking to “retain” the pseudonym orders in the primary proceedings in order that they carry over to the appeal of Needham J’s orders. For the reasons given below, Needham J did not err in dismissing the applicant’s application for suppression orders: AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 4) [2024] FCA 1212.

Consideration of the orders themselves in context

67    It was within the primary judge’s power, on 21 June 2024, to defer the respondents being required to respond to the notice to admit: rr 1.32, 1.34, 1.35 and 1.39. The notice to admit required in its terms for the Commonwealth and the State of NSW to admit that she had been placed under a “law enforcement-controlled operation” at the direction of the current and former Prime Ministers, among other heads of executive agencies, their awareness of Mr Reznor’s suicide and attacks against her, including her poisoning in Switzerland, among other facts. As observed by Feutrill J in Ogbonna v Link Workforce Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 633, at [21], any conferral of power or duty imposed under Part 22 (which deals with admissions), like other civil practice and procedure provisions, must be exercised or carried out in a way which best promotes the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions articulated in s 37M of the Federal Court Act. The order was appropriate in circumstances where the notice to admit sought to circumvent the pleadings (which had not closed) in advance of the summary dismissal application.

68    With respect to the primary judge refusing leave on 28 June 2024 (claimed to be 28 July but in fact 28 June), 25 July 2024 (but rather 23 July 2024) and 31 July 2024 allowing the applicant leave to file interlocutory applications seeking production of documents, enforcing subpoenas and issuing a subpoena to the Prime Minister, the applicant has failed to identify any error in the primary judge’s making of those orders. The primary judge was permitted to refuse leave to the applicant to file documents, pursuant to r 2.27(f) and had previously been upheld for doing so, with respect to earlier steps in the proceeding, in AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555 at [26]–[42].

69    A person is not entitled, as of right, to invoke the Court’s processes to obtain evidence in advance of the summary dismissal application. If a reasonable cause of action is disclosed in the pleading, premised on material facts (which are not fanciful, trifling, implausible, improbable or tenuous) then subsequent to the summary dismissal application being dismissed and the pleadings closed, the Court may permit processes enabling a party to seek the production of documents and the issuing of subpoenas.

70    Similarly, with respect to the applicant’s challenge to an order made on 25 July 2024 dismissing the applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 17 July 2024 seeking to stay the primary proceedings, the applicant has advanced no submission nor evidence which identifies any appealable error. It is not apparent that the 25 July 2024 order dismissing the applicant’s application to stay the primary proceeding pending the judicial review proceeding (that ultimately sought to reopen the leave to appeal application to have the primary judge disqualified) was attended with any error or apparent unfairness. On 28 May 2024, the applicant had already been refused leave to appeal the primary judge’s decision to not disqualify himself: AZO24 v Commonwealth [2024] FCA 555. The judicial review proceeding commenced on 5 July 2024 (over a month after leave to appeal was refused) and has now been dismissed.

71    I can discern no error in the primary judge’s refusal of the 30 August 2024 order refusing leave to the applicant to obtain evidence abroad under the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth). The primary judge, refused the application for two primary reasons, at [34]–[38]: (a) given the issuing of a letter of request, would involve substantial time and effort by Australian and US officials and would not be appropriate where the applicant could not point to a skerrick of evidence to support her claim and (b) the application was simultaneously premature (because of the pending summary dismissal application) and too late because it sought to obtain evidence to resist the summary dismissal hearing a very short time before that application was to be heard.

72    Finally, the applicant challenges orders 1 and 3 made on 25 September 2024 dismissing with costs her interlocutory application filed on 12 September 2024 to maintain the pseudonym and suppression orders. The applicant failed to file any evidence in support of the application and provided no adequate explanation for the orders: AZO24 v Commonwealth [2024] FCA 1113 at [14]–[15]. A party seeking an order under s 37AF bears a heavy onus: Mere embarrassment, inconvenience, annoyance, unreasonable or groundless fears, even commercial confidentiality alone, are not enough to justify the making of such an order: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Oakmoore Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 1170 at [22] per Gleeson J. If such orders are made on an interim basis under s 37AI(1), then the Court must determine the application, for itself, as a matter of urgency: s 37AI(2). The Federal Court Act, therefore, reveals that interim suppression orders should not remain on foot indefinitely but rather only until they can be determined properly with supporting evidence. Kennett J gave the applicant an opportunity to make submissions as to why, despite the lack of any supportive evidence, the suppression of her identity was necessary to protect her safety and to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice. It is evident from Kennett J’s reasons that the applicant could not justify the making of the order. None of the submissions or evidence before this Court demonstrates any error by Kennett J in making these orders.

