FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

ASP Ship Management Pty Limited v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2006] FCAFC 23


SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION – who is the operator of a ship – proper approach to apply the phrase “operated by” in s 10 of Navigation Act 1912

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – incorrect question addressed in application of s 10 of the Navigation Act 1912

 

WORKERS COMPENSATION – proper approach to the application of the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) by reference to the application of Part 2 of the Navigation Act through s 10 thereof.


Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (UK)

Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)

Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Cth)

Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)

Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth)

 

Australasian United Steamship Navigation Co Ltd v Shipping Control Board (1945) 71 CLR 508 applied

Baumwoll Manufactur Von Scheibler v Christopher Furness [1893] AC 8 applied

Behnke v Bede Shipping Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 649 referred to

Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal [2005] FCAFC 246 referred

CMA CGM SA v Classica Shipping Co Ltd [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 50 referred to

CMA CGM v Classica [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 460 referred to

Colvin v Newberry (1832) 1 Cl & F 283; 6 ER 923 applied

Director General of Social Security v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 80 referred to

Frost v Warner (2002) 209 CLR 509 cited

McDermid v Nash Dredging Ltd [1986] 1 QB 965 referred to

McLellan v Gumm (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 290 referred to

Sandeman v Scurr (1866) LR 2 QB 86 applied

The ‘Berge Tasta’ [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 422 referred to

The ‘Gregos’ [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 335; [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 followed

The ‘Guiseppe Vittorio’ [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 136 applied

The ‘Hill Harmony’ [2001] 1 AC 638 referred to

The ‘Peonia’ [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100 referred to

United States v Cornell Steamboat Co 267 US 281 (1925) applied

United States v Shea 152 US 178 (1894) applied

 

1924 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels

1957 International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships

1976 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Convention

 

Brodie’s Dictionary of Shipping Terms (4th Ed)

ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (London, Lloyd’s 1998)

Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (6th Ed)

Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (2nd Ed)


ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

NSD 997 OF 2005

 

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL & ANOR

NSD 998 OF 2005

 

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED v GERT BERGVALL

NSD 706 OF 2005

 

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED v SHANE ANTHONY KELK

NSD 708 OF 2005

 

 

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ

10 MARCH 2006

SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD997 OF 2005


BETWEEN:

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

GERT BERGVALL

SECOND RESPONDENT


JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:


1.                  There be an order, in the nature of prohibition, that the first respondent not enter upon a consideration of the merits of the application by the second respondent under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) unless and until it finds, according to law, that M T Flinders was being operated by the applicant at the time of the injury to the second respondent.

 

2.                  The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.


Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD998 OF 2005


BETWEEN:

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

SHANE ANTHONY KELK

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:



1.                  There be an order, in the nature of prohibition, that the first respondent not enter upon a consideration of the merits of the application by the second respondent under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) unless and until it finds, according to law, that M V Lorelay was being operated by the applicant at the time of the injury to the second respondent.

 

2.                  The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.


Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD706 OF 2005

 

BETWEEN:

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

GERT BERGVALL

RESPONDENT

 

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:



1.                  The appeal be dismissed.


2.                  The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.


Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD708 OF 2005

 

BETWEEN:

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

SHANE ANTHONY KELK

RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

 



1.                  The appeal be dismissed.


2.                  The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.


Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

 

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

 

NSD997 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

GERT BERGVALL

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

NSD998 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

FIRST RESPONDENT

 

SHANE ANTHONY KELK

SECOND RESPONDENT

 

NSD706 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

GERT BERGVALL

RESPONDENT

 

NSD708 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED

APPLICANT

 

AND:

SHANE ANTHONY KELK

RESPONDENT

 

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ

DATE:

10 MARCH 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY



REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

 

the court


Introduction [ 1 ]

The Compensation Act [ 2 ] – [ 7 ]

Part II of the Navigation Act [ 8 ] – [ 46 ]

Present form of Section 10 [ 9 ] – [ 13 ]

Legislative History of Seciton 10 [ 14 ] – [ 46 ]

The Claims for Compensation [ 47 ] – [ 66 ]

Mr Bergvall and ASP [ 48 ] – [ 54 ]

Mr Kelk and Mermaid [ 55 ] – [ 66 ]

The Tribunal’s Decisions [ 67 ] – [ 79 ]

The Proceedings before the Full Court [ 80 ] – [ 88 ]

The arguments of the Employers [ 83 ] – [ 87 ]

The arguments of the Seamen [ 88 ]

Meaning of Operate and Operator [ 89 ] – [ 108 ]

Conclusion [ 109 ] – [ 116 ]


INTRODUCTION

1                     Each of these four proceedings raises a question as to the meaning of s 10 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth). In particular, the proceedings raise questions as to whether a company that supplies the crew for a ship, in particular circumstances, can be said to be ‘operating’ that ship. The questions arise in the context of determining the jurisdiction under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the AAT Act’) of the Administration Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) to review decisions in relation to claims for compensation by seamen under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) (‘the Compensation Act’).

THE COMPENSATION ACT

2                     Section 26(1) of the Compensation Act provides that, if an ‘employee’ suffers an ‘injury’ that results in his or her death, incapacity for work or impairment, compensation is payable for the injury. Section 28(1) of the Compensation Act relevantly provides that, if an employee suffers an injury and obtains medical treatment for the injury, compensation is payable for the cost of the medical treatment.

3                     Under s 3, ‘injury’ relevantly means an injury suffered by an employee arising out of or in the course of the employee’s employment. Under s 4(1)(a) ‘employee’ relevantly means a ‘seafarer’. Under s 3, ‘seafarer’ means a person employed in any capacity on a ‘prescribed ship’, on the business of the ship. Under s 3, ‘prescribed ship’ means a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act applies, but does not include a ‘Government ship’.

4                     ‘Government ship’ is defined in s 3 of the Compensation Act as meaning a ship:

(a)                that belongs to the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or

(b)               the beneficial interest in which is vested in the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or

(c)                that is for the time being demised or sub-demised to, or in the exclusive possession of, the Commonwealth or a State or Territory.

The term also includes a ship that belongs to an arm of the Defence Force but does not include a ship that belongs to a trading corporation that is an authority or agency of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, a ship the beneficial interest in which is vested in such a trading corporation or a ship that is for the time being demised or sub demised to, or in the exclusive possession of, such a trading corporation. The term ‘Government ship’ also does not include a ship that is ‘operated by’seafarers supplied (directly or indirectly) by a corporation under a contract with the Commonwealth or a State or Territory.

5                     Section 63(1) of the Compensation Act provides that compensation is not payable to a person under the Act unless a claim for compensation is made by or on behalf of the person. Under s 63(2), a claim must be made by giving the employer a written claim in accordance with a form approved by the Seafarers Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Authority established by s 103 of the Compensation Act. Section 73 of the Compensation Act applies to a claim for compensation under s 26 or under s 28. Under s 73(2) the employer must determine its liability in relation to the claim within the time specified in s 73(2). Under s 73(6), if the employer has not determined the claim by the end of the period allowed by s 73, the employer is taken to have made a decision, at the end of that period, disallowing the claim.

6                     Section 78(2) of the Compensation Act provides that a claimant may, by notice in writing given to an employer, request the employer to reconsider a determination made by the employer. Under s 76(1) ‘determination’ means, relevantly, a determination, decision or requirement made by the employer under s 26 or s 28. Section 79(1) provides that, if a claimant requests an employer to reconsider a determination made by the employer, the employer must reconsider the determination within the time specified in s 79(1). Under s 79(6), if the employer has not determined the claim by the end of the period allowed by s 79, the employer is taken to have made a decision, at the end of that period, disallowing the claim.

7                     Section 88(1) of the Compensation Act provides that application may be made to the Tribunal by a claimant for review of a reviewable decision. Under s 76(1) ‘reviewable decision’ means a decision made under s 78. Under s 88(2) no person other than the claimant may make an application to the Tribunal under s 88(1). The Tribunal is invested with jurisdiction to hear and determine such an application.

PART II OF THE NAVIGATION ACT

8                     As is apparent from this outline, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is ultimately dependent upon whether a claimant was a person employed in any capacity on a ‘prescribed ship’. That in turn depends upon whether the ship on which the claimant was employed was a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act applies. Section 10 of the Navigation Act determines the ships to which Part II applies. It is therefore desirable to say something about Part II and the wording of s 10 as presently applicable and then something about the legislative history of that wording.

PRESENT FORM OF SECTION 10

9                     Part II of the Navigation Act, comprising s 9A to s 174, is entitled ‘Masters and Seamen’. It has 21 divisions, which cover such matters as:

  • Manning of Ships,
  • Qualification of Masters, Officers and Seamen,
  • the Engagement of Seamen,
  • Discharge of Seaman,
  • Seamen’s Wages,
  • Discipline,
  • Provisions,
  • Health,
  • Accommodation, and
  • Protection of Seamen.

10                  Section 10 of the Navigation Act relevantly provides that, except so far as the contrary intention appears, Part II applies only to:

(a) ‘a ship registered in Australia’ (as defined in s 7A);

(b) ‘a ship’ (other than a ship registered in Australia) ‘engaged in the coasting trade’ (as defined in s 7(1)); or

(c) ‘a ship’ (other than a ship registered in Australia or engaged in the coasting trade) of which the majority of the crew are residents of Australia and which is ‘operated by’ any one of:

(i) a person who is a resident of, or has his or her principal place of business in, Australia;

(ii) a firm that has its principal place of business in Australia; or

(iii) a company that is incorporated, or has its principal place of business, in Australia.

Part II will apply to a ship that is operated by any such person, firm or company, whether or not the ship is operated in association with any other person, firm or company. Further, Part II applies not only to such a ship but also to the owner, master and crew of such a ship.

