FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Edington v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2008] FCAFC 78

APPEALS  - procedures – consent order – appeal from primary judge on appeal from Superannuation Complaints Tribunal – agreed error – want of logical connection between Tribunal conclusion and evidence  

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy [2008] FCAFC 7 cited

JOSEPH DAVID EDINGTON v SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE PUBLIC SECTOR SUPERANNUATION SCHEME

QUD 24 of 2008

FRENCH, MOORE AND LINDGREN  JJ

15 MAY 2008

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.                  The appeal be allowed.

2.                  The orders of the Federal Court made on 14 December 2007 be set aside.

3.                  The decision of the First Respondent made on 2 October 2006 be set aside.

4.                  The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent to be determined according to law.

5.                  The Second Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal and the hearing below.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

1                     The parties in this appeal have proposed to the Court consent orders that would have the effect of allowing the appeal, setting aside the orders made by the primary judge and the decision of the first respondent, that is the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (the Tribunal), and remitting the matter to the Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (the Board) to be determined according to law.

2                     Conformably with the Court’s decision in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy [2008] FCAFC 7, the parties have sought to identify to the Court a basis of error on the part of the decision‑maker, that is to say, the Tribunal, which would have constituted an error of law and on the basis of which the primary judge should have come to a different decision.

3                     The error, shortly stated, is that there was no logical basis, having regard to the evidence, for the Tribunal’s conclusion that a relationship had been demonstrated between the appellant’s schizophrenia as a pre-existing medical condition and the post-traumatic stress disorder, which was the basis of the claim under the relevant policy.

4                     On the basis of the submissions made by Mr Dorney and his characterisation of that error in which Mr Steele concurs, we are satisfied that it is proper to make the orders sought.  The consequence will be that the matter will go back to the Board, at which time the report of Dr De Leacy that was not before the Board when it made its decision, will be before the Board and it can make a decision fully informed about the evidence relevant to the appellant’s condition.

5                     We will make the orders set out in the terms of the minute, with the addition, as order 1, that the appeal be allowed.  The other orders are renumbered accordingly.

Associate:

Dated:         28 July 2008