73    The applicant appeared to be pressing, in her grounds and submissions, some challenge to a refusal by Kennett J to grant an injunction requiring the removal of people who lived in her apartment building (who the applicant alleged were agents of the respondents placed there to intimidate her). Kennett J refused the applicant leave to file the interlocutory application and accompanying affidavit on 20 March 2024: AZO24 v Commonwealth (No 2). This claim was also the subject of the applicant’s unsuccessful application for leave to appeal disposed of by Abraham J. It is not an order that is impugned by the applicant in her proposed grounds of appeal before this Court.

74    By reason of the foregoing, leave to extend time and/or leave to appeal these orders should be refused.

Why the appeal from the orders of Needham J made with respect to the applicant’s judicial review application fail

75    As adverted to above, this is an appeal from an order of Needham J which dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of the decision of the Registrar to not accept for filing an interlocutory application and supporting affidavit pursuant to r 2.26 of the Rules.

Relevant procedural history

76    On or around 31 May 2024 and 14 June 2024, the applicant sought to file an application for judicial review of the leave to appeal judgment of Abraham J, which was refused for filing by a Registrar on 18 June 2024 pursuant to rr 2.26 and2.27(b) of the Rules (referred to by Kennett J in AZO24 v Commonwealth (Suppression Orders) [2024] FCA 1113 at [8]).

77    On 5 July 2024, the applicant then lodged a further application to review the decision of the Registrar made on 18 June 2024, amongst other matters (summarised in the Registrar’s reasons extracted below).

78    On 9 July 2024, the Registrar informed the applicant by letter that he refused to accept the application for filing in exercise of r 2.26 of the Rules as he was satisfied that the documents were an abuse of process and frivolous or vexatious and gave the following reasons (which upon my review accurately summarise the substance of the misguided application for judicial review):

The Application seeks orders in respect of the decision of Justice Abraham in AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555. By this decision her Honour refused leave to appeal from Justice Kennett of this Court in respect of interlocutory decisions made in proceeding NSD1036/2023. In doing so, Justice Abraham was exercising, as a single judge, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to s 25(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1977 (Cth). The Application contains sixteen prayers for relief which are wide-ranging. Prayers 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 relate to proceeding NSD325/2024; prayers 9 to 15 relate to proceeding NSD1036/2023; prayer 4 seeks judicial review of a decision of a Registrar in respect documents earlier refused for filing; and prayer 16 seeks expedition of the Application.

The prayers in respect of NSD325/2024 seek, when considered as a whole, to ‘re-open’ the application for leave to appeal from the orders of Justice Kennett. That application has been finally determined by Abraham J in the above decision. I can discern no basis for the relief sought and for this reason it would be doomed to fail. Accordingly, I am satisfied that this portion of the Application is an abuse of process.

The remainder of the relief sought in the Application in relation to proceeding NSD1036/2023 is either consequent upon an appeal having been instituted or granted (in circumstances where neither has occurred) or seeks relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) against the respondents and Justice Kennett. In substance, what this relief seeks is to overturn the orders of Justice Kennett made in proceeding NSD1036/2023 which was the very subject of the application for leave in NSD325/2024. The judicial decisions of Justice Kennett in the first instance proceeding are not susceptible to judicial review pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and it would be an abuse of process and frivolous or vexatious for relief to be sought in this manner when the application for leave to appeal has already been refused. For the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, on the face of the documents and by reference the material already filed in the proceeding, I am satisfied that the Documents are an abuse of process and frivolous or vexatious. I refuse to accept them in accordance with r 2.26 of the Rules.

79    On 18 July 2024, the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision.

80    On 27 August 2024, Needham J rejected the applicant’s application to join the Commonwealth and the State of NSW: AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 976.

81    Then, on 2 September 2024, Needham J dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept the documents: AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1004. It is this decision which is the subject of the appeal.

The grounds of appeal

82    There are 12 grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal are prolix and verge on being submissions. They are summarised below.