11                  Section 7A of the Navigation Act provides that a reference in that Act to a ship ‘registered in Australia’ is to be read as a reference to a ship registered under the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth) (‘the Registration Act’) and as including a reference to a ship that is required to be registered under the Registration Act but is not so registered. Section 7(1) of the Navigation Act provides that, subject to certain provisos not presently relevant, a ship is to be deemed to be ‘engaged in the coasting trade’ if it takes on board passengers or cargo at any port in a State or Territory, to be carried to, and landed or delivered at, any other port in the same State or Territory or in any other State or Territory.

12                  Section 6(4) of the Navigation Act has a bearing on the question raised in the proceedings as to when a ship is to be regarded as being operated by a particular entity. That section provides that, unless the contrary intention appears, a reference in the Navigation Act to the ‘owner’ of a ship is, in the case of a ship that is ‘operated’ by a person other than the owner, to be read as including a reference to the ‘operator’.

13                  The first task is to ascribe content to the words chosen by Parliament from the context and purpose of the Navigation Act, assisted by an understanding of the Act as a whole, and by reference to relevant secondary material: see generally Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal [2005] FCAFC 246 at [36]. In that context, it is desirable to examine the legislative history of the present form of s 10.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 10

Prior to 1979

14                  Since 1921, at the latest, Part II of the Navigation Act has been entitled ‘Masters and Seamen’. Its provisions are derived ultimately from the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (UK). Until 1979, s 10 of the Navigation Act provided that the provisions of Part II relating to ships and to their owners, masters and crews were, unless the subject matter required a different application, to apply ‘only to British ships and their owners, masters and crews’. The term ‘British Ship’ was defined in s 6(1) as including a ship registered in a Commonwealth country or a ship recognised by the law of a Commonwealth country as a ship belonging to that country. The term ‘Commonwealth country’ was also defined in s 6(1) as meaning Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana and Malaysia and any other country declared by the Regulations to be a Commonwealth country. The term also included colonies, overseas territories and protectorates of Commonwealth countries. That definition of British ship appears to have been first inserted in s 6(1) by the Navigation Act 1958 (Cth) (Act No. 36 of 1958).

The 1979 Amendments

15                  In 1979, substantial amendments were made to the Navigation Act by the Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) (‘the 1979 Amendment Act’) (Act No. 98 of 1979). Apart from technical drafting amendments, no change was made to s 10. However, other amendments made by the 1979 Amendment Act introduced into the Navigation Act the concept of a ship being ‘operated by’ someone other than the owner.

16                  Section 6 was amended by adding s 6(4), to provide that a reference in the Navigation Act to the owner of a ship or vessel was, in the case of a ship or vessel that is ‘operated’ by a person other than the owner, to be read as including a reference to the operator. In addition, provisions were inserted into Part II that were to apply to ships other than British ships, being ships identified by reference to the entity ‘operating’ the ship.

17                  Division 2A, dealing with ‘The Manning of Ships’, was inserted. Division 2A consisted of s 14. Section 14(1) provided that the Minister may require a ship, or each ship included in a class of ships, to carry a qualified master of a specified designation, not less than a specified number of qualified officers of specified designations and not less than a specified number of qualified seamen of specified designations. However, that requirement was not to apply to all British ships.

18                  Section 14(13)(a) provided that, in the preceding provisions of s 14, a reference to a ‘ship’ was to be read as a reference to:

(i) a ship registered in Australia;

(ii) a ship (other than a ship registered in Australia) engaged in the coasting trade; or

(iii) a ship (other than a ship registered in Australia or engaged in the coasting trade) licensed under s 288 to engage in the coasting trade and ‘operated by’ any of the following (whether or not in association with any other person, firm or company, being a person, firm or company of any description), namely:

(A) a person who is a resident of, or has his principal place of business in, Australia,

(B) a firm that has its principal place of business in Australia, or

(C) a company that is incorporated, or has its principal place of business, in Australia.

Section 14(13)(b) provided that a reference to a ship was also to be read as including a reference to a ship that was intended to be constructed or was in the course of construction and, in either case, was intended to become a ship of the kind referred to in pars (i), (ii) or (iii) above. Thus, s 14(13) anticipated to some extent the subsequent structure of s 10, including the reference to an entity operating a ship.

19                  As at 1979, s 7 of the Navigation Act specified the circumstances in which a ship was to be deemed to be engaged in the coasting trade. In addition, s 288(1) provided that, subject to the Navigation Act, a ship was not to engage in the coasting trade unless licensed to do so. Section 288 specified the periods of such licences and the conditions with which a ship and the ship’s master, owner and agent must comply while engaged in the coasting trade. Licences were to be granted by the relevant Minister. However, there does not appear to have been a definition in the Navigation Act as at that time of the term ‘ship registered in Australia’.

20                  The 1979 Amendment Act also repealed Division 3 of Part II of the Navigation Act and substituted a new Division 3, which dealt with ‘Qualifications of Masters, Officers and Seamen’. Division 3 consisted of ss 15 to 19 inclusive. Section 15(1) provided that the Regulations may specify standards of competence to be attained and other conditions to be satisfied, or specify conditions to be satisfied, by a person in order to be a qualified master, officer or seaman of any designation for the purposes of the Navigation Act. Section 16(a) then provided that a person must not serve on a ship as a master, officer or seaman of a particular designation if he was not a qualified master, officer or seaman of that designation. Further, s 18 provided that a proper authority at a port may refuse to permit a person to enter into an agreement to serve on a ship as a master, officer or seaman of a particular designation if the proper authority was not satisfied that the person was a qualified master, officer or seaman of that designation.

21                  Section 19, which has since been repealed, also anticipated the subsequent structure of s 10. Section 19(2) provided that a reference in the new Division 3 to a ship was to be read as a reference to a ship to which Division 3 applies. Section 19(1) also anticipated the subsequent form of s 10, by providing that the provisions of Division 3 were to apply to:

(a) ships registered in Australia,

(b) ships (other than ships registered in Australia) engaged in the coasting trade, and

(c) ships (other than ships registered in Australia or engaged in the coasting trade) licensed under s 288 to engage in the coasting trade and operated by any of the following (whether or not in association with any other person, firm or company, being a person, firm or company), namely –

(i) a person who is a resident of, or has his principal place of business in, Australia,

(ii) a firm that has its principal place of business in Australia, and

(iii) a company that is incorporated, or has its principal place of business, in Australia.

22                  Following the 1979 Amendment Act, Divisions 2A and 3 were to apply to a category of ships different from the category to which the balance of Part II was to apply, as specified in the then s 10.

23                  The concept of a ship or ships being operated by an entity having a connection with Australia was clearly included to ensure that certain ships that were neither registered in Australia nor engaged in the coasting trade, but were licensed to engage in the coasting trade, would be regulated by Divisions 2A and 3. That is to say, even if a ship was not registered in Australia or engaged in the coasting trade, if the ship was being operated by an entity that had a relevant connection with Australia, the provisions of Division 2A and 3 were to apply to it.

24                  The Minister’s speech on the second reading of the Bill for the 1979 Amendment Act included the following:

One important amendment extends the references in the Act to the owner of a ship to include a reference to the operator, except in a few special circumstances. This is to ensure that where a duty or liability is imposed by the Act on the owner, responsibility for ensuring that that duty or liability is discharged is imposed on the person who is directly concerned with the relevant operations, for example, a bareboat charterer, as well as on the owner. Conversely, a benefit conferred on the owner will also, in appropriate cases, be available to the operator. Other amendments empower the Minister to make orders in relation to detailed technical requirements to be applied under the Act, so that such requirements can be quickly implemented, or varied without delay; in the light of ship casualties, equipment failure investigations, or technical developments. There are a number of amendments relating to the engagement and discharge of seamen and certain of the conditions of their employment, mainly to cater for modern developments in the industry. (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, vol HR116, p 2179)

[Emphasis added.]

25                  The Explanatory Notes on the Bill for the 1979 Amendment Act, circulated by the Minister for Transport, pointed out that the Bill consisted of a series of amendments for a number of different purposes. Two of the main subjects of the amendments were said to be:

  • Manning; and

·        Qualifications of seafarers.

26                  The general comments in the Explanatory Notes included the following in relation to those subjects:

Manning

The Bill contains new manning provisions in place of the existing provisions which were designed for the shipping industry of half a century ago. These provisions will come into force in two stages. Initially, action will be taken to remove the outdated schedules and other inflexible provisions of the Act. This will pave the way for the second stage which is to enable the Minister to specify detailed requirements as to the minimum numbers and qualifications of officers and seamen to be carried to the extent that it appears necessary in the interests of safety or protection of the marine environment. These provisions call for the laying down in the regulations of parameters on which the minimum manning will be based and will not come into force before these have been fully developed and included in the regulations.

Qualifications of Seafarers

Here too the Bill repeals outmoded provisions and in their place provides broad enabling powers under which necessary standards of competence will be specified by regulation or order. Training, examination and certificates of competency are covered. There will be a new structure for such certificates which has been developed in conjunction with the industry and which is designed to meet present-day needs.

27                  Section 4 of the 1979 Amendment Act inserted various new and amended definitions, including s 6(4), to which reference has already been made. The Explanatory Notes contain the following in relation to that provision:

The effect of this sub-section is that, where a ship or vessel is being operated by a person other than the owner, provisions in the Act that refer to the owner (except those where a contrary intention appears, e.g. collision loss and damage liability in Division 11 of Part IV, wreck removal in section 329 and salvage matters in Divisions 3 and 4 of Part VII), will apply equally to the operator. In many cases it is more appropriate that the operator rather than the owner should be responsible. It will materially assist in prosecutions in certain circumstances for the company directly responsible for the operating of the ship to be made liable for breaches of the Act, e.g. where the actual owner is not within jurisdiction.