83    By ground 1, the applicant asserts a denial of procedural fairness and apprehended bias. There is a submission that her Honour failed to consider the evidence before her. That her Honour was effectively an advocate for the respondents. That she was denied an opportunity to properly ventilate her arguments in her judicial review application. That her Honour refused to allow a joinder of other parties to this proceeding. That her Honour prejudiced the determination before the hearing. That there was some kind of hidden symbolism and “calculated” timing of judgment delivery. That her Honour was appointed to the Court by the current Government and therefore cannot bring to bear an impartial mind.

84    By ground 2, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Registrar refusing the application for filing was an “improper use of the power” by the Registrar pursuant to r 2.26 of the Rules and that the primary judge erred in some respect by failing to consider rr 39.04, and 39.05 of the Rules.

85    By ground 3, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred in “failing to observe that 39.04 and 39.05 of the FCR enabled my filing of the interlocutory application to re-open the leave to appeal and that the Registrar had therefore erred in law in his refusal to accept the application.”

86    By ground 4, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred in making factual findings that were not open on the evidence or were plainly unreasonable in respect of the finding that the interlocutory application to re-open the leave to appeal was an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious. It is asserted that the primary judge erred in failing to have read all of the affidavits that she relied upon and failed to apply the law correctly.

87    By ground 5, the applicant asserts that the primary judge “erred in law by disregarding the errors, defects and omissions” she identified in the decision of Abraham J in AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555. The applicant asserts that the primary judge should have “remedied” that decision pursuant to ss 22, 23, 28 and 51 of the Federal Court Act and rr 39.04 or 39.05 of the Rules.

88    By ground 6, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred in distinguishing Kitoko v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCAFC 14; 182 ALD 347; Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) [1993] HCA 6; 176 CLR 300; and R v Pettigrew [1997] 1 Qd R 601; from the present proceeding because they were “different types of cases to mine”. The applicant points to [60] and [62] of the primary judge’s reasons.

89    By ground 7, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred in law in her reasoning at [64] by stating that “the Registrar did not, and cannot, per Nyoni v Murphy (2018) 261 FCR 164; [2018] FCAFC 75, make a substantive judgment about the underlying merit of the claims in proposed proceedings when refusing to accept an originating application for filing under FCR 2.26.”

90    By ground 8, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred at [65] in finding that the Registrar correctly determined that there was not a proper basis to her application as there were clear errors and omissions in the decision in AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555 and by reference to a failure to “take a material consideration into account of the serious nature and necessity of the injunction that was being sought in the application to reopen the leave to appeal. The injunction was for a restraining order as an Apprehended Personal Violence order to restrain the respondents to the Primary proceedings for intimidation and other actions.”

91    By ground 9, the applicant asserts “The primary judge erred in law by removing an interlocutory order to stay the costs order in the leave to appeal NSD325/2024 as it was within her jurisdiction to be able to make such an order. Further, varying the costs order was a ground of the interlocutory order to re-open the leave to appeal and the validity under r. 39.04 and 39.05 of the FCR and the substance of the reasons to vary the costs order was not considered by her Honour.”

92    By ground 10, the applicant asserts that the primary judge failed to consider her submission that the Registry denied her procedural fairness in failing to provide “proper procedural directions as was requested by me in the first instances of 31 May 2024 and via the letter and application I made on 14 June 2024 pursuant to r1.21 and/or r36.11 (1) of the FCR or alternatively under r. 35.22 of the FCR for seeking to re-open the leave to appeal for the purposes of reviewing and/or rehearing due to errors, omissions and defects identified.”

93    By ground 11, the applicant asserts that the primary judge “disregarded a material consideration and did not address the liberty question arising in the application to re-open the leave to appeal. The applicant contended “leave” to appeal had not been required because the orders being appealed affected the liberty of the applicant. This therefore invalidated the leave to appeal judgement made on 28 May 2024.”

94    By ground 12, the applicant asserts that the primary judge “disregarded a material consideration involving the nature of the underlying proceedings in NSD1036/2023 and the motivation of obstructing those proceedings and the context and proportionality of me as a self-represented litigant who is suing the Commonwealth and State of NSW.”

Disposition

95    At hearing, the applicant articulated, the key bases for her appeal, in the following way: that Needham J dismissed her application to join the Commonwealth and NSW governments in circumstances where the applicant wanted them joined so as to assist her application to stay the substantive proceedings before Kennett J, pending the determination of her judicial review application; that it “did not appear” that Needham J had read the applicant’s affidavits; that Needham J asked her questions in a leading form and that the applicant felt as though she was being cross-examined and that a disproportionate amount of time was spent at the hearing on the interlocutory orders and the joinder of parties (Ground 1).

96    After careful consideration has been given by this Court to the applicant’s affidavit evidence below, the applicant’s submissions and the primary judge’s reasons, I do not accept that the primary judge failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness by the manner in which the hearing was conducted nor was there any purported failure to consider the applicant’s submissions (and the orders she agitated for) nor her evidence. To the extent that it was submitted that the primary judge failed to refer the applicant for legal assistance or consider her “status” as a self-represented litigant, for the reasons already given at [50] above, even if such a referral were made, it is an administrative act, and there is no guarantee of representation. A judge is not required to consider some special status of a person as a “self-represented litigant” but to ensure, generally through procedure, that the proceedings are conducted in a procedurally fair manner for all parties: Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138; 280 FCR 479 at [53] per Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ; Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWCA, 16 June 1986) at [27] per Samuels JA, approved in Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36; 265 CLR 236 at [47] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ; MZAGE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 630 at [32] per Mortimer J.

97    A judge determines his or her own procedure for dealing with the matters required for resolution at the hearing. Indeed, in this case, as is evident from the reasoning, the primary judge approached the issues as to the related additional interlocutory applications the applicant had brought (including the issue of joinder) and then the application for judicial review, consistently with an “agreed format” determined at hearing: J[31].

98    The scope of the application for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision was confined. The primary judge was not called on, as part of the judicial review application, to determine the substantive merits of the applicant’s claims but rather to discern if there was any jurisdictional error in the Registrar’s decision to refuse her leave. The order and time given to the argument of matters before the Court varies from case to case and is dependent on many factors including whether, for example, written submissions have already been filed and considered by the Court such that there is not a necessity for further lengthy consideration of them during the hearing.

99    The primary judge correctly identified the evidence the applicant relied upon in support of her judicial review application: Needham J decision at [6]: The first affidavit, dated 17 July 2024, identified the applicant’s grounds for review and the second affidavit, dated 16 August 2024, attached “proposed affidavits”. In the first of the proposed affidavits, comprising 154 paragraphs, the applicant described events that she said had happened subsequent to her lodging of an interlocutory application dated 18 March 2024 and an affidavit, which were purportedly supportive of her allegations in the substantive proceedings as to the coercive operations by the Federal government. For example, allegations that government agents had placed “Hello Fresh” home delivery boxes outside the entrance to her apartment building, parking rental cars in her building’s car park, optical devices being placed in the roof gutter outside her window. The second proposed affidavit detailed the applicant’s arguments for why her application for leave to appeal (disposed of by Abraham J) should be reopened. The primary judge referred to the applicant’s evidence in numerous parts of her judgment, either specifically or by adopting the applicant’s description of the evidence, from her written submissions as the “fresh evidence”: at [19]–[20], [42], [49], [69].

100    Addressing grounds 2–7, the applicant further submitted that the primary judge failed to consider whether the Registrar’s use of the Court’s power under r 2.26 of the Rules to refuse to accept a document was an abuse of process or is frivolous or vexatious, was “improper” conceding that the Registrar had power but that power was discretionary. Needham J, expressly identified, in her summary of the applicant’s grounds of review that the applicant was agitating that the Registrar’s use of the power under r 2.26 was improper: J[17(5)] and J[66]. Her Honour then considered the nature of that discretionary power, and the meaning of the terms “vexatious” and “frivolous”, by reference to three Full Court authorities: Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; 128 FCR 353; Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; 261 FCR 164 and Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80 (at J[29]–[30]); and ultimately determined there was no error arising from the Registrar’s decision: at J[67]–[70]. I can discern no error in the primary judge’s reasoning in this respect.

101    Further it was submitted that the primary judge failed to consider rr 39.04 and 39.05 which permitted the applicant to file the application which the Registrar had refused. This is not the case, specific consideration was given as to whether the applicant was so permitted to file the application by operation of any of these rules: J[33]–[41], [57]–[63].

102    As adverted to by the Full Court, in Kitoko at [26]–[27]:

26    Consistently with earlier rules of this Court, it is the time that orders are entered which governs the question of whether the order may be varied or set aside generally or only on specified grounds – see, for example: Eastman v R [2008] FCAFC 62; 166 FCR 579 at [17].