[Emphasis added.]

28                  In relation to the subjects of Manning and Qualifications of Seafarers respectively, the Explanatory Notes contained the following:

THE MANNING OF SHIPS

This clause inserts new provisions for the manning of ships in place of the old detailed and inflexible provisions that were designed for the shipping industry of half a century ago. The new provisions have been the subject of lengthy consultation with the industry and the State Marine Authorities.

The new section 14 will enable the Minister to specify, by order, detailed requirements as to the numbers and qualifications of masters, officers and seamen to be carried in specified ships or classes of ships, in respect of different voyages, the carriage of different cargoes, and the performance of different operations, and according to whether the ship is in port or at sea. This will allow the obsolete schedules and other inflexible sections of the Act to be repealed almost immediately and then after a prescribed date the Minister is to exercise his powers only to the extent that it appears to him necessary or expedient in the interests of safety or the protection of the marine environment. The criteria to be applied in determining the minimum manning are to be set out in the regulations and pending the determination of these requirements no date of operation for the minimum safety manning provisions will be proclaimed.

The Minister may exempt a ship or ships from the application of a manning order, subject to conditions, and such exemption may be confined to a particular period or to one or more particular voyages or operations. This will provide flexibility in allowing vessels to sail without their full crews in certain circumstances.

Failure to comply with an order or the conditions of an exemption renders the master and owner liable to a fine of not over $1,000.

A ship not carrying a master, officers and seamen as required by an order or the conditions of an exemption may be detained, or specified operations may, by notice, be restricted. Failure to comply with such a notice renders the master and owner liable to a fine of not over $5,000.

QUALIFICATIONS OF MASTERS, OFFICERS AND SEAMEN

The Bill repeals and replaces the old outmoded provisions of Division 3 that deal with matters relating to certificates of competency permits to serve, certificates of service and examinations for certificates.

The new section 15 provides broad enabling powers under which standards of competence to be attained and other conditions to be satisfied for a person to become ‘qualified’ for the purposes of the Act will be specified by regulation or by order under the regulations. The things to be so prescribed are set out in proposed sub-section 15(2), and include detailed requirements in respect of instruction, training and the conduct of examinations, the issue of certificates of competency and the recognition of certificates issued by other countries. Under section 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 the regulations will also provide for the review by an appropriately-constituted Administrative Appeals Tribunal of administrative decisions made under those regulations and orders.

Under these provisions there will be a new structure of certificates of competency designed to meet modern shipping needs and derived from a uniform Code prepared by the Department of Transport in conjunction with the State Marine Authorities and in consultation with the maritime industry. The Code is based on international requirements developed through the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) which in 1978 were embodied in an international Convention, and are designed to gain maximum advantage from the new Australian Maritime College. Certificates issued under the new provisions will be acceptable to the various Australian Marine Authorities.

The new section 16 replaces present section 25 and makes the necessary provisions to prohibit unqualified masters, officers or seamen from accepting employment to serve on a ship, to prohibit persons from falsely representing themselves as being qualified, and to prohibit persons from falsely representing themselves as being qualified, and to prohibit persons from taking on unqualified masters, officers or seamen. A penalty of $1,000 is provided.

The new section 17 requires a person serving in a ship as a qualified master, officer or seaman, or who has entered or is entering an agreement to so serve, to produce his certificates to the proper authority on demand. There is a penalty of $500 for failure to do so without reasonable excuse. This section replaces present section 58(1), which is being repealed.

The new section 18 authorises a proper authority at a port to refuse to approve the engagement of a master, officer or seaman if he is not satisfied that the person is qualified as required. This section replaces present sections 40 and 58(2).

Thenew section 19 sets out the classes of ships to which (together with their owners, masters and crews) the new Vision 3 applies.

29                  Those contemporaneous secondary materials reveal that a purpose behind the conflation of ‘owner’ and ‘operator’ by s 6(4) was that the Navigation Act should apply to the entity directly and immediately concerned with the manning of a ship and the qualifications of those manning the ship. The amendments contemplate that an entity can be identified who is responsible for determining who will man the ship, both in terms of numbers and of qualifications.

The 1981 Amendments

30                  The relevant provisions of Part II were further amended in 1981 at the same time as the enactment of the Shipping Registration Act 1981 (‘the Registration Act’). Section 10 of the Navigation Act was enacted substantially in its present form by the Navigation Amendment Act 1981 (No. 10 of 1981) (‘the 1981 Amendment Act’). The Registration Act, the 1981 Amendment Act and the Flags Amendment Act 1981 (Cth) were all assented to on 25 March 1981 as cognate Acts.

31                  In his Second Reading Speech on the Bill for the 1981 Amendment Act, the Minister for Transport said:

The principal purpose of the [Bill] is to amend the Navigation Act so as to accord with the proposed Shipping Registration Act …

 

Many provisions of the Navigation Act refer to British ships…Thesereferences to British ships are being replaced with references to ships registered in Australia under the Shipping Registration Act or otherwise having a close connection with Australia. (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, vol HR121, 1981, p 253.)

[Emphasis added.]

 

32                  After the 1981 Amendment Act, the formula previously adopted in ss 14(13) and 19 was used in relation to the whole of Part II and not merely Divisions 2A and 3. There is nothing, however, in the 1981 Amendment Act that reveals an intention to alter the meaning of ‘operate’ and ‘operator’ as those words were used the 1979 Amendment Act.

33                  While s 19 as introduced by the 1979 Amendment Act, and s 10 after the 1981 Amendment Act, both attract the application of certain provisions of Part II of the Navigation Act to ships operated by an entity having a relevant connection with Australia, those provisions are also applicable to the owner, master and crew of such ships.

34                  In contrast, s 14, in the form in which it was introduced in the 1979 Amendment Act (since amended), applied only to ships through the operation of s 14(13). However, the sanctions in ss 14(8) and 14(11) applied to the master and owner of a ship to which s 14 applied by the operation of s 14(13). In reading those provisions, s 6(4) must be taken to have the effect that the references to the owner are to be taken to be references to the operator.

35                  Part II of the Registration Act established a regime for the registration of ships. Section 12(1) provided that, subject to Part II, every Australian-owned ship must be registered under the Registration Act. Under s 8(1), a reference in the Registration Act to an ‘Australian owned ship’ is to be read as a reference to a ship that:

(a) is owned by an Australian national or Australian nationals and no other person;

(b) is owned (otherwise than as described in paragraph (c) below) by three or more persons as joint owners, where the majority of those persons are Australian nationals; or

(c) is owned by two or more persons as owners in common, where more than half of the shares in the ship are owned by an Australian national or Australian nationals.

36                  However, under s 12(2) of the Registration Act, where an Australian-owned ship is ‘operated by’ a foreign resident under a demise charter, the Minister may exempt the ship during the term of the charter from the requirement to be registered. Further, under s 13, ships less than 24 metres in tonnage length, Government ships, fishing vessels and pleasure craft are exempt from this requirement under s 12 to be registered. Section 14 of the Registration Act provides that, where application is made as provided by the Act, the following ships are also to be registered:

(a) Australian owned ships referred to in s 13;

(b) small craft wholly owned by residents of Australia or by residents of Australia and Australian nationals;

(c) small craft operated solely by residents of Australia or Australian nationals or both;

(d) ships on demise charter to Australian based operators.

37                  There is nothing in the Registration Act that specifies when a ship is to be taken to be ‘operated’ by a particular entity or when a particular entity will be an ‘operator’. However, s 9(1) provides that a reference to a ship on demise charter to an Australian based operator is to be read as a reference to a ship (not being a ship required to be registered or that may be registered by virtue of s 14(a), (b) or (c)) on demise charter to:

‘(a) an Australian national or Australian nationals and to no other person; or

 

(b) 2 or more persons who include an Australian national or Australian nationals, where the Australian national is, or the Australian nationals are, as the case may be, in a position to control the exercise of the rights and powers of the charterers under the charter party.’

[Emphasis added.]

38                  In addition to substituting a new s 10 in the Navigation Act, the 1981 Amendment Act omitted s 14(13) and substituted a new s 14(13), which in substance re-enacted the previous s 14(13)(b). The new s 14(13) provided that, in s 14, a reference to a ship is to be read as including a reference to a ship that is intended to be constructed or is in the course of construction and, in either case, is intended to become a ship of a kind referred to in the new s 10(a), (b) or (c). Section 19 of the Navigation Act was also repealed. Once s 10 had been enacted to refer to ships operated by Australian entities and to govern the whole of Part II, s 14(13)(a) and s 19 no longer had work to do.

39                  It is to be noted, however, that there was introduced into s 10 a new and different prerequisite in the first limb of paragraph (c): that the majority of the crew of a ship be residents of Australia. Under the old paragraph (c), the prerequisite was that the ship be licensed under s 288 to engage in the coasting trade, being a ship that was not registered in Australia and not in fact engaged in the coasting trade. The prerequisite of the second limb of the new s 10(c) was that which was previously in s 14(13)(a) and s 19, namely that the ship be operated by an Australian entity, whether or not in association with any other entity.

40                  These changes to the Navigation Act between 1979 to 1981 should be understood in the context of the subject matter of the Navigation Act, and the recognition that some provisions of the Navigation Act applied to the limited classes of ships provided for in s 10 and some provisions applied to all ships.