27     Rule 39.04 (set out at [15] above) provides a general power to vary or set aside orders before the relevant orders have been entered and r 39.05 (set out at [17] above) provides a power to vary or set aside orders after they have been entered, but only on the grounds identified in the rule.

103    Consistent with settled principle, whilst the Court has power to vary or set aside a judgment or order prior to entry (inherently or under r 39.04), it is a discretionary power that will only be exercised with great caution in exceptional circumstances. There have been very few occasions where this power has been exercised. The absence of examples illustrates the very limited circumstances where the power will be exercised given the principle of finality. The Court will not allow an unsuccessful litigant to use the power to re-agitate unsuccessful claims at trial or on appeal. The Court will not be so persuaded to exercise the power to allow a party to reopen their case where they were unable to make out an element of their claim on the evidence: Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 2) (1996) 68 FCR 367 at 374D–G and 384B–F per Lindgren J and at 386 per Lehane J; or to rely on new evidence that is at best inconclusive and they could have, but did not, agitate the issue at hearing: Alfred v Wakelin (No 3) [2009] FCA 224; 179 IR 76 at [6]–[10] per Jagot J. The Court will only do so where, for example, it has formed the view that it assessed damages or made an order for costs upon a misapprehension of fact or law: Dib Group Pty Ltd v Coolabah Tree Aust-Wide Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 57 at [79]–[84]; Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; 314 ALR 84 at [14], [31], [34], [37]; or to remedy a potential procedural unfairness visited on a party ordered to pay another’s costs without being able to agitate an application for each party to bear their own: CCU21 v Minister for Home Affairs (Costs) [2023] FCAFC 112; 297 FCR 530 at [3] and [15] or as in Kitoko where, before entry, a party sought to re-open to raise an allegation of apprehended bias and breach of procedural fairness.

104    The scope of r 39.05 (which applies after entry) is narrower than provided for by r 39.04; in that it is a power only enlivened by the existence of one of the matters specified in paragraphs (a)–(g), and once enlivened, it is discretionary power, to be exercised judicially, with caution, in “exceptional circumstances”: Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; 295 ALR 52 at [53]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [6] per Gordon J. The underlying principle of the finality of litigation has particular force in circumstances involving interlocutory orders (r 39.05(c)) where the subject of the order has already been the subject of unsuccessful appellate or review processes. The rule cannot be used as an alternative to the appellate procedure available with respect to interlocutory judgments: Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 at [11]; Professional Administration at [53]; ActiveSuper at [15]; Austal Ships Sales Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag [2009] FCAFC 179; 263 ALR 384 at [22]–[23] and [25] per Finn and Dowsett JJ; see also Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 304 at [37]. It is a power that may be enlivened and exercised for the purposes of 39.05(c), (g) and/or (h) to rectify injustices or reflect the true intention of the Court, for example, by removing a civil penalty imposed upon an individual respondent when one had not been applied for by an applicant and would not have been ordered had the Court known that to be the case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bluescope Steel Ltd (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140; to clarifying the scope of ambiguous declarations made in a proceeding, including from several years prior where there remains a dispute between parties (Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Branir Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 629; 129 FCR 558 at [51], [61]–[64] per Allsop J; or to vacate an order for costs made under a misapprehension of the Court’s jurisdiction to award costs in the proceeding (Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 104; 209 FCR 123 at [8]–[10], [41]–[43] per Gilmour J); or, where the Court made no order for costs under a misapprehension that none was sought: Fischer v Commonwealth [1997] FCA 1029 at [1] and [3] per Branson J.

105    It was submitted that the primary judge erred in law by distinguishing the cases the applicant had relied upon namely Pettigrew, Autodesk and Kitoko, which are said to illustrate that there is a power to reopen or set aside orders made by a single judge exercising the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This submission is misconceived because it is premised on a factual scenario that did not occur in this case. Neither the Registrar nor the primary judge reasoned that there was no power to reopen or set aside orders made before or after entry, under either rr 39.04 or 39.05, made by a single judge exercising the Court’s appellant jurisdiction.

106    Further, there is no basis to discern any error in the primary judge’s treatment of the authorities relied upon by the applicant. In Kitoko, the error arose because the primary judge, overlooked the operation of r 39.32(3) (as to when orders are taken to be entered) and assumed that r 39.04 did not apply. No such error arose before the Registrar nor before the primary judge in this case. Further, the Registrar’s basis for making the administrative decision was on the basis that he could not (and thereafter the primary judge could not) discern any basis for the relief sought in the application, such that, the relief, on its face was an abuse of process and so refused permission for them to be filed. The difference between the circumstances of Kitoko and what has occurred in this case was correctly identified by the primary judge: J[60]. For the same reason, the applicant has not established in her submissions or evidence how there are grounds to support her allegation, that there were “clear errors or omissions” in the decision of Abraham J which were not accepted by the Registrar or the primary judge, accordingly ground 8 too must fail.

107    In Autodesk, the application to reopen was refused. Reliance appears to have been placed by the applicant, before the primary judge, on general observations of a more expansive nature by Mason CJ as to when a judgment may be reopened but which did not form part of the majority holding and for which his Honour held alone and in dissent. Similarly, reliance was placed on Pettigrew for the general, accepted proposition, that there is a power for the Court to set aside a judgment. No error has been established in the primary judge’s consideration and application of the principles arising from those authorities. In any event, the primary judge did not proceed on an erroneous assumption as to the scope (purportedly too narrow) of circumstances when a judgment could be reopened.

108    It was submitted that there were additional errors in the judgment, namely and indecipherably “matters completely omitted, and the matter that was omitted was that the [appellant] had been appealing that end-dating of the 26 April order by Kennett J, for the pseudonym and the suppression”. This appears to be a misconceived challenge to the orders made by Kennett J, on 25 September 2024, dismissing the applicant’s attempt to make pseudonym orders suppressing her identity. The reference to the “26 April order” appears to be a reference to an interim suppression order made by Kennett J on 7 March 2024 which was subsequently extended on 3 April 2024, which ceased to have effect, at the latest, on 23 July 2024: AZO24 v Commonwealth (Suppression Orders) [2024] FCA 1113 at [12]. The applicant made no cogent submission sounding in any basis to illustrate error on the part of the primary judge in this regard.

109    As to ground 8, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred, at [65], in upholding the Registrar’s conclusion that her application was without foundation by purportedly failing to take into account the serious nature and necessity of the injunction that was being sought in her application, to restrain the respondents to the primary proceedings from taking alleged intimidatory and other actions. The primary judge acknowledged that the applicant submitted that the Registrar failed to consider the substance of the application and the errors of the leave to appeal judgment (at [64]) and purportedly did not consider the underlying aspects of the documents, including fresh evidence (at [69]). However, the primary judge observed correctly the Registrar could not decide the underlying merit of the claims in proposed proceedings when refusing to accept an originating application for filing under r 2.26 (at [64] and [69]). I am satisfied no such error can be established.

110    With respect to ground 9, the applicant challenges the primary judge’s purported removal of an interlocutory order to stay the costs order, arising from her unsuccessful application for leave to appeal before Abraham J. No order had been made to stay that costs order and therefore nothing for the primary judge to purportedly remove. The primary judge referred to the fact there were two applications for a stay of the costs order but ultimately made no order with respect to the stay: J[45]. It appears from the reasoning of the primary judge that the applications were not in fact ultimately pursued by the applicant and to the extent that they were, it is not apparent from any submission or evidence placed before this Court as to why it was erroneous not to make such an order staying the effect of those orders.

111    The applicant, asserted by ground 10, that the primary judge failed to consider that the Registrar had purportedly failed to provide proper procedural directions, as requested by her, with respect to her application to re-open which led to a delay in lodgement. This is not the case. The primary judge specifically referred to the submission in her reasons: J[17]. For the reasons already given, the point in time when the applicant made her application, proximate to the entry of orders was not an issue which was dispositive of the Registrar’s conclusions nor that of the primary judge as to why leave was refused. This was the conclusion of the primary judge and accordingly disposed of any allegation of purported failure by the Registrar to provide procedural directions (even if it were found to exist which is not made out on any submission or evidence of the applicant).

112    As to the assertion, by ground 11, that the primary judge had disregarded a material consideration, namely that leave to appeal is not required because the orders the applicant was seeking in the interlocutory application concerned her personal liberty, it is not apparent that any such submission was made before the primary judge. At its highest, the applicant baldly states in her application for judicial review that there had been a failure to “observe the law pertaining to Apprehended Personal Violence Orders under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007” and fleeting reference in her submission that she was denied procedural fairness because of the alleged “material impact … on my life”. In any event, I do not accept there is any evidence to support the applicant’s claim that her personal liberty has been compromised.