41                  Prior to 1981, several provisions of Part II applied to all ships, whether or not they were British ships. Thus, s 45(1) provided that a member of the crew of a foreign going ship (whether British or foreign) was not to be employed at a port in Australia in handling cargo or ballast in connection with the loading or unloading of a ship. Since the 1981 Amendment Act, s 45(1) has contained a similar prohibition in respect of a ship, ‘whether or not it is a ship to which [Part II] applies’. Before 1981, Section 104(1) provided that no person must secrete himself and go to sea in a ship, including a foreign ship, without the consent of some person entitled to give that consent. Since the 1981 Amendment Act, the prohibition has been in respect of a ship, ‘whether or not it is a ship to which [Part II] applies’. Prior to 1981, Section 145(1) contained a prohibition against any person, unless authorised by law, going on board any ship which is about to arrive, without the permission of the master, or remain on board a ship, including a foreign ship, after being warned to leave by the master. Since the 1981 Amendment Act, s 145 has contained a similar prohibition in respect of any ship, ‘whether or not it is a ship to which [Part II] applies’. Before the 1981 Amendments, Section 147 contained an exemption for masters and seaman of all ships from serving as jurors. Since the 1981 Amendment Act, s 147 has expressly stated that the exemption applies to masters and seaman of all ships, ‘whether or not they are ships to which [Part II] applies’. Finally, s 148A previously contained a prohibition against wrongfully forcing on shore and leaving behind at a place in Australia a seaman or apprentice belonging to a ship, including a foreign ship. Since the 1981 Amendment Act, the prohibition has referred to a seaman belonging to a ship, ‘whether or not it is a ship to which [Part II] applies’.

42                  Divisions 2A and 3 of Part II, in relation to which the concept of the ‘operation’ of a ship was introduced into the Navigation Act, are concerned with the manning of ships. Thus, under s 14(1) the Minister may, by order, require a ship or each ship included in a class of ships to carry a qualified master of a specified designation and to carry not less than a specified number of qualified officers of specified designations and a specified number of qualified seamen of specified designations. Under s 14(8), if such an order is contravened or not complied with in relation to a ship, the master and the owner of the ship are guilty of an offence. Further, under s 14(9), where a ship does not carry a master of such designation and such officers and seamen as it is required to carry by virtue of such an order, the Minister may cause the ship to be detained for the purpose of preventing from going to sea or may require that a specified operation by or in relation to the ship shall not commence. Such a requirement is to be given by notice in writing addressed to the master or owner of the ship. Under s 14(11), if such a notice is contravened or not complied with in relation to a ship, the master and owner of the ship are each guilty of a further offence. In the context of those provisions, s 6(4) would operate to treat the reference to owner as including a reference to the operator of a ship.

43                  The new s 15(1), in Division 3, provides that the Regulations may specify standards of competence to be attained and other conditions to be satisfied by a person in order to be a qualified master, officer or seaman of any designation for the purposes of the Navigation Act. Section 16 then provided that a person must not serve on a ship as a master, officer or seaman of a particular designation if he is not a qualified master, officer or seaman of that designation. Further, s 16 also provides that a person must not take into employment as a qualified master, officer or seaman of a particular designation a person who is not a qualified master, officer or seaman of that designation. A penalty is imposed for contravention.

44                  Under s 17, a person who is serving on a ship as a qualified master, officer or seaman of any designation must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to produce, on demand, his certificates to a proper authority. Under s 18, a proper authority at a port may refuse to permit a person to enter into an agreement to serve on a ship as a master, officer or seaman of a particular designation if the proper authority is not satisfied that the person is a qualified master, officer or seaman of that designation.

45                  The subject matter dealt with by the whole of Part II is amenable to being applied to a ship whose master and crew is employed and directed by an Australian entity. Part II is concerned with the day to day regulation of the work and conditions of seafarers. To the extent that the phrase ‘operated by’ is apt to identify the party in control of and managing the master and crew (even though acting in the capacity of an agent) that is conformable with the objects of Part II.

46                  Other parts of the Navigation Act are not as limited in their application as Part II. For example, Part IV deals with all ships. A number of provisions providing for the responsibility of the owner (and so, operator: s 6(4)) were said by counsel not to be apt to apply to parties such as the applicants managing and controlling only the master and crew: see for example s 193 (the requirements for regular survey), s 211(2) (the cost of detention of substandard ships), s 227A (the prohibition on the master or owner - and so operator: s 6(4) - proceeding to sea without a relevant loadline certificate), s 227D (offences of the master or owner - and so, operator; s 6(4) - with respect to load line markings), s 307 (the recovery of expenses by any receiver in respect of a wreck from the owner - and so, operator: s 6(4) - and s 314A (the power in AMSA to require the owner - and so, operator: s 6(4) - to remove a wreck). We will return to this argument in due course.

THE CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION

47                  The proceedings before the Court involve two separate claims for compensation, one by Mr Gert Bergvall and the other by Mr Shane Anthony Kelk. It is necessary to say something about each.

MR BERGVALL AND ASP

48                  Mr Bergvall was at relevant times employed by ASP Ship Management Pty Limited (‘ASP’) and was a member of the crew of the MT Flinders. Flinders is an oil tanker. Mr Bergvall claims to have been injured in the course of his employment as a member of the crew of Flinders and made a claim for compensation under the Compensation Act. ASP did not determine the claim by the end of the period allowed by s 73 and, accordingly, if Flinders is a prescribed ship, ASP is taken to have made a decision disallowing the claim. Mr Bergvall requested ASP to reconsider that deemed determination. ASP had not determined the claim by the end of the period allowed by s 79 of the Compensation Act and, accordingly, ASP is taken to have made a decision disallowing the claim. Mr Bergvall then made an application to the Tribunal for review of ASP’s deemed decision disallowing his claim for compensation.

49                  Flinders is owned by Mobil Shipping and Transportation Company, a United States company (‘Mobil US’). Flinders was the subject of a demise charter to Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (‘Mobil Australia’), which entered into a contract with ASP in relation to the management of Flinders. At that time, Flinders was registered in Australia. By the end of 1999 the demise charter had been terminated and Flinders was registered in Panama. The Tribunal found that ‘the ultimate management’ of Flinders was then put in the hands of Mobil Shipping Co Limited, a United Kingdom company (‘Mobil UK’). The full content of that phrase used by the Tribunal is not clear. That is not a criticism of the Tribunal, little attention having been given by the parties to the precise role and functions of Mobil UK.

50                  At the time of Mr Bergvall’s accident, there was a ship management agreement in place between Mobil UK and ASP dated 3 December 1999 (‘the ASP Management Agreement’), which governed the legal relationship between Mobil UK and ASP. The ASP Management Agreement was based on the ‘Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) Standard Ship Management Agreement’, which bears the code name ‘Shipman 98’.

51                  By clause 2 of the ASP Management Agreement, Mobil UK appointed ASP and ASP agreed to act as ‘the Managers’ of Flinders. By clause 3, ASP promised to carry out ‘Management Services’ (as defined in the ASP Management Agreement) in respect of Flindersas agents for an on behalf of Mobil UK’. ASP was given authority to take such actions as ASP may from time to time in its absolute discretion consider to be necessary to enable it to perform the ASP Management Agreement ‘in accordance with sound ship management practice’.

52                  Clause 3 of the ASP Management Agreement specified the ‘Management Services’ and read, relevantly:

3.1 The Managers shall provide suitably qualified Crew for the Vessel as required by the Owners in accordance with the STCW 95 requirements, provision of which includes but is not limited to the following functions:

(i)                 selecting and engaging the Vessel’s Crew (subject to the prior agreement of the Owner for Masters, First Mates, Chief Engineers and First Engineers), including payroll arrangements, pension administration and insurances for the Crew other than those mentioned in Clause 6;

(ii)               ensuring that the applicable requirements of the law of the flag of the Vessel are satisfied in respect of manning levels, rank, qualification and certification of the Crew and employment regulations including Crew’s tax, social insurance, discipline and other requirements;

(iii)             ensuring that all members of the Crew have passed a medical examination with a qualified doctor certifying that they are fit for the duties for which they are engaged and are in possession of valid medical certificates issued in accordance with appropriate flag State requirements…;

(iv)             ensuring that the crew shall have a command of the English language of a sufficient standard to enable them to perform their duties safely;

(v)               arranging transportation of the Crew, including repatriation;

(vi)             training of the Crew and supervising their efficiency;

(vii)           conducting Union negotiations;

(viii)         operating the Owners’ drug and alcohol policy unless otherwise agreed.

‘3.4 "The Managers shall arrange insurances in accordance with Clause 6.1(iv), on such terms and conditions as the Owners shall have instructed or agreed, in particular regarding conditions, insured values, deductibles and franchises".

‘3.5 The Managers shall:

(i)                 establish an accounting system which meets the requirements of the Owners and provide regular accounting services, supply regular reports and records;

(ii)               maintain the records of all costs and expenditure incurred as well as data necessary or proper for the settlement of accounts between the parties.’

53                  By clause 4 of the ASP Management Agreement, ASP undertook to use its best endeavours to provide the agreed Management Services ‘as agent for and on behalf of’ Mobil UK in accordance with sound ship management practice and to protect and promote the interests of Mobil UK in all matters relating to the provision of the Management Services. By clause 5.3, Mobil UK agreed to procure that the requirements of the law of the flag of Flinders would be satisfied and that Mobil UK, or such other entity as may be appointed by Mobil UK and identified to ASP, would be deemed to be ‘the Company’, as defined by International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention as adopted by the International Maritime Organisation by Resolution A.741(18) (‘ISM Code’), assuming the responsibility for the operation of Flinders and taking over the duties and responsibilities imposed by the ISM Code when applicable.

54                  By clause 8.1, Mobil UK agreed to pay ASP an annual management fee for ASP’s services as managers. Under clause 11.2(i), ASP was to be under no liability to Mobil UK for any loss, damage, delay or expense of whatsoever nature, whether direct or indirect and howsoever arising in the course of performance of the Management Services unless and to the extent that such loss, damage, delay or expense was caused by the negligence, gross negligence, wilful default or recklessness of ASP or their employees or agents or subcontractors employed by them in connection with Flinders. Under clause 11.2(ii), ASP was not to be liable for any of the actions of the crew, even if such actions were negligent, grossly negligent or wilful, except only to the extent that they were shown to have resulted from a failure by ASP to discharge its obligations under clause 3.1. Clause 11 also provided for an indemnity to ASP and its employees and agents by Mobil UK arising out of or in connection with the performance of the agreement.