113    By ground 12, the applicant contends that there was a failure by the primary judge to have regard to the fact of the underlying substantive procedures and that there was an apparent motivation by the Commonwealth and State of NSW for “obstructing those proceedings”. I am not persuaded on the evidence before the Court that there is any basis to submit that the Commonwealth or State of NSW were motivated to obstruct the proceedings.

114    For these reasons the appeal must fail.

Other applications

115    Remaining in both proceedings before this Court are five interlocutory applications. All of which may be dispensed with for the following reasons.

116    In NSD1252, the applicant made an application on 21 October 2024, which seeks in its terms that Halley J recuse himself, and that a suppression and non-publication of identity order be made both on an interim and final basis and blanket apply across the proceedings. Halley J has no current involvement in these proceedings. No evidence or submissions were made as to any basis to support the application or the utility of making the order. To the extent that the order seeks further orders for suppression or non-publication of identity, those matters are dealt with below.

117    In NSD1450, the applicant filed an application on 21 October 2024, the applicant sought an order for extension of time “to be applied to other orders being appealed”. There was no need for this application as the applicant sought to extend time as part of her application. The applicant also filed a further interlocutory application on 28 October 2024 for a suppression and non-publication of identity order be made both on an interim and final basis and blanket apply across the proceedings, and for “the applicant [sic] be allowed to produce to the Court the medical letter from her doctor after the 30 October 2024 or whatever date her doctor provides this to the applicant before this application is determined”. This application is addressed below.

118    Further applications were filed on 13 February 2025, in NSD1252 and NSD1450, which are apparently identical in their terms, seeking for further evidence to be accepted for filing in support of the suppression and non-publication of identity.

Pseudonym orders

119    As is apparent from the above, in both proceedings, AZO24 seeks, by way of the application for leave to appeal or the appeal, to impugn orders made dismissing AZO24’s applications for the extension of pseudonym orders or by further interlocutory application, in both proceedings, orders on an interim and final basis for the suppression and non-publication of her identity, by reason of the grounds referred to in ss 37AG(1)(a) (the order being necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice) and 37AG(1)(c) (the order being necessary to protect the safety of any person).

120    In support of that application, AZO24 relied upon aspects of her written submissions in both sets of proceeding: in her submissions dated 29 November 2024 in proceeding NSD1252: at [21]–[33], and in her submissions dated 29 November 2024 in NSD1450 at [107]–[113]. In essence, AZO24, submitted, that because she had pseudonym orders in place in one set of proceedings that she ought to be able to maintain them, as of right, in another. This does not follow and can be rejected. A judge must determine, whether at the time that the orders are sought, they are necessary. Whether there are or have been such orders in place, does not remove the requirement, that the applicant establish there is a necessity.

121    Further, without forming part of this appeal, (in NSD1252), AZO24 sought to impugn orders made by Needham J, on 16 October 2024 dismissing her application for a suppression order under s 37AF: AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 4) [2024] FCA 1212. These orders do not form part of this appeal.

122    Further, AZO24 submitted that she has not been able to obtain a medical letter or certificate from her doctor (by reason of his retirement) supportive of her continuing illness. AZO24, maintained, in support of her application, that she has been the subject of a law enforcement operation, which had impacted directly upon her medical care and that without further orders, her medical care would be compromised. I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes this alleged impact.

123    The mere fact of reputational damage is not sufficient to give rise to the making of such an order.

124    Accordingly, I am not prepared to make the orders that AZO24 seeks.

Vexatious litigant orders

125    As is evident from the above, the applicant has commenced five sets of proceedings in this Court: NSD1036/2023, NSD325/2024, NSD942/2024, NSD1252/2024 and NSD1450/2024. Within these proceedings, the applicant has filed a further 23 interlocutory applications (which are listed in Schedule A to these reasons), and voluminous submissions and material.

126    In addition, the applicant has made five unsuccessful applications in the High Court.

127    In In the Matter of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave to Issue or File [2024] HCASJ 3, on 1 February 2024, Beech-Jones J refused leave to file or issue an application for leave for a constitutional or other writ, filed on or about 14 December 2023, on the basis that the proceeding sought to be commenced was (at [7]), “clearly an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious.” 

128    In In the Matter of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave to Issue or File (No 2) [2024] HCASJ 14 (Beech-Jones J), on 29 February 2024, Beech-Jones J dismissed the applicant’s application dated 22 February 2024 for orders restricting the identification of her identity in relation to her proceedings. Having regard to the public interest in open justice, his Honour was not satisfied that it was necessary to make any of the orders sought by the applicant: [7]. This decision appears to relate to his Honour’s decision of 1 February 2024, relating NSD1036/2023.

129    In In The Matter Of An Application By Anna Laverack For Leave To Appeal [2024] HCASL 123, on 9 May 2024, Gordan and Steward JJ refused leave to appeal against a decision of Beech-Jones J dated 1 February 2024, to refuse the applicant's ex parte application for leave to issue or file the application dated 14 December 2023, because an appeal would enjoy no prospects of success: [2].

130     In In The Matter Of An Application By Anna Laverack for Leave To Appeal [2024] HCASL 124, the applicant sought leave to appeal Beech-Jones J’s decision dated 29 February 2024, in which his Honour refused the applicant’s application seeking orders restricting the identification of her identity in relation to her proceedings in this Court [1]. On 9 May 2024, Gordan and Steward JJ refused leave to appeal on the basis that their Honour’s considered an appeal would enjoy no prospects of success and did not raise any questions of law of public importance [2]–[3].

131     In In the Matter Of An Application By Anna Laverack For Leave To Issue Or File [2024] HCASJ 21 (Gleeson J), Gleeson J refused the applicant’s application dated 22 May 2024 for an order that she be “granted a permanent pseudonym in the records of the Court to restrict identifying me to the public” in the three proceedings in this Court, on the basis that her Honour was not satisfied that they were required on the basis of “safety risk to the applicant” (as the applicant contended), nor that the orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice [12].

132    Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers the Court to make a vexatious proceedings order against a person. A consequence of making such an order includes making an order that the person is precluded from instituting proceedings without the leave of the Court: s 37AO(2)(b), s 37AQ(1)(a). The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative: s 37AO(3). However, the Court must not make such an order without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard: s 37AO(4).

133    It may be accepted that the making of such an order is an “extreme measure”: Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 (at [56]). The purpose of the relief is not to bar vexatious litigants from instituting proceedings entirely or to impose punishment but to place prospective litigation under the control of the Court to protect the Court’s processes against unwarranted usurpations of its limited resources: Storry v Parkyn [2024] FCAFC 67 at [39].

134    These proceedings and the applicant’s other litigious activity have consumed time and resources of the Court.

135    I have formed the preliminary view that it may be that the Court could be satisfied that the applicant has, on multiple occasions, instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts and, if this was established, that, in the result, a vexatious proceedings order might be appropriately made.

136    As a consequence, I propose to consider, whether to make orders (the proposed orders) in the following form:

1.    “Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):

(a)    all current proceedings instituted by the applicant in this Court be stayed; and

(b)    The applicant be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue.

2.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court Act, the applicant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the Federal Court Act.

3.    At the time of filing any application pursuant to s 37AR of the Federal Court Act, or any other application, the applicant pay the sum of $200 to the Registrar as security for costs, to be held by the Court in a non-interest-bearing account”.

137    I propose to give the applicant the opportunity to provide submissions and evidence concerning the question as to whether the proposed orders ought be made.

138    I am of the view that the most appropriate course is that the matter be determined on the papers.

Conclusion and orders

139    By reason of the foregoing, it is my view that the Court ought make the following orders:

1.    The applicant’s application for leave to appeal dated 26 September 2024, interlocutory application dated 18 October 2024 and interlocutory applications dated 12 February 2025 in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024 be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024.

3.    The appeal in proceeding NSD 1252 of 2024 be dismissed.

4.    The interim pseudonym order made on 28 October 2024 is vacated.

5.    On or by 9 July 2025, the applicant file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders and any written outline of submissions of no more than 10 pages (of 2.0 line spacing, Times New Roman font, 12pt font size).

6.    The issue as to whether the proposed orders ought to be made be dealt with on the papers by the Full Court.

Associate:

Dated: 11 June 2025

Annexure A