MR KELK AND MERMAID

55                  Mr Kelk was at relevant times employed by Mermaid Labour and Management Limited (‘Mermaid’) as a member of the crew of the MV Lorelay, a pipe laying vessel. Mr Kelk claims to have been injured in the course of his employment as a member of the crew of Lorelay and made a claim for compensation under the Compensation Act. Mermaid did not determine Mr Kelk’s claim by the end of the period allowed by s 73 and, accordingly, if Lorelay is a prescribed ship, Mermaid was taken to have made a decision disallowing Mr Kelk’s claim. Mr Kelk requested Mermaid to reconsider that deemed determination. Mermaid did not determine Mr Kelk’s claim by the end of the period allowed by s 79 and, accordingly, Mermaid was taken to have made a decision disallowing the claim. Mr Kelk then applied to the Tribunal for review of Mermaid’s deemed decision disallowing his claim for compensation.

56                  Lorelay is owned by Société D’Exploration du Lorelay SA, a Swiss company. She is registered in Panama. The Tribunal found that the ‘ultimate management’ of Lorelay is in the hands of Allseas Marine Contractors SA, a Swiss company (‘Allseas Marine’). The precise content of this phrase is not clear. At the time of Mr Kelk’s accident, there was a labour and catering agreement (‘the Mermaid Agreement’) in place between Mermaid and Allseas Construction Contractors SA (‘Allseas Construction’). Allseas Construction is associated with Allseas Marine. Allseas Construction was the contractor engaged to lay the Bass Strait Pipeline, which was part of the Tasmanian Natural Gas Offshore Pipeline Installation Project.

57                  The Mermaid Agreement recited that Allseas Construction has a contract with ‘the operator’ of Lorelay and that Allseas Construction desires Mermaid to provide competent, skilled Australian labour personnel and catering and accommodation services (referred to as ‘the Services’) for its off shore operations with Lorelay for work to be carried out for any client in Australian waters.

58                  By Article 1(a) of the Mermaid Agreement, Allseas Construction appointed Mermaid to administer the provision, payment and ongoing employment of workers and provision of Services to Lorelay. By Article 1(d) Mermaid undertook to provide the required labour during the continuance of the Mermaid Agreement in accordance with good commercial practice.

59                  By Article 2(a) Mermaid was to be responsible, ‘on behalf of Allseas Construction and with prior approval solely as agents’, for providing workers for Lorelay in accordance with Article 2(b). Under Article 2(b) Mermaid contracted to procure, engage on behalf of Allseas Construction, and employ the necessary complement of workers on behalf of Allseas Construction in accordance with Australian regulations. That complement was always to consist of competent, experienced personnel fit for the purpose and tasks required by Allseas Construction to be performed on Lorelay. Mermaid was to be liable to provide Allseas Construction with all documentary evidence to prove the Personnel supplied have the necessary competency and experience relevant to the tasks required. Mermaid was also to provide and administer wages and other direct and indirect employment costs of the crew.

60                  By Article 2(c), Mermaid agreed to discharge any Personnel as directed by Allseas Construction in accordance with the awards, enterprise agreements and applicable laws pertaining to the discharge of labour. All discharges were to be documented with reasons for discharge and name of witnesses, where appropriate.

61                  By Article 12, it was agreed that Mermaid was to be an independent contractor for all purposes under the Mermaid Agreement, and at all times was to act as one. Mermaid was required at all times to control the manner and means of the performance of Service to be provided under the Mermaid Agreement. Neither Mermaid nor Personnel supplied by Mermaid, or the employees, agents, representatives, suppliers or subcontractors engaged in any of the services under the Mermaid Agreement for or on behalf of Mermaid or otherwise were to be deemed to be employees, agents or borrowed servants of Allseas Construction.

62                  A construction labour agreement was entered into between Allseas Construction and Mermaid on the same day as the Mermaid Agreement. In addition, Allseas Construction entered into a memorandum of understanding (‘the Memorandum of Understanding’) with the Australian Maritime Officers Union, the Maritime Union of Australia and the Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (together ‘the Maritime Unions’). The purpose of the Memorandum of Understanding was to:

  • establish a framework which would provide a mutually beneficial ongoing industrial relationship between Allseas Construction and the Maritime Unions and their members; and
  • record the intention of the parties for crewing by members of the Maritime Unions of Lorelay.

63                  By clause 7a of the Memorandum of Understanding, Allseas Construction agreed to contract with a recognised marine contractor for the employment of members of the Maritime Unions on Lorelay during the operation of the vessel on the off shore pipeline installation phase of the Tasmania Natural Gas Offshore Pipeline Installation Project. The crewing classifications and numbers were to be in accordance with the manning schedules attached to the Memorandum of Understanding. The schedules specified the numbers of permanent and Australian members of the crew for the following phases:

(a) mobilisation from the Lorelay’s last foreign port of call;

(b) arrival at Bell Bay.

64                  By clause 7b, the members of the Maritime Unions were to be employed in the following areas of responsibility whilst the Lorelay was engaged in the Tasmanian Natural Gas Pipeline Installation Project:

(i) operation of the bridge;

(ii) deck operations;

(iii) operations and maintenance of inbuilt machinery and equipment; and

(iv) galley and catering personnel.

The parties agreed that the maritime job descriptions contained in attachments to the Memorandum of Understanding were to be those duties performed but not limited to by the respective maritime members appointed to such positions.


65                  By clause 8 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the parties recognised that, because of the uniqueness of Lorelay and the short term nature of the project, Allseas Construction was to provide permanent manning, in addition to the Australian manning, and it was agreed that Allseas Construction would mobilise, operate and demobilise Lorelay with permanent personnel identified in Schedule 3 to the Memorandum of Understanding. That schedule specified the following:


 

JOB CLASSIFICATION:

SCHEDULE ‘3’

 

(Permanent)

MASTER

1

CHIEF OFFICER / DP OPERATOR

2

CHIEF ENGINEER

1

1st ENGINEER

2

CHIEF ELECTRICIAN

1

ELECTRICIAN

4

CATERING MANAGER

1

TOTAL:

12

66                  By clause 8a of the Memorandum of Understanding, it was agreed that Allseas Construction would provide a permanent master for the duration of the project who would be the ‘person in command’ and would have responsibility for the management and supervision of Lorelay’s operations and safety. By clause 8b, it was agreed that, in addition to the permanent master, an Australian master would be employed as ‘deputy’ to the permanent master and would have responsibility for the management and safety of Lorelay in his role as deputy.

THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISIONS

67                  The Tribunal determined to decide, as a preliminary question before embarking on any consideration of the merits of the claims for compensation, whether or not there was a reviewable decision in each proceeding. Each of ASP and Mermaid (together ‘the Employers’) asserted before the Tribunal that there had not been a reviewable decision under the Compensation Act such as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Each contended that s 88 of the Compensation Act had no application. ASP asserted that Mr Bergvall was not a seafarer because Flinders was not a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act applied and Mermaid asserted that Mr Kelk was not a seafarer because Lorelay was not a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act applied.

68                  The Employers were the only relevant Australian entities for the purposes of s 10 and each asserted that the respective ship was not operated by it. On the other hand, Mr Bergvall asserted that Flinders was operated by ASP, whether or not in association with another entity, and Mr Kelk asserted that Lorelay was operated by Mermaid, whether or not in association with another entity.

69                  The Tribunal described the problem as a novel one, although recognising that the use of a procurer of labour for shipboard service was not a new practice. What was seen as novel was that the procurer of the labour was to remain the employer of the persons who became the crew, whilst another party directed the ship. The Tribunal decided that each proceeding involved a reviewable decision and that, accordingly, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the deemed disallowances of the claims for compensation.

70                  The Tribunal directed itself to s 10 of the Navigation Act. The phrase ‘operated by’ was said to be illuminated by the seventh and eighth meanings (of 11 meanings) given by the Oxford English Dictionary Online, as follows:

‘7. trans. Orig. U.S. to cause or direct the functioning of; to control the working of (a machine, boat, etc.).

8. trans. Orig. U.S. to manage, to direct the operation of (a business, enterprise, etc.); to carry out or through, apply (a principle, a tradition, etc).’

The Tribunal used those meanings to ‘highlight the competing possible meanings’, as follows:

Does the phrase refer to the physical operation of the ship or does it refer to the operation of the enterprise in which the ship is engaged?

71                  The Tribunal examined how the verb ‘operate’ and the noun ‘operator’ have been used in maritime contexts, in particular in the development of the law (domestic and international) concerning limitation of liability for maritime claims. It was noted that the classes of persons entitled to limit had grown from owners to include charterers (not merely by demise), persons interested in the ship, persons in possession of the ship and the manager or operator of the ship.

72                  The Tribunal also examined the history of s 10 and concluded, erroneously, that the phrase ‘operated by’ was first inserted into the Navigation Act by the 1981 Amendment Act. The Tribunal observed that in the Second Reading Speech on the Bill for the 1981 Amendment Act the Minister for Transport said:

‘The principal purpose of the [Bill] is to amend the Navigation Act so as to accord with the proposed Shipping Registration Act …

 

Many provisions of the Navigation Act refer to British ships. Thesereferences to British ships are being replaced with reference to ships registered in Australia under the Shipping Registration Act or otherwise having a close connection with Australia.’ (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, vol HR121, 1981, p 253)

73                  Though recognising the limitations on examining the word ‘operate’ in relation to activities of ships in different contexts in different legislation, the Tribunal thought that the use of the words ‘operator’ in the legislation concerning limitation of liability was an illustration of the seventh meaning earlier referred to (controlling the workings of a machine) rather than the eighth meaning (controlling or managing the business or enterprise).

74                  The Tribunal noted the central and critical role of the master on the ship: see Frost v Warner (2002) 209 CLR 509 at [29] where Gleeson CJ, Gummow J and Callinan J said:

It is to the master that the government, care, safety and security of the vessel, her crew, passengers and cargo are committed (Kennerson v Jane R, Inc (1967) 274 F Supp 28 at 20; Whistler International Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [2001] 1 AC 638 at 646, 657-658; noted Baughen, “Navigation or Employment?”, [2001] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 177 at p 177). As was said by the United States Supreme Court in Southern Steamship Co v National Labor Relations Board (1942) 316 US 31 at 38:

“The lives of passengers and crew, as well as the safety of ship and cargo, are entrusted to the master’s care. Every one and every thing depend upon him.”

75                  The Tribunal concluded that Flinders was operated by ASP. The Tribunal concluded that ASP did not, alone, operate Flinders, though nor did Mobil UK or Mobil US. Rather, ASP acted in association with Mobil UK when it, ASP, carried out part of the management of Flinders.

76                  The Tribunal concluded that ASP was the source of authority for the master and all the crew. Mobil UK’s right to direct the master and crew came through ASP. ASP was therefore a company closely involved with the actual navigation of the ship. ASP carried out one of the areas of management provided for by the standard Shipman 98 agreement, namely, crew management. Thus ASP was at least partly involved in the management of the Flinders. The Tribunal said that that was that part of the management most closely associated with the physical operation of the ship.

77                  The Tribunal concluded at [68] to [72] as follows:

‘68. There is evidence before me which shows a close relationship between ASP and the master of the Flinders. It is true that he took directions from Mobil UK, that the ship operated under Mobil’s operation manuals and that audits were conducted on behalf of Mobil UK by its nominees. Nevertheless, the masters, for masters were alternated as was all the crew, were constantly in contact with ASP discussing operational activities.

69. When I take into account the facts that ASP employed the master of the Flinders and all of its crew, that it was contracted to do so pursuant to an agreement which proceeded on the basis that its role was a management role, and particularly crew management, and that the day to day navigation and activities of the ship were effectively under its control through the crew it employed, I come to the conclusion that ASP is at least an operator of the Flinders. The fact that the activities of the ship were directed by Mobil UK or Mobil US is an important factor. However, it is not enough to displace the finding to which I have come. The finding is a finding of fact. However, I accept that the finding is assisted by my sense that “operated by” is to be understood more in the seventh than in the eighth sense in the Oxford English Dictionary and by the presence of the phrase in legislation which has, as a primary role, the protection of the health, safety and employment conditions of seafarers.

70. Although the noun “association” usually denotes a close connection, the use of the word in the phrase “in association with” does not necessarily have the same sense. One person can act in association with another person without the two comprising an association or being associates. A contractual arrangement under which one party engages another to carry out activities which are connected with activities retained by the first party will usually amount to the doing of the whole by the two in association. This will particularly be so when there is inevitable contact between the two.

71. To my mind ASP acted in association with Mobil UK when it carried out that part of the management of the Flinders which it contracted to undertake.

72. The group of activities undertaken by the ASP and Mobil UK, if undertaken by one company, would undoubtedly constitute the company as the operator of the Flinders. I find that the work of ASP was part of the activities of an operator of a ship. It follows that I find that ASP at least operated the Flinders in association with Mobil UK and possibly Mobil US as well.’

78                  The Tribunal considered that the position of Lorelay was not so clear as that of Flinders. The Tribunal found that the ultimate master of Lorelay was an employee of Allseas Construction, not Mermaid. The Tribunal concluded that, while the Mermaid Agreement was not a management agreement, but a labour and catering agreement supplemented by a construction labour agreement, the actual role of Mermaid was not materially different from that of ASP. Mermaid employed all the Australian crew and, during the mobilisation and demobilisation voyages, the Australian master was to be the person in charge. The Tribunal concluded that what mattered was that that was the contractual arrangement between the parties, whether or not that in fact happened. The Tribunal considered, therefore, that the permanent master was not always in charge and whether or not Mermaid was operator could not change from the end of the mobilisation voyage during the pipe laying period and then resume during the demobilisation voyage. The Tribunal considered that the parties treated the whole period as one.

79                  The Tribunal concluded at [76] to [78] as follows:

‘76. I do not doubt that the involvement of Mermaid could be said to be at a lower level than those of ASP. However, I do not think that it is so low that it does not include activities which are among those appropriate to an operator. In day to day terms on the ship they must have been little different.

77. Although the role of the master is critical and a different decision might have been reached if there had been no time when the Australian master was in charge it remains true that there was an Australian master at all times who would in fact have been in charge of the ship and all the crew for substantial periods.

78. I conclude that the Lorelay was operated by Mermaid in association with Allseas Construction, Allseas Marine or both and that there is a reviewable decision before the Tribunal relating to the application by Shane Kelk.’

THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FULL COURT

80                  Each of the Employers filed a notice of appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act claiming that the Tribunal made an error of law in concluding that there had been a reviewable decision. In addition, each of ASP and Mermaid commenced a proceeding in the Federal Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), seeking to prohibit the Tribunal from dealing with the applications before it on the basis that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the applications. The applications under s 39B were commenced because of a concern that the Tribunal’s purported decisions of 8 April 2005 in each application may not be decisions within the meaning of s 44(1) of the AAT Act from which an appeal would lie on a question of law. It was said on behalf of Mr Bergvall and Mr Kelk that such an appeal was incompetent, there being no relevant decision from which an appeal lay. In Director General of Social Security v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 80, Deane and Fisher JJ (Northrop J dissenting) decided that a separate and preliminary ruling that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear an application for review (as opposed to a separate and preliminary ruling that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction) was not a decision from which an appeal lay under s 44. In order to avoid unnecessary argument as to whether Chaney’s case was correctly decided, ASP pressed before the Court only its application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. The Tribunal, it was said, lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application and prohibition was sought to prevent an impermissible assertion of jurisdiction by the Tribunal.

81                  By the operation of s 44(3)(c) of the AAT Act, the appeals must be heard by a Court constituted by a Full Court. The two proceedings under s 39B of the Judiciary Act have been referred by the Chief Justice to a Full Court pursuant to s 20(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and all four proceedings have been heard together. The Employers were represented by the same solicitors and counsel and Mr Bergvall and Mr Kelk were represented by the same solicitors and counsel.

82                  It is common ground that the majority of the crew of both MT Flinders and MV Lorelay were at relevant times residents of Australia and that each of ASP and Mermaid is a company incorporated in Australia. All parties accepted, therefore, that the substantive questions raised for the determination of the Full Court are:

  • whether Flinders was being ‘operated by’ ASP at the time of Mr Bergvall’s injury; whether or not in association with another entity; and

·        whether Lorelay was being ‘operated by’ Mermaid at the time of Mr Kelk’s injury; whether or not in association with another entity.

Those two questions raise factual issues in the context of determining the facts upon which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depends. They also raise the legal issue as to when, under the terms of s 10 of the Navigation Act, it can be said that a ship is being operated by a specific entity, whether or not in association with another entity.

THE ARGUMENTS OF THE EMPLOYERS

83                  The Employers identified the relevant error of the Tribunal as construing the words ‘operated by’ as referring to the physical operation of the ships, solely in accordance with the seventh definition referred to, rather than as referring to the managing and directing the enterprise that the ships represent, and in which they are engaged as revenue and income producing assets.

84                  It was said that s 10(c) refers to the exercise of dominion and control over a ship and its use and employment, not the mere navigation of the ship and the performance of her daily activities. Thus, it was said, the Tribunal misdirected itself by approaching the question by reference to the navigation and day to day activities of the ship rather than by reference to the source of the power to direct the use of the ship including the activities performed on board the ship and the manner of their performance. The argument of the Employers thus directed attention to questions of operation of a ship as an enterprise from both a commercial and a technical perspective and to the source of authority to direct and control the activities on board the ship.

85                  This meaning of the phrase ‘operated by’, beyond the immediate authority of the employer of the master and crew, was said to be: (a) reflective of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, (b) consistent with the context of the Navigation Act, namely of commercial and trading vessels, (c) consistent with the circumstances of the introduction of the words into the Navigation Act, (d) consistent with the meaning of the word ‘operator’ in international and domestic limitation of liability provisions and (e) consistent with the ISM Code.

86                  ASP pointed to the following factors which, broadly, were not in dispute, as being important in relation to ASP and Flinders:

(a)      ASP played no role in deciding what work Flinders would undertake;

(b)      the ultimate management of Flinders was in the hands of Mobil UK;

(c)      Flinders was required to be managed in accordance with manuals issued by Mobil UK, including Mobil’s drug and alcohol policy;

(d)      on-board audits were carried out by nominees of Mobil UK;

(e)      Mobil UK was ‘the Company’ nominated for Flinders under the ISM Code;

(f)        ASP took no part in the technical management and upkeep of the ship such as dry-docking, ensuring compliance with Class, procuring spares and the like, which was done by Mobil UK;

(g)      though ASP employs the master and crew, it did so on behalf of and as agents for Mobil UK, which made decisions and gave directions (including to the master and crew) as to the use and manner of use of Flinders;

(h)      ASP did not participate in any decisions about the operational procedures on board, rather it only instructs the master and crew by reference to instructions of Mobil UK.

87                  The following factors were said to be important in relation to Mermaid and Lorelay:

(a) the ultimate management of Lorelay was in the hands of Allseas Marine;

(b) Allseas Constructions was awarded the contract to install the pipeline and intends to perform all pipe laying activities with Lorelay;

(c) Allseas Constructions entered into a construction contract pursuant to an agreement with Allseas Marine;

(d) Allseas Construction entered into the Memorandum of Understanding with the Maritime Unions;

(e) apart from Australian resident crew, Lorelay has permanent maritime personnel;

(f) Allseas Construction required those on board Lorelay to comply with its drug and alcohol policy;

(g) the Mermaid Agreement provided detailed job descriptions for senior officers;

(h) Mermaid took instructions from Allseas Construction and the employees of Mermaid on board Lorelay took instructions from the permanent master;

(i) Mermaid performed no function in relation to Lorelay’s condition, apart from crew providing ongoing maintenance.


THE ARGUMENTS OF THE SEAMEN

88                  On behalf of Mr Bergvall and Mr Kelk, it was submitted that the Tribunal approached the question correctly by looking to the physical operation of the ships. Counsel said that, as a matter of fact, the Employers were managing the respective ships. The context of the enquiry is one closely connected with the physical operation of the ships by the master and crew: Part II of the Navigation Act is concerned with conditions relating to the health, welfare and safety of seafarers. The enquiry is not one directed to the one person who has ultimate control or who is, alone, the ‘operator’. It is a practical factual enquiry as to who operates the ships, recognising that it may be by more than one person or entity by reference to the wide notion of ‘in association with’ and by reference to the exigencies of everyday affairs. Further, it was said, the relevant construction of the phrase should be seen as against the background of the Compensation Act as beneficial legislation.

MEANING OF ‘OPERATE’ AND ‘OPERATOR

89                  The task of construction and interpretation of s 10 is directed to the Navigation Act, not the Compensation Act. Section 10 of the former is picked up by its adoption in the definition of ‘prescribed ship’ in the latter. There can be no meaning given to s 10 for the purposes of its incorporation into the Compensation Act different from its meaning for all other purposes relevant to the operation of the Navigation Act itself. To the extent that the submissions put on behalf of Mr Bergvall and Mr Kelk were to the contrary, we reject them.

90                  The task in construing s 10 is to assess whether, in any given circumstances, a given entity having the relevant connection with Australia has sufficient management and control of a ship, as a chattel and as an operating enterprise, such that it can be said that the ship is operated by that entity, albeit in association with any other party. It is important to recognise that an affirmative answer to the question as to whether a ship is operated by an entity in association with another is not provided by a conclusion that the entity merely assists in the operation of the ship by another. The ship must be ‘operated by’ the entity for the purposes of s 10.

91                  The legislative history of the wording of s 10 makes clear that the concept of a ship being ‘operated by’ an Australian entity, whether or not in association with another entity is designed to require an Australian nexus. However, it is not sufficient that the crew has a very strong association with Australia. Even if 100 percent of the crew were resident in Australia, that would not be sufficient. There must be an aspect, in addition to residence of the crew, that has a connection with Australia. The task for the Court is to determine the rationale behind the second limb of s 10(c), to explain how the nexus as to ‘operating’ is to operate.

92                  It is necessary to understand the maritime context. The phrase ‘a ship … which is operated by’ and the word ‘operator’ of a ship do not carry a precise content from maritime law or history. Brodie’s Dictionary of Shipping Terms (4th Ed) defines the phrase ‘to operate a ship’ as follows:

To run a ship. There are two principal aspects of operating a ship: technical and commercial. Technical operation includes crewing and supplying the ship, keeping her machinery and equipment in working order and stowing cargoes safely and efficiently. Commercial operation is concerned more with booking cargoes, negotiating freight rates and bunker prices and appointing ship’s agents at the ports of call.

 

93                  Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (6th Ed) does not define ‘operator’ or ‘to operate’. Interestingly, however, the second edition of Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (Lloyds of London 1988) defined the phrase ‘to operate a ship’ as follows:

‘To run a ship. There are two principal aspects of operating a ship:

Technical and commercial. Technical operation includes crewing and supplying the ship, keeping her machinery and equipment in working order and stowing cargoes safely and efficiently. Commercial operation is concerned more with booking cargoes, negotiating freight rates and bunker prices and appointing ships’ agents at the ports of call.’

94                  The words ‘operator’ and ‘to operate’ can be used at several levels of abstraction. Much depends on context. Here it is the ship which is to be operated by an Australian person, firm or company whether alone or in association with others. Whilst one may speak of a machine being operated by a person who physically attends to its working, the level of abstraction required by the phrase in s10 ‘a ship which is operated by a person, firm or company’ assists one to conclude that it is not the master and crew individually and in association with one another who are operating the ship. They can certainly be seen to be working the ship, but the context here requires the notion of management and control of the ship.

95                  In many cases, there will be one operator in whom there reside important, perhaps all the important, elements of physical and commercial dominion over a large trading and operating asset such as a ship. That is illustrated by the phrase used in ss 3, and 9 and 14 of the Registration Act:‘ship on demise charter to an Australian-based operator’. There, for the purpose of registration, it is posited that an Australian-based operator is the demise charterer of the ship. Thus, a ship so chartered could be registered as long as the demise charter is to an Australian-based operator. A demise (or bareboat) charter is, of course, the equivalent of a chattel lease in which transfer is made of the possession, command and control of the vessel: Colvin v Newberry (1832) 1 Cl & F 283; 6 ER 923; Baumwoll Manufactur Von Scheibler v Christopher Furness [1893] AC 8; Sandeman v Scurr (1866) LR 2 QB 86; Australasian United Steamship Navigation Co Ltd v Shipping Control Board (1945) 71 CLR 508, 521; United States v Shea 152 US 178 (1894); United States v Cornell Steamboat Co 267 US 281 (1925); and The ‘Guiseppe Vittorio’ [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 136.

96                  As the Tribunal noted, the Registration Actwas introduced into Parliament at the same time that s 10 in its, relevantly, current form was inserted into the Navigation Act. Sections 3, 9 and 14 of the Registration Actin that respect do not govern s 10(c) of the Navigation Act. They do, however, assist with a conclusion that, to the extent that the noun form (operator) and the verb form (to operate) can be seen to have the same essential meaning, they carry a notion of management and control. This assists in understanding that ‘operated by’ is not a reference merely to the physical working of the parts of the ship, but to the management and control of the ship. That is, to an extent, reinforced by s 6(4) of the Navigation Act.

97                  The effect of s 23 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) is that the singular use of the words ‘owner’ and ‘operator’ includes the plurals of those words. To a degree, the conflation of owner and operator in s 6(4) of the Navigation Act points to the conclusion that the word ‘operator’ is being used in a sense beyond merely working the mechanical parts of the ship and in a sense importing the notions of control and management of and dominion over the ship that one would associate with ownership.

98                  A ship is, of course, a chattel: Behnke v Bede Shipping Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 649, 659. Nevertheless, as Turner LJ said in McLellan v Gumm (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 290, a ship is unlike an ordinary personal chattel. It is also a working commercial enterprise, often both the home and workplace, for long periods, to the ship’s complement. The ship is engaged in activity that has inherent danger to those on board, and is a potential source of environmental and other danger to her physical and human surroundings. For those reasons, those having the management and control of the ship have responsibilities concerning the commercial deployment of the ship, the technical safety and adequacy of the ship as a complex integrated working entity, and of the choice, supervision, care and discipline of the master and crew on board the ship. All these activities, indeed operational responsibilities, have a relationship with one another. The commercial enterprise undertaken (the types of cargoes lifted, the ports visited and the routes taken on voyages) is not unrelated to the maintenance of an appropriate standard of technical adequacy of the ship for the tasks involved in carrying out that enterprise. The skill and competence of the chief engineer and those under him or her will be vital in the assessment of the day to day adequacy of performance of the ship from a commercial and technical point of view. The skill, competence, discipline and working conditions of the crew will also, in a real and practical way, be related to the efficient and safe working of the ship, productively from a commercial point of view and efficiently from the perspective of human and environmental safety. This tripartite division (commercial, technical and crewing) of what are practical operating responsibilities can be seen in the industry standard form agreement: BIMCO Shipman 98.

99                  Subject to the context which dictated the enquiry, given the intensely practical nature of the operation of a ship one would not readily limit the use of the words ‘operator of a ship’ or ‘to operate a ship’ only to the legal entity or entities (human or corporate) which had ultimate and final decision-making power over how the ship was to be commercially deployed or run, or to those final decision-making activities. Whilst the words in the present context carry with them notions of management and control, they also carry with them the notions of the practical working of, and responsibility for, the ship – both as a chattel and an enterprise and - having regard to the legislative history and secondary material - the notion of the direct responsibility therefor.

100               Context is, of course, vital to answering questions such as: Who is or are the operator or operators of the ship, or by whom is the ship operated? It was pressed before us by the Employers that the nomination of Mobil UK as ‘the Company’ for the purposes of the ISM Code was of critical importance. The ISM Code deals with the operation of ships and their safe management. Its purpose was expressed in paragraph 1 of its preamble:

To provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.

Throughout the ISM Code there are responsibilities placed on ‘the Company’. Those responsibilities include the development, implementation and maintenance of a safety-management system including instructions and procedures (section 1.4), the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a safety and environmental-protection policy (section 1.5), the ensuring of the proper manning of the ship, including establishing and maintaining relevant training (section 6), and the establishment and maintenance of procedures for the maintenance of the ship and her equipment (section 10). That Mobil UK has been nominated as the Company for the purposes of section 1.1.2 of the ISM Code reflects the need in the ISM Code for one entity to have, in effect, ultimate responsibility for the carrying out of these most important responsibilities. Section 1.1.2 is in the following terms:

Company means the owner of the ship or any other organisation or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility imposed by the Code.

101               This requirement for one nominated entity to be responsible for all the matters in the ISM Code has led one commentator, Mr Philip Anderson in ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (London, Lloyd’s 1998), to say at p 60 of that work:

If the shipowner has told the relevant Administration that some other party is to be responsible for the operation of the ship then a rather unsatisfactory situation may arise. It may be that an owner has appointed a ship manager to operate the ship, or maybe the ship is subject to a bareboat charter. In the latter case it may not necessarily pose a problem for the bareboat charterer would appoint his own master and crew and maintain and trade the ship as though it were his own. However, it is not unusual for a shipowner to contract out only part or certain parts of the operation of the ship to ship managers, retaining certain parts of the operation to himself. For example, he may contract out the technical management and the crewing – possibly even to different managers – keeping the commercial trading side of the operation under his own roof. The Code does not appear to provide for the division of operating responsibilities.

[Emphasis added.]

102               The ISM Code, introduced as it was after 1981, is not a tool for interpreting the Navigation Act. It does however, illuminate the important practical inter-relationship in the safe management and operation of a ship between the establishing of proper procedures and their day-to-day maintenance and the implementation thereof, and the importance not only of the choice of qualified master and crew, but also of the quality of the discharge by them of their duties on a day-to-day basis and the supervision thereof.

103               The Employers emphasised the importance of the commercial operation of the ship to the notion of ‘operation’. The commercial operation of a working merchant ship may be considered in different contexts. The choice of cargoes, ports and commercial method is a sophisticated and complex part of the operation of the ship. It may be undertaken by a so-called ship manager or operator on behalf of an owner or demise charterer. It may be undertaken in conjunction with the technical and crewing responsibilities. But the commercial control of the use of the vessel does not, of itself, lead to the conclusion that the party having commercial control would be called a ship operator for all purposes. For example, a time charterer of a working merchant ship is normally considered to have the ship at its commercial disposition (subject to the terms of the arrangement, including limits of trading). Indeed, such a charterer is often called the ‘disponent owner’. In a time charter, the person who stands as owner will agree to provide the services of the ship and crew and to place them at the commercial disposition of the time charterer: see The ‘Peonia’ [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100, 107; The ‘Berge Tasta’ [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 422, 424; The ‘Gregos’ [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 335, 337 and [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1; and The ‘Hill Harmony’ [2001] 1 AC 638. One would not, however, ordinarily describe the time charterer as the operator of the ship, unless the context was such that the relevant designation was by reference only to the control of the commercial disposition of the ship: cf the definition of ‘disponent owner’ in Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (6th Ed) p 135.

104               Both parties pressed upon us the history of the use of the word ‘operator’ in limitation conventions and statutes. The history of limitation in England and of the attempts at international harmonisation was helpfully set out by David Steel J in CMA CGM SA v Classica Shipping Co Ltd [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 50 at [14] to [27]. That history reveals an expansion of the categories of persons entitled to limit their liability. See also McDermid v Nash Dredging Ltd [1986] 1 QB 965, 980-82. The extension of limitation to operators appeared first in the 1924 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels. It was repeated in the 1957 International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships and the 1976 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Convention in slightly varying terms. It is to be noted that no particular technical meaning was ascribed to the word in those Conventions. Rather, its ordinary meaning in the context of the use of a ship appears to have been intended. The decision of the Court of Appeal in CMA CGM v Classica [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 460 made clear that the ordinary meaning was to be given to the words of the 1976 Convention in the designation of the parties entitled to limitation, without infusing them with qualifying notions based on ownership.

105               These considerations suggest that no special or particular meaning of the words is likely to come from the maritime context. Rather, an ordinary English meaning is to be expected, influenced by the maritime context of the intensely practical inter-related responsibilities involved in the management and control of a ship. The legislative history and relevant secondary material make clear, however, that the meaning of ‘operated by’ in s 10 involves direct responsibility for the management and control of the ship, and that it is significantly directed to the crew, their choice, qualifications, conditions, control and discipline.

106               We therefore reject the contention that the word ‘operator or the phrase ‘to operate, and the relevant parts of speech taken therefrom, relate only to the entity that has the commercial disposition of the ship or who has the final authority on operational matters. The person or entity who has the commercial disposition of a ship, or who has the final authority on operational matters, as commercial common sense dictates, may be entirely divorced from the practical day-to-day activities of the ship and is likely to be identified by reference to legal form, not practical affairs. Nor, in this context, are the words limited to the party who has the final legal say about how the physical activities on board the ship are to be conducted. Nor is the question to be approached, as we take the Tribunal to have done, by only asking whether operations are physical or commercial, as reflected by the seventh or eighth definitions referred to by the Tribunal. Rather, the question is whether, as a matter of English, in a recognised maritime context, the respective ships were operated by the Employers in association with others, having regard to the directness of the actual management and control by the Employers of the operation of the ships. The phrase ‘operated by’ in s 10 encompasses the notions of a real, substantial and direct role in the management and control of the commercial, technical and crewing operations of the ship. Care must be taken not to replace the ordinary English words chosen by Parliament with some other phrase. The ‘commercial’, ‘technical’ and ‘crewing’ aspects of a ship’s operations are identified, not because they form an inflexible taxonomy within the Navigation Act, but because, in the maritime context, they appear to be the major inter-related groups of tasks or responsibilities in the control and management of a ship. The history of the relevant amendments to the Navigation Act, the secondary material connected therewith and the subject matter of the Navigation Act permit one to conclude that the party who has the direct responsibility for the management and control of the ship in connection with the manning and qualifications of the master and crew, the conduct of their duties on board the ship and the conduct of the working of the ship may well be the operator of the ship, albeit in association with another or others.

107               It is the direct responsibility for the management and control of the ship in the above sense that is important although, as s 10 makes clear, this responsibility can be shared. Undoubtedly such sharing can be between or among entities all of whom report individually to the owner or a supervising controller. The existence of the owner or supervising controller would not preclude an affirmative answer to the question whether an agent for some aspects of the control and management of the ship was in fact the ‘operator’ in association with others.

108               A perceived difficulty pointed to by the Employers is that the effect of the conclusion that there could be a crewing operator who would or could be liable (because of s 6(4)) for matters beyond its operational responsibilities. That difficulty is, however, more apparent than real. It is solved by reading each provision to which s 6(4) applies as referring to the relevant operator. That is permissible if one recognises the background and purpose of the Navigation Act and one also recognises that maritime practice before and after the 1981 Amendment Act would admit of the possibility of there being more than one entity undertaking operational responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

109               The Tribunal correctly approached the question as a factual one, albeit a factual question going to its jurisdiction. It was of course necessary for the Tribunal to address the legal questions involved in that factual inquiry, and this it did. It correctly had regard to the legal relationship between the Employers and others. It embarked upon its task however by asking, as a fundamental question, whether to ‘operate’ a ship meant to cause or direct the working of the ship in the sense of its physical operation or whether, on the other hand, it meant to operate the ship as a commercial enterprise. We are persuaded that, in so doing, the Tribunal was in error. As we have sought to show, the relevant concept is wider than such a division would allow. The concept of ‘operation’ may involve both elements relating to the physical operation of the ship and elements relating to its commercial operation, in the management and control of the vessel as we have described.

110               Merely providing the crew and being their employer is not, of itself, sufficient to make the employer an ‘operator’. Control over the identity of the master and crew is also relevant, as is control over the qualifications of the crew. The Tribunal did not make findings as to the extent to which either ASP or Mermaid was in a position to exercise control over those aspects of the crewing of the respective ships.

111               The extent to which the employer of the crew of a ship is entitled to direct and does in fact direct the crew in the management and control of the ship, namely her navigation, state and working operation is also a relevant factor. The Tribunal made no findings as to the power, right or practice of the Employers to direct the activities of the crew in relation to the running and operation of the respective ships.

112               The Tribunal made no findings as to the detailed extent to which, for example, Mobil UK was responsible for the management and control of Flinders, in the sense of her navigation, state and working operation. There were no findings as to the degree of expertise of ASP on the one hand or Mobil UK on the other hand in the management and control of a ship such as Flinders. Similarly, the Tribunal made no findings as to the relationship between Mermaid, on the one hand, and the crew of Lorelay, on the other. Nor did the Tribunal make any findings as to the respective expertise of Mermaid, on the one hand, and Allseas Construction or Allseas Marine, on the other hand, in the management and control of a ship such as Lorelay.

113               The Tribunal made no findings as to whether the responsibility for the management and control of Flinders and Lorelay, in the sense indicated above, rested with ASP and Mermaid respectively.

114               These are illustrations of the factual matters that may need to be addressed. As a consequence of what we have concluded was an error in its interpretation of the meaning of ‘operator’ the Tribunal misdirected itself as to the inquiry upon which it had to embark and has not found facts necessary to establish its jurisdiction to relation to the applications by Mr Bergvall and Mr Kelk for review of the deemed disallowance of their claims for compensation.

115               It follows that the Tribunal should not enter upon a consideration of the merits of the applications unless and until it finds, according to law, that the respective ships were being operated by the respective Employers at the time of the respective injuries to Messrs Bergvall and Kelk. Orders should be made accordingly. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to deal with the purported appeals by ASP and Mermaid, which should be dismissed.

116               We will hear the parties on costs.


I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixteen (116) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Chief Justice Black and the Honourable Justices Emmett and Allsop.



Associate:


Dated: 10 March 2006



Counsel for the Appellant:

Mr G J Nell



Solicitor for the Appellant:

Middletons



Counsel for the Second Respondents:

Mr W P Kearns SC and Ms L M Csillag



Solicitor for the Second Respondents:

W G McNally & Co



Dates of Hearing:

3 and 4 November 2005



Date of Judgment:

10 March 